LABOR
Reno Foods Inc. vs. NLM-Katipuan et. al.
G.R. No. 164016, March 15, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Corporation terminated Nenita Capor after she was caught sneaking out cans of RENO products during a standard operating procedure of searching the belongings of employees upon leaving company premises conducted by the guards. Capor alleged that the goods in her bag were not pilfered and that it may have just been planted by the company to avoid paying separation pay as she was already about to retire. RENO filed a case of qualified theft against Capor. While NLM-Katipunan filed in behalf of Capor, a case of illegal dismissal and money claims against RENO before the Head Arbitration Office of the NLRC, praying that Capor be awarded backwages and moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter found Capor guilty of grave misconduct which was just cause for termination. Further, that Capor is not entitled to reinstatement, backwages, moral and exemplary damages. On appeal, the NLRC modified the ruling by awarding separation pay to Capor as financial assistance. Petitioner appealed before the CA, which affirmed the ruling of NLRC. Meanwhile, Capor was acquitted of qualified theft charges.
Issue:
Is an employee terminated for just cause entitled to financial assistance?
Ruling:
No. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault, , such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause, such as serious misconduct.
The Court awards financial assistance to employees who were terminated for just causes, on grounds of equity and social justice. We recognized the harsh realities faced by employees that forced them, despite their good intentions, to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate their employment. BUT the award of financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees, whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. When the employee commits an act of dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant of financial assistance is misplaced compassion. It is tantamount not only to condoning a patently illegal or dishonest act, but an endorsement thereof. It will be an insult to all the laborers who, despite their economic difficulties, strive to maintain good values and moral conduct.
Further, an employee’s acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the employer’s interests. Criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while labor disputes require only substantial evidence. Since the Labor tribunals found substantial evidence to conclude that Capor had been validly dismissed for dishonesty or serious misconduct there is no compelling reason to doubt the common findings of these reviewing bodies.
On Capor’s allegation that her length of service and previously clean employment record should be considered in awarding her separation pay, the Court ruled that it cannot simply erase the gravity of the betrayal exhibited by a malfeasant employee. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer. After all, an employer-employee relationship is symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual loyalty and dedicated service. If an employer had treated his employee well, has accorded him fairness and adequate compensation as determined by law, it is only fair to expect a long-time employee to return such fairness with at least some respect and honesty. Betrayal by a long-time employee is more insulting and odious for a fair employer.
Solidbank Corporation vs. NLRC, Rodolfo N. Bombita, et al.
GR No. 165951; March 30, 2010
Facts:
In May 2000, petitioner Solidbank decided to cease its commercial banking operations, which would cause the termination of 1,867 of its employees, among which are the respondents. After sending individual letters to its employees of their termination that would take effect at the close of business hours on August 31, 2000, the bank sent on July 31, 2000 a letter dated July 28, 2000 to the Department of Labor and Employment, informing it about the termination of its employees because of the closure of the bank. It informed DOLE that the bank would be giving its terminated employees a separation pay equivalent to 150% of gross monthly pay per year of service, and cash equivalent of earned and accrued vacation and sick leaves as a result of their dismissal. The bank emphasized that the separation package offered to Solidbankers is more than what is required by law. Article 283 of the Labor Code requires that “in case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.” The employees were paid the separation package. Upon receipt of their separation pay, the employees of petitioner, including respondents, individually signed a "Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.”
After their termination, the respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment of separation pay, among others, before the labor arbiter, who ruled that the respondents were validly terminated from employment as a result of petitioner's decision to cease its banking operations. The labor arbiter, however, inspired by compassionate justice, awarded financial assistance of one month's salary to respondents. The NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter but increased the amount of financial assistance to two month’s salary. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the labor arbiter’s decision. Solidbank went up to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is there any legal basis for the award of financial assistance to the respondents on the ground of compassionate justice?
Ruling:
No, the award of financial assistance is not required by law. All that Article 283 of the Labor Code requires in cases of dismissal due to an authorized cause is that the employer must pay financial assistance or separation pay in an amount equivalent to "one month's pay or one-half month's pay for every year of service, whichever is higher." Solidbank has complied with the mandate of the law. Hence, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the employees to receive higher benefits than those prescribed by the Labor Code and jurisprudence.
In the case at bar, petitioner paid respondents the following: (a) separation pay computed at 150% of their gross monthly pay per year of service; and (b) cash equivalent of earned and accrued vacation and sick leaves. Clearly, petitioner had gone over and above the requirements of the law. Despite this, however, petitioner has been ordered to pay respondents an additional amount, equivalent to one month's salary, as a form of financial assistance. The LA awarded the financial assistance out of "compassionate justice." The CA affirmed such grant also out of "compassionate justice" and as a form of "equitable relief" for the employees who were suddenly dismissed due to exigencies of business.After a thorough consideration of the circumstances at bar, this Court finds that the award of financial assistance is bereft of legal basis and serves to penalize petitioner who has complied with the requirements of the law.
Moreover, a review of jurisprudence relating to the application of "compassionate and social justice" in granting financial assistance in labor cases shows that the same has been generally used in instances when an employee has been dismissed for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code (when circumstances warranted such an award) and not when an employee has been dismissed for an authorized cause under Article 283.
The petitioner may, however, grant on a voluntary and ex gratia basis, any amount more than what is required by the law, but to insist that more financial assistance be given is certainly something that this Court cannot countenance, as the same serves to penalize petitioner, which has already given more than what the law requires.
Golden Ace Builders vs. Jose A. Talde
GR No. 187200; May 5, 2010
Facts:
Jose Tadle was hired in 1990 as a carpenter by petitioner Golden Ace Builders. In February 1999, petitioner, alleging the unavailability of construction projects, stopped giving work assignments to respondent, prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Talde and his immediate reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and with payment of full back wages. Pending appeal with the NLRC and in compliance with the Labor Arbiter’s decision, petitioner advised Talde to report for work in the construction site. Talde however submitted a a manifestation to the Labor Arbiter that actual animosities existed between him and petitioners and there had been threats to his life and his family’s safety, hence, he opted for the payment of separation pay.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal holding that respondent was a regular employee and not a project employee, and that there was no valid ground for the termination of his services. The petitioner and Talde were then referred to the Fiscal Examiner of the NLRC for the recomputation of the amount due to Talde. The NLRC ruled that since respondent did not appeal the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting him only reinstatement and backwages, not separation pay in lieu thereof, he may not be afforded affirmative relief; and since he refused to go back to work, he may recover backwages only up to May 20, 2001, the day he was supposed to return to the job site.
The CA set aside the Resolution of the NLRC holding that Talde is entitled to both backwages and separation pay, even if separation pay was not granted by the Labor Arbiter, the latter in view of the strained relations between the parties.
Issue:
Is Talde entitled to separation pay?
Ruling:
Yes. The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the employee’s service while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu thereof. The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated.
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.
Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact, however, to be adequately supported by substantial evidence. In the present case, the Labor Arbiter found that actual animosity existed between petitioner and Talde as a result of the filing of the illegal dismissal case. Such finding, especially when affirmed by the appellate court as in the case at bar, is binding upon the Court.
Clearly then, respondent is entitled to backwages and separation pay as his reinstatement has been rendered impossible due to strained relations. As correctly held by the appellate court, the backwages due respondent must be computed from the time he was unjustly dismissed until his actual reinstatement, or from February 1999 until June 30, 2005 when his reinstatement was rendered impossible without fault on his part.
As to the computation of separation pay, petitioner was hired in 1990, however, and he must be considered to have been in the service not only until 1999, when he was unjustly dismissed, but until June 30, 2005, the day he is deemed to have been actually separated (his reinstatement having been rendered impossible) from petitioner company or for a total of 15 years. Thus, Talde is entitled to separation pay for 15 years.
Union Registration and Certification Election
National Union of Workers in Hotels vs. Sec. of Labor and Employment
G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009
Facts:
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel. Eleven votes were initially segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who cast them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement , such employees cannot vote.
Out of 346 votes cast, petitioner garnered 151 votes. They argued that the votes of the probationary employees should have been opened. Petitioner also averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would then become 169.
Issues:
(1) Can employees on probationary status at the time of the
certification elections be allowed to vote?
(2) Is HIMPHLU qualified to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent?
Ruling (First Issue):
The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon. A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should be included, under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which it took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months before the election.
(Second Issue):
As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, the Court rules in the negative. It is well-settled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
Prescinding from the Court’s ruling that all the probationary employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase – from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote. It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material.
Certification Election; Employer as mere bystander
Voluntary Recognition
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corp. vs. Sec. of Labor
G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009
Facts:
On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation (SLECC) and its Affiliates. The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE Commercial, SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials.
On 10 October 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union] reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation. It was issued Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter No. RO400-0110-CC-004.
On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition for direct certification. It alleged that [SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members.
On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be dismissed for violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
On 29 November 2001, a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on 9 January 2002.
In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to [SLECC’S] Motion to Dismiss.
In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification. This was reversed by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court further ruled that the Secretary of Labor and Employment (Secretary) was correct when she held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) executed by SLECC with Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC) could not bar Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association’s (SLECCWA) petition for direct certification.
Issue:
Can the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition?
Ruling:
No. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. It may be recalled that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union’s initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for certification election on 27 February 2001 and this petition remained pending as of 20 July 2001. Thus, SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC and SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition for certification election.
We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification election. In petitions for certification election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter’s decision. The exception to this rule, which happens when the employer is requested to bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us
Heritage Hotel Manila vs. PIGLAS
GR 177024, October 30, 2009
Facts:
Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file employees of petitioner Heritage Hotel Manila formed the “Heritage Hotel Employees Union” (the HHE union). The Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) later issued a certificate of registration to this union.
Subsequently, the HHE union filed a petition for certification election that petitioner company opposed. The company alleged that the HHE union misrepresented itself to be an independent union, when it was, in truth, a local chapter of the National Union of Workers in Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN).
Meanwhile, the Med-Arbiter granted the HHE union’s petition for certification election. Petitioner company appealed the decision to the Secretary of Labor but the latter denied the appeal. The Secretary also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the company to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
On October 12, 2001 the Court of Appeals issued a writ of injunction against the holding of the HHE union’s certification election, effective until the petition for cancellation of that union’s registration shall have been resolved with finality. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final when the HHE union withdrew the petition for review that it filed with this Court.
On December 10, 2003 certain rank and file employees of petitioner company held a meeting and formed another union, the respondent Pinag-Isang Galing at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Heritage Manila (the PIGLAS union). Two months later, the members of the first union, the HHE union, adopted a resolution for its dissolution. The HHE union then filed a petition for cancellation of its union registration.
On September 4, 2004 respondent PIGLAS union filed a petition for certification election that petitioner company also opposed, alleging that the new union’s officers and members were also those who comprised the old union. According to the company, the employees involved formed the PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of Appeals’ injunction against the holding of the certification election sought by the former union. Despite the company’s opposition, however, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election.
Issues:
(1) Did the union made fatal misrepresentation in its application for union registration?
(2) Is dual unionism a ground for cancelling a union’s registration?
Ruling (First Issue):
No. Respondent PIGLAS union’s organization meeting lasted for 12 hours. It was possible for the number of attendees to have increased from 90 to 128 as the meeting progressed. Besides, with a total of 250 employees in the bargaining unit, the union needed only 50 members to comply with the 20 percent membership requirement. Thus, the union could not be accused of misrepresentation since it did not pad its membership to secure registration.
(Second Issue): No. The fact that some of respondent PIGLAS union’s members were also members of the old rank and file union, the HHE union, is not a ground for canceling the new union’s registration. The right of any person to join an organization also includes the right to leave that organization and join another one. Besides, HHE union is dead. It had ceased to exist and its certificate of registration had already been cancelled. Thus, petitioner’s arguments on this point may also be now regarded as moot and academic.
FVC Labor Union-PTGWO vs SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO
G.R. No. 176249, November 27, 2009
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, the petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO – the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the FVC Philippines, Incorporated – signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement with the company. The five-year CBA period was from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of the 3rd year of the five-year term and pursuant to the CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA and modified, among other provisions, the CBA’s duration. Article XXV, Section 2 of the renegotiated CBA provides that “this re-negotiation agreement shall take effect beginning February 1, 2001 and until May 31, 2003” thus extending the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4) months. On January 21, 2003, nine (9) days before the January 30, 2003 expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term (and four [4] months and nine [9] days away from the expiration of the amended CBA period), the respondent Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA. FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside of the sixty (60) days before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.
Issue:
Was the certification election filed within the freedom period?
Ruling:
Yes. While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years.
In the present case, the CBA was originally signed for a period of five years, i.e., from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003, with a provision for the renegotiation of the CBA’s other provisions at the end of the 3rd year of the five-year CBA term. Thus, prior to January 30, 2001 the workplace parties sat down for renegotiation but instead of confining themselves to the economic and non-economic CBA provisions, also extended the life of the CBA for another four months, i.e., from the original expiry date on January 30, 2003 to May 30, 2003.
This negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal effect on the FVCLU-PTGWO’s exclusive bargaining representation status which remained effective only for five years ending on the original expiry date of January 30, 2003. Thus, sixty days prior to this date, or starting December 2, 2002, SANAMA-SIGLO could properly file a petition for certification election. Its petition, filed on January 21, 2003 or nine (9) days before the expiration of the CBA and of FVCLU-PTGWO’s exclusive bargaining status, was seasonably filed.
Mariwasa Siam Ceramics vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et. al.
G.R. No. 183317 December 21, 2009
Facts:
On May 2005, private respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A.On June 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against private respondent, claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the same code.
The Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the registration of respondent, and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions. SMMSC-Independent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR ruled in favor of the respondent, thus, they remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. The petitioner appealed and insisted that private respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102 employees who executed affidavits recanting their union membership. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
1) Was there failure to comply with the 20% union membership requirement?
2) Did the withdrawal of 31 union members affect the petition for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned?
Ruling:
No.While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the union’s application for registration, the affiants were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence.
On the second issue, it appears undisputedly that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to the petition before the filing of said petition. The distinction must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary. Therefore, following jurisprudence, the employees were not totally free from the employer’s pressure and so the voluntariness of the employees’ execution of the affidavits becomes suspect.
The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
Fraud or Misrepresentation in the Application for Registration
Yokohama Tire Phils. Vs. Yokohama Employees Union
G.R. No. 163532, March 10, 2010
Facts:
Yokohama Employees Union (YEU) is the labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. (YTPI). YEU was registered as a legitimate labor labor union on 10 September 1999. YEU filed before the Regional Office a petition for certification election. YTPI filed a petition in the Regional Office for the revocation of YEU’s registration alleging fraud and misrepresentation by including signatures of employees in the organizational documents despite the lack of knowledge of the employees of the election of union officers and securing signatures of employees by making them believe that they were signing a petition for a 125% increase in the minimum wage, not a petition for registration. YTPI’s petition was granted and YEU appealed to the BLR, which reversed the decision.
The BLR found that the persons whose signatures were allegedly secured through misrepresentation never asked for their signatures to be removed from the organizational documents, that some employees executed a Sama-Samang Pahayag which alleged that they have indeed attended a meeting for the purpose of organizing and ratifying their Union By Laws and that the employees did not question the legality of YEU’s organization. The BLR also held that although the Sama-Samang Pahayag did not specifically mention that an election took place during the organizational meeting, it may be possible that the same was conducted and that any infirmity in the election of union officers may be remedied under the last paragraph of Article 241 of the Labor Code and under Rule XIV of DOLE Department Order No. 9.
YTPI filed for a motion for reconsideration before the BLR, which was denied. Then a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed in the CA, the same was denied, as well as the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Did YEU commit fraud and misrepresentation?
Ruling:
No. Whether YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation in failing to remove signatures of some employees from the list of employees who supported YEU’s application for registration and whether YEU conducted an election of its officers are questions of fact. YTPI, being the one which filed the petition for the revocation of YEU’s registration, had the burden of proving that YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation. The CA already ruled that YTPI failed to prove that YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation.
Factual findings of the CA and other lower tribunals are binding on the Court. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should include only questions of law — questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question is one of fact.
Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club vs. CA, et. al.
G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club(Eagle Ridge), which has around 112 rank-and-file employees, alleges that Eagle Ridge Employees Union(EREU) committed fraud, misrepresentation and false statement when it filed for its registration and that EREU failed to comply with the membership requirement for the registration as a labor organization. Eagle Ridge seeks to have EREU’s registration cancelled when the Union filed a petition for certification election. Eagle Ridge alleged that the EREU declared in its application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its December 6, 2005 organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members. The misrepresentation was exacerbated by the discrepancy between the certification issued by the Union secretary and president that 25 members actually ratified the constitution and by-laws on December 6, 2005 and the fact that 26 members affixed their signatures on the documents, making one signature a forgery.
DOLE Regional Director granted Eagle Ridge’s petition and delisted EREU from the roster of legitimate labor organizations. EREU appealed to the BLR, which initially affirmed the order of the Regional Director, but upon filing of the EREU of a motion for reconsideration it was reinstated in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Eagle Ridge filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, thus a petition for certiorari to the CA. The CA dismissed Eagle Ridge’s petition for being deficient as the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was subscribed to by Luna C. Piezas on her representation as the legal counsel of the petitioner, but sans [the requisite] Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution authorizing her to execute and sign the same. The CA denied a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Eagle Ridge’s petition to cancel EREU’s registration?
Ruling:
No. A scrutiny of the records fails to show any misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by EREU to merit cancellation of its registration. The Union submitted the required documents attesting to the facts of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005, the election of its officers, and the adoption of the Union’s constitution and by-laws. EREU complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c). when it had 30 employees as member when it registered. Any seeming infirmity in the application and admission of union membership, most especially in cases of independent labor unions, must be viewed in favor of valid membership.
In the issue of the affidavits of retraction executed by six union members, the probative value of these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005. The DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director obviously erred in giving credence to the affidavits of retraction, but not according the same treatment to the supporting affidavits. It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. It is required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing party, i.e., the Union. For their non-presentation, the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as evidence against the Union in the instant case. Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge would require a union membership of at least 22 employees. When the EREU filed its application for registration on December 19, 2005, there were clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the certificate of registration was granted, there is no dispute that the Union complied with the mandatory 20% membership requirement. Prior to their withdrawal, the six employees who retracted were bona fide union members. With the withdrawal of six union members, there is still compliance with the mandatory membership requirement under Art. 234(c), for the remaining 24 union members constitute more than the 20% membership requirement of 22 employees.
Collective Bargaining Agreement
University of San Agustin vs.
University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW,
G.R. No. 177594, July 23, 2009
Facts:
On July 27, 2000, petitioner forged with the University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW (respondent) a Collective Bargaining Agreement effective for five years or from July, 2000 to July, 2005. Among other things, the parties agreed to include a provision on salary increases based on the incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds and pursuant to Republic Act No. 6728 the Tuition Fee Law. It appears that for the School Year 2001-2002, the parties disagreed on the computation of the salary increases.
Respondent refused to accept petitioner’s proposed across-the-board salary increase of P1,500 per month and its subtraction from the computation of the TIP of the scholarships and tuition fee discounts it grants to deserving students and its employees and their dependents. Respondent likewise rejected petitioner’s interpretation of the term "salary increases" as referring not only to the increase in salary but also to corresponding increases in other benefits. Respondent argued that the provision in question referred to "salary increases" alone, hence, the phrase "P1,500.00 or 80% of the TIP, whichever is higher," should apply only to salary increases and should not include the other increases in benefits received by employees.
Resort to the existing grievance machinery having failed, the parties agreed to submit the case to voluntary arbitration. VA ruled in favor for respondent, holding that the salary increases shall be paid out of 80% of the TIP should the same be higher than P1,500. As to petitioner’s deduction of scholarship grants and tuition fee discounts from the TIP, the VA ruled that it is invalid. Court of Appeals. sustained the VA’s interpretation of the questioned CBA provision but reversed its finding on the TIP computation. Hence, the present petition which seeks only the review of the appellate court’s interpretation of the questioned provision of the CBA.
Issue:
Is the CBA valid and binding between the parties?
Ruling:
Yes. It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.
A reading of the above-quoted provision of the CBA shows that the parties agreed that 80% of the TIP or at the least the amount of P1,500 is to be allocated for individual salary increases.
The CBA does not speak of any other benefits or increases which would be covered by the employees’ share in the TIP, except salary increases. The CBA reflects the incorporation of different provisions to cover other benefits such as Christmas bonus , service award, leaves, educational benefits, medical and hospitalization benefits, bereavement assistance, and signing, without mentioning that these will likewise be sourced from the TIP. Thus, petitioner’s belated claim that the 80% TIP should be taken to mean as covering ALL increases and not merely the salary increases as categorically stated in Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the CBA does not lie.1avvphi1
In the present case, petitioner could have, during the CBA negotiations, opposed the inclusion of or renegotiated the provision allotting 80% of the TIP to salary increases alone, as it was and is not under any obligation to accept respondent’s demands hook, line and sinker. Art. 252 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. – The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
Unmistakably, what the law sets is the minimum, not the maximum percentage, and there is even a 10% portion the disposition of which the law does not regulate. Hence, if academic institutions wish to allot a higher percentage for salary increases and other benefits, nothing in the law prohibits them from doing so.
It is axiomatic that labor laws setting employee benefits only mandate the minimum that an employer must comply with, but the latter is not proscribed from granting higher or additional benefits if it so desires, whether as an act of generosity or by virtue of company policy or a CBA, as it would appear in this case. While, in following to the letter the subject CBA provision petitioner will, in effect, be giving more than 80% of the TIP as its personnel’s share in the tuition fee increase, petitioner’s remedy lies not in the Court’s invalidating the provision, but in the parties’ clarifying the same in their subsequent CBA negotiations.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. vs. Montaño
G.R. No. 182836, Oct. 13, 2009
Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. According to the Certificate of Fetal Death, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Petitioner Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. The Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA to reverse the denial of the claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer. On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits. Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration, hence this petition.
Issue:
Is the CBA clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied?
Ruling:
No. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The Court emphasized that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association
G.R. No. 180866, March 2, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., a corporation primarily in the business of manufacture, makes, buy and sell, on whole sale basis, tiles, marbles, mosaics and other similar products. Respondent Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the establishment of petitioner.
In 1998, petitioner gave P3, 000.00 as bonus to its employees, members of the respondent Association. Subsequently, in September 1999, petitioner and respondent Association entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides for, among others, the grant of a Christmas gift package/bonus to the members of the respondent Association.
In the succeeding years, 1999, 2000, 2001, petitioner gave bonuses in a form of a certificate which is equivalent to P3, 000.00. However, in 2002, petitioner gave only P600.00 as cash benefit. Respondent Association objected to the P600.00 cash benefit and argued that it was in violation of the CBA. Petitioner averred that the giving of extra compensation was based on the company’s available resources for a given year and the workers are not entitled to a bonus if the company does not make profits. Unable to amicably settle the dispute, the case was referred to the Voluntary Arbitrator. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision, declaring that petitioner is bound to grant each of its workers a Christmas bonus of P3,000.00 for the reason that the bonus was given prior to the effectivity of the CBA between the parties and that the financial losses of the company is not a sufficient reason to exempt it from granting the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
Issue:
Is petitioner obliged to give a Christmas bonus to respondent Association?
Ruling:
Yes. Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this case is integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to respondent Association has become more than just an act of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.
A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the same provides for the giving of a "Christmas gift package/bonus" without qualification. The said provision did not state that the Christmas package shall be made to depend on the petitioner’s financial standing. The records are also bereft of any showing that the petitioner made it clear during CBA negotiations that the bonus was dependent on any condition. Indeed, if the petitioner and respondent Association intended that the P3,000.00 bonus would be dependent on the company earnings, such intention should have been expressed in the CBA.
All given, business losses are a feeble ground for petitioner to repudiate its obligation under the CBA. The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection.
Concerted Union Activities
A. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation
G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009
Facts:
On May 22, 1997, A. Soriano Aviation (petitioner or the company) which is engaged in providing transportation of guests to and from Amanpulo and El Nido resorts in Palawan, and respondent Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation (the Union), the duly-certified exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of petitioner, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective January 1, 1997 up to December 31, 1999. The CBA included a "No-Strike, No-Lock-out" clause.
On May 1 & 12, and June 12, 1997, which were legal holidays and peak season for the company, eight (8) mechanics-members of respondent Union, its herein co-respondents, refused to render overtime work. Petitioner treated the refusal to work as a concerted action which is a violation of the "No-Strike, No-Lockout" clause in the CBA. It thus meted the workers a 30-day suspension. In relation to the incident, a Union officer was also allegedly constructively dismissed.
The attempted settlement between the parties having been futile, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on October 3, 1997 for . Petitioner then filed a case of illegal strike against the eight mechanics.
As despite conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived at, the Union went on strike on October 22, 1997.
In the interim or on June 16, 1998, eight months into the "second strike," petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the Labor Arbiter, praying for the declaration as illegal of the strike on account of their alleged pervasive and widespread use of force and violence and for the loss of their employment, citing the following acts committed by them: publicly shouting of foul and vulgar words to company officers and non-striking employees; threatening of officers and non-striking employees with bodily harm and dousing them with water while passing by the strike area; destruction of or inflicting of damage to company property, as well as private property of company officers; and putting up of placards and streamers containing vulgar and insulting epithets including imputing crime on the company.
Issues:
(1) Are the eight employees liable for illegal strike?
(2) Was the strike staged by respondents on October 22, 1997 illegal, due to alleged commission of illegal acts and violation of the “No Strike Clause?”
Ruling (First Issue):
Yes. The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the first strike or the mechanics’ refusal to work on 3 consecutive holidays was prompted by their disagreement with the management-imposed new work schedule. Having been grounded on a non-strikeable issue and without complying with the procedural requirements, then the same is a violation of the "No Strike-No Lockout Policy" in the existing CBA.
YSS Employees Union vs. YSS Laboratories, Inc.
G.R. No. 155125, December 4, 2009
Facts:
YSSEU is a duly registered labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of YSS Laboratories. YSS Laboratories implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11 employees. Of the 11 employees sought to be retrenched, nine were officers and members of YSSEU. Initially, these employees were given the option to avail themselves of the early retirement program of the company. When no one opted to retire early, YSS Laboratories exercised its option to terminate the services of its employees. Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said retrenchment program, YSSEU held a strike.
The Secretary of Labor intervened and certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, all striking workers were thereby directed to return to work within 24 hours from their receipt of the said Order, and YSS Laboratories to accept them under the terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
YSS Laboratories refused to comply with the directive of the Secretary of Labor. It contended that the nine union officers and members who were previously terminated from service pursuant to a valid retrenchment should be excluded from the operation of the return-to-work order. It also asserted that the union officers who participated in the purported illegal strike should likewise not be allowed to be back to their employment for they were deemed to have already lost their employment status.
Issue:
Should the retrenched employees be excluded from the operation of the return to work order?
Ruling:
No.The assumption or certification order shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one has already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work, and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
YSS Laboratories’ vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. The Secretary of Labor is afforded plenary and broad powers, and is granted great breadth of discretion to adopt the most reasonable and expeditious way of writing finis to the labor dispute.
Accordingly, when the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking workers back to work, the Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same. This was done for the promotion of the common good, considering that a lingering strike could be inimical to the interest of both employer and employee. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to interfere with the management’s rights but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute.
Certainly, the determination of who among the strikers could be admitted back to work cannot be made to depend upon the discretion of employer, lest we strip the certification or assumption-of-jurisdiction orders of the coercive power that is necessary for attaining their laudable objective. The return-to-work order does not interfere with the management’s prerogative, but merely regulates it when, in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference.
(Second Issue):
It was not a violation of the "No Strike- No Lockout" provisions, but it was an illegal strike. The Union complied with procedural requirements, therefore the same was not a violation of the "No Strike- No Lockout" provisions, as a "No Strike-No Lockout" provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a valid stipulation but may be invoked only by employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. In the present case, the Union believed in good faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when it went on strike on account of the 30-day suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer and perceived union-busting, among others.
However, well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
The Union members’ repeated name-calling, harassment and threats of bodily harm directed against company officers and non-striking employees and, more significantly, the putting up of placards, banners and streamers with vulgar statements imputing criminal negligence to the company, which put to doubt reliability of its operations, come within the purview of illegal acts under Art. 264 and jurisprudence.
That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost eight months that the strike was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or widespread to be excusable. Nowhere in Art. 264 does it require that violence must be continuous or that it should be for the entire duration of the strike.
Bandila Maritime Services vs. Dubduban
G.R. No. 171984, September 29, 2009
Facts:
Respondent Rolando Dubduban was engaged by petitioner Tokomaru Kaiun Co., Ltd. and its Philippine manning agent, Bandila Maritime Services, Inc., as chief cook of M/V White Arrow for 10 months. After the expiration of his contract, respondent returned to the Philippines on October 8, 1999. A month later, he had a medical examination at the Metropolitan Hospital in Manila where he was diagnosed with fibroid scarrings in his right upper ear lobe and consequently was advised to undergo parotidectomy. Respondent agreed. During the pre-operational procedure, he was found to be suffering from diabetes mellitus type II.
After recovering from surgery, respondent filed a complaint for disability benefits and damages in the NLRC. He alleged that he could no longer be employed as a seafarer because of his diabetes. Petitioners, being his last employers, were therefore liable to pay him disability benefits and reimburse him for medical expenses.
Petitioners, on the other hand, pointed out that respondent was diagnosed with diabetes after his contract expired on September 3, 1999. Thus, they were not liable for disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses.
Issue:
Are petitioners liable for disability benefits?
Ruling:
No. Respondent admitted that he had been previously diagnosed with diabetes in 1994 or four years before he was engaged by petitioners as chief cook of M/V White Arrow. Clearly, he was not afflicted with the said illness only during the term of his contract but even prior to his employment. He did not even complain of any complications of the disease at any time during his employment. Hence, Section 20(B) of the Contract was inapplicable.
Moreover, even assuming respondent contracted the disease during the term of his contract, he was precluded from claiming disability benefits for his failure to comply with Section 20(B)(3) of the Contract. The provision requires a claimant to submit himself to a company-designated physician three days after his arrival in the Philippines for medical examination and failure to do so bars the filing of a claim for disability benefits.
Respondent did not submit himself to a company-designated physician for medical examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines, without any lawful excuse. Respondent's claim (assuming he had a valid one) was therefore barred.
Neither is respondent entitled to disability benefits under Section 32-A of the Contract since diabetes is not one of the compensable occupational diseases listed there. Since his claim has no basis in the Contract, there is no reason to award him disability benefits.
Dionisio Musnit vs. Sea Star Shipping Corp.
G.R. No. 182623, December 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Dionisio Musnit entered into a contract of employment with respondent Sea Star Shipping Corporation as chief cook on board the vessel M/V Navajo Princess. While on board the vessel Musnit felt a throbbing pain in his chest and shortening of breath. He then reported his condition to his officer who ignored it. As the pain persisted, he resorted to pain relievers. Upon completion of his contract, Musnit was repatriated to the Philippines. He informed the Sea Star Office of his condition however he was never referred to a doctor for consultation.
Seven months after Musnit’s repatriation he sought re-employment with Sea Star. However, he was denied further deployment because his medical examination result showed that he is unfit for sea duties. Petitioner then filed a claim against Sea Star for disability benefits but was denied. This prompted Musnit to file his claim before the Labor Arbiter which was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC likewise dismissed the complaint. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Musnit was able to finish the term of his employment contract and accordingly repatriated due to ‘completion of contract.’ Furthermore, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found no evidence to support Musnit’s claim that he suffered his illness during the term of his contract. The CA likewise dismissed petitioner’s claim ruling that Musnit failed to have himself checked by the company-designated doctor in accordance with the mandatory requirement for post-employment medical examination.
Issue:
Is Musnit entitled to disability compensation?
Ruling:
No. Petitioner claims to have reported his illness to an officer once on board the vessel during the course of his employment. The records are bereft, however, of any documentary proof that he had indeed referred his illness to a nurse or doctor in order to avail of proper treatment. It thus becomes apparent that he was repatriated to the Philippines, not on account of any illness or injury, but in view of the completion of his contract.
But even assuming that petitioner was repatriated for medical reasons, he failed to submit himself to the company-designated doctor in accordance with the post-employment medical examination requirement under paragraph 3 of Section 20(B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Failure to comply with this requirement which is a sine qua non bars the filing of claim for disability benefits.
All told, the rule is that under Section 20-B(3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits.
Without any valid excuse, petitioner did not submit himself to a company-designated physician for medical examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines. He submitted himself for medical examination to the company-designated physician only on May 26, 2003, or seven months after his repatriation following the completion of his previous contract, only because he was procuring further employment from respondent Sea Star. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to disability compensation.
Joelson Iloreta vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
G.R. No. 183908, December 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Joelson Iloreta was hired by Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. as an Able Seaman. He was a member of the Associated Marine Officer and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines which had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with respondents. While pushing drums full of caustic soda, petitioner complained of chest pains. He later noticed that whenever he exerted physical effort, the pains persisted. When the vessel was docked at the port of Santos, Brazil he was referred to the Centro Medico Internacional and diagnosed by Dr. Heraldo de Carvalho to be suffering from a serious heart disease, involving life risk. On the doctor’s recommendation, petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines and was confined at St. Luke’s Medical Center under the care of respondents’ company-designated physician Natalio G. Alegre (Dr. Alegre). After undergoing surgery and post-surgery check-ups Dr. Alegre issued a certificate declaring petitioner “Fit to resume work”.
However, since petitioner’s chest pains and dizziness persisted, he consulted the opinion of an independent doctor. Dr. Vicaldo declared petitioner "unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity" as"his illness is consideredwork-aggravated". Relying on the findings of Dr. Vicaldo, the petitioner asked from respondents for full permanent disability benefits, but was unsuccessful. This prompted petitioner to file for recovery of permanent total disability compensation before the NLRC Arbitration Office.
The parties later agreed to refer petitioner for examination by a third physician, Dr. Reynaldo P. Fajardo who issued a Medical Certificate with findings similar to those of Dr. Vicaldo’s ranking petitioners condition within Impediment Grade IV (68.66%). The Labor Arbiter awarded US$60,000 disability compensation to petitioner based on the provisions of the existing CBA. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the CA reduced the amount of award holding that under the CBA an Impediment Grade IV (68.66%) is only entitled to US$50,000.00 x 68.66% or the amount equivalent to US$34,330.00.
Issue:
Is petitioner entitled to 100% permanent disability compensation?
Ruling:
Yes. Atotaldisabilitydoes not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn there from. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. From the time petitioner was medically repatriated on August 16, 2002 up to the time he filed his complaint for disability compensation on July 14, 2003 or for almost eleven (11) months, petitioner remained unemployed, his disability is considered permanent and total. In Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob the Supreme Court held that to be entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits, the employee’s disability must not only be total but also permanent. Furthermore, under paragraph 20.1.5 of the parties’ CBA, it is stipulated that "[a] seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50%ormore under the POEA Employment Contract shall x x x be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., x x x US$60,000.00 for ratings." Petitioner’s disability rating being 68.66%, he is entitled to a 100% disability compensation of US$60,000, as correctly found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Abente vs. KJGS Fleet
G.R. No. 182430, December 4, 2009
Facts:
Leopoldo Abante was hired by KJGS Fleet Management Manila (KJGS) to work as ablebodied seaman aboard M/T Rathboyne. While carrying equipment on board the vessel, Abante slipped and hurt his back. Upon the vessel’s arrival in Kaohsiung, Taiwan on July 4, 2000, Abante was brought to a hospital whereupon he was diagnosed to be suffering from "lower back pain r/o old fracture lesion 4th lumbar body." Nevertheless, he was still declared to be fit for restricted work and was advised to see another doctor in the next port of call.
He then reported to KJGS and was referred to a company-designated physician, Dr. Roberto D. Lim, at the Metropolitan Hospital. After a series of tests, he was diagnosed to be suffering from "Foraminal stenosis L3-L14 and central disc protrusion L4-L5" on account of which he underwent Laminectomy and Discectomy on August 18, 2000, the cost of which was borne by KJGS. He was discharged from the hospital 10 days later, but was advised to continue physical therapy. He was seen by Dr. Lim around 10 times from the time he was discharged until February 20, 2001 when he was pronounced fit to resume sea duties. He, however, refused to sign his Certificate of Fitness for Work.
Abante later sought the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Jocelyn Myra R. Caja, who diagnosed him to have "failed back syndrome" and gave a grade 6 disability rating --- which rating rendered him medically unfit to work again as a seaman. This prompted him to file a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for disability compensation in the amount of US$25,000.00, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals both ruled that in case of conflicting assessments, the opinion of a third doctor agreed by both the employer and the seafarer should be sought. However, Abante’s immediate filing of the complaint, insisting on his own physician’s assessment, was premature and, therefore, the assessment of the company-designated physician that he is still fit to work prevails.
Issues:
(1) Is Abante precluded from seeking the opinion of a doctor of his own choice?
(2) Is Abante entitled to disability compensation?
Ruling (First Issue):
No. Section 20 (B) (3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract of 2000 provides:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS - The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctormay be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
Clearly, the above provision does not preclude the seafarer from getting a second opinion as to his condition which can then be used by the labor tribunals in awarding disability claims. Courts are called upon to be vigilant in their time-honored duty to protect labor, especially in cases of disability or ailment. When applied to Filipino seamen, the perilous nature of their work is considered in determining the proper benefits to be awarded. These benefits, at the very least, should approximate the risks they brave on board the vessel every single day. The POEA standard employment contract for seamen was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor.
(Second Issue):
Yes.As to whether petitioner can claim disability benefits, the Court rules in the affirmative. Permanent disability refers to the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body. What determines petitioner’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days. In the case at bar, it was only on February 20, 2001 when the Certificate of Fitness for Work was issued by Dr. Lim, more than 6 months from the time he was initially evaluated by the doctor on July 4, 2000 and after he underwent operation on August 18, 2001. Moreover, Dr. Lim consistently recommended that petitioner continue his physical rehabilitation/therapy and revisit clinic on specific dates for re-evaluation, thereby implying that petitioner was not yet fit to work. Given a seafarer’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits when he is unable to work for more than 120 days, the failure of the company-designated physician to pronounce petitioner fit to work within the 120-day period entitles him to permanent total disability benefit in the amount of US$60,000.00.
Rizaldy Quitoriano vs. Jebsens Maritime, Inc.
G.R. No. 179868, January 21, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Quitoriano was hired as 2nd Officer aboard the vessel M/V Trimnes by respondent Jebsens Maritime, Inc. While Quitoriano was assigned as navigating officer he complained of dizziness with severe headache, and general body weaknesses. He was brought to a hospital in Spain where he was diagnosed to be suffering "hypertension arterial" or "mild stroke." When his health condition did not improve, he was repatriated to the Philippines on May 30, 2001 to undergo further medical examination and treatment.
On June 6, 2001, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz, the company-designated physician diagnosed petitioner of Hypertension and Transient ischemic attack. On November 16, 2001 or 169 days after petitioner’s repatriation, Dr. Cruz issued a medical report declaring him "fit to work.” Petitioner then sought the opinion of an independent internist-cardiologist, Dr. Sharon A. Lacson who diagnosed him as suffering from "hypertension cardiovascular disease and hyperlipidemia." Dr. Aquino also found him to have "cerebral infarction, R, basal ganglia area." Thereupon, petitioner asked from Jebsens for full permanent disability compensation but was unsuccessful. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of permanent disability compensation before the NLRC Arbitration Office. The Labor Arbiter however dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the latter’s decision with modification that the petitioner be allowed to resume sea duty. The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Is Quitoriano’s disability considered permanent and total thereby entitling him to disability compensation?
Ruling:
YES.In Vicente v. ECC, the Supreme Court ruled that the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Atotaldisabilitydoes not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that theemployee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom. On the other hand, a total disabilityis considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. In this case it was only on November 16, 2001 that the "fit to work" certification was issued by Dr. Cruz or more than five months from the time petitioner was medically repatriated on May 30, 2001. Thus, petitioner’s disability is considered permanent and total. Petitioner’s disability being then permanent and total, he is "entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., US$80,000 for officers," as stipulated in par. 20.1.7 of the parties’ CBA.
G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010
Facts:
Private respondent Villamater was hired as Chief Engineer for the ship MV Nord Monaco, owned by petitioner World Marine Panama, S.A., through the services of petitioner Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. Around four (4)months after his deployment, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given a blood transfusion. He consulted a physician in Hamburg, Germany, and was diagnosed with Obstructive Adenocarcinoma of the Sigmoid. Villamater was later repatriated and was referred to company-designated physicians. The diagnosis and the recommended treatment abroad were confirmed. He was advised to undergo six (6) cycles of chemotherapy. However, Dr. Kelly Siy Salvador, one of the company-designated physicians, opined that Villamater’s condition "appears to be not work-related," but suggested a disability grading of 1.
Subsequently, Villamater filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for payment of permanent and total disability benefits, reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Villamater, holding that his illness was compensable, but denying his claim for moral and exemplary damages. On appeal the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was later dismissed by the court.
Issues:
(1) Was the finality of the NLRC case rendered the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA moot and academic?
(2) Is Villamater entitled to total and permanent disability benefits?
Ruling (First Issue):
No. As ruled in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC (295 SCRA 494), judicial review of decisions of the NLRC is sought via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and the petition should be filed before the CA, following the strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. Under Rule 65, Section 4, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Thus, although the petition was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioners reasonably filed their petition for certiorari before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.
(Second Issue):
Yes. The Court sustain the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in granting total and permanent disability benefits in favor of Villamater, as it was sufficiently shown that his having contracted colon cancer was, at the very least, aggravated by his working conditions, taking into consideration his dietary provisions on board, his age, and his job as Chief Engineer, who was primarily in charge of the technical and mechanical operations of the vessels to ensure voyage safety. Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection and not direct causal relation is required. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.
Cootauco vs. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 184722, March 15, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Alex Cootauco was hired by MMS Phil. Maritime Services Inc. as Able Seaman for M/V Pax Phoenix after he passed the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) conducted by MMS Phils.’s. One day he saw a speck of blood in his urine and told his 2nd mate about it. He consulted Dr. Benjamin C. Parco who advised him to take a rest and prescribed him with medicines for his flu and Urinary Tract Infection. On May 21, 2004, he reported at respondents’ office for mandatory reportorial requirement and informed respondents’ company officer about his medical condition and asked for medical assistance which went unheeded.Despite the medications prescribed by Dr. Parco, petitioner’s health did not improve. Petitioner then consulted another physician, Dr. Rodrigo Guanlao of the Philippine Heart Center, who evaluated him to be permanently unfit for sea duty after he was diagnosed with Hypertension stage 2, TB of the left Uretus, Cystolithiasis, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome of both hands with impediment disability Grade 1. Petitioner sought medical reimbursement and sickness allowance.
Respondents alleged that petitioner failed to undergo the mandatory post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return as required by Section 20(B), paragraph (3)[1] of the POEA Standard Employment Contract which incorporated the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. The Labor Arbiter granted petitioner’s claim for disability compensation on a decision dated August 31, 2006. Upon appeal by the respondent’s to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed. Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA which affirmed the NLRC’s resolution.
Issue:
Is petitioner entitled to permanent disability benefits?
.
Ruling:
No. Applying the provision of Section 20(B), paragraph (3)of POEA-SEC, petitioner is required to undergo post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days from arrival, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period would suffice.
It is mandatoryfor a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits. The Court is constrained to deny his claim for compensation benefits absent proof of compliance with the requirements set forth in Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the claimant must prove a positive proposition. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits, but the Court cannot altogether disregard the mandatory provisions of the law.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Cruise Ships Catering and Services International N.V. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Rommel B. Cedol
GR No. 186180; March 22, 2010
Facts:
Rommel B. Cedol was employed as an assistant housekeeping manager for the vessel Costa Mediterranea. This was pursuant to a seven-month contract of employment he entered with petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay Maritime) for its foreign principal, Cruise Ships Catering and Services International N.V. (Cruise Ships). After undergoing the required Pre-Emplyment Medical Examination (PEME), he was declared fit for work. He boarded the vessel Costa Mediterranea on July 19, 2004. The respondent had also previously worked on board petitioner’s other vessels from 2000 to 2004. Each time, he passed the company’s PEME.
In November 2004, the respondent felt pain in his lower right quadrant, for which reason he was hospitalized and underwent medical procedure in a hospital in Cyprus.
On February 1, 2005, the respondent was repatriated back to the Philippines. Immediately after returning to the Philippines, he went to the company-designated physician to undergo medical examination and treatment. The company-designated physician found out that the respondent was suffering from lymphoma. The said physician, however, declared that his illness was non-work related. Thereafter, the respondent underwent surgical procedure and several sessions of chemotherapy. In April 2005, he was declared “fit to resume sea duties.”
On June 16, 2006, the respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees against the petitioners. He claims that he contracted his illness while working on board the petitioners’ vessel. The labor arbiter ruled in favour of respondent Cedol and awarded him permanently and totally disabled and awarded him disability compensation of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent and US$6,000.00 attorney’s fees. The labor arbiter ruled that respondent’s illness was work-related, considering the fact the he had always passed the company’s physical examinations since 2000. The labor arbiter also ruled that respondent was not fit to work because he had undergone chemotherapy. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the labor arbiter and also ruled that there was a reasonable connection between the nature of the respondent’s work as assistant housekeeping manager and the development of respondent Cedol’s illness. The NLRC said that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection, and not a direct causal connection for a disability to be compensable.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari and ruled that under the provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), it is enough that the work has contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the worker’s disease. This prompted the petitioners to raise the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Were the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals correct in ruling that respondent’s illness was work-related, and thus entitling him to total and permanent disability benefits?
Ruling:
No, the respondent’s illness is not work-related. Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
Lymphoma is not listed as a disability under Section 32 (Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted) of the 2000 POEA-SEC nor listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A thereof. Nonetheless, Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) provides that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." The burden is, therefore, placed upon the respondent to present substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion that there is a causal connection between the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions. This, the respondent failed to do. In fact, a careful review of the records shows that the respondent did not, by way of a contrary medical finding, assail the diagnosis arrived at by the company-designated physician.
Under Section 20 (B), paragraphs (2) and (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. In this case, the company-designated physician was able to sufficiently explain her basis in concluding that the respondent’s illness was not work-related: she found the respondent not to have been exposed to any carcinogenic fumes, or to any viral infection in his workplace. The series of tests and evaluations show that the company-designated physician’s findings were not arrived at arbitrarily; neither were they biased in the company’s favor. It is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability. Since the company-designated physician deemed the respondent as fit to resume sea duties, then such declaration should be given credence.
The evidence on record is totally bare of essential facts on how the respondent contracted or developed lymphoma and how and why his working conditions increased the risk of contracting this illness. In the absence of substantial evidence, we cannot just presume that respondent’s job caused his illness or aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have had.
The fact that respondent passed the company’s PEME is of no moment. The PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical condition. The PEME merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service," it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. In short, the "fit to work" declaration in the respondent’s PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.
Death Compensation
Government Service Insurance System vs Raoet
G.R. No. 157038, December 23, 2009
Facts:
The respondent’s husband, Francisco, entered government service as an Engineer Trainee at the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). He was then promoted to the position of Engineer A – the position he held until his death on May 5, 2001.
In 2000, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and he was confined at the Region I Medical Center from July 16 to July 25, 2000. As the GSIS considered this a work-related condition, Francisco was awarded 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred during treatment.
On May 5, 2001, Francisco was rushed to the Dr. Marcelo M. Chan Memorial Hospital because he was vomiting blood. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. His death certificate listed the causes of his death as cardiac arrest.
The respondent, as widow, filed with the GSIS a claim for income benefits accruing from the death of her husband, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the respondent did not submit any supporting documents to show that Francisco’s death was compensable. On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the GSIS since it could not determine if Francisco’s death was compensable due to the absence of documents supporting the respondent’s claim.
The CA reversed the ECC decision. The appellate court held that while the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation does not list peptic ulcer as an occupational disease, Francisco’s death should be compensable since its immediate cause was cardiac arrest.
Issue:
Is the CA correct in reversing the ruling of the ECC
Ruling:
Yes. To be entitled to compensation, a claimant must show that the sickness is either: (1) a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation under the conditions Annex “A” sets forth; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Based on Francisco’s death certificate, the immediate cause of his death was cardiac arrest; the antecedent cause was acute massive hemorrhage, and the underlying cause was bleeding peptic ulcer disease.
In determining the compensability of an illness, the worker’s employment need not be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimant’s illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the disease.
P.D. 626 is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income. In employee compensation, persons charged by law to carry out the Constitution’s social justice objectives should adopt a liberal attitude in deciding compensability claims and should not hesitate to grant compensability where a reasonable measure of work-connection can be inferred. Only this kind of interpretation can give meaning and substance to the law’s compassionate spirit as expressed in Article 4 of the Labor Code – that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including their implementing rules and regulations, should be resolved in favor of labor.
[1] 3. upon sign off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one-hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
ECOLA
Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (Dusit Hotel) vs. National Union of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries
GR No. 181972, August 25, 2009
Facts:
WO No. 9, approved by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) of the National Capital Region (NCR), took effect on 5 November 2001. It grants P30.00 ECOLA to particular employees and workers of all private sectors.
Section 13. Wage increases/allowances granted by an employer in an organized establishment with three (3) months prior to the effectivity of this Order shall be credited as compliance with the prescribed increase set forth herein, provided the corresponding bargaining agreement provision allowing creditability exists. In the absence of such an agreement or provision in the CBA, any increase granted by the employer shall not be credited as compliance with the increase prescribed in this Order.
The Union reported the non-compliance of Dusit Hotel with WO No. 9, which affected 144 hotel employees. Meanwhile there was an on-going compulsory arbitration before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) due to a bargaining deadlock between the Union and Dusit Hotel; and it also requested immediate assistance on this matter.
An inspection was held, and the DOLE-NCR, directed Dusit Hotel to pay 144 of its employees the total amount of P1,218,240.00, corresponding to their unpaid ECOLA under WO No. 9; plus, the penalty of double indemnity, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6727, as amended by Republic Act No. 8188.
In the meantime, the NLRC rendered a Decision dated 9 October 2002 in NLRC-NCR-CC No. 000215-02 – the compulsory arbitration involving the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) deadlock between Dusit Hotel and the Union – granting the hotel employees the following wage increases, in accord with the CBA:
Effective January 1, 2001- P500.00/month
Effective January 1, 2002- P550.00/month
Effective January 1, 2003- P600.00/month
Dusit Hotel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the DOLE-NCR Order, arguing that the NLRC, resolving the bargaining deadlock between Dusit Hotel and the Union, and awarding salary increases under the CBA to hotel employees retroactive to 1 January 2001, already rendered the DOLE-NCR Order moot and academic. With the increase in the salaries of the hotel employees, along with the hotel employees’ share in the service charges, the 144 hotel employees, covered by the DOLE-NCR Order, would already be receiving salaries beyond the coverage of WO No. 9.
The DOLE Secretary favored Dusit Hotel, hence, the Union appealed with the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the Union and declared that wage increases/allowances granted by the employer shall not be credited as compliance with the prescribed increase in the same Wage Order, unless so provided in the law or the CBA itself; and there was no such provision in the case at bar.
Dusit Hotel filed an MR but it was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals, hence this case.
Issue:
Were the 144 hotel employees were still entitled to ECOLA granted by WO No. 9 despite the increases in their salaries, retroactive to 1 January 2001, ordered by NLRC in the latter’s Decision dated 9 October 2002?
Ruling:
The Court agrees with Dusit Hotel that the increased salaries of the employees should be used as bases for determining whether they were entitled to ECOLA under WO No. 9. The very fact that the NLRC decreed that the salary increases of the Dusit Hotel employees shall be retroactive to 1 January 2001 and 1 January 2002, means that said employees were already supposed to receive the said salary increases beginning on these dates. The increased salaries were the rightful salaries of the hotel employees by 1 January 2001, then again by 1 January 2002. Although belatedly paid, the hotel employees still received their salary increases.
It is only fair and just, therefore, that in determining entitlement of the hotel employees to ECOLA, their increased salaries by 1 January 2001 and 1 January 2002 shall be made the bases. There is no logic in recognizing the salary increases for one purpose (i.e., to recover the unpaid amounts thereof) but not for the other (i.e., to determine entitlement to ECOLA). For the Court to rule otherwise would be to sanction unjust enrichment on the part of the hotel employees, who would be receiving increases in their salaries, which would place them beyond the coverage of Section 1 of WO No. 9, yet still be paid ECOLA under the very same provision.
Money Claims
Grandteq Industrial Steel Products vs. Edna Margallo
G.R. No. 181393, July 28, 2009
Facts:
Grandteq is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling welding electrodes, alloy steels, aluminum and copper alloys. Gonzales is the President/Owner of Grandteq. Grandteq employed Margallo as Sales Engineer. Margallo claimed she availed herself of the car loan program offered to her by Grandteq as a reward for being "Salesman of the Year." She paid the down payment on a brand new Toyota Corolla, amounting to P201,000.00, out of her own pocket. The monthly amortization for the car was P10,302.00, of which P5,302.00 was to be her share and P5,000.00 was to be the share of Grandteq.
On 29 December 2003, Margallo received a letter allegedly questioning Margallos’s acts of working with JVM Industrial Supply and Allied Services concurrent with being employed with Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Margallo claims that she was following her supervisors orders. Margallo then averred that in January 2004, De Leon asked her to just resign, promising that if she did, she would still be paid her commissions and other benefits, as well as be reimbursed her car loan payments. Relying on De Leon’s promise, Margallo tendered on 13 January 2004, her irrevocable resignation, effective immediately.
Margallo, however, alleged that she was never paid her money claims. Grandteq failed to pay her commissions in the sum of P87,508.00, equivalent to 5% of the total sales that she collected as of January 2004, which amounted to P1,750,148.84. Grandteq likewise failed to refund the "sales accommodations" or advances she gave her customers. In addition, after Margallo’s resignation, Grandteq sold her car to Annaliza Estrella, another employee, for P550,000.00.12
The Labor Arbiter held that Margallo was not able to prove by substantial evidence her entitlement to the sales commission, the payment of cash incentive and no right to the reimbursement of her car loan payments under her car loan agreement with Grandteq.
NLRC partially reversed the decision and ordered Grandteq and Gonzales reimburse the car loan payments made by Margallo the NLRC reasoned. NLRC affirmed her entitlement to the unpaid sales commission, but not to the cash incentive. Like the NLRC, the Court of Appeals found that Margallo had a right to be reimbursed her car loan payments, and the terms of the car loan agreement between Margallo and Grandteq should not be applied for being highly prejudicial to the employee’s interest. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the order of the NLRC that Grandteq and Gonzales pay Margallo her sales commission, placing the burden upon the employer to prove that the employee’s money claims had been paid:
Issue:
Is Margallo entitled reimbursement for car loans?
Ruling:
The Court, is in agreement with the Court of Appeals and the NLRC. Generally speaking, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The Court rigorously disapproves contracts that demonstrate a clear attempt to exploit the employee and deprive him of the protection sanctioned by both the Constitution and the Labor Code. The Constitution and the Labor Code mandate the protection of labor. Hence, as a matter of judicial policy, this Court has, in a number of instances, leaned backwards to protect labor and the working class against the machinations and incursions of their more financially entrenched employers.
Although not strictly a labor contract, the car loan agreement herein involves a benefit extended by the employers, Grandteq and Gonzales, to their employee, Margallo. It should benefit, and not unduly burden, Margallo. The Court cannot, in any way, uphold a car loan agreement that threatens the employee with the forfeiture of all the car loan payments he/she had previously made, plus loss of the possession of the car, should the employee wish to resign; otherwise, said agreement can then be used by the employer as an instrument to either hold said employee hostage to the job or punish him/her for resigning.
The Court further finds no error in the grant by the Court of Appeals and the NLRC of Margallo’s claim for sales commission. In cases involving money claims of employees, the employer has the burden of proving that the employees did receive their wages and benefits and that the same were paid in accordance with law. It is settled that once the employee has set out with particularity in his complaint, position paper, affidavits and other documents the labor standard benefits he is entitled to, and which the employer allegedly failed to pay him, it becomes the employer’s burden to prove that it has paid these money claims. One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; and even where the employees must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment.
Gina Tiangco et. al. vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club
G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Tiangco was employed by respondent USWCI as concession manager. In 1998, she was designated as group merchandising manager for the fashion and personal care department. On the other hand, petitioner Manego was initially employed as buyer but was promoted as senior category head with. Petitioners Tiangco and Manego respectively filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, payment of separation pay as well as award of moral and exemplary damages in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaints were consolidated.
The respondents filed a manifestation and motion praying that the proceedings on the consolidated cases be suspended on the ground that respondent USWCI had been placed in a state of suspension of payments by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a receivership committee had in fact been appointed. The labor arbiter suspended the proceedings until further orders from the SEC.
Then petitioners filed a motion to reopen case on the ground that the SEC had already approved the second amendment to the rehabilitation plan (SARP) of respondent USWCI. In their opposition to the motion, respondents argued that the proceedings in the consolidated cases must remain suspended inasmuch as the mere approval of the SARP did not constitute a valid ground for their reopening.
Issue:
Can the consolidated illegal dismissal cases be reopened at this point of the SEC proceedings for respondent USWCI’s rehabilitation?
Ruling:
No. The term “claim,” as contemplated in Section 6 (c), refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It is the assertion of rights for the payment of money. Here, petitioners have pecuniary claims—the payment of separation pay and moral and exemplary damages. In Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC [365 Phil. 273 (1999)], the Court held that a labor claim is a “claim” within the contemplation of PD 902-A, as amended. This is consistent with the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation which came out in 2000. Thus, labor claims are included among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employer-corporations. Labor claims are included among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employer-corporations. The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions “shall be suspended accordingly.” No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. The suspensive effect of the stay order is not time-bound. As held in Rubberworld, it continues to be in effect as long as reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose.
Reimbursement of Salaries and Benefits
College of Immaculate Conception vs. NLRC, et. al.
G.R. No. 167563, March 22, 2010
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Marius Carlos was appointed as Dean of the Department of Business, Economics and Accountancy effective June 1, 1996 until May 31, 2000. Upon the expiry of his 4-year term, he was appointed as full-time professor of Law and Accounting without diminution of his teaching salary as Dean. Subsequently he was requested to vacate the Dean’s office. Respondent said that his demotion from Dean of the Department to a Faculty member was without legal basis and that the non-renewal of his appointment as Dean was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, tainted with abuse of discretion. Petitioner replied that there was no demotion in position from Dean to Faculty member, because respondent’s appointment as Dean was for a fixed period of four (4) years. Petitioner informed respondent that he will not be assigned any teaching load for the succeeding semester pursuant to Section 16.8,[1] CHED Memorandum No. 19, Series of 1998. Respondent protested the imposition of the sanction and filed a complaint against petitioner before Regional Arbitration Branch No. III of San Fernando, Pampanga, for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, with payment of backwages and damages. Petitioner denied dismissing respondent and alleged that the sanction imposed on him was based on the mandate of Section 16.8, CHED Memorandum No. 19, Series of 1998.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed and ordered him to be reinstated to his former position, as DEAN, with award for backwages. Petitioner opted to reinstate respondent on its payroll but appealed the decision of the LA to the NLRC which rendered a Decision, setting aside the LA’s decision and dismissing the complaint of respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration. The NLRC, in its Resolution denied petitioner's motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the respondent to return all the monetary benefits he had received on account of his payroll reinstatement as Dean. The CA dismissed the petition and sustained the ruling of the NLRC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Issue:
Is petitioner entitled to reimbursement of salaries and benefits?
Ruling:
No. Petitioner could not validly insist that it is entitled to reimbursement for the payment of the salaries of respondent pursuant to the execution of the LA's decision by simply arguing that the LA's order for reinstatement is incorrect.
Applying Paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code[2], a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.
An employee cannot be compelled to reimburse the salaries and wages he received during the pendency of his appeal, notwithstanding the reversal by the NLRC of the LA's order of reinstatement. In this case, there is even more reason to hold the employee entitled to the salaries he received pending appeal, because the NLRC did not reverse the LA's order of reinstatement, but merely declared the correct position to which respondent is to be reinstated, i.e., that of full-time professor, and not as Dean.
[1] x xx faculty members teaching in more than one school must give formal notice in their teaching assignment to all schools concerned; failure to give notices mean automatic withdrawal or cancellation of his teaching assignment and non-assignment of teaching load for the succeeding semester.
[2] In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein. (Emphasis supplied)
Retirement Benefits
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Antonio
G.R. No. 171587, Oct. 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines is a domestic corporation doing business in the Philippines. Respondent was hired by petitioner since December 12, 1981 to work as a seaman on board its various vessels. In January 1996, respondent took the licensure examinations for 2nd Engineer while petitioner’s vessel was dry-docked for repairs. On February 13, 1996, while in Yokohama, Japan and in the employ of petitioner, he suffered a fractured left transverse process of the fourth lumbar vertebra and was advised to rest for a month. He was later examined by the company doctor and declared fit to resume work. However, he was not admitted back to work. Respondent applied for an optional retirement on January 16, 1997 but was disapproved by petitioner on the ground that his shipboard employment history and track record as a seaman did not meet the standard required in granting the optional retirement benefits. Respondent filed a complaint for payment of optional retirement benefits against petitioner with DOLE which was forwarded to the NLRC for proper proceedings upon failure to settle amicably.
In its defense, petitioner alleged that sometime in January 1996, respondent filed a vacation leave to take the licensure examinations for 2nd Engineer while his vessel was dry-docked for repairs. The following month, respondent filed another vacation leave for an alleged medical check-up. Having passed the licensure examinations for 2nd Engineer, he signified his intention to petitioner that he be assigned to a vessel for the said position. Since there was still no vacancy in the desired position, respondent was instructed to undergo medical examinations as a prerequisite for boarding a vessel. He was found to be medically fit. Respondent, however, failed to report to petitioner after undergoing the medical examinations. On January 16, 1997, respondent suddenly went to the office and decided to avail himself of the company's retirement gratuity plan by formally applying for payment of his optional retirement benefits due to financial reasons. Petitioner denied his application ratiocinating that his shipboard employment history and track record as a seaman did not meet the standard required in granting the optional retirement benefits.
The LA rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. It found that respondent was forced to file his optional retirement due to petitioner's failure to give him any work assignment despite his recovery from his injury and was declared fit to work. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC on grounds of serious errors which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to petitioner and for grave abuse of discretion. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the LA and dismissed petitioner's appeal. It held that petitioner’s denial of respondent's application for optional retirement benefits was arbitrary and illegal. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA affirmed the resolutions of the NLRC, but modified the award of moral damages and deleted the award of exemplary damages. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Is respondent entitled to optional retirement benefit?
Ruling:
No. Under the Labor Code, the age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement or employment contract. In the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under Article 287 of the Labor Code, the mandated compulsory retirement age is set at 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. In the case at bar, there is a retirement gratuity plan between the petitioner and the respondent, and under Paragraph B of the plan, a shipboard employee, upon his written request, may retire from service if he has reached the eligibility age of 60 years. In this case, the option to retire lies with the employee. Records show that respondent was only 41 years old when he applied for optional retirement, which was 19 years short of the required eligibility age. Thus, he cannot claim optional retirement benefits as a matter of right.Under Paragraph C of the retirement gratuity plan, the option to retire is exclusively lodged in the employer. Although respondent may have rendered at least 3,650 days of service on board a vessel, which qualifies him for optional retirement under Paragraph C, however, he cannot demand the same as a matter of right. If an employee upon rendering at least 3,650 days of service would automatically be entitled to the benefits of the gratuity plan, then it would not have been termed as optional, as the foregoing scenario would make the retirement mandatory and compulsory.
Execution of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision
Marmosy Trading, Inc. and Victor Morales vs. Court of Appeals, NLRC, Labor Arbiter Salinas, and Joselito Hubilla
G.R. No. 170515; May 6, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Victor Morales is the President and General Manager of Marmosy Trading, Inc., a domestic corporation, which terminated the services of respondent Joselito Hubilla, who was a technical salesman of the company, at the time of his dismissal. An illegal dismissal case was filed by the respondent against the petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. The labor arbiter ruled that the private respondent’s dismissal was illegal and without just and valid cause. Thus, the petitioners were ordered by the labor arbiter to reinstate Hubilla, and pay him backwages, among others. The petitioners elevated the case to the NLRC but the appeal was denied for lack of merit. After the NLRC resolution became final and executory, the private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. Undeterred, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which outrightly dismissed the petition because of procedural infirmities. The appellate court’s resolution became final and executory and an Entry of Judgment was issued by it on November 25, 2000. Petitioners went up to the Supreme Court via a petition for review docketed as GR No. 145881. The Supreme Court denied the petition for late filing of the petition and and failure to show reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court on August 2001. Respondent Hubilla then moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. The labor arbiter issued such writ on August 28, 2001, but the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with a motion to recall the writ of execution. The same was denied by the labor arbiter on October 22, 2001. The labor arbiter directed the sheriff of the NLRC to proceed with the execution. Not satisfied, the petitioners appealed the labor arbiter’s order before the NLRC, which however, denied the same because of the non-filing of the petitioners of a supersedeas bond and that the same did not raise any new issues. Thus, an alias writ of execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter, which ordered the NLRC sheriff to collect the sum of P251,927.12 from the petitioners and if the cash could not be collected, to cause the satisfaction of the same out of the movables, chattels and in the absence thereof, to the immovable not exempt from execution. The Sheriff garnished petitioners account with Equitable-PCI Bank in the amount of P22,896.58,25 which was later released to the NLRC cashier and, thereafter, turned over to the respondent as partial satisfaction of the judgment in his favor. Petitioners objected, through a motion for reconsideration, to the garnishment alleging that the account in the said bank belongs to both Marmosy Trading, Inc and petitioner Morales, and that only Marmosy Trading Inc. was the employer of the private respondent. The labor arbiter denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The NLRC also dismissed the petitioners’ appeal.
Unsatisfied, the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals, which denied their petition for certiorari. The appellate court ruled that since petitioner Morales was likewise ordered in the decision sought to be executed to pay private respondent, the Sheriff properly levied on his real property. Section 2 Rule 4 of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides that the Sheriff or proper officer shall enforce the execution of a money judgment by levying on all the property, real and personal, of the losing party, of whatever name and nature and which may be disposed of for value, not exempt from execution. The petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is the CA decision allowing the notice of levy to be annotated on the title of the real property registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59496 in the name of petitioner Victor Morales, in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence?
Ruling:
Yes, the annotation of the notice of levy cannot anymore be questioned by petitioner Victor Morales because he is barred, by the fact of a final judgment, from questioning the annotation. We disfavor delay in the enforcement of the labor arbiter’s decision. The Labor Arbiter’s decision has long become final and executory and it can no longer be reversed or modified. Everything considered, what should be enforced thru an order or writ of execution in this case is the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision as affirmed by the NLRC, the Court of Appeals and this Court. Since the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter does not vary but is in fact completely consistent with the final decision in this case, the order of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter is beyond challenge.
It is no longer legally feasible to modify the final ruling in this case through the expediency of a petition questioning the order of execution. This late in the day, petitioner Victor Morales is barred, by the fact of a final judgment, from advancing the argument that his real property cannot be made liable for the monetary award in favor of respondent. For a reason greater than protection from personal liability, petitioner Victor Morales, as president of his corporation, cannot rely on our previous ruling that "to hold a director personally liable for debts of a corporation and thus pierce the veil of corporate fiction, the bad faith or wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and convincingly." The final judgment in this case may no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court. The reason for this is that, a litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies.
G.R. No. 164016, March 15, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Corporation terminated Nenita Capor after she was caught sneaking out cans of RENO products during a standard operating procedure of searching the belongings of employees upon leaving company premises conducted by the guards. Capor alleged that the goods in her bag were not pilfered and that it may have just been planted by the company to avoid paying separation pay as she was already about to retire. RENO filed a case of qualified theft against Capor. While NLM-Katipunan filed in behalf of Capor, a case of illegal dismissal and money claims against RENO before the Head Arbitration Office of the NLRC, praying that Capor be awarded backwages and moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter found Capor guilty of grave misconduct which was just cause for termination. Further, that Capor is not entitled to reinstatement, backwages, moral and exemplary damages. On appeal, the NLRC modified the ruling by awarding separation pay to Capor as financial assistance. Petitioner appealed before the CA, which affirmed the ruling of NLRC. Meanwhile, Capor was acquitted of qualified theft charges.
Issue:
Is an employee terminated for just cause entitled to financial assistance?
Ruling:
No. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault, , such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause, such as serious misconduct.
The Court awards financial assistance to employees who were terminated for just causes, on grounds of equity and social justice. We recognized the harsh realities faced by employees that forced them, despite their good intentions, to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate their employment. BUT the award of financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees, whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. When the employee commits an act of dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant of financial assistance is misplaced compassion. It is tantamount not only to condoning a patently illegal or dishonest act, but an endorsement thereof. It will be an insult to all the laborers who, despite their economic difficulties, strive to maintain good values and moral conduct.
Further, an employee’s acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the employer’s interests. Criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while labor disputes require only substantial evidence. Since the Labor tribunals found substantial evidence to conclude that Capor had been validly dismissed for dishonesty or serious misconduct there is no compelling reason to doubt the common findings of these reviewing bodies.
On Capor’s allegation that her length of service and previously clean employment record should be considered in awarding her separation pay, the Court ruled that it cannot simply erase the gravity of the betrayal exhibited by a malfeasant employee. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer. After all, an employer-employee relationship is symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual loyalty and dedicated service. If an employer had treated his employee well, has accorded him fairness and adequate compensation as determined by law, it is only fair to expect a long-time employee to return such fairness with at least some respect and honesty. Betrayal by a long-time employee is more insulting and odious for a fair employer.
Solidbank Corporation vs. NLRC, Rodolfo N. Bombita, et al.
GR No. 165951; March 30, 2010
Facts:
In May 2000, petitioner Solidbank decided to cease its commercial banking operations, which would cause the termination of 1,867 of its employees, among which are the respondents. After sending individual letters to its employees of their termination that would take effect at the close of business hours on August 31, 2000, the bank sent on July 31, 2000 a letter dated July 28, 2000 to the Department of Labor and Employment, informing it about the termination of its employees because of the closure of the bank. It informed DOLE that the bank would be giving its terminated employees a separation pay equivalent to 150% of gross monthly pay per year of service, and cash equivalent of earned and accrued vacation and sick leaves as a result of their dismissal. The bank emphasized that the separation package offered to Solidbankers is more than what is required by law. Article 283 of the Labor Code requires that “in case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.” The employees were paid the separation package. Upon receipt of their separation pay, the employees of petitioner, including respondents, individually signed a "Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.”
After their termination, the respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment of separation pay, among others, before the labor arbiter, who ruled that the respondents were validly terminated from employment as a result of petitioner's decision to cease its banking operations. The labor arbiter, however, inspired by compassionate justice, awarded financial assistance of one month's salary to respondents. The NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter but increased the amount of financial assistance to two month’s salary. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the labor arbiter’s decision. Solidbank went up to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is there any legal basis for the award of financial assistance to the respondents on the ground of compassionate justice?
Ruling:
No, the award of financial assistance is not required by law. All that Article 283 of the Labor Code requires in cases of dismissal due to an authorized cause is that the employer must pay financial assistance or separation pay in an amount equivalent to "one month's pay or one-half month's pay for every year of service, whichever is higher." Solidbank has complied with the mandate of the law. Hence, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the employees to receive higher benefits than those prescribed by the Labor Code and jurisprudence.
In the case at bar, petitioner paid respondents the following: (a) separation pay computed at 150% of their gross monthly pay per year of service; and (b) cash equivalent of earned and accrued vacation and sick leaves. Clearly, petitioner had gone over and above the requirements of the law. Despite this, however, petitioner has been ordered to pay respondents an additional amount, equivalent to one month's salary, as a form of financial assistance. The LA awarded the financial assistance out of "compassionate justice." The CA affirmed such grant also out of "compassionate justice" and as a form of "equitable relief" for the employees who were suddenly dismissed due to exigencies of business.After a thorough consideration of the circumstances at bar, this Court finds that the award of financial assistance is bereft of legal basis and serves to penalize petitioner who has complied with the requirements of the law.
Moreover, a review of jurisprudence relating to the application of "compassionate and social justice" in granting financial assistance in labor cases shows that the same has been generally used in instances when an employee has been dismissed for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code (when circumstances warranted such an award) and not when an employee has been dismissed for an authorized cause under Article 283.
The petitioner may, however, grant on a voluntary and ex gratia basis, any amount more than what is required by the law, but to insist that more financial assistance be given is certainly something that this Court cannot countenance, as the same serves to penalize petitioner, which has already given more than what the law requires.
Golden Ace Builders vs. Jose A. Talde
GR No. 187200; May 5, 2010
Facts:
Jose Tadle was hired in 1990 as a carpenter by petitioner Golden Ace Builders. In February 1999, petitioner, alleging the unavailability of construction projects, stopped giving work assignments to respondent, prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Talde and his immediate reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and with payment of full back wages. Pending appeal with the NLRC and in compliance with the Labor Arbiter’s decision, petitioner advised Talde to report for work in the construction site. Talde however submitted a a manifestation to the Labor Arbiter that actual animosities existed between him and petitioners and there had been threats to his life and his family’s safety, hence, he opted for the payment of separation pay.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal holding that respondent was a regular employee and not a project employee, and that there was no valid ground for the termination of his services. The petitioner and Talde were then referred to the Fiscal Examiner of the NLRC for the recomputation of the amount due to Talde. The NLRC ruled that since respondent did not appeal the Decision of the Labor Arbiter granting him only reinstatement and backwages, not separation pay in lieu thereof, he may not be afforded affirmative relief; and since he refused to go back to work, he may recover backwages only up to May 20, 2001, the day he was supposed to return to the job site.
The CA set aside the Resolution of the NLRC holding that Talde is entitled to both backwages and separation pay, even if separation pay was not granted by the Labor Arbiter, the latter in view of the strained relations between the parties.
Issue:
Is Talde entitled to separation pay?
Ruling:
Yes. The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the employee’s service while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu thereof. The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated.
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.
Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact, however, to be adequately supported by substantial evidence. In the present case, the Labor Arbiter found that actual animosity existed between petitioner and Talde as a result of the filing of the illegal dismissal case. Such finding, especially when affirmed by the appellate court as in the case at bar, is binding upon the Court.
Clearly then, respondent is entitled to backwages and separation pay as his reinstatement has been rendered impossible due to strained relations. As correctly held by the appellate court, the backwages due respondent must be computed from the time he was unjustly dismissed until his actual reinstatement, or from February 1999 until June 30, 2005 when his reinstatement was rendered impossible without fault on his part.
As to the computation of separation pay, petitioner was hired in 1990, however, and he must be considered to have been in the service not only until 1999, when he was unjustly dismissed, but until June 30, 2005, the day he is deemed to have been actually separated (his reinstatement having been rendered impossible) from petitioner company or for a total of 15 years. Thus, Talde is entitled to separation pay for 15 years.
Union Registration and Certification Election
National Union of Workers in Hotels vs. Sec. of Labor and Employment
G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009
Facts:
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel. Eleven votes were initially segregated because they were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the employees who cast them were already occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement , such employees cannot vote.
Out of 346 votes cast, petitioner garnered 151 votes. They argued that the votes of the probationary employees should have been opened. Petitioner also averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would then become 169.
Issues:
(1) Can employees on probationary status at the time of the
certification elections be allowed to vote?
(2) Is HIMPHLU qualified to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent?
Ruling (First Issue):
The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon. A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should be included, under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which it took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months before the election.
(Second Issue):
As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent, the Court rules in the negative. It is well-settled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
Prescinding from the Court’s ruling that all the probationary employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase – from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote. It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material.
Certification Election; Employer as mere bystander
Voluntary Recognition
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corp. vs. Sec. of Labor
G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009
Facts:
On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation (SLECC) and its Affiliates. The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE Commercial, SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials.
On 10 October 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union] reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation. It was issued Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter No. RO400-0110-CC-004.
On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition for direct certification. It alleged that [SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members.
On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be dismissed for violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
On 29 November 2001, a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on 9 January 2002.
In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to [SLECC’S] Motion to Dismiss.
In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for direct certification. This was reversed by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court further ruled that the Secretary of Labor and Employment (Secretary) was correct when she held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) executed by SLECC with Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC) could not bar Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association’s (SLECCWA) petition for direct certification.
Issue:
Can the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition?
Ruling:
No. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. It may be recalled that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union’s initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized establishment when it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for certification election on 27 February 2001 and this petition remained pending as of 20 July 2001. Thus, SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA executed by SLECC and SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWA’s present petition for certification election.
We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification election. In petitions for certification election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter’s decision. The exception to this rule, which happens when the employer is requested to bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us
Heritage Hotel Manila vs. PIGLAS
GR 177024, October 30, 2009
Facts:
Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file employees of petitioner Heritage Hotel Manila formed the “Heritage Hotel Employees Union” (the HHE union). The Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) later issued a certificate of registration to this union.
Subsequently, the HHE union filed a petition for certification election that petitioner company opposed. The company alleged that the HHE union misrepresented itself to be an independent union, when it was, in truth, a local chapter of the National Union of Workers in Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN).
Meanwhile, the Med-Arbiter granted the HHE union’s petition for certification election. Petitioner company appealed the decision to the Secretary of Labor but the latter denied the appeal. The Secretary also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the company to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
On October 12, 2001 the Court of Appeals issued a writ of injunction against the holding of the HHE union’s certification election, effective until the petition for cancellation of that union’s registration shall have been resolved with finality. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final when the HHE union withdrew the petition for review that it filed with this Court.
On December 10, 2003 certain rank and file employees of petitioner company held a meeting and formed another union, the respondent Pinag-Isang Galing at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Heritage Manila (the PIGLAS union). Two months later, the members of the first union, the HHE union, adopted a resolution for its dissolution. The HHE union then filed a petition for cancellation of its union registration.
On September 4, 2004 respondent PIGLAS union filed a petition for certification election that petitioner company also opposed, alleging that the new union’s officers and members were also those who comprised the old union. According to the company, the employees involved formed the PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of Appeals’ injunction against the holding of the certification election sought by the former union. Despite the company’s opposition, however, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election.
Issues:
(1) Did the union made fatal misrepresentation in its application for union registration?
(2) Is dual unionism a ground for cancelling a union’s registration?
Ruling (First Issue):
No. Respondent PIGLAS union’s organization meeting lasted for 12 hours. It was possible for the number of attendees to have increased from 90 to 128 as the meeting progressed. Besides, with a total of 250 employees in the bargaining unit, the union needed only 50 members to comply with the 20 percent membership requirement. Thus, the union could not be accused of misrepresentation since it did not pad its membership to secure registration.
(Second Issue): No. The fact that some of respondent PIGLAS union’s members were also members of the old rank and file union, the HHE union, is not a ground for canceling the new union’s registration. The right of any person to join an organization also includes the right to leave that organization and join another one. Besides, HHE union is dead. It had ceased to exist and its certificate of registration had already been cancelled. Thus, petitioner’s arguments on this point may also be now regarded as moot and academic.
FVC Labor Union-PTGWO vs SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO
G.R. No. 176249, November 27, 2009
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, the petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO – the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the FVC Philippines, Incorporated – signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement with the company. The five-year CBA period was from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of the 3rd year of the five-year term and pursuant to the CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA and modified, among other provisions, the CBA’s duration. Article XXV, Section 2 of the renegotiated CBA provides that “this re-negotiation agreement shall take effect beginning February 1, 2001 and until May 31, 2003” thus extending the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4) months. On January 21, 2003, nine (9) days before the January 30, 2003 expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term (and four [4] months and nine [9] days away from the expiration of the amended CBA period), the respondent Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA. FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside of the sixty (60) days before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.
Issue:
Was the certification election filed within the freedom period?
Ruling:
Yes. While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years.
In the present case, the CBA was originally signed for a period of five years, i.e., from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003, with a provision for the renegotiation of the CBA’s other provisions at the end of the 3rd year of the five-year CBA term. Thus, prior to January 30, 2001 the workplace parties sat down for renegotiation but instead of confining themselves to the economic and non-economic CBA provisions, also extended the life of the CBA for another four months, i.e., from the original expiry date on January 30, 2003 to May 30, 2003.
This negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal effect on the FVCLU-PTGWO’s exclusive bargaining representation status which remained effective only for five years ending on the original expiry date of January 30, 2003. Thus, sixty days prior to this date, or starting December 2, 2002, SANAMA-SIGLO could properly file a petition for certification election. Its petition, filed on January 21, 2003 or nine (9) days before the expiration of the CBA and of FVCLU-PTGWO’s exclusive bargaining status, was seasonably filed.
Mariwasa Siam Ceramics vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et. al.
G.R. No. 183317 December 21, 2009
Facts:
On May 2005, private respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A.On June 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against private respondent, claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the same code.
The Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the registration of respondent, and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions. SMMSC-Independent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR ruled in favor of the respondent, thus, they remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. The petitioner appealed and insisted that private respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102 employees who executed affidavits recanting their union membership. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
1) Was there failure to comply with the 20% union membership requirement?
2) Did the withdrawal of 31 union members affect the petition for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned?
Ruling:
No.While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the union’s application for registration, the affiants were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence.
On the second issue, it appears undisputedly that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to the petition before the filing of said petition. The distinction must be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary. Therefore, following jurisprudence, the employees were not totally free from the employer’s pressure and so the voluntariness of the employees’ execution of the affidavits becomes suspect.
The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
Fraud or Misrepresentation in the Application for Registration
Yokohama Tire Phils. Vs. Yokohama Employees Union
G.R. No. 163532, March 10, 2010
Facts:
Yokohama Employees Union (YEU) is the labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. (YTPI). YEU was registered as a legitimate labor labor union on 10 September 1999. YEU filed before the Regional Office a petition for certification election. YTPI filed a petition in the Regional Office for the revocation of YEU’s registration alleging fraud and misrepresentation by including signatures of employees in the organizational documents despite the lack of knowledge of the employees of the election of union officers and securing signatures of employees by making them believe that they were signing a petition for a 125% increase in the minimum wage, not a petition for registration. YTPI’s petition was granted and YEU appealed to the BLR, which reversed the decision.
The BLR found that the persons whose signatures were allegedly secured through misrepresentation never asked for their signatures to be removed from the organizational documents, that some employees executed a Sama-Samang Pahayag which alleged that they have indeed attended a meeting for the purpose of organizing and ratifying their Union By Laws and that the employees did not question the legality of YEU’s organization. The BLR also held that although the Sama-Samang Pahayag did not specifically mention that an election took place during the organizational meeting, it may be possible that the same was conducted and that any infirmity in the election of union officers may be remedied under the last paragraph of Article 241 of the Labor Code and under Rule XIV of DOLE Department Order No. 9.
YTPI filed for a motion for reconsideration before the BLR, which was denied. Then a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed in the CA, the same was denied, as well as the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Did YEU commit fraud and misrepresentation?
Ruling:
No. Whether YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation in failing to remove signatures of some employees from the list of employees who supported YEU’s application for registration and whether YEU conducted an election of its officers are questions of fact. YTPI, being the one which filed the petition for the revocation of YEU’s registration, had the burden of proving that YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation. The CA already ruled that YTPI failed to prove that YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation.
Factual findings of the CA and other lower tribunals are binding on the Court. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should include only questions of law — questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question is one of fact.
Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club vs. CA, et. al.
G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club(Eagle Ridge), which has around 112 rank-and-file employees, alleges that Eagle Ridge Employees Union(EREU) committed fraud, misrepresentation and false statement when it filed for its registration and that EREU failed to comply with the membership requirement for the registration as a labor organization. Eagle Ridge seeks to have EREU’s registration cancelled when the Union filed a petition for certification election. Eagle Ridge alleged that the EREU declared in its application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its December 6, 2005 organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members. The misrepresentation was exacerbated by the discrepancy between the certification issued by the Union secretary and president that 25 members actually ratified the constitution and by-laws on December 6, 2005 and the fact that 26 members affixed their signatures on the documents, making one signature a forgery.
DOLE Regional Director granted Eagle Ridge’s petition and delisted EREU from the roster of legitimate labor organizations. EREU appealed to the BLR, which initially affirmed the order of the Regional Director, but upon filing of the EREU of a motion for reconsideration it was reinstated in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Eagle Ridge filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, thus a petition for certiorari to the CA. The CA dismissed Eagle Ridge’s petition for being deficient as the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was subscribed to by Luna C. Piezas on her representation as the legal counsel of the petitioner, but sans [the requisite] Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution authorizing her to execute and sign the same. The CA denied a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Eagle Ridge’s petition to cancel EREU’s registration?
Ruling:
No. A scrutiny of the records fails to show any misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by EREU to merit cancellation of its registration. The Union submitted the required documents attesting to the facts of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005, the election of its officers, and the adoption of the Union’s constitution and by-laws. EREU complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c). when it had 30 employees as member when it registered. Any seeming infirmity in the application and admission of union membership, most especially in cases of independent labor unions, must be viewed in favor of valid membership.
In the issue of the affidavits of retraction executed by six union members, the probative value of these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005. The DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director obviously erred in giving credence to the affidavits of retraction, but not according the same treatment to the supporting affidavits. It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. It is required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing party, i.e., the Union. For their non-presentation, the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as evidence against the Union in the instant case. Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge would require a union membership of at least 22 employees. When the EREU filed its application for registration on December 19, 2005, there were clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the certificate of registration was granted, there is no dispute that the Union complied with the mandatory 20% membership requirement. Prior to their withdrawal, the six employees who retracted were bona fide union members. With the withdrawal of six union members, there is still compliance with the mandatory membership requirement under Art. 234(c), for the remaining 24 union members constitute more than the 20% membership requirement of 22 employees.
Collective Bargaining Agreement
University of San Agustin vs.
University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW,
G.R. No. 177594, July 23, 2009
Facts:
On July 27, 2000, petitioner forged with the University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW (respondent) a Collective Bargaining Agreement effective for five years or from July, 2000 to July, 2005. Among other things, the parties agreed to include a provision on salary increases based on the incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds and pursuant to Republic Act No. 6728 the Tuition Fee Law. It appears that for the School Year 2001-2002, the parties disagreed on the computation of the salary increases.
Respondent refused to accept petitioner’s proposed across-the-board salary increase of P1,500 per month and its subtraction from the computation of the TIP of the scholarships and tuition fee discounts it grants to deserving students and its employees and their dependents. Respondent likewise rejected petitioner’s interpretation of the term "salary increases" as referring not only to the increase in salary but also to corresponding increases in other benefits. Respondent argued that the provision in question referred to "salary increases" alone, hence, the phrase "P1,500.00 or 80% of the TIP, whichever is higher," should apply only to salary increases and should not include the other increases in benefits received by employees.
Resort to the existing grievance machinery having failed, the parties agreed to submit the case to voluntary arbitration. VA ruled in favor for respondent, holding that the salary increases shall be paid out of 80% of the TIP should the same be higher than P1,500. As to petitioner’s deduction of scholarship grants and tuition fee discounts from the TIP, the VA ruled that it is invalid. Court of Appeals. sustained the VA’s interpretation of the questioned CBA provision but reversed its finding on the TIP computation. Hence, the present petition which seeks only the review of the appellate court’s interpretation of the questioned provision of the CBA.
Issue:
Is the CBA valid and binding between the parties?
Ruling:
Yes. It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control.
A reading of the above-quoted provision of the CBA shows that the parties agreed that 80% of the TIP or at the least the amount of P1,500 is to be allocated for individual salary increases.
The CBA does not speak of any other benefits or increases which would be covered by the employees’ share in the TIP, except salary increases. The CBA reflects the incorporation of different provisions to cover other benefits such as Christmas bonus , service award, leaves, educational benefits, medical and hospitalization benefits, bereavement assistance, and signing, without mentioning that these will likewise be sourced from the TIP. Thus, petitioner’s belated claim that the 80% TIP should be taken to mean as covering ALL increases and not merely the salary increases as categorically stated in Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the CBA does not lie.1avvphi1
In the present case, petitioner could have, during the CBA negotiations, opposed the inclusion of or renegotiated the provision allotting 80% of the TIP to salary increases alone, as it was and is not under any obligation to accept respondent’s demands hook, line and sinker. Art. 252 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. – The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
Unmistakably, what the law sets is the minimum, not the maximum percentage, and there is even a 10% portion the disposition of which the law does not regulate. Hence, if academic institutions wish to allot a higher percentage for salary increases and other benefits, nothing in the law prohibits them from doing so.
It is axiomatic that labor laws setting employee benefits only mandate the minimum that an employer must comply with, but the latter is not proscribed from granting higher or additional benefits if it so desires, whether as an act of generosity or by virtue of company policy or a CBA, as it would appear in this case. While, in following to the letter the subject CBA provision petitioner will, in effect, be giving more than 80% of the TIP as its personnel’s share in the tuition fee increase, petitioner’s remedy lies not in the Court’s invalidating the provision, but in the parties’ clarifying the same in their subsequent CBA negotiations.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. vs. Montaño
G.R. No. 182836, Oct. 13, 2009
Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. According to the Certificate of Fetal Death, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Petitioner Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. The Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA to reverse the denial of the claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer. On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits. Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration, hence this petition.
Issue:
Is the CBA clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied?
Ruling:
No. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The Court emphasized that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association
G.R. No. 180866, March 2, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., a corporation primarily in the business of manufacture, makes, buy and sell, on whole sale basis, tiles, marbles, mosaics and other similar products. Respondent Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the establishment of petitioner.
In 1998, petitioner gave P3, 000.00 as bonus to its employees, members of the respondent Association. Subsequently, in September 1999, petitioner and respondent Association entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides for, among others, the grant of a Christmas gift package/bonus to the members of the respondent Association.
In the succeeding years, 1999, 2000, 2001, petitioner gave bonuses in a form of a certificate which is equivalent to P3, 000.00. However, in 2002, petitioner gave only P600.00 as cash benefit. Respondent Association objected to the P600.00 cash benefit and argued that it was in violation of the CBA. Petitioner averred that the giving of extra compensation was based on the company’s available resources for a given year and the workers are not entitled to a bonus if the company does not make profits. Unable to amicably settle the dispute, the case was referred to the Voluntary Arbitrator. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision, declaring that petitioner is bound to grant each of its workers a Christmas bonus of P3,000.00 for the reason that the bonus was given prior to the effectivity of the CBA between the parties and that the financial losses of the company is not a sufficient reason to exempt it from granting the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
Issue:
Is petitioner obliged to give a Christmas bonus to respondent Association?
Ruling:
Yes. Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this case is integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to respondent Association has become more than just an act of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.
A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the same provides for the giving of a "Christmas gift package/bonus" without qualification. The said provision did not state that the Christmas package shall be made to depend on the petitioner’s financial standing. The records are also bereft of any showing that the petitioner made it clear during CBA negotiations that the bonus was dependent on any condition. Indeed, if the petitioner and respondent Association intended that the P3,000.00 bonus would be dependent on the company earnings, such intention should have been expressed in the CBA.
All given, business losses are a feeble ground for petitioner to repudiate its obligation under the CBA. The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection.
Concerted Union Activities
A. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation
G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009
Facts:
On May 22, 1997, A. Soriano Aviation (petitioner or the company) which is engaged in providing transportation of guests to and from Amanpulo and El Nido resorts in Palawan, and respondent Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation (the Union), the duly-certified exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of petitioner, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective January 1, 1997 up to December 31, 1999. The CBA included a "No-Strike, No-Lock-out" clause.
On May 1 & 12, and June 12, 1997, which were legal holidays and peak season for the company, eight (8) mechanics-members of respondent Union, its herein co-respondents, refused to render overtime work. Petitioner treated the refusal to work as a concerted action which is a violation of the "No-Strike, No-Lockout" clause in the CBA. It thus meted the workers a 30-day suspension. In relation to the incident, a Union officer was also allegedly constructively dismissed.
The attempted settlement between the parties having been futile, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on October 3, 1997 for . Petitioner then filed a case of illegal strike against the eight mechanics.
As despite conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived at, the Union went on strike on October 22, 1997.
In the interim or on June 16, 1998, eight months into the "second strike," petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the Labor Arbiter, praying for the declaration as illegal of the strike on account of their alleged pervasive and widespread use of force and violence and for the loss of their employment, citing the following acts committed by them: publicly shouting of foul and vulgar words to company officers and non-striking employees; threatening of officers and non-striking employees with bodily harm and dousing them with water while passing by the strike area; destruction of or inflicting of damage to company property, as well as private property of company officers; and putting up of placards and streamers containing vulgar and insulting epithets including imputing crime on the company.
Issues:
(1) Are the eight employees liable for illegal strike?
(2) Was the strike staged by respondents on October 22, 1997 illegal, due to alleged commission of illegal acts and violation of the “No Strike Clause?”
Ruling (First Issue):
Yes. The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the first strike or the mechanics’ refusal to work on 3 consecutive holidays was prompted by their disagreement with the management-imposed new work schedule. Having been grounded on a non-strikeable issue and without complying with the procedural requirements, then the same is a violation of the "No Strike-No Lockout Policy" in the existing CBA.
YSS Employees Union vs. YSS Laboratories, Inc.
G.R. No. 155125, December 4, 2009
Facts:
YSSEU is a duly registered labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of YSS Laboratories. YSS Laboratories implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11 employees. Of the 11 employees sought to be retrenched, nine were officers and members of YSSEU. Initially, these employees were given the option to avail themselves of the early retirement program of the company. When no one opted to retire early, YSS Laboratories exercised its option to terminate the services of its employees. Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said retrenchment program, YSSEU held a strike.
The Secretary of Labor intervened and certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly, all striking workers were thereby directed to return to work within 24 hours from their receipt of the said Order, and YSS Laboratories to accept them under the terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
YSS Laboratories refused to comply with the directive of the Secretary of Labor. It contended that the nine union officers and members who were previously terminated from service pursuant to a valid retrenchment should be excluded from the operation of the return-to-work order. It also asserted that the union officers who participated in the purported illegal strike should likewise not be allowed to be back to their employment for they were deemed to have already lost their employment status.
Issue:
Should the retrenched employees be excluded from the operation of the return to work order?
Ruling:
No.The assumption or certification order shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one has already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work, and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
YSS Laboratories’ vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. The Secretary of Labor is afforded plenary and broad powers, and is granted great breadth of discretion to adopt the most reasonable and expeditious way of writing finis to the labor dispute.
Accordingly, when the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking workers back to work, the Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same. This was done for the promotion of the common good, considering that a lingering strike could be inimical to the interest of both employer and employee. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to interfere with the management’s rights but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute.
Certainly, the determination of who among the strikers could be admitted back to work cannot be made to depend upon the discretion of employer, lest we strip the certification or assumption-of-jurisdiction orders of the coercive power that is necessary for attaining their laudable objective. The return-to-work order does not interfere with the management’s prerogative, but merely regulates it when, in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference.
(Second Issue):
It was not a violation of the "No Strike- No Lockout" provisions, but it was an illegal strike. The Union complied with procedural requirements, therefore the same was not a violation of the "No Strike- No Lockout" provisions, as a "No Strike-No Lockout" provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a valid stipulation but may be invoked only by employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. In the present case, the Union believed in good faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when it went on strike on account of the 30-day suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer and perceived union-busting, among others.
However, well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
The Union members’ repeated name-calling, harassment and threats of bodily harm directed against company officers and non-striking employees and, more significantly, the putting up of placards, banners and streamers with vulgar statements imputing criminal negligence to the company, which put to doubt reliability of its operations, come within the purview of illegal acts under Art. 264 and jurisprudence.
That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost eight months that the strike was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or widespread to be excusable. Nowhere in Art. 264 does it require that violence must be continuous or that it should be for the entire duration of the strike.
Bandila Maritime Services vs. Dubduban
G.R. No. 171984, September 29, 2009
Facts:
Respondent Rolando Dubduban was engaged by petitioner Tokomaru Kaiun Co., Ltd. and its Philippine manning agent, Bandila Maritime Services, Inc., as chief cook of M/V White Arrow for 10 months. After the expiration of his contract, respondent returned to the Philippines on October 8, 1999. A month later, he had a medical examination at the Metropolitan Hospital in Manila where he was diagnosed with fibroid scarrings in his right upper ear lobe and consequently was advised to undergo parotidectomy. Respondent agreed. During the pre-operational procedure, he was found to be suffering from diabetes mellitus type II.
After recovering from surgery, respondent filed a complaint for disability benefits and damages in the NLRC. He alleged that he could no longer be employed as a seafarer because of his diabetes. Petitioners, being his last employers, were therefore liable to pay him disability benefits and reimburse him for medical expenses.
Petitioners, on the other hand, pointed out that respondent was diagnosed with diabetes after his contract expired on September 3, 1999. Thus, they were not liable for disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses.
Issue:
Are petitioners liable for disability benefits?
Ruling:
No. Respondent admitted that he had been previously diagnosed with diabetes in 1994 or four years before he was engaged by petitioners as chief cook of M/V White Arrow. Clearly, he was not afflicted with the said illness only during the term of his contract but even prior to his employment. He did not even complain of any complications of the disease at any time during his employment. Hence, Section 20(B) of the Contract was inapplicable.
Moreover, even assuming respondent contracted the disease during the term of his contract, he was precluded from claiming disability benefits for his failure to comply with Section 20(B)(3) of the Contract. The provision requires a claimant to submit himself to a company-designated physician three days after his arrival in the Philippines for medical examination and failure to do so bars the filing of a claim for disability benefits.
Respondent did not submit himself to a company-designated physician for medical examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines, without any lawful excuse. Respondent's claim (assuming he had a valid one) was therefore barred.
Neither is respondent entitled to disability benefits under Section 32-A of the Contract since diabetes is not one of the compensable occupational diseases listed there. Since his claim has no basis in the Contract, there is no reason to award him disability benefits.
Dionisio Musnit vs. Sea Star Shipping Corp.
G.R. No. 182623, December 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Dionisio Musnit entered into a contract of employment with respondent Sea Star Shipping Corporation as chief cook on board the vessel M/V Navajo Princess. While on board the vessel Musnit felt a throbbing pain in his chest and shortening of breath. He then reported his condition to his officer who ignored it. As the pain persisted, he resorted to pain relievers. Upon completion of his contract, Musnit was repatriated to the Philippines. He informed the Sea Star Office of his condition however he was never referred to a doctor for consultation.
Seven months after Musnit’s repatriation he sought re-employment with Sea Star. However, he was denied further deployment because his medical examination result showed that he is unfit for sea duties. Petitioner then filed a claim against Sea Star for disability benefits but was denied. This prompted Musnit to file his claim before the Labor Arbiter which was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC likewise dismissed the complaint. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Musnit was able to finish the term of his employment contract and accordingly repatriated due to ‘completion of contract.’ Furthermore, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found no evidence to support Musnit’s claim that he suffered his illness during the term of his contract. The CA likewise dismissed petitioner’s claim ruling that Musnit failed to have himself checked by the company-designated doctor in accordance with the mandatory requirement for post-employment medical examination.
Issue:
Is Musnit entitled to disability compensation?
Ruling:
No. Petitioner claims to have reported his illness to an officer once on board the vessel during the course of his employment. The records are bereft, however, of any documentary proof that he had indeed referred his illness to a nurse or doctor in order to avail of proper treatment. It thus becomes apparent that he was repatriated to the Philippines, not on account of any illness or injury, but in view of the completion of his contract.
But even assuming that petitioner was repatriated for medical reasons, he failed to submit himself to the company-designated doctor in accordance with the post-employment medical examination requirement under paragraph 3 of Section 20(B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Failure to comply with this requirement which is a sine qua non bars the filing of claim for disability benefits.
All told, the rule is that under Section 20-B(3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits.
Without any valid excuse, petitioner did not submit himself to a company-designated physician for medical examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines. He submitted himself for medical examination to the company-designated physician only on May 26, 2003, or seven months after his repatriation following the completion of his previous contract, only because he was procuring further employment from respondent Sea Star. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to disability compensation.
Joelson Iloreta vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
G.R. No. 183908, December 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Joelson Iloreta was hired by Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. as an Able Seaman. He was a member of the Associated Marine Officer and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines which had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with respondents. While pushing drums full of caustic soda, petitioner complained of chest pains. He later noticed that whenever he exerted physical effort, the pains persisted. When the vessel was docked at the port of Santos, Brazil he was referred to the Centro Medico Internacional and diagnosed by Dr. Heraldo de Carvalho to be suffering from a serious heart disease, involving life risk. On the doctor’s recommendation, petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines and was confined at St. Luke’s Medical Center under the care of respondents’ company-designated physician Natalio G. Alegre (Dr. Alegre). After undergoing surgery and post-surgery check-ups Dr. Alegre issued a certificate declaring petitioner “Fit to resume work”.
However, since petitioner’s chest pains and dizziness persisted, he consulted the opinion of an independent doctor. Dr. Vicaldo declared petitioner "unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity" as"his illness is consideredwork-aggravated". Relying on the findings of Dr. Vicaldo, the petitioner asked from respondents for full permanent disability benefits, but was unsuccessful. This prompted petitioner to file for recovery of permanent total disability compensation before the NLRC Arbitration Office.
The parties later agreed to refer petitioner for examination by a third physician, Dr. Reynaldo P. Fajardo who issued a Medical Certificate with findings similar to those of Dr. Vicaldo’s ranking petitioners condition within Impediment Grade IV (68.66%). The Labor Arbiter awarded US$60,000 disability compensation to petitioner based on the provisions of the existing CBA. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the CA reduced the amount of award holding that under the CBA an Impediment Grade IV (68.66%) is only entitled to US$50,000.00 x 68.66% or the amount equivalent to US$34,330.00.
Issue:
Is petitioner entitled to 100% permanent disability compensation?
Ruling:
Yes. Atotaldisabilitydoes not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn there from. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. From the time petitioner was medically repatriated on August 16, 2002 up to the time he filed his complaint for disability compensation on July 14, 2003 or for almost eleven (11) months, petitioner remained unemployed, his disability is considered permanent and total. In Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob the Supreme Court held that to be entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits, the employee’s disability must not only be total but also permanent. Furthermore, under paragraph 20.1.5 of the parties’ CBA, it is stipulated that "[a] seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50%ormore under the POEA Employment Contract shall x x x be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., x x x US$60,000.00 for ratings." Petitioner’s disability rating being 68.66%, he is entitled to a 100% disability compensation of US$60,000, as correctly found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Abente vs. KJGS Fleet
G.R. No. 182430, December 4, 2009
Facts:
Leopoldo Abante was hired by KJGS Fleet Management Manila (KJGS) to work as ablebodied seaman aboard M/T Rathboyne. While carrying equipment on board the vessel, Abante slipped and hurt his back. Upon the vessel’s arrival in Kaohsiung, Taiwan on July 4, 2000, Abante was brought to a hospital whereupon he was diagnosed to be suffering from "lower back pain r/o old fracture lesion 4th lumbar body." Nevertheless, he was still declared to be fit for restricted work and was advised to see another doctor in the next port of call.
He then reported to KJGS and was referred to a company-designated physician, Dr. Roberto D. Lim, at the Metropolitan Hospital. After a series of tests, he was diagnosed to be suffering from "Foraminal stenosis L3-L14 and central disc protrusion L4-L5" on account of which he underwent Laminectomy and Discectomy on August 18, 2000, the cost of which was borne by KJGS. He was discharged from the hospital 10 days later, but was advised to continue physical therapy. He was seen by Dr. Lim around 10 times from the time he was discharged until February 20, 2001 when he was pronounced fit to resume sea duties. He, however, refused to sign his Certificate of Fitness for Work.
Abante later sought the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Jocelyn Myra R. Caja, who diagnosed him to have "failed back syndrome" and gave a grade 6 disability rating --- which rating rendered him medically unfit to work again as a seaman. This prompted him to file a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for disability compensation in the amount of US$25,000.00, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals both ruled that in case of conflicting assessments, the opinion of a third doctor agreed by both the employer and the seafarer should be sought. However, Abante’s immediate filing of the complaint, insisting on his own physician’s assessment, was premature and, therefore, the assessment of the company-designated physician that he is still fit to work prevails.
Issues:
(1) Is Abante precluded from seeking the opinion of a doctor of his own choice?
(2) Is Abante entitled to disability compensation?
Ruling (First Issue):
No. Section 20 (B) (3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract of 2000 provides:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS - The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctormay be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
Clearly, the above provision does not preclude the seafarer from getting a second opinion as to his condition which can then be used by the labor tribunals in awarding disability claims. Courts are called upon to be vigilant in their time-honored duty to protect labor, especially in cases of disability or ailment. When applied to Filipino seamen, the perilous nature of their work is considered in determining the proper benefits to be awarded. These benefits, at the very least, should approximate the risks they brave on board the vessel every single day. The POEA standard employment contract for seamen was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor.
(Second Issue):
Yes.As to whether petitioner can claim disability benefits, the Court rules in the affirmative. Permanent disability refers to the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body. What determines petitioner’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days. In the case at bar, it was only on February 20, 2001 when the Certificate of Fitness for Work was issued by Dr. Lim, more than 6 months from the time he was initially evaluated by the doctor on July 4, 2000 and after he underwent operation on August 18, 2001. Moreover, Dr. Lim consistently recommended that petitioner continue his physical rehabilitation/therapy and revisit clinic on specific dates for re-evaluation, thereby implying that petitioner was not yet fit to work. Given a seafarer’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits when he is unable to work for more than 120 days, the failure of the company-designated physician to pronounce petitioner fit to work within the 120-day period entitles him to permanent total disability benefit in the amount of US$60,000.00.
Rizaldy Quitoriano vs. Jebsens Maritime, Inc.
G.R. No. 179868, January 21, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Quitoriano was hired as 2nd Officer aboard the vessel M/V Trimnes by respondent Jebsens Maritime, Inc. While Quitoriano was assigned as navigating officer he complained of dizziness with severe headache, and general body weaknesses. He was brought to a hospital in Spain where he was diagnosed to be suffering "hypertension arterial" or "mild stroke." When his health condition did not improve, he was repatriated to the Philippines on May 30, 2001 to undergo further medical examination and treatment.
On June 6, 2001, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz, the company-designated physician diagnosed petitioner of Hypertension and Transient ischemic attack. On November 16, 2001 or 169 days after petitioner’s repatriation, Dr. Cruz issued a medical report declaring him "fit to work.” Petitioner then sought the opinion of an independent internist-cardiologist, Dr. Sharon A. Lacson who diagnosed him as suffering from "hypertension cardiovascular disease and hyperlipidemia." Dr. Aquino also found him to have "cerebral infarction, R, basal ganglia area." Thereupon, petitioner asked from Jebsens for full permanent disability compensation but was unsuccessful. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of permanent disability compensation before the NLRC Arbitration Office. The Labor Arbiter however dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the latter’s decision with modification that the petitioner be allowed to resume sea duty. The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Is Quitoriano’s disability considered permanent and total thereby entitling him to disability compensation?
Ruling:
YES.In Vicente v. ECC, the Supreme Court ruled that the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Atotaldisabilitydoes not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that theemployee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom. On the other hand, a total disabilityis considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. In this case it was only on November 16, 2001 that the "fit to work" certification was issued by Dr. Cruz or more than five months from the time petitioner was medically repatriated on May 30, 2001. Thus, petitioner’s disability is considered permanent and total. Petitioner’s disability being then permanent and total, he is "entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., US$80,000 for officers," as stipulated in par. 20.1.7 of the parties’ CBA.
G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010
Facts:
Private respondent Villamater was hired as Chief Engineer for the ship MV Nord Monaco, owned by petitioner World Marine Panama, S.A., through the services of petitioner Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. Around four (4)months after his deployment, Villamater suffered intestinal bleeding and was given a blood transfusion. He consulted a physician in Hamburg, Germany, and was diagnosed with Obstructive Adenocarcinoma of the Sigmoid. Villamater was later repatriated and was referred to company-designated physicians. The diagnosis and the recommended treatment abroad were confirmed. He was advised to undergo six (6) cycles of chemotherapy. However, Dr. Kelly Siy Salvador, one of the company-designated physicians, opined that Villamater’s condition "appears to be not work-related," but suggested a disability grading of 1.
Subsequently, Villamater filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for payment of permanent and total disability benefits, reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Villamater, holding that his illness was compensable, but denying his claim for moral and exemplary damages. On appeal the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was later dismissed by the court.
Issues:
(1) Was the finality of the NLRC case rendered the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA moot and academic?
(2) Is Villamater entitled to total and permanent disability benefits?
Ruling (First Issue):
No. As ruled in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC (295 SCRA 494), judicial review of decisions of the NLRC is sought via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and the petition should be filed before the CA, following the strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. Under Rule 65, Section 4, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Thus, although the petition was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioners reasonably filed their petition for certiorari before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.
(Second Issue):
Yes. The Court sustain the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in granting total and permanent disability benefits in favor of Villamater, as it was sufficiently shown that his having contracted colon cancer was, at the very least, aggravated by his working conditions, taking into consideration his dietary provisions on board, his age, and his job as Chief Engineer, who was primarily in charge of the technical and mechanical operations of the vessels to ensure voyage safety. Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection and not direct causal relation is required. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.
Cootauco vs. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 184722, March 15, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Alex Cootauco was hired by MMS Phil. Maritime Services Inc. as Able Seaman for M/V Pax Phoenix after he passed the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) conducted by MMS Phils.’s. One day he saw a speck of blood in his urine and told his 2nd mate about it. He consulted Dr. Benjamin C. Parco who advised him to take a rest and prescribed him with medicines for his flu and Urinary Tract Infection. On May 21, 2004, he reported at respondents’ office for mandatory reportorial requirement and informed respondents’ company officer about his medical condition and asked for medical assistance which went unheeded.Despite the medications prescribed by Dr. Parco, petitioner’s health did not improve. Petitioner then consulted another physician, Dr. Rodrigo Guanlao of the Philippine Heart Center, who evaluated him to be permanently unfit for sea duty after he was diagnosed with Hypertension stage 2, TB of the left Uretus, Cystolithiasis, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome of both hands with impediment disability Grade 1. Petitioner sought medical reimbursement and sickness allowance.
Respondents alleged that petitioner failed to undergo the mandatory post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return as required by Section 20(B), paragraph (3)[1] of the POEA Standard Employment Contract which incorporated the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. The Labor Arbiter granted petitioner’s claim for disability compensation on a decision dated August 31, 2006. Upon appeal by the respondent’s to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed. Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA which affirmed the NLRC’s resolution.
Issue:
Is petitioner entitled to permanent disability benefits?
.
Ruling:
No. Applying the provision of Section 20(B), paragraph (3)of POEA-SEC, petitioner is required to undergo post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days from arrival, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period would suffice.
It is mandatoryfor a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits. The Court is constrained to deny his claim for compensation benefits absent proof of compliance with the requirements set forth in Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the claimant must prove a positive proposition. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits, but the Court cannot altogether disregard the mandatory provisions of the law.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Cruise Ships Catering and Services International N.V. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Rommel B. Cedol
GR No. 186180; March 22, 2010
Facts:
Rommel B. Cedol was employed as an assistant housekeeping manager for the vessel Costa Mediterranea. This was pursuant to a seven-month contract of employment he entered with petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay Maritime) for its foreign principal, Cruise Ships Catering and Services International N.V. (Cruise Ships). After undergoing the required Pre-Emplyment Medical Examination (PEME), he was declared fit for work. He boarded the vessel Costa Mediterranea on July 19, 2004. The respondent had also previously worked on board petitioner’s other vessels from 2000 to 2004. Each time, he passed the company’s PEME.
In November 2004, the respondent felt pain in his lower right quadrant, for which reason he was hospitalized and underwent medical procedure in a hospital in Cyprus.
On February 1, 2005, the respondent was repatriated back to the Philippines. Immediately after returning to the Philippines, he went to the company-designated physician to undergo medical examination and treatment. The company-designated physician found out that the respondent was suffering from lymphoma. The said physician, however, declared that his illness was non-work related. Thereafter, the respondent underwent surgical procedure and several sessions of chemotherapy. In April 2005, he was declared “fit to resume sea duties.”
On June 16, 2006, the respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees against the petitioners. He claims that he contracted his illness while working on board the petitioners’ vessel. The labor arbiter ruled in favour of respondent Cedol and awarded him permanently and totally disabled and awarded him disability compensation of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent and US$6,000.00 attorney’s fees. The labor arbiter ruled that respondent’s illness was work-related, considering the fact the he had always passed the company’s physical examinations since 2000. The labor arbiter also ruled that respondent was not fit to work because he had undergone chemotherapy. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the labor arbiter and also ruled that there was a reasonable connection between the nature of the respondent’s work as assistant housekeeping manager and the development of respondent Cedol’s illness. The NLRC said that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection, and not a direct causal connection for a disability to be compensable.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari and ruled that under the provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), it is enough that the work has contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the worker’s disease. This prompted the petitioners to raise the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Were the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals correct in ruling that respondent’s illness was work-related, and thus entitling him to total and permanent disability benefits?
Ruling:
No, the respondent’s illness is not work-related. Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
Lymphoma is not listed as a disability under Section 32 (Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted) of the 2000 POEA-SEC nor listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A thereof. Nonetheless, Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) provides that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." The burden is, therefore, placed upon the respondent to present substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion that there is a causal connection between the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions. This, the respondent failed to do. In fact, a careful review of the records shows that the respondent did not, by way of a contrary medical finding, assail the diagnosis arrived at by the company-designated physician.
Under Section 20 (B), paragraphs (2) and (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. In this case, the company-designated physician was able to sufficiently explain her basis in concluding that the respondent’s illness was not work-related: she found the respondent not to have been exposed to any carcinogenic fumes, or to any viral infection in his workplace. The series of tests and evaluations show that the company-designated physician’s findings were not arrived at arbitrarily; neither were they biased in the company’s favor. It is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability. Since the company-designated physician deemed the respondent as fit to resume sea duties, then such declaration should be given credence.
The evidence on record is totally bare of essential facts on how the respondent contracted or developed lymphoma and how and why his working conditions increased the risk of contracting this illness. In the absence of substantial evidence, we cannot just presume that respondent’s job caused his illness or aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have had.
The fact that respondent passed the company’s PEME is of no moment. The PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical condition. The PEME merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service," it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. In short, the "fit to work" declaration in the respondent’s PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.
Death Compensation
Government Service Insurance System vs Raoet
G.R. No. 157038, December 23, 2009
Facts:
The respondent’s husband, Francisco, entered government service as an Engineer Trainee at the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). He was then promoted to the position of Engineer A – the position he held until his death on May 5, 2001.
In 2000, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and he was confined at the Region I Medical Center from July 16 to July 25, 2000. As the GSIS considered this a work-related condition, Francisco was awarded 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred during treatment.
On May 5, 2001, Francisco was rushed to the Dr. Marcelo M. Chan Memorial Hospital because he was vomiting blood. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. His death certificate listed the causes of his death as cardiac arrest.
The respondent, as widow, filed with the GSIS a claim for income benefits accruing from the death of her husband, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the respondent did not submit any supporting documents to show that Francisco’s death was compensable. On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the GSIS since it could not determine if Francisco’s death was compensable due to the absence of documents supporting the respondent’s claim.
The CA reversed the ECC decision. The appellate court held that while the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation does not list peptic ulcer as an occupational disease, Francisco’s death should be compensable since its immediate cause was cardiac arrest.
Issue:
Is the CA correct in reversing the ruling of the ECC
Ruling:
Yes. To be entitled to compensation, a claimant must show that the sickness is either: (1) a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation under the conditions Annex “A” sets forth; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Based on Francisco’s death certificate, the immediate cause of his death was cardiac arrest; the antecedent cause was acute massive hemorrhage, and the underlying cause was bleeding peptic ulcer disease.
In determining the compensability of an illness, the worker’s employment need not be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimant’s illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the disease.
P.D. 626 is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income. In employee compensation, persons charged by law to carry out the Constitution’s social justice objectives should adopt a liberal attitude in deciding compensability claims and should not hesitate to grant compensability where a reasonable measure of work-connection can be inferred. Only this kind of interpretation can give meaning and substance to the law’s compassionate spirit as expressed in Article 4 of the Labor Code – that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including their implementing rules and regulations, should be resolved in favor of labor.
[1] 3. upon sign off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one-hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
ECOLA
Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (Dusit Hotel) vs. National Union of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries
GR No. 181972, August 25, 2009
Facts:
WO No. 9, approved by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) of the National Capital Region (NCR), took effect on 5 November 2001. It grants P30.00 ECOLA to particular employees and workers of all private sectors.
Section 13. Wage increases/allowances granted by an employer in an organized establishment with three (3) months prior to the effectivity of this Order shall be credited as compliance with the prescribed increase set forth herein, provided the corresponding bargaining agreement provision allowing creditability exists. In the absence of such an agreement or provision in the CBA, any increase granted by the employer shall not be credited as compliance with the increase prescribed in this Order.
The Union reported the non-compliance of Dusit Hotel with WO No. 9, which affected 144 hotel employees. Meanwhile there was an on-going compulsory arbitration before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) due to a bargaining deadlock between the Union and Dusit Hotel; and it also requested immediate assistance on this matter.
An inspection was held, and the DOLE-NCR, directed Dusit Hotel to pay 144 of its employees the total amount of P1,218,240.00, corresponding to their unpaid ECOLA under WO No. 9; plus, the penalty of double indemnity, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6727, as amended by Republic Act No. 8188.
In the meantime, the NLRC rendered a Decision dated 9 October 2002 in NLRC-NCR-CC No. 000215-02 – the compulsory arbitration involving the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) deadlock between Dusit Hotel and the Union – granting the hotel employees the following wage increases, in accord with the CBA:
Effective January 1, 2001- P500.00/month
Effective January 1, 2002- P550.00/month
Effective January 1, 2003- P600.00/month
Dusit Hotel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the DOLE-NCR Order, arguing that the NLRC, resolving the bargaining deadlock between Dusit Hotel and the Union, and awarding salary increases under the CBA to hotel employees retroactive to 1 January 2001, already rendered the DOLE-NCR Order moot and academic. With the increase in the salaries of the hotel employees, along with the hotel employees’ share in the service charges, the 144 hotel employees, covered by the DOLE-NCR Order, would already be receiving salaries beyond the coverage of WO No. 9.
The DOLE Secretary favored Dusit Hotel, hence, the Union appealed with the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the Union and declared that wage increases/allowances granted by the employer shall not be credited as compliance with the prescribed increase in the same Wage Order, unless so provided in the law or the CBA itself; and there was no such provision in the case at bar.
Dusit Hotel filed an MR but it was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals, hence this case.
Issue:
Were the 144 hotel employees were still entitled to ECOLA granted by WO No. 9 despite the increases in their salaries, retroactive to 1 January 2001, ordered by NLRC in the latter’s Decision dated 9 October 2002?
Ruling:
The Court agrees with Dusit Hotel that the increased salaries of the employees should be used as bases for determining whether they were entitled to ECOLA under WO No. 9. The very fact that the NLRC decreed that the salary increases of the Dusit Hotel employees shall be retroactive to 1 January 2001 and 1 January 2002, means that said employees were already supposed to receive the said salary increases beginning on these dates. The increased salaries were the rightful salaries of the hotel employees by 1 January 2001, then again by 1 January 2002. Although belatedly paid, the hotel employees still received their salary increases.
It is only fair and just, therefore, that in determining entitlement of the hotel employees to ECOLA, their increased salaries by 1 January 2001 and 1 January 2002 shall be made the bases. There is no logic in recognizing the salary increases for one purpose (i.e., to recover the unpaid amounts thereof) but not for the other (i.e., to determine entitlement to ECOLA). For the Court to rule otherwise would be to sanction unjust enrichment on the part of the hotel employees, who would be receiving increases in their salaries, which would place them beyond the coverage of Section 1 of WO No. 9, yet still be paid ECOLA under the very same provision.
Money Claims
Grandteq Industrial Steel Products vs. Edna Margallo
G.R. No. 181393, July 28, 2009
Facts:
Grandteq is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling welding electrodes, alloy steels, aluminum and copper alloys. Gonzales is the President/Owner of Grandteq. Grandteq employed Margallo as Sales Engineer. Margallo claimed she availed herself of the car loan program offered to her by Grandteq as a reward for being "Salesman of the Year." She paid the down payment on a brand new Toyota Corolla, amounting to P201,000.00, out of her own pocket. The monthly amortization for the car was P10,302.00, of which P5,302.00 was to be her share and P5,000.00 was to be the share of Grandteq.
On 29 December 2003, Margallo received a letter allegedly questioning Margallos’s acts of working with JVM Industrial Supply and Allied Services concurrent with being employed with Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Margallo claims that she was following her supervisors orders. Margallo then averred that in January 2004, De Leon asked her to just resign, promising that if she did, she would still be paid her commissions and other benefits, as well as be reimbursed her car loan payments. Relying on De Leon’s promise, Margallo tendered on 13 January 2004, her irrevocable resignation, effective immediately.
Margallo, however, alleged that she was never paid her money claims. Grandteq failed to pay her commissions in the sum of P87,508.00, equivalent to 5% of the total sales that she collected as of January 2004, which amounted to P1,750,148.84. Grandteq likewise failed to refund the "sales accommodations" or advances she gave her customers. In addition, after Margallo’s resignation, Grandteq sold her car to Annaliza Estrella, another employee, for P550,000.00.12
The Labor Arbiter held that Margallo was not able to prove by substantial evidence her entitlement to the sales commission, the payment of cash incentive and no right to the reimbursement of her car loan payments under her car loan agreement with Grandteq.
NLRC partially reversed the decision and ordered Grandteq and Gonzales reimburse the car loan payments made by Margallo the NLRC reasoned. NLRC affirmed her entitlement to the unpaid sales commission, but not to the cash incentive. Like the NLRC, the Court of Appeals found that Margallo had a right to be reimbursed her car loan payments, and the terms of the car loan agreement between Margallo and Grandteq should not be applied for being highly prejudicial to the employee’s interest. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the order of the NLRC that Grandteq and Gonzales pay Margallo her sales commission, placing the burden upon the employer to prove that the employee’s money claims had been paid:
Issue:
Is Margallo entitled reimbursement for car loans?
Ruling:
The Court, is in agreement with the Court of Appeals and the NLRC. Generally speaking, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The Court rigorously disapproves contracts that demonstrate a clear attempt to exploit the employee and deprive him of the protection sanctioned by both the Constitution and the Labor Code. The Constitution and the Labor Code mandate the protection of labor. Hence, as a matter of judicial policy, this Court has, in a number of instances, leaned backwards to protect labor and the working class against the machinations and incursions of their more financially entrenched employers.
Although not strictly a labor contract, the car loan agreement herein involves a benefit extended by the employers, Grandteq and Gonzales, to their employee, Margallo. It should benefit, and not unduly burden, Margallo. The Court cannot, in any way, uphold a car loan agreement that threatens the employee with the forfeiture of all the car loan payments he/she had previously made, plus loss of the possession of the car, should the employee wish to resign; otherwise, said agreement can then be used by the employer as an instrument to either hold said employee hostage to the job or punish him/her for resigning.
The Court further finds no error in the grant by the Court of Appeals and the NLRC of Margallo’s claim for sales commission. In cases involving money claims of employees, the employer has the burden of proving that the employees did receive their wages and benefits and that the same were paid in accordance with law. It is settled that once the employee has set out with particularity in his complaint, position paper, affidavits and other documents the labor standard benefits he is entitled to, and which the employer allegedly failed to pay him, it becomes the employer’s burden to prove that it has paid these money claims. One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; and even where the employees must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment.
Gina Tiangco et. al. vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club
G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Tiangco was employed by respondent USWCI as concession manager. In 1998, she was designated as group merchandising manager for the fashion and personal care department. On the other hand, petitioner Manego was initially employed as buyer but was promoted as senior category head with. Petitioners Tiangco and Manego respectively filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, payment of separation pay as well as award of moral and exemplary damages in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaints were consolidated.
The respondents filed a manifestation and motion praying that the proceedings on the consolidated cases be suspended on the ground that respondent USWCI had been placed in a state of suspension of payments by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a receivership committee had in fact been appointed. The labor arbiter suspended the proceedings until further orders from the SEC.
Then petitioners filed a motion to reopen case on the ground that the SEC had already approved the second amendment to the rehabilitation plan (SARP) of respondent USWCI. In their opposition to the motion, respondents argued that the proceedings in the consolidated cases must remain suspended inasmuch as the mere approval of the SARP did not constitute a valid ground for their reopening.
Issue:
Can the consolidated illegal dismissal cases be reopened at this point of the SEC proceedings for respondent USWCI’s rehabilitation?
Ruling:
No. The term “claim,” as contemplated in Section 6 (c), refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It is the assertion of rights for the payment of money. Here, petitioners have pecuniary claims—the payment of separation pay and moral and exemplary damages. In Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC [365 Phil. 273 (1999)], the Court held that a labor claim is a “claim” within the contemplation of PD 902-A, as amended. This is consistent with the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation which came out in 2000. Thus, labor claims are included among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employer-corporations. Labor claims are included among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employer-corporations. The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions “shall be suspended accordingly.” No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. The suspensive effect of the stay order is not time-bound. As held in Rubberworld, it continues to be in effect as long as reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose.
Reimbursement of Salaries and Benefits
College of Immaculate Conception vs. NLRC, et. al.
G.R. No. 167563, March 22, 2010
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Marius Carlos was appointed as Dean of the Department of Business, Economics and Accountancy effective June 1, 1996 until May 31, 2000. Upon the expiry of his 4-year term, he was appointed as full-time professor of Law and Accounting without diminution of his teaching salary as Dean. Subsequently he was requested to vacate the Dean’s office. Respondent said that his demotion from Dean of the Department to a Faculty member was without legal basis and that the non-renewal of his appointment as Dean was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, tainted with abuse of discretion. Petitioner replied that there was no demotion in position from Dean to Faculty member, because respondent’s appointment as Dean was for a fixed period of four (4) years. Petitioner informed respondent that he will not be assigned any teaching load for the succeeding semester pursuant to Section 16.8,[1] CHED Memorandum No. 19, Series of 1998. Respondent protested the imposition of the sanction and filed a complaint against petitioner before Regional Arbitration Branch No. III of San Fernando, Pampanga, for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, with payment of backwages and damages. Petitioner denied dismissing respondent and alleged that the sanction imposed on him was based on the mandate of Section 16.8, CHED Memorandum No. 19, Series of 1998.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed and ordered him to be reinstated to his former position, as DEAN, with award for backwages. Petitioner opted to reinstate respondent on its payroll but appealed the decision of the LA to the NLRC which rendered a Decision, setting aside the LA’s decision and dismissing the complaint of respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration. The NLRC, in its Resolution denied petitioner's motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the respondent to return all the monetary benefits he had received on account of his payroll reinstatement as Dean. The CA dismissed the petition and sustained the ruling of the NLRC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Issue:
Is petitioner entitled to reimbursement of salaries and benefits?
Ruling:
No. Petitioner could not validly insist that it is entitled to reimbursement for the payment of the salaries of respondent pursuant to the execution of the LA's decision by simply arguing that the LA's order for reinstatement is incorrect.
Applying Paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code[2], a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.
An employee cannot be compelled to reimburse the salaries and wages he received during the pendency of his appeal, notwithstanding the reversal by the NLRC of the LA's order of reinstatement. In this case, there is even more reason to hold the employee entitled to the salaries he received pending appeal, because the NLRC did not reverse the LA's order of reinstatement, but merely declared the correct position to which respondent is to be reinstated, i.e., that of full-time professor, and not as Dean.
[1] x xx faculty members teaching in more than one school must give formal notice in their teaching assignment to all schools concerned; failure to give notices mean automatic withdrawal or cancellation of his teaching assignment and non-assignment of teaching load for the succeeding semester.
[2] In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein. (Emphasis supplied)
Retirement Benefits
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Antonio
G.R. No. 171587, Oct. 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines is a domestic corporation doing business in the Philippines. Respondent was hired by petitioner since December 12, 1981 to work as a seaman on board its various vessels. In January 1996, respondent took the licensure examinations for 2nd Engineer while petitioner’s vessel was dry-docked for repairs. On February 13, 1996, while in Yokohama, Japan and in the employ of petitioner, he suffered a fractured left transverse process of the fourth lumbar vertebra and was advised to rest for a month. He was later examined by the company doctor and declared fit to resume work. However, he was not admitted back to work. Respondent applied for an optional retirement on January 16, 1997 but was disapproved by petitioner on the ground that his shipboard employment history and track record as a seaman did not meet the standard required in granting the optional retirement benefits. Respondent filed a complaint for payment of optional retirement benefits against petitioner with DOLE which was forwarded to the NLRC for proper proceedings upon failure to settle amicably.
In its defense, petitioner alleged that sometime in January 1996, respondent filed a vacation leave to take the licensure examinations for 2nd Engineer while his vessel was dry-docked for repairs. The following month, respondent filed another vacation leave for an alleged medical check-up. Having passed the licensure examinations for 2nd Engineer, he signified his intention to petitioner that he be assigned to a vessel for the said position. Since there was still no vacancy in the desired position, respondent was instructed to undergo medical examinations as a prerequisite for boarding a vessel. He was found to be medically fit. Respondent, however, failed to report to petitioner after undergoing the medical examinations. On January 16, 1997, respondent suddenly went to the office and decided to avail himself of the company's retirement gratuity plan by formally applying for payment of his optional retirement benefits due to financial reasons. Petitioner denied his application ratiocinating that his shipboard employment history and track record as a seaman did not meet the standard required in granting the optional retirement benefits.
The LA rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. It found that respondent was forced to file his optional retirement due to petitioner's failure to give him any work assignment despite his recovery from his injury and was declared fit to work. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC on grounds of serious errors which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to petitioner and for grave abuse of discretion. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the LA and dismissed petitioner's appeal. It held that petitioner’s denial of respondent's application for optional retirement benefits was arbitrary and illegal. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA affirmed the resolutions of the NLRC, but modified the award of moral damages and deleted the award of exemplary damages. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Is respondent entitled to optional retirement benefit?
Ruling:
No. Under the Labor Code, the age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement or employment contract. In the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under Article 287 of the Labor Code, the mandated compulsory retirement age is set at 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. In the case at bar, there is a retirement gratuity plan between the petitioner and the respondent, and under Paragraph B of the plan, a shipboard employee, upon his written request, may retire from service if he has reached the eligibility age of 60 years. In this case, the option to retire lies with the employee. Records show that respondent was only 41 years old when he applied for optional retirement, which was 19 years short of the required eligibility age. Thus, he cannot claim optional retirement benefits as a matter of right.Under Paragraph C of the retirement gratuity plan, the option to retire is exclusively lodged in the employer. Although respondent may have rendered at least 3,650 days of service on board a vessel, which qualifies him for optional retirement under Paragraph C, however, he cannot demand the same as a matter of right. If an employee upon rendering at least 3,650 days of service would automatically be entitled to the benefits of the gratuity plan, then it would not have been termed as optional, as the foregoing scenario would make the retirement mandatory and compulsory.
Execution of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision
Marmosy Trading, Inc. and Victor Morales vs. Court of Appeals, NLRC, Labor Arbiter Salinas, and Joselito Hubilla
G.R. No. 170515; May 6, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Victor Morales is the President and General Manager of Marmosy Trading, Inc., a domestic corporation, which terminated the services of respondent Joselito Hubilla, who was a technical salesman of the company, at the time of his dismissal. An illegal dismissal case was filed by the respondent against the petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. The labor arbiter ruled that the private respondent’s dismissal was illegal and without just and valid cause. Thus, the petitioners were ordered by the labor arbiter to reinstate Hubilla, and pay him backwages, among others. The petitioners elevated the case to the NLRC but the appeal was denied for lack of merit. After the NLRC resolution became final and executory, the private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. Undeterred, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which outrightly dismissed the petition because of procedural infirmities. The appellate court’s resolution became final and executory and an Entry of Judgment was issued by it on November 25, 2000. Petitioners went up to the Supreme Court via a petition for review docketed as GR No. 145881. The Supreme Court denied the petition for late filing of the petition and and failure to show reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court on August 2001. Respondent Hubilla then moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. The labor arbiter issued such writ on August 28, 2001, but the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with a motion to recall the writ of execution. The same was denied by the labor arbiter on October 22, 2001. The labor arbiter directed the sheriff of the NLRC to proceed with the execution. Not satisfied, the petitioners appealed the labor arbiter’s order before the NLRC, which however, denied the same because of the non-filing of the petitioners of a supersedeas bond and that the same did not raise any new issues. Thus, an alias writ of execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter, which ordered the NLRC sheriff to collect the sum of P251,927.12 from the petitioners and if the cash could not be collected, to cause the satisfaction of the same out of the movables, chattels and in the absence thereof, to the immovable not exempt from execution. The Sheriff garnished petitioners account with Equitable-PCI Bank in the amount of P22,896.58,25 which was later released to the NLRC cashier and, thereafter, turned over to the respondent as partial satisfaction of the judgment in his favor. Petitioners objected, through a motion for reconsideration, to the garnishment alleging that the account in the said bank belongs to both Marmosy Trading, Inc and petitioner Morales, and that only Marmosy Trading Inc. was the employer of the private respondent. The labor arbiter denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The NLRC also dismissed the petitioners’ appeal.
Unsatisfied, the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals, which denied their petition for certiorari. The appellate court ruled that since petitioner Morales was likewise ordered in the decision sought to be executed to pay private respondent, the Sheriff properly levied on his real property. Section 2 Rule 4 of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides that the Sheriff or proper officer shall enforce the execution of a money judgment by levying on all the property, real and personal, of the losing party, of whatever name and nature and which may be disposed of for value, not exempt from execution. The petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is the CA decision allowing the notice of levy to be annotated on the title of the real property registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59496 in the name of petitioner Victor Morales, in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence?
Ruling:
Yes, the annotation of the notice of levy cannot anymore be questioned by petitioner Victor Morales because he is barred, by the fact of a final judgment, from questioning the annotation. We disfavor delay in the enforcement of the labor arbiter’s decision. The Labor Arbiter’s decision has long become final and executory and it can no longer be reversed or modified. Everything considered, what should be enforced thru an order or writ of execution in this case is the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision as affirmed by the NLRC, the Court of Appeals and this Court. Since the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter does not vary but is in fact completely consistent with the final decision in this case, the order of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter is beyond challenge.
It is no longer legally feasible to modify the final ruling in this case through the expediency of a petition questioning the order of execution. This late in the day, petitioner Victor Morales is barred, by the fact of a final judgment, from advancing the argument that his real property cannot be made liable for the monetary award in favor of respondent. For a reason greater than protection from personal liability, petitioner Victor Morales, as president of his corporation, cannot rely on our previous ruling that "to hold a director personally liable for debts of a corporation and thus pierce the veil of corporate fiction, the bad faith or wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and convincingly." The final judgment in this case may no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court. The reason for this is that, a litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies.