IPL
SOCIETE DES PRODUITS NESTLE, S.A., vs. MARTIN T. DY, JR
G.R. No. 172276 August 8, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. (Nestle) is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Switzerland. It manufactures food products and beverages. As evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. R-14621 issued on 7 April 1969 by the then Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, Nestle owns the “NAN” trademark for its line of infant powdered milk products, consisting of PRE-NAN, NAN-H.A., NAN-1, and NAN-2. NAN is classified under Class 6 — “diatetic preparations for infant feeding.”
Nestle distributes and sells its NAN milk products all over the Philippines. It has been investing tremendous amounts of resources to train its sales force and to promote the NAN milk products through advertisements and press releases.
Dy, Jr. owns 5M Enterprises. He imports Sunny Boy powdered milk from Australia and repacks the powdered milk into three sizes of plastic packs bearing the name “NANNY.” The packs weigh 80, 180 and 450 grams and are sold for P8.90, P17.50 and P39.90, respectively. NANNY is is also classified under Class 6 — “full cream milk for adults in [sic] all ages.” Dy, Jr. distributes and sells the powdered milk in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, Cagayan de Oro, and parts of Mindanao.
In a letter dated 1 August 1985, Nestle requested Dy, Jr. to refrain from using “NANNY” and to undertake that he would stop infringing the “NAN” trademark. Dy, Jr. did not act on Nestle’s request. On 1 March 1990, Nestle filed before the RTC, Judicial Region 7, Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint against Dy, Jr. for infringement. Dy, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint did not state a cause of action. In its 4 June 1990 order, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Nestle appealed the 4 June 1990 order to the Court of Appeals. In its 16 February 1993 Resolution, the Court of Appeals set aside the 4 June 1990 order and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95, Nestle filed with the trial court a motion to transfer the case to the RTC, Judicial Region 7, Branch 9, Cebu City, which was designated as a special court for intellectual property rights.
Issue: Is Mr. Dy, Jr. liable of infringement?
Ruling:
Applying the dominancy test in the present case, the Court finds that “NANNY” is confusingly similar to “NAN.” “NAN” is the prevalent feature of Nestle’s line of infant powdered milk products. It is written in bold letters and used in all products. The line consists of PRE-NAN, NAN-H.A., NAN-1, and NAN-2. Clearly, “NANNY” contains the prevalent feature “NAN.” The first three letters of “NANNY” are exactly the same as the letters of “NAN.” When “NAN” and “NANNY” are pronounced, the aural effect is confusingly similar.
The Court agrees with the lower courts that there are differences between NAN and NANNY: (1) NAN is intended for infants while NANNY is intended for children past their infancy and for adults; and (2) NAN is more expensive than NANNY. However, as the registered owner of the “NAN” mark, Nestle should be free to use its mark on similar products, in different segments of the market, and at different price levels. In McDonald’s Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc., the Court held that the scope of protection afforded to registered trademark owners extends to market areas that are the normal expansion of business: Even respondent’s use of the “Big Mak” mark on non-hamburger food products cannot excuse their infringement of petitioners’ registered mark, otherwise registered marks will lose their protection under the law.
The registered trademark owner may use his mark on the same or similar products, in different segments of the market, and at different price levels depending on variations of the products for specific segments of the market. The Court has recognized that the registered trademark owner enjoys protection in product and market areas that are the normal potential expansion of his business. Thus, the Court has declared:
Modern law recognizes that the protection to which the owner of a trademark is entitled is not limited to guarding his goods or business from actual market competition with identical or similar products of the parties, but extends to all cases in which the use by a junior appropriator of a trade-mark or trade-name is likely to lead to a confusion of source, as where prospective purchasers would be misled into thinking that the complaining party has extended his business into the field (see 148 ALR 56 et sq; 53 Am. Jur. 576) or is in any way connected with the activities of the infringer; or when it forestalls the normal potential expansion of his business (v. 148 ALR, 77, 84; 52 Am. Jur. 576, 577).
SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., vs Super Green
G.R. No. 161823 March 22, 2007
Facts:
The case stemmed from the complaint filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) by petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., against respondent Supergreen, Incorporated. The NBI found that respondent engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit “PlayStation” game software, consoles and accessories in violation of Sony Computer’s intellectual property rights.
Ruling:
Nonetheless, we agree with petitioner that this case involves a transitory or continuing offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293, which provides,
SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. – …
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.
Pertinent too is Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code that enumerates the elements of unfair competition, to wit:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearanceof the goods of another manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrappingof their packages, or in the (3) device or wordstherein, or in (4) any other featureof their appearance;
(c) That the offender offersto sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and
(d) That there is actual intent to deceivethe public or defraud a competitor.
Respondent’s imitation of the general appearance of petitioner’s goods was done allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly, under Section 2 (b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was committed, including any of the courts within the National Capital Region (Metro Manila).
SUPERIOR COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. KUNNAN ENTERPRISES LTD. AND SPORTS CONCEPT & DISTRIBUTOR, INC., G.R. No. 169974, April 20, 2010
Facts:
On February 23, 1993, SUPERIOR filed a complaint for trademark infringement and unfair competition with preliminary injunction against KUNNAN and SPORTS CONCEPT with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93014888.
In support of its complaint, SUPERIOR first claimed to be the owner of the trademarks, trading styles, company names and business names “KENNEX”, “KENNEX & DEVICE”, “PRO KENNEX” and “PRO-KENNEX” (disputed trademarks). Second, it also asserted its prior use of these trademarks, presenting as evidence of ownership the Principal and Supplemental Registrations of these trademarks in its name. Third, SUPERIOR also alleged that it extensively sold and advertised sporting goods and products covered by its trademark registrations. Finally, SUPERIOR presented as evidence of its ownership of the disputed trademarks the preambular clause of the Distributorship Agreement dated October 1, 1982 (Distributorship Agreement) it executed with KUNNAN, which states:
Whereas, KUNNAN intends to acquire the ownership of KENNEX trademark registered by the [sic] Superior in the Philippines. Whereas, the [sic] Superior is desirous of having been appointed [sic] as the sole distributor by KUNNAN in the territory of the Philippines.” [Emphasis supplied.]
In its defense, KUNNAN disputed SUPERIOR’s claim of ownership and maintained that SUPERIOR – as mere distributor from October 6, 1982 until December 31, 1991 – fraudulently registered the trademarks in its name. KUNNAN alleged that it was incorporated in 1972, under the name KENNEX Sports Corporation for the purpose of manufacturing and selling sportswear and sports equipment; it commercially marketed its products in different countries, including the Philippines since 1972. It created and first used “PRO KENNEX,” derived from its original corporate name, as a distinctive trademark for its products in 1976. KUNNAN also alleged that it registered the “PRO KENNEX” trademark not only in the Philippines but also in 31 other countries, and widely promoted the “KENNEX” and “PRO KENNEX” trademarks through worldwide advertisements in print media and sponsorships of known tennis players.
On October 1, 1982, after the expiration of its initial distributorship agreement with another company, KUNNAN appointed SUPERIOR as its exclusive distributor in the Philippines under a Distributorship Agreement whose pertinent provisions state:
Whereas, KUNNAN intends to acquire ownership of KENNEX trademark registered by the Superior in the Philippines. Whereas, the Superior is desirous of having been appointed [sic] as the sole distributor by KUNNAN in the territory of the Philippines.
Now, therefore, the parties hereto agree as follows:
“1. KUNNAN in accordance with this Agreement, will appoint the sole distributorship right to Superior in the Philippines, and this Agreement could be renewed with the consent of both parties upon the time of expiration.
2. The Superior, in accordance with this Agreement, shall assign the ownership of KENNEX trademark, under the registration of Patent Certificate No. 4730 dated 23 May 1980 to KUNNAN on the effects [sic] of its ten (10) years contract of distributorship, and it is required that the ownership of the said trademark shall be genuine, complete as a whole and without any defects…….”
On December 3, 1991, upon the termination of its distributorship agreement with SUPERIOR, KUNNAN appointed SPORTS CONCEPT as its new distributor. Subsequently, KUNNAN also caused the publication of a Notice and Warning in the Manila Bulletin’s January 29, 1993 issue, stating that (1) it is the owner of the disputed trademarks; (2) it terminated its Distributorship Agreement with SUPERIOR; and (3) it appointed SPORTS CONCEPT as its exclusive distributor. This notice prompted SUPERIOR to file its Complaint for Infringement of Trademark and Unfair Competition with Preliminary Injunction against KUNNAN.
The IPO and CA Rulings
there being sufficient evidence to prove that the Petitioner-Opposer (KUNNAN) is the prior user and owner of the trademark “PRO-KENNEX”, the consolidated Petitions for Cancellation and the Notices of Opposition are hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the trademark “PRO-KENNEX” bearing Registration Nos. 41032, 40326, 39254, 4730, 49998 for the mark PRO-KENNEX issued in favor of Superior Commercial Enterprises, Inc., herein Respondent-Registrant under the Principal Register and SR No. 6663 are hereby CANCELLED. Accordingly, trademark application Nos. 84565 and 84566, likewise for the registration of the mark PRO-KENNEX are hereby REJECTED.
It dismissed SUPERIOR’s Complaint for Infringement of Trademark and Unfair Competition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that SUPERIOR failed to establish by preponderance of evidence its claim of ownership over the KENNEX and PRO KENNEX trademarks. The CA found the Certificates of Principal and Supplemental Registrations and the “whereas clause” of the Distributorship Agreement insufficient to support SUPERIOR’s claim of ownership over the disputed trademarks.
The CA stressed that SUPERIOR’s possession of the aforementioned Certificates of Principal Registration does not conclusively establish its ownership of the disputed trademarks as dominion over trademarks is not acquired by the fact of registration alone; at best, registration merely raises a presumption of ownership that can be rebutted by contrary evidence. The CA further emphasized that the Certificates of Supplemental Registration issued in SUPERIOR’s name do not even enjoy the presumption of ownership accorded to registration in the principal register; it does not amount to a prima facie evidence of the validity of registration or of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the trademarks in connection with the goods, business, or services specified in the certificate
From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public. The essential elements of unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods; and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor.
Jurisprudence also formulated the following “true test” of unfair competition: whether the acts of the defendant have the intent of deceiving or are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions of the particular trade to which the controversy relates. One of the essential requisites in an action to restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive, actual or probable must be shown before the right to recover can exist.
In the present case, no evidence exists showing that KUNNAN ever attempted to pass off the goods it sold (i.e. sportswear, sporting goods and equipment) as those of SUPERIOR. In addition, there is no evidence of bad faith or fraud imputable to KUNNAN in using the disputed trademarks. Specifically, SUPERIOR failed to adduce any evidence to show that KUNNAN by the above-cited acts intended to deceive the public as to the identity of the goods sold or of the manufacturer of the goods sold. In McDonald’s Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.,we held that there can be trademark infringement without unfair competition such as when the infringer discloses on the labels containing the mark that he manufactures the goods, thus preventing the public from being deceived that the goods originate from the trademark owner. In this case, no issue of confusion arises because the same manufactured products are sold; only the ownership of the trademarks is at issue.
Finally, with the established ruling that KUNNAN is the rightful owner of the trademarks of the goods that SUPERIOR asserts are being unfairly sold by KUNNAN under trademarks registered in SUPERIOR’s name, the latter is left with no effective right to make a claim. In other words, with the CA’s final ruling in the Registration Cancellation Case, SUPERIOR’s case no longer presents a valid cause of action. For this reason, the unfair competition aspect of the SUPERIOR’s case likewise falls.
G.R. No. 172276 August 8, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. (Nestle) is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Switzerland. It manufactures food products and beverages. As evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. R-14621 issued on 7 April 1969 by the then Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, Nestle owns the “NAN” trademark for its line of infant powdered milk products, consisting of PRE-NAN, NAN-H.A., NAN-1, and NAN-2. NAN is classified under Class 6 — “diatetic preparations for infant feeding.”
Nestle distributes and sells its NAN milk products all over the Philippines. It has been investing tremendous amounts of resources to train its sales force and to promote the NAN milk products through advertisements and press releases.
Dy, Jr. owns 5M Enterprises. He imports Sunny Boy powdered milk from Australia and repacks the powdered milk into three sizes of plastic packs bearing the name “NANNY.” The packs weigh 80, 180 and 450 grams and are sold for P8.90, P17.50 and P39.90, respectively. NANNY is is also classified under Class 6 — “full cream milk for adults in [sic] all ages.” Dy, Jr. distributes and sells the powdered milk in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, Cagayan de Oro, and parts of Mindanao.
In a letter dated 1 August 1985, Nestle requested Dy, Jr. to refrain from using “NANNY” and to undertake that he would stop infringing the “NAN” trademark. Dy, Jr. did not act on Nestle’s request. On 1 March 1990, Nestle filed before the RTC, Judicial Region 7, Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint against Dy, Jr. for infringement. Dy, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint did not state a cause of action. In its 4 June 1990 order, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Nestle appealed the 4 June 1990 order to the Court of Appeals. In its 16 February 1993 Resolution, the Court of Appeals set aside the 4 June 1990 order and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95, Nestle filed with the trial court a motion to transfer the case to the RTC, Judicial Region 7, Branch 9, Cebu City, which was designated as a special court for intellectual property rights.
Issue: Is Mr. Dy, Jr. liable of infringement?
Ruling:
Applying the dominancy test in the present case, the Court finds that “NANNY” is confusingly similar to “NAN.” “NAN” is the prevalent feature of Nestle’s line of infant powdered milk products. It is written in bold letters and used in all products. The line consists of PRE-NAN, NAN-H.A., NAN-1, and NAN-2. Clearly, “NANNY” contains the prevalent feature “NAN.” The first three letters of “NANNY” are exactly the same as the letters of “NAN.” When “NAN” and “NANNY” are pronounced, the aural effect is confusingly similar.
The Court agrees with the lower courts that there are differences between NAN and NANNY: (1) NAN is intended for infants while NANNY is intended for children past their infancy and for adults; and (2) NAN is more expensive than NANNY. However, as the registered owner of the “NAN” mark, Nestle should be free to use its mark on similar products, in different segments of the market, and at different price levels. In McDonald’s Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc., the Court held that the scope of protection afforded to registered trademark owners extends to market areas that are the normal expansion of business: Even respondent’s use of the “Big Mak” mark on non-hamburger food products cannot excuse their infringement of petitioners’ registered mark, otherwise registered marks will lose their protection under the law.
The registered trademark owner may use his mark on the same or similar products, in different segments of the market, and at different price levels depending on variations of the products for specific segments of the market. The Court has recognized that the registered trademark owner enjoys protection in product and market areas that are the normal potential expansion of his business. Thus, the Court has declared:
Modern law recognizes that the protection to which the owner of a trademark is entitled is not limited to guarding his goods or business from actual market competition with identical or similar products of the parties, but extends to all cases in which the use by a junior appropriator of a trade-mark or trade-name is likely to lead to a confusion of source, as where prospective purchasers would be misled into thinking that the complaining party has extended his business into the field (see 148 ALR 56 et sq; 53 Am. Jur. 576) or is in any way connected with the activities of the infringer; or when it forestalls the normal potential expansion of his business (v. 148 ALR, 77, 84; 52 Am. Jur. 576, 577).
SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., vs Super Green
G.R. No. 161823 March 22, 2007
Facts:
The case stemmed from the complaint filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) by petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., against respondent Supergreen, Incorporated. The NBI found that respondent engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit “PlayStation” game software, consoles and accessories in violation of Sony Computer’s intellectual property rights.
Ruling:
Nonetheless, we agree with petitioner that this case involves a transitory or continuing offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293, which provides,
SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. – …
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.
Pertinent too is Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code that enumerates the elements of unfair competition, to wit:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearanceof the goods of another manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrappingof their packages, or in the (3) device or wordstherein, or in (4) any other featureof their appearance;
(c) That the offender offersto sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and
(d) That there is actual intent to deceivethe public or defraud a competitor.
Respondent’s imitation of the general appearance of petitioner’s goods was done allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly, under Section 2 (b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was committed, including any of the courts within the National Capital Region (Metro Manila).
SUPERIOR COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. KUNNAN ENTERPRISES LTD. AND SPORTS CONCEPT & DISTRIBUTOR, INC., G.R. No. 169974, April 20, 2010
Facts:
On February 23, 1993, SUPERIOR filed a complaint for trademark infringement and unfair competition with preliminary injunction against KUNNAN and SPORTS CONCEPT with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93014888.
In support of its complaint, SUPERIOR first claimed to be the owner of the trademarks, trading styles, company names and business names “KENNEX”, “KENNEX & DEVICE”, “PRO KENNEX” and “PRO-KENNEX” (disputed trademarks). Second, it also asserted its prior use of these trademarks, presenting as evidence of ownership the Principal and Supplemental Registrations of these trademarks in its name. Third, SUPERIOR also alleged that it extensively sold and advertised sporting goods and products covered by its trademark registrations. Finally, SUPERIOR presented as evidence of its ownership of the disputed trademarks the preambular clause of the Distributorship Agreement dated October 1, 1982 (Distributorship Agreement) it executed with KUNNAN, which states:
Whereas, KUNNAN intends to acquire the ownership of KENNEX trademark registered by the [sic] Superior in the Philippines. Whereas, the [sic] Superior is desirous of having been appointed [sic] as the sole distributor by KUNNAN in the territory of the Philippines.” [Emphasis supplied.]
In its defense, KUNNAN disputed SUPERIOR’s claim of ownership and maintained that SUPERIOR – as mere distributor from October 6, 1982 until December 31, 1991 – fraudulently registered the trademarks in its name. KUNNAN alleged that it was incorporated in 1972, under the name KENNEX Sports Corporation for the purpose of manufacturing and selling sportswear and sports equipment; it commercially marketed its products in different countries, including the Philippines since 1972. It created and first used “PRO KENNEX,” derived from its original corporate name, as a distinctive trademark for its products in 1976. KUNNAN also alleged that it registered the “PRO KENNEX” trademark not only in the Philippines but also in 31 other countries, and widely promoted the “KENNEX” and “PRO KENNEX” trademarks through worldwide advertisements in print media and sponsorships of known tennis players.
On October 1, 1982, after the expiration of its initial distributorship agreement with another company, KUNNAN appointed SUPERIOR as its exclusive distributor in the Philippines under a Distributorship Agreement whose pertinent provisions state:
Whereas, KUNNAN intends to acquire ownership of KENNEX trademark registered by the Superior in the Philippines. Whereas, the Superior is desirous of having been appointed [sic] as the sole distributor by KUNNAN in the territory of the Philippines.
Now, therefore, the parties hereto agree as follows:
“1. KUNNAN in accordance with this Agreement, will appoint the sole distributorship right to Superior in the Philippines, and this Agreement could be renewed with the consent of both parties upon the time of expiration.
2. The Superior, in accordance with this Agreement, shall assign the ownership of KENNEX trademark, under the registration of Patent Certificate No. 4730 dated 23 May 1980 to KUNNAN on the effects [sic] of its ten (10) years contract of distributorship, and it is required that the ownership of the said trademark shall be genuine, complete as a whole and without any defects…….”
On December 3, 1991, upon the termination of its distributorship agreement with SUPERIOR, KUNNAN appointed SPORTS CONCEPT as its new distributor. Subsequently, KUNNAN also caused the publication of a Notice and Warning in the Manila Bulletin’s January 29, 1993 issue, stating that (1) it is the owner of the disputed trademarks; (2) it terminated its Distributorship Agreement with SUPERIOR; and (3) it appointed SPORTS CONCEPT as its exclusive distributor. This notice prompted SUPERIOR to file its Complaint for Infringement of Trademark and Unfair Competition with Preliminary Injunction against KUNNAN.
The IPO and CA Rulings
there being sufficient evidence to prove that the Petitioner-Opposer (KUNNAN) is the prior user and owner of the trademark “PRO-KENNEX”, the consolidated Petitions for Cancellation and the Notices of Opposition are hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the trademark “PRO-KENNEX” bearing Registration Nos. 41032, 40326, 39254, 4730, 49998 for the mark PRO-KENNEX issued in favor of Superior Commercial Enterprises, Inc., herein Respondent-Registrant under the Principal Register and SR No. 6663 are hereby CANCELLED. Accordingly, trademark application Nos. 84565 and 84566, likewise for the registration of the mark PRO-KENNEX are hereby REJECTED.
It dismissed SUPERIOR’s Complaint for Infringement of Trademark and Unfair Competition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that SUPERIOR failed to establish by preponderance of evidence its claim of ownership over the KENNEX and PRO KENNEX trademarks. The CA found the Certificates of Principal and Supplemental Registrations and the “whereas clause” of the Distributorship Agreement insufficient to support SUPERIOR’s claim of ownership over the disputed trademarks.
The CA stressed that SUPERIOR’s possession of the aforementioned Certificates of Principal Registration does not conclusively establish its ownership of the disputed trademarks as dominion over trademarks is not acquired by the fact of registration alone; at best, registration merely raises a presumption of ownership that can be rebutted by contrary evidence. The CA further emphasized that the Certificates of Supplemental Registration issued in SUPERIOR’s name do not even enjoy the presumption of ownership accorded to registration in the principal register; it does not amount to a prima facie evidence of the validity of registration or of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the trademarks in connection with the goods, business, or services specified in the certificate
From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public. The essential elements of unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods; and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor.
Jurisprudence also formulated the following “true test” of unfair competition: whether the acts of the defendant have the intent of deceiving or are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions of the particular trade to which the controversy relates. One of the essential requisites in an action to restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive, actual or probable must be shown before the right to recover can exist.
In the present case, no evidence exists showing that KUNNAN ever attempted to pass off the goods it sold (i.e. sportswear, sporting goods and equipment) as those of SUPERIOR. In addition, there is no evidence of bad faith or fraud imputable to KUNNAN in using the disputed trademarks. Specifically, SUPERIOR failed to adduce any evidence to show that KUNNAN by the above-cited acts intended to deceive the public as to the identity of the goods sold or of the manufacturer of the goods sold. In McDonald’s Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.,we held that there can be trademark infringement without unfair competition such as when the infringer discloses on the labels containing the mark that he manufactures the goods, thus preventing the public from being deceived that the goods originate from the trademark owner. In this case, no issue of confusion arises because the same manufactured products are sold; only the ownership of the trademarks is at issue.
Finally, with the established ruling that KUNNAN is the rightful owner of the trademarks of the goods that SUPERIOR asserts are being unfairly sold by KUNNAN under trademarks registered in SUPERIOR’s name, the latter is left with no effective right to make a claim. In other words, with the CA’s final ruling in the Registration Cancellation Case, SUPERIOR’s case no longer presents a valid cause of action. For this reason, the unfair competition aspect of the SUPERIOR’s case likewise falls.
2006 Criminal Law Case Digests
EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005
Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.
Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES
G.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005
Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.
Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code states: “(a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.” As explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two. In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to ravish his very own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the absence of his wife, removed her (private complainant’s) clothing and thereafter placed himself on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant, then proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he rendered private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly acts of accused-appellant constitute “the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts executed in order to consummate the crime of rape against the person of private complainant.
SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005
Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the 18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who are the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor, integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front page news item read by the public throughout the Bicol Region “VILLAFUERTE’S DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE”. The trial court found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous.
Held: No. Libel is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.” The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are classified as absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the first classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution establishes the presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code fall into this category. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary – to any or all the agencies of Government – public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.
NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.
2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.
Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005
Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court.
Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE- ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE
CONRADO CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004
Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened by his wife Aida, the latter having heard somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: “You ought to be killed, you devil.” So Romeo stood up and peeped to see who was outside. When he did not see anybody, he proceeded towards the road.
Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo which was more that 1 foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be appellant Conrado whom he knew since the 1970’s and whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the place. Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in different parts of the body, including ears and the head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him. Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he sustained 11 wounds.
Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioner’s plea of self-defense and convicted him of frustrated homicide.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.
Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the three essential requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the person defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the petitioner thereby submitted having deliberately caused the victim’s injuries. The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing all the requisites of his affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not the weakness of that of the disbelieved after the petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.
The number, nature and location of the victim’s wounds belie the petitioner’s claim that the said wounds or the victim were inflicted as they duel with each other.
Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could not have been caused by bolo.
Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to defend himself. The petitioner did not do so.
BIGAMY; ELEMENTS, EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF NULLITY OFSECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PENALTY
VERONICO TENEBRO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes and produced two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
(2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held: (1) Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The prosecution sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, proved the existence of the marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
(2) A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA SILONGAN, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 137182, Apirl 24, 2003
Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat with three other men to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada. They arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagal’s relative and that he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City.
Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Alexander identified all the abductors including the brothers of Macapagal.
The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The kidnappers demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexander’s wife for his release, but the amount was reduced to twelve million. The victims were then transferred from one place to another. They made Alexander write a letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several occasions, a person named Mayangkang himself would write to Alexander’s wife. The two other victims managed to escape but Alexander was released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted Macapagal and his companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention.
Issue: Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping.
Held: No, it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping. For the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout where Alexander was first taken, he was made a letter to his wife asking her to pay ransom of twelve million. Also Mayangkang himself wrote more letters to his family threatened the family to kill Alexander if the ransom was not paid.
ESTAFA; TRUST RECEIPTS LAW
EDWARD ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119858, April 29, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Edward Ong, representing ARMAGRI International Corporation (ARMAGRI), executed two trust receipts acknowledging receipt from the Solid Bank Corp. of goods valued at P 2,532,500 and P 2, 050,000. In addition, he bounded himself to any increase or decrease of interest rate in case Central Bank floated rates and to pay any additional penalty until the trust receipts are fully paid.
When the trust receipts became due and demandable, ARMAGRI failed to pay or deliver the goods to the Bank despite several demand letters. The trial court convicted Ong of two counts of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of two counts estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
Held: Yes, he is guilty for failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the entrustee fails to: (1) turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods, or (2) return the goods covered by the trust receipts if the good are not sold. The mere failure to account or return gives rise to the crime which is malum prohibitum. There is no requirement to prove intent to defraud.
The Bank released the goods to ARMAGRI upon execution of the trust receipts and as part of the loan transactions of ARMAGRI. The Bank had a right to demand from ARMAGRI payment or at least a return of the goods. ARMAGRI failed tom pay or return the goods despite repeated demands by the Bank.
It is well-settled doctrine long before the enactment of the Trust Receipts Law, that the failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is evidence of conversion or misappropriation. Under the law, mere failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law punishes dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to prejudice the public order. The mere failure to deliver proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to the creditor, but also to the public interest. Evidently, the Bank suffered prejudice for neither money nor the goods were turned over the Bank.
PARRICIDE; ELEMENTS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG
G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003
Facts: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married to Leah Nolido Dalag. They had three children. Their marriage was far from idyllic. Their covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end. Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different parts of her body.
On August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking when Leah admonished him not to do so. Leah was then banged on the wall by Armando. Then he pushed and kicked Leah on the left side of her body which caused her to fall on the ground. Even as Leah was already lying prostrate, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of her body. Leah then fled to the house of Felia Horilla but Armando ran after her and herded her back to their house. Leah fell again to the ground and lost her consciousness. The trial court convicted Armando of parricide.
Issue: Whether the trial court correctly convicted the accused.
Held: Yes, the trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that caused her death were the consequence of the appellant’s deliberate and intentional acts.
The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus: Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.
STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN HILET
G.R. No. 146685-86, April 30, 2003
Facts: Sometime in 1998, ten-year old Richelle Cosada was told by appellant Benjamin Hilet, the common law husband of her mother not to go to school and watch the house. At about 10 AM, while her mother was out selling fish, Richelle saw appellant sharpening his bolo. Moments later, appellant dragged her towards the room and raped her. She kept the afternoon of March 17, 1999. Richelle finally confided to her mother. The latter asked their neighbor to report the incident to the police. The trial court convicted the appellant guilty of two counts of statutory rape.
Issue: Whether time is an essential element of statutory rape.
Held: No, time is not an essential element of statutory rape. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omission constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of rape. Thus, in a prosecution of rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of rape, not the time of its commission.
It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is important is the information alleges that the victim is a minor under twelve years of age and the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if no force or intimidation was used or she was not otherwise deprived of reason.
STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LOZADA
Facts: Reynaldo Diaz, a tricycle driver, went to a coffee shop to meet Ronnie Sanchez and this Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob Rosita Sy. Thereafter Belleza Lozada arrived. They planned to wait Rosita Sy as she would normally leave her drugstore between 10:30 and 11 PM. They have also planned to kill Rosita Sy, upon realizing that Sy would be killed, Diaz excused himself on the pretext that he would get a weapon but he delayed himself and the plan was not implemented that night because of the delay. They have agreed to pursue it the next day. Diaz deliberately stayed away from their meeting place the next day. The following day, he learned over the radio that a lifeless body of Rosita was found in a remote area.
Issue: Whether or not all elements of a Robbery with Homicide are present to constitute a penalty of death.
Held: The SC ruled that all the elements were present. The taking with animo lurid or personal property belonging to another person by means of violence against or intimidation of person or using force upon thing constitutes robbery, and the complex crime of robbery with homicide arises when by reason or on the occasion of robbery, someone is killed. All these elements have satisfactorily been shown by the prosecution.
“BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME”AS A VIABLE PLEA WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DEFENSE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA
G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000
Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense is applicable in this case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
RAPE; “TOUCHING” WHEN APPLIED TO RAPE CASES
PEOPLE OF TH PHILIPPINES vs. LEVI SUMARAGO
G.R. No. 140873-77, February 6, 2004
Facts: The spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children. Two of them were girls and named- Norelyn and Doneza. Teodora left Vivencio and kept custody of their fpur children. Then, Teodora and Levi started living together as husband and wife.
Sometime in 1995, Norelyn, who was barely ten years old, was gathering firewood with the appellant Levi in his farm. While they were nearing a guava tree, the appellant suddenly boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had her clothes when she woke up. She had a terrible headache and felt pain in her vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of her right leg. The appellant warned not to tell her mother about it, otherwise he would kill her.
The sexual assaults were repeated several times so she decided to tell her sister and eventually her mother. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime rape and sentenced him to death.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. For the accused to held guilty of consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: 1) there had been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; 20 the accused achieves the act through force or intimidation upon the victim because the latter is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that rape had been committed and that the accused is the perpetrator thereof. A finding of guilt of the accused for rape may be based solely on the victim’s testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility. Corroborating testimony frequently unavailable in rape cases is not indispensable to warrant a conviction of the accused for the crime. This Court has ruled that when a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would necessary to show rape did take place. However, the testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with extreme caution. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.
The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony cannot be assailed simply because her admission that it took the appellant only short time to insert his penis into her vagina and to satiate his lust. The mere entry of his penis into the labia of the pudendum, even if only for a short while, is enough insofar as the consummation of the crime of rape is concerned, the brevity of time that the appellant inserted penis into the victim’s vagina is of no particular importance.
Posted by UNC Bar Operations Commission 2007
EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005
Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.
Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES
G.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005
Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.
Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code states: “(a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.” As explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two. In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to ravish his very own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the absence of his wife, removed her (private complainant’s) clothing and thereafter placed himself on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant, then proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he rendered private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly acts of accused-appellant constitute “the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts executed in order to consummate the crime of rape against the person of private complainant.
SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005
Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the 18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who are the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor, integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front page news item read by the public throughout the Bicol Region “VILLAFUERTE’S DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE”. The trial court found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous.
Held: No. Libel is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.” The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are classified as absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the first classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution establishes the presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code fall into this category. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary – to any or all the agencies of Government – public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.
NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.
2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.
Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005
Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court.
Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE- ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE
CONRADO CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004
Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened by his wife Aida, the latter having heard somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: “You ought to be killed, you devil.” So Romeo stood up and peeped to see who was outside. When he did not see anybody, he proceeded towards the road.
Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo which was more that 1 foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be appellant Conrado whom he knew since the 1970’s and whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the place. Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in different parts of the body, including ears and the head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him. Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he sustained 11 wounds.
Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioner’s plea of self-defense and convicted him of frustrated homicide.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.
Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the three essential requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the person defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the petitioner thereby submitted having deliberately caused the victim’s injuries. The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing all the requisites of his affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not the weakness of that of the disbelieved after the petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.
The number, nature and location of the victim’s wounds belie the petitioner’s claim that the said wounds or the victim were inflicted as they duel with each other.
Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could not have been caused by bolo.
Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to defend himself. The petitioner did not do so.
BIGAMY; ELEMENTS, EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF NULLITY OFSECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PENALTY
VERONICO TENEBRO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes and produced two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
(2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held: (1) Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The prosecution sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, proved the existence of the marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
(2) A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA SILONGAN, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 137182, Apirl 24, 2003
Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat with three other men to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada. They arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagal’s relative and that he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City.
Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Alexander identified all the abductors including the brothers of Macapagal.
The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The kidnappers demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexander’s wife for his release, but the amount was reduced to twelve million. The victims were then transferred from one place to another. They made Alexander write a letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several occasions, a person named Mayangkang himself would write to Alexander’s wife. The two other victims managed to escape but Alexander was released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted Macapagal and his companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention.
Issue: Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping.
Held: No, it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping. For the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are replete with instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout where Alexander was first taken, he was made a letter to his wife asking her to pay ransom of twelve million. Also Mayangkang himself wrote more letters to his family threatened the family to kill Alexander if the ransom was not paid.
ESTAFA; TRUST RECEIPTS LAW
EDWARD ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119858, April 29, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Edward Ong, representing ARMAGRI International Corporation (ARMAGRI), executed two trust receipts acknowledging receipt from the Solid Bank Corp. of goods valued at P 2,532,500 and P 2, 050,000. In addition, he bounded himself to any increase or decrease of interest rate in case Central Bank floated rates and to pay any additional penalty until the trust receipts are fully paid.
When the trust receipts became due and demandable, ARMAGRI failed to pay or deliver the goods to the Bank despite several demand letters. The trial court convicted Ong of two counts of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of two counts estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
Held: Yes, he is guilty for failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the entrustee fails to: (1) turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods, or (2) return the goods covered by the trust receipts if the good are not sold. The mere failure to account or return gives rise to the crime which is malum prohibitum. There is no requirement to prove intent to defraud.
The Bank released the goods to ARMAGRI upon execution of the trust receipts and as part of the loan transactions of ARMAGRI. The Bank had a right to demand from ARMAGRI payment or at least a return of the goods. ARMAGRI failed tom pay or return the goods despite repeated demands by the Bank.
It is well-settled doctrine long before the enactment of the Trust Receipts Law, that the failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is evidence of conversion or misappropriation. Under the law, mere failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law punishes dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to prejudice the public order. The mere failure to deliver proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to the creditor, but also to the public interest. Evidently, the Bank suffered prejudice for neither money nor the goods were turned over the Bank.
PARRICIDE; ELEMENTS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG
G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003
Facts: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married to Leah Nolido Dalag. They had three children. Their marriage was far from idyllic. Their covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end. Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different parts of her body.
On August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking when Leah admonished him not to do so. Leah was then banged on the wall by Armando. Then he pushed and kicked Leah on the left side of her body which caused her to fall on the ground. Even as Leah was already lying prostrate, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of her body. Leah then fled to the house of Felia Horilla but Armando ran after her and herded her back to their house. Leah fell again to the ground and lost her consciousness. The trial court convicted Armando of parricide.
Issue: Whether the trial court correctly convicted the accused.
Held: Yes, the trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that caused her death were the consequence of the appellant’s deliberate and intentional acts.
The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus: Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.
STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN HILET
G.R. No. 146685-86, April 30, 2003
Facts: Sometime in 1998, ten-year old Richelle Cosada was told by appellant Benjamin Hilet, the common law husband of her mother not to go to school and watch the house. At about 10 AM, while her mother was out selling fish, Richelle saw appellant sharpening his bolo. Moments later, appellant dragged her towards the room and raped her. She kept the afternoon of March 17, 1999. Richelle finally confided to her mother. The latter asked their neighbor to report the incident to the police. The trial court convicted the appellant guilty of two counts of statutory rape.
Issue: Whether time is an essential element of statutory rape.
Held: No, time is not an essential element of statutory rape. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omission constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of rape. Thus, in a prosecution of rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of rape, not the time of its commission.
It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is important is the information alleges that the victim is a minor under twelve years of age and the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if no force or intimidation was used or she was not otherwise deprived of reason.
STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LOZADA
Facts: Reynaldo Diaz, a tricycle driver, went to a coffee shop to meet Ronnie Sanchez and this Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob Rosita Sy. Thereafter Belleza Lozada arrived. They planned to wait Rosita Sy as she would normally leave her drugstore between 10:30 and 11 PM. They have also planned to kill Rosita Sy, upon realizing that Sy would be killed, Diaz excused himself on the pretext that he would get a weapon but he delayed himself and the plan was not implemented that night because of the delay. They have agreed to pursue it the next day. Diaz deliberately stayed away from their meeting place the next day. The following day, he learned over the radio that a lifeless body of Rosita was found in a remote area.
Issue: Whether or not all elements of a Robbery with Homicide are present to constitute a penalty of death.
Held: The SC ruled that all the elements were present. The taking with animo lurid or personal property belonging to another person by means of violence against or intimidation of person or using force upon thing constitutes robbery, and the complex crime of robbery with homicide arises when by reason or on the occasion of robbery, someone is killed. All these elements have satisfactorily been shown by the prosecution.
“BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME”AS A VIABLE PLEA WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DEFENSE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA
G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000
Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense is applicable in this case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
RAPE; “TOUCHING” WHEN APPLIED TO RAPE CASES
PEOPLE OF TH PHILIPPINES vs. LEVI SUMARAGO
G.R. No. 140873-77, February 6, 2004
Facts: The spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children. Two of them were girls and named- Norelyn and Doneza. Teodora left Vivencio and kept custody of their fpur children. Then, Teodora and Levi started living together as husband and wife.
Sometime in 1995, Norelyn, who was barely ten years old, was gathering firewood with the appellant Levi in his farm. While they were nearing a guava tree, the appellant suddenly boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had her clothes when she woke up. She had a terrible headache and felt pain in her vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of her right leg. The appellant warned not to tell her mother about it, otherwise he would kill her.
The sexual assaults were repeated several times so she decided to tell her sister and eventually her mother. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime rape and sentenced him to death.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. For the accused to held guilty of consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: 1) there had been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; 20 the accused achieves the act through force or intimidation upon the victim because the latter is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that rape had been committed and that the accused is the perpetrator thereof. A finding of guilt of the accused for rape may be based solely on the victim’s testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility. Corroborating testimony frequently unavailable in rape cases is not indispensable to warrant a conviction of the accused for the crime. This Court has ruled that when a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would necessary to show rape did take place. However, the testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with extreme caution. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.
The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony cannot be assailed simply because her admission that it took the appellant only short time to insert his penis into her vagina and to satiate his lust. The mere entry of his penis into the labia of the pudendum, even if only for a short while, is enough insofar as the consummation of the crime of rape is concerned, the brevity of time that the appellant inserted penis into the victim’s vagina is of no particular importance.
Posted by UNC Bar Operations Commission 2007
CRIM 2
Abdulla vs. People
April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 79
Facts:
Petitioner Norma Abdulla is the president of the Sulu State College. As the president and head of the administration, she allegedly paid the terminal benefits of the other employees of said college instead of giving the allotted money authorized by the Department of Budget and Management to be distributed to the 34 secondary school teachers as payment for their salary differentials.
Furthermore, it was alleged that this incident was motivated with intent to gain. Proper charges were then filed and petitioner was sentenced guilty of technical malversation by the Sandiganbayan. The ruling was based on Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which criminalizes the illegal use of public funds. In her appeal, she argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part of the saving, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose.
Issue:
Is petitioner guilty of technical malversation?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court, in its decision, provided the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation, defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: 1) that the offender is a public officer; 2) that there is public fund or property under his administration; 3) that such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance; and 4) that he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance.
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the third element was not satisfied as the authorization of DBM of the use of the allotment for the payment of salary differentials of secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 thereof. The use of the remaining amount for the payment of the terminal leave benefits cannot hold her guilty of the alleged technical malversation.
It was also noted that petitioner did not commit an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State University to its employees, in the form of terminal leave benefits since the employees were also legally entitled to receive such benefits under the Civil Service laws.
People vs. Saldaña
427 SCRA 765, April 15, 2004
Facts:
Early in the morning of November 14, 1994, the Tan siblings were on their way to their school in Pampanga boarding their family L-300 van. Along the highway, the vehicle slowed down to steer clear of a damaged portion of the road when one of the accused, Malit, poked a gun at their driver. Three other men got inside the car. The accused blindfolded the victims and transferred them to a hilly location. The eledest was able to send a note to their father. The day after, he was allowed to call the father and the latter and the kidnappers agreed on a P2 million ranson. When the eldest child was sent back to get the money, he did not come back due to the advice of the policemen. The price was haggled down to P92, 000.
Fernando Morales, one of the accused denied that he willingly participated in the kidnapping and that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear. He contends that he has no knowledge of the plan during the commission of the crime. When he tried to walk away, they were chased by the other accused and threatened to shoot them if they didn’t board the vehicle. Malit also used the same defense.
Issue:Was the crime of kidnapping committed?
Ruling:
Yes. According to the High Court, the accused-defendants committed the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: 1) the accused is a private individual, 2) the accused kidnaps another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty, 3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal and 4) in the commission of the defense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. All these elements are present in this case.
Accordingly, the imposition of the death penalty is proper if the kidnapping was committed in consideration of a ransom. Since the accused-defendants, acting in conspiracy, extorted ransom money from the victims’ family, the death penalty sentence was upheld.
People vs. Soriano G.R. No. 142568, July 29, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner has a live-in partner and a son. On the night of the incident, he had a heated argument with his live-in partner concerning their son who went out with his uncle. In the middle of the quarrel, petitioner intimated to have sex with his partner but the latter kicked him instead. Consequently, petitioner began hurting her. He got a match, lighted a cigarette and burned the plastic partition that served as divider of his partner’s room. He then proceeded to burn the clothes of his live-in partner. He poked a knife at his wife, then, desisted. It was already too late when he came back to his senses that he and his partner had to leave.
What started as a lover’s quarrel turned out to be an inferno for them and for the four more families whose houses were burned that night.
Issue:
Did the accused-defendant commit destructive arson?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court elucidated, thus: Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known asDestructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent people. On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Articles 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present. In the present case, the special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was “motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned” was not appreciated where it appeared that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Hence, petitioner was convicted guilty of simple arson.
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 573
Facts:
An information was charged against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for having committed rebellion complexed with murder with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Another information was subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court 9of Makati, charging the former with a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 for willfully and knowingly obstructing or delaying the apprehension of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan.
Allegedly, Senator Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gringo Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house and not doing anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. It was the prosecution’s contention that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while rebellion is based on Revised Penal Code; thus, the two crimes can be separately punished.
Issue: Can a separate crime of a violation of PD 1829 be charged against the petitioner?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court used the doctrine that if a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion, he can neither be charged separately for two different offenses, where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
It was also noted that petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with Honasan. Being in conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate charge.
Also, the High Court reiterated that in cases of rebellion, all crimes committed in furtherance thereof shall be absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion complexed with murder cannot prosper. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance of rebellion, become absorbed and it cannot be charged as separate crimes.
PEOPLE VS GARCIA
423 SCRA 583
FEBRUARY 23, 2004
Facts:
On May 22, 1998, Bentley Billon and Sanily, boarded a passenger jeepney on their way to school and alighted on Zabarto Road. While Sanily was crossing the street, a passenger jeepney hit her. The jeepney stopped and suddenly accelerated running over Sanily’s stomach. Bentley and appellant pulled her from underneath the vehicle and brought her to the hospital where she died four days later. The lower court rendered judgment, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by evident premeditation because he deliberately ran over the slumped body of the victim.
Issue:Whether or not he is guilty of murder or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Ruling:
The elements of evident premeditation are: 1) a previous decision by the appellant to commit the crime; 2) an overt acts/acts manifestly indicating that the appellant clung to his determination; and 3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. When the vehicle stopped and accelerated the crime. There is also no evidence that shows overt acts for the commission of the crime. The court ruled that the accused is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Art. 365 of the RPC states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution. In this case, the appellant showed an inexcusable lack of precaution when he disregarded a traffic sign cautioning motorist to slow down and drove his vehicle in full speed despite being aware that he was transversing a school zone and pedestrian were crossing the street.
Roque vs. People
444 SCRA 98, November 25, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner is a teller at the Basa Airbase Savings and Loan Association (BABSLA) from 1989 to the last working day of June 1990. One of the prosecution witnesses is Antonio Salazar, who is a depositor of the same financial institution. Sometime in 1990, the latter heard that the funds of other depositors were missing and were supposedly clandestinely circulating around the base. He was supposed to withdraw P40,000 but was informed that his balance was insufficient to cover the withdrawal. Accordingly, several withdrawals were made on his account, deducting P30, 500 therein. In this instance, Salazar claimed that the signature in the withdrawal slips was not his.The general manager of BABSLA also testified that before petitioner went on leave, the latter approached her and asked her to help since petitioner feared she would be removed from work, having allegedly taken some of the depositors’ money.
Issues:
1) Can qualified theft be committed when the personal property in question is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony?
2) Were all the elements of the crime of qualified theft present in this case?
Ruling:
1) Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in the instant case, the possession of the money by the accused as a teller is only material possession. Judicial possession remains with the bank. When the teller appropriates the money for personal gain, the crime committed is theft. Furthermore, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.
2) No. The elements of qualified theft necessarily include the elements of simple theft, as follows: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that, further, it be done without the owner’s consent; and (5) finally, that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things. The qualifying circumstances are as follows: a) Taking of personal property, b) That the said property belongs to another, c) That the said taking be done with intent to gain, d) That it be done without the owner’s consent, e) That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things, and f) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In this instant case, the first element was not proven by direct evidence. Petitioner was ACQUITTED.
Valeroso vs. People
412 SCRA 257, September 29, 2003
Facts:
Valeroso was a former barangay captain hired by the Philippine National Bank as caretaker of its lot in Bataan. Fulfilling his duties as caretaker thereof, petitioner put up a sign, which reads “No Trespassing, PNB Property” to ward off squatters. Despite the sign, a certain Mrs. Julita Castillo, believing that the said lot was owned by her grandparents, constructed a nipa hut on the said lot.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner, together with four others, tore down and demolished Mrs. Castilla’s hut. Invoking paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner claimed that his act of demolishing said hut was in the lawful exercise of a right as a caretaker.
Issue: Did petitioner commit malicious mischief?
Ruling:
Yes. According to the Supreme Court, petitioner committed the crime of malicious mischief. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1) that the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another, 2) that such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction, and 3) that the act of damaging another’s property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
Though petitioner contended that the third element is lacking in the instant case, the High Court found out that he has no authority to summarily and extra judicially effect the demolition and that his actions were founded not so much as to safeguard the property in question but to vent out his anger on Mrs. Castillo’s disregard of the No Trespassing sign.
More importantly, appellant cannot rightfully invoke paragraph 5, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code. The requisites of justifying circumstance are 1) that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right and 2) that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The courts ruled that the petitioner deliberately demolished the property of Mrs. Castillo without any lawful authority. He was not acting in accordance with his duty when he took the law into his own hands and summarily demolished the nipa hut.
(Digaum, Ma. Zusabel Redulla)
April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 79
Facts:
Petitioner Norma Abdulla is the president of the Sulu State College. As the president and head of the administration, she allegedly paid the terminal benefits of the other employees of said college instead of giving the allotted money authorized by the Department of Budget and Management to be distributed to the 34 secondary school teachers as payment for their salary differentials.
Furthermore, it was alleged that this incident was motivated with intent to gain. Proper charges were then filed and petitioner was sentenced guilty of technical malversation by the Sandiganbayan. The ruling was based on Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which criminalizes the illegal use of public funds. In her appeal, she argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part of the saving, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose.
Issue:
Is petitioner guilty of technical malversation?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court, in its decision, provided the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation, defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: 1) that the offender is a public officer; 2) that there is public fund or property under his administration; 3) that such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance; and 4) that he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance.
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the third element was not satisfied as the authorization of DBM of the use of the allotment for the payment of salary differentials of secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 thereof. The use of the remaining amount for the payment of the terminal leave benefits cannot hold her guilty of the alleged technical malversation.
It was also noted that petitioner did not commit an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State University to its employees, in the form of terminal leave benefits since the employees were also legally entitled to receive such benefits under the Civil Service laws.
People vs. Saldaña
427 SCRA 765, April 15, 2004
Facts:
Early in the morning of November 14, 1994, the Tan siblings were on their way to their school in Pampanga boarding their family L-300 van. Along the highway, the vehicle slowed down to steer clear of a damaged portion of the road when one of the accused, Malit, poked a gun at their driver. Three other men got inside the car. The accused blindfolded the victims and transferred them to a hilly location. The eledest was able to send a note to their father. The day after, he was allowed to call the father and the latter and the kidnappers agreed on a P2 million ranson. When the eldest child was sent back to get the money, he did not come back due to the advice of the policemen. The price was haggled down to P92, 000.
Fernando Morales, one of the accused denied that he willingly participated in the kidnapping and that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear. He contends that he has no knowledge of the plan during the commission of the crime. When he tried to walk away, they were chased by the other accused and threatened to shoot them if they didn’t board the vehicle. Malit also used the same defense.
Issue:Was the crime of kidnapping committed?
Ruling:
Yes. According to the High Court, the accused-defendants committed the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: 1) the accused is a private individual, 2) the accused kidnaps another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty, 3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal and 4) in the commission of the defense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. All these elements are present in this case.
Accordingly, the imposition of the death penalty is proper if the kidnapping was committed in consideration of a ransom. Since the accused-defendants, acting in conspiracy, extorted ransom money from the victims’ family, the death penalty sentence was upheld.
People vs. Soriano G.R. No. 142568, July 29, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner has a live-in partner and a son. On the night of the incident, he had a heated argument with his live-in partner concerning their son who went out with his uncle. In the middle of the quarrel, petitioner intimated to have sex with his partner but the latter kicked him instead. Consequently, petitioner began hurting her. He got a match, lighted a cigarette and burned the plastic partition that served as divider of his partner’s room. He then proceeded to burn the clothes of his live-in partner. He poked a knife at his wife, then, desisted. It was already too late when he came back to his senses that he and his partner had to leave.
What started as a lover’s quarrel turned out to be an inferno for them and for the four more families whose houses were burned that night.
Issue:
Did the accused-defendant commit destructive arson?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court elucidated, thus: Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known asDestructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent people. On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Articles 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present. In the present case, the special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was “motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned” was not appreciated where it appeared that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Hence, petitioner was convicted guilty of simple arson.
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 573
Facts:
An information was charged against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for having committed rebellion complexed with murder with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Another information was subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court 9of Makati, charging the former with a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 for willfully and knowingly obstructing or delaying the apprehension of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan.
Allegedly, Senator Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gringo Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house and not doing anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. It was the prosecution’s contention that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while rebellion is based on Revised Penal Code; thus, the two crimes can be separately punished.
Issue: Can a separate crime of a violation of PD 1829 be charged against the petitioner?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court used the doctrine that if a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion, he can neither be charged separately for two different offenses, where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
It was also noted that petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with Honasan. Being in conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate charge.
Also, the High Court reiterated that in cases of rebellion, all crimes committed in furtherance thereof shall be absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion complexed with murder cannot prosper. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance of rebellion, become absorbed and it cannot be charged as separate crimes.
PEOPLE VS GARCIA
423 SCRA 583
FEBRUARY 23, 2004
Facts:
On May 22, 1998, Bentley Billon and Sanily, boarded a passenger jeepney on their way to school and alighted on Zabarto Road. While Sanily was crossing the street, a passenger jeepney hit her. The jeepney stopped and suddenly accelerated running over Sanily’s stomach. Bentley and appellant pulled her from underneath the vehicle and brought her to the hospital where she died four days later. The lower court rendered judgment, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by evident premeditation because he deliberately ran over the slumped body of the victim.
Issue:Whether or not he is guilty of murder or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Ruling:
The elements of evident premeditation are: 1) a previous decision by the appellant to commit the crime; 2) an overt acts/acts manifestly indicating that the appellant clung to his determination; and 3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. When the vehicle stopped and accelerated the crime. There is also no evidence that shows overt acts for the commission of the crime. The court ruled that the accused is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Art. 365 of the RPC states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution. In this case, the appellant showed an inexcusable lack of precaution when he disregarded a traffic sign cautioning motorist to slow down and drove his vehicle in full speed despite being aware that he was transversing a school zone and pedestrian were crossing the street.
Roque vs. People
444 SCRA 98, November 25, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner is a teller at the Basa Airbase Savings and Loan Association (BABSLA) from 1989 to the last working day of June 1990. One of the prosecution witnesses is Antonio Salazar, who is a depositor of the same financial institution. Sometime in 1990, the latter heard that the funds of other depositors were missing and were supposedly clandestinely circulating around the base. He was supposed to withdraw P40,000 but was informed that his balance was insufficient to cover the withdrawal. Accordingly, several withdrawals were made on his account, deducting P30, 500 therein. In this instance, Salazar claimed that the signature in the withdrawal slips was not his.The general manager of BABSLA also testified that before petitioner went on leave, the latter approached her and asked her to help since petitioner feared she would be removed from work, having allegedly taken some of the depositors’ money.
Issues:
1) Can qualified theft be committed when the personal property in question is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony?
2) Were all the elements of the crime of qualified theft present in this case?
Ruling:
1) Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in the instant case, the possession of the money by the accused as a teller is only material possession. Judicial possession remains with the bank. When the teller appropriates the money for personal gain, the crime committed is theft. Furthermore, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.
2) No. The elements of qualified theft necessarily include the elements of simple theft, as follows: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that, further, it be done without the owner’s consent; and (5) finally, that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things. The qualifying circumstances are as follows: a) Taking of personal property, b) That the said property belongs to another, c) That the said taking be done with intent to gain, d) That it be done without the owner’s consent, e) That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things, and f) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
In this instant case, the first element was not proven by direct evidence. Petitioner was ACQUITTED.
Valeroso vs. People
412 SCRA 257, September 29, 2003
Facts:
Valeroso was a former barangay captain hired by the Philippine National Bank as caretaker of its lot in Bataan. Fulfilling his duties as caretaker thereof, petitioner put up a sign, which reads “No Trespassing, PNB Property” to ward off squatters. Despite the sign, a certain Mrs. Julita Castillo, believing that the said lot was owned by her grandparents, constructed a nipa hut on the said lot.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner, together with four others, tore down and demolished Mrs. Castilla’s hut. Invoking paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner claimed that his act of demolishing said hut was in the lawful exercise of a right as a caretaker.
Issue: Did petitioner commit malicious mischief?
Ruling:
Yes. According to the Supreme Court, petitioner committed the crime of malicious mischief. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1) that the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another, 2) that such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction, and 3) that the act of damaging another’s property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
Though petitioner contended that the third element is lacking in the instant case, the High Court found out that he has no authority to summarily and extra judicially effect the demolition and that his actions were founded not so much as to safeguard the property in question but to vent out his anger on Mrs. Castillo’s disregard of the No Trespassing sign.
More importantly, appellant cannot rightfully invoke paragraph 5, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code. The requisites of justifying circumstance are 1) that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right and 2) that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The courts ruled that the petitioner deliberately demolished the property of Mrs. Castillo without any lawful authority. He was not acting in accordance with his duty when he took the law into his own hands and summarily demolished the nipa hut.
(Digaum, Ma. Zusabel Redulla)