SULAW 2011
VICKY MOSTER VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES
G.R. No. 167461, February 19, 2008
BP 22
Facts:
Petitioner obtained from Presas a loan of P450,000, for which the petitioner issued as payment three postdated PhilBank checks. The three checks were all payable to cash. Presas testified she did not deposit the checks on their due dates upon petitioner’s request and assurance that they would be replaced with cash. When she could not wait any longer, Presas deposited Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 in her Westmont Bank account, only to be notified later that the checks were dishonored because the account had been closed. Presas said she did not deposit Check No. 026137 after she agreed to petitioner’s request to withhold its deposit as it had not yet been funded. After receiving notice that Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 had been dishonored, Presas immediately informed petitioner thereof and demanded payment for the value of the checks. This demand, however, went unheeded.
In a letter, Presas through counsel, demanded from petitioner the settlement of P367,602, representing the total value of the three checks, within five days from receipt. Petitioner, however, did not comply. Thus, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of a violation of BP 22?
Ruling:
NO. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes as malum prohibitum the mere issuance of a worthless check, provided the other elements of the offense are proved. Section 1 enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22, as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Upon careful examination of the records, however, the Court found that only the first and third elements have been established by the prosecution. By her own admission, petitioner issued the three subject checks, two of which were presented to PhilBank but were dishonored and stamped for the reason “Account Closed”. Under Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22, the introduction in evidence of the dishonored check, having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuing of the said checks and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks.
As to the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.
Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. But in criminal cases, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioner through registered mail and the registry return card. There was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of petitioner or her authorized agent remains a mystery. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. Unfortunately, the prosecution presented only the testimony of Presas to prove mailing and receipt of the demand letter
JAMES SVENDSEN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175381, February 26, 2008
BP 22
Facts:
Cristina Reyes (Cristina) extended a loan to petitioner in the amount of P200,000, to bear interest at 10% a month. After petitioner had partially paid his obligation, he failed to settle the balance thereof which had reached P380,000 inclusive of interest.
Cristina thus filed a collection suit against petitioner, which was eventually settled when petitioner paid her P200,000 and issued in her favor an International Exchange Bank check postdated February 2, 1999 (the check) in the amount of P160,000 representing interest. The check was co-signed by one Wilhelm Bolton.
When the check was presented for payment on February 9, 1999, it was dishonored for having been Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF).
Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to petitioner by registered mail informing him that the check was dishonored by the drawee bank, and demanding that he make it good within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
No settlement having been made by petitioner, an Information for violation of BP 22 was filed against the two.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of a violation of BP 22?
Ruling:
NO. For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites must thus concur: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to Cristina. The check, however, was dishonored when deposited for payment in Banco de Oro due to DAIF. Hence, the first and the third elements obtain in the case.
The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second element. While the registry receipt, which is said to cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of demand sent to petitioner, was presented, there is no proof that he or a duly authorized agent received the same. Receipts for registered letters including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
Petitioner is civilly liable, however. For in a criminal case, the social injury is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, whereas with respect to the personal injury of the victim, it is sought to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in nature.
ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 147578-85, January 28, 2008
Direct Bribery
Facts:
Rolando L. Balderama was employed with the Land Transportation Commission (LTO) assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento, respondent, operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units.
Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport discriminate against passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on a “contract” basis, the LTO created a team to look into the veracity of the complaints.
The team flagged down for inspection an “SJ Taxi” owned by respondent. The team impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon inspection and testing by the LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the meter waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was functioning normally. The vehicle was released to respondent.
Respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioner. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting “protection money” from him.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of direct bribery?
Ruling:
YES. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as “protection money” from respondent on several dates. As against the prosecution’s evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of defenses.
To hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners and Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of respondent, causing him undue injury.
Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. We found none of these exceptions in the present cases.
ZENON R. PEREZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008
Malversation of Public Funds
Facts:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine.
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation?
Ruling:
YES. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was accountable for the public funds under his custody or control. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.
Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion. Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision.
However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed. In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or control.
RAUL S. TELLO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165781, June 5, 2009
Malversation of Public Funds
Facts:
Raul S. Tello was a Telegraph Operator and Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Lordino Tomampos Saligumba, Commission on Audit Auditor II assigned at the office of the Provincial Auditor of Agusan del Sur, received an order directing him and Dionisio Virtudazo to conduct an audit examination of petitioner’s accounts. Saligumba and Virtudazo conducted an audit where it was initially determined that petitioner had a shortage in the total amount of P6,152.90. When the auditors questioned petitioner on the official receipts of the bank to confirm the remittance advices, petitioner informed them that they were sent to the regional office of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Saligumba wrote the unit auditor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), San Francisco, Agusan del Sur branch, requesting for confirmation of petitioner’s remittances and a list of validated remittances from 1 January to 9 December 1986. In a letter dated 10 December 1986, PNB’s branch auditor informed Saligumba that petitioner did not make any remittance to the bank from 31 July 1985 to 30 October 1986. Saligumba secured copies of the official receipts and compared them with the remittance advices submitted by petitioner and found that the bank’s official receipts did not correspond with petitioner’s remittance advices. The auditors found that the total shortage incurred by petitioner amounted to P204,607.70. Petitioner failed to submit his explanation and to produce or restitute the missing funds. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the RPC.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation?
Ruling:
YES. The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the RPC are:
1. that the offender is a public officer; 2. that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; 3. that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and 4. that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
In this case, all the elements of the crime are present. Petitioner is a public officer. He took his Oath of Office as Acting Operator-in-Charge on 13 January 1982. Regional Office Order No. 35 dated 27 September 1984 designated petitioner as Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge aside from his regular duties as Acting Operator-in-Charge of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. He was appointed Telegraph Operator effective 1 March 1986.
As Telegraph Operator and Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge, petitioner was in charge of the collections which he was supposed to remit to the PNB. The funds are public funds for which petitioner was accountable. It was also established that petitioner misappropriated the money. He failed to remit his cash collections and falsified the entries in the cashbooks to make it appear that he remitted the money to PNB. Petitioner failed to explain the discrepancies and shortage in his accounts and he failed to restitute the missing amount upon demand. It was also established that petitioner stopped reporting to work starting 8 December 1986.
Petitioner did not present any testimonial evidence for his defense. Instead, he merely manifested that he only incurred a shortage of P6,152.90, the initial shortage found by the auditors.
The last paragraph of Article 217 of the RPC states: “The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.”
In this case, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of malversation. He did not present testimonial evidence to defend himself. He practically admitted the shortage except that he manifested, contrary to the evidence presented by the prosecution, that only the amount of P6,152.90 was missing. He did not report to his office when the audit examination started. We sustain the Sandiganbayan’s finding that petitioner’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
VIOLETA BAHILIDAD VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010
Malversation of Public Funds
Facts: Acting on a complaint filed by a “Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province” with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants and donations using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its investigation from June 1 to July 31, 2003. Included in the list of alleged fictitious associations that benefited from the financial assistance given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), People’s Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in the amount of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof. Based on its findings, the Special Audit Team recommended the filing of charges of malversation through falsification of public documents against the officials involved. Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation of public funds? Ruling: NO. In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The trial court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction.
In the instant case, we find petitioner’s participation in the crime not adequately proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her name. A cursory look at the disbursement voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals the following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz certifying that the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision; signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and propriety of the supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash advances; signature of Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of Provincial Treasurer Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is available; signature of Constantino, with the initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name, certifying that the disbursement is approved for payment, and with petitioner’s signature as the payee.
The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioner’s name and, as payee, she had the authority to encash it. All told, there is reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an accused must be acquitted even though his innocence may not have been fully established. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, exoneration must be granted as a matter of right. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO CALONGE G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010 Parricide Facts: Rosita A. Calonge was appellant’s legitimate wife, with whom he had three children. On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning, the Villaverde Police Station received a radio call from the barangay captain of Cabuluan that a massacre took place in their locality. Rosita’s bloodied body was found lying on the ground about fifteen (15) meters away from their house. Her right hand was loosely clasping a knife. Lying on his back near the stairs was appellant who was also wounded but still conscious. Beside him were a bolo and a flashlight, both stained with blood. While the windows of the house were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door was already opened. Inside the two “bedrooms” of the house separated only by a curtain, they found the lifeless bodies of the two young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other child, Melody, was also bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought Melody to the Veterans Regional Hospital where she was treated and confined for seventeen days. Melody’s grandparents said they knew it was appellant because they had heard Rosita shouting that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when appellant was asked what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does not know. Appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide. Issue: Is the accused guilty of the crime charged? Ruling: YES. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no one else but the appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. In the killing of victims in this case, the trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected than when a father stabs to death his two young daughters while they were sound asleep and totally defenseless. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS LUIS ANTONIO GARCHITORENA G.R. No. 184172, May 8, 2009 Parricide Facts: On appeal is the 21 January 2008 Decision of the Court of affirming the conviction of appellant Luis Antonio Garchitorena of the crime of parricide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the16th day of [August 2000], in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, being then the legitimate husband of FLORDELIZA TABLA GARCHITORENA, with intent to kill, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of said FLORDELIZA TABL[A] GARCHITORENA, his wife, by then and there shooting her with a gun, hitting her on the head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wound, which was the direct and immediate cause of her untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FLORDELIZA TABLA GARCHITORENA.
Issue: Is accused guilty of parricide? Ruling: YES.The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. It was stipulated during the pre-trial that appellant and the victim are married on 24 August 1999. That the appellant killed the victim was proven specifically by circumstantial evidence.
As aptly stated by the trial court:
In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances warrant a finding that accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fact that accused and the deceased were the only persons in the bedroom when the shooting incident occurred is undisputed. Secondly, there was an argument between the spouses, as narrated by the accused to the police investigator and during trial. Thirdly, accused, giving no logical excuse, got a gun. In this, the Court finds criminal purpose. Also, there is a finding by this Court of improbability of the deceased shooting herself.
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of the deceased by the accused, the established circumstances aforestated, however, constituted an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other [hypothesis] that he is not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inaccurate and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RENATO ESPAÑOL
G.R. No. 175603, February 13, 2009
Parricide Facts: At about 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, Domingo Petilla was waiting for his companions at Pantal Road, Dagupan City on their way to Manila. All of a sudden, he heard two successive gunshots. A few moments later, a yellow tricycle sped past him along Pantal Road headed towards Sitio Guibang, Dagupan City. The tricycle was driven by a man wearing a dark-colored long-sleeved shirt. Petilla’s companions arrived shortly thereafter on board a van. As they started loading their things, they saw, through the lights of their vehicle, a person lying on the pavement along Pantal Road. Upon closer scrutiny, they discovered the lifeless body of Gloria Español. The gunshots were also heard by Harold Villanueva, a boatman working at the Pantal River, while he was waiting for passengers at the dock about 100 meters away from the crime scene. The shots were followed by the sound of a motorcycle’s revving engine. He then saw a speeding yellow tricycle. The tricycle bore the name “Rina” in front of its cab. Its driver was wearing a dark jacket and blue pants. Out of curiosity, he (the boatman) went there and recognized the victim as one of his regular passengers. Appellant arrived at the scene and Villanueva noticed that the appellant seemed to be wearing the same clothes as those worn by the driver of the speeding tricycle. He was subsequently charged of parricide. Issue: Is the accused guilty of parricide? Ruling: YES. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, parricide is the killing of one’s legitimate or illegitimate father, mother, child, any ascendant, descendant or spouse and is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. None of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual killing of the victim by appellant. However, their separate and detailed accounts of the surrounding circumstances reveal only one conclusion: that it was appellant who killed his wife. Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is accorded great respect in the absence of proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily or that the trial court overlooked material facts. The rationale behind this rule is that the credibility of a witness can best be determined by the trial court since it has the direct opportunity to observe the candor and demeanor of the witnesses at the witness stand and detect if they are telling the truth or not. The Court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. In sum, the guilt of appellant was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence. Reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed considering that there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present. The heirs of the victim are entitled to a civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for the death.
People vs. Tabuelog
G.R. No. 178059, January 22, 2008
Murder
Facts:
An Information was filed charging appellant with murder. The accused admits that he stabbed Clinton Badinas on or about that time on said place and as a consequence of the wound he sustained Clinton Badinas died. However, he claimed that he acted in self-defense.
The trial court found the version of the prosecution credible thus rejecting appellant’s theory of self-defense. On May 6, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of murder.
Appellant alleges that the justifying circumstance of self-defense was not properly considered in his favor; that assuming the killing was committed not in self-defense, still the courts below erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Issue:
Is appellant’s contention meritorious?
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
In invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence since he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act. One who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. If the accused’s evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail.
We agree with the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the defense miserably
In the instant case, appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; moreover, his narration of the events was unbelievable. As correctly observed by the trial court, considering the alleged disadvantageous position of the appellant and the relentless assault from the victim, it is surprising that appellant remained unscathed. The presence of a pitcher and a knife conveniently within the reach of appellant was highly suspect and coincidental. As noted by the trial court, "the presence of a pitcher of water which the accused picked up to repel the attack of the deceased and the knife which the accused was able to grasp and swung it to the (victim) hitting him near the left armpit seems to suggest that pitchers and knives are scattered around Fort Ilocandia."11 Moreover, if it were true that the victim was pursuing Roger Domingo with a broken bottle, then it is preposterous for the appellant to shout at and order Domingo, instead of the victim, to stop, thus putting Domingo’s life at risk. Further, if Domingo stopped as narrated by appellant, then it is inconceivable that he was not harmed by his alleged pursuer.
In fine, the trial court correctly held that the defense failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There being no unlawful aggression, there is no need to discuss whether the means employed to repel the attack was reasonable or whether appellant sufficiently provoked the victim into attacking him.
However, we cannot agree with the findings of the trial court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because "the attack by the accused upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any possible way for the victim to defend himself." Nevertheless, mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.
It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him. In the instant case, there was no proof that appellant consciously adopted the mode of attack, hence he may only be held liable for homicide, not murder.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant guilty of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds appellant guilty of Homicide.
People vs. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010
Murder, Self-defense
Facts:
On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three (3) counts of attempted murder were filed against appellant.
When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts.
Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence. He admits having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.
Issue:
Did the accused act in self-defense?
Ruling:
No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:
One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.
In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge has the best opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such exceptions obtains in this case.
In Razon v. People, we held:
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellant’s plea of self-defense.
This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.
The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that treachery was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and appellant’s testimony that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 is correct.
We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his death had medical help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death.
People vs. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010
Murder qualified by Treachery
Facts:
In an Information filed on August 11, 2003, accused-appellant Leozar Dela Cruz y Balobal was indicted for the crime of murder of Vincent Pimentel under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On September 5, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Leozar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder attended by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. On February 27, 2008, the CA rendered the appealed decision, affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction of Leozar but modifying the award of damages.
Accused raises the same assignment of errors as in his Brief, to wit: first, that the courts a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery; and second, that the courts a quo gravely erred in convicting him of murder instead of homicide.
Issue:
Was there treachery?
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that Leozar and Vincent did not quarrel prior to the killing is indicative of the treachery employed by Leozar. After Vincent paid Leozar some money, he left and went inside the alley. When Vincent came back to Mockingbird St. from the alley, Leozar deliberately employed means with treachery affording Vincent no opportunity to defend himself, i.e., Leozar draped his arm around Vincent and slash/slit his neck using a 24-inch bladed samurai. The fatal neck wound caused Vincent’s death, described in his death certificate as "hemorrhagic shock secondary to an incised wound of the neck." All told, the victim was unaware of the imminent attempt on his life, and was not in a position to defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
People vs. Tabarnero
G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010
Self-defense, Voluntary Surrender
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027 dated April 29, 2005. In said Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the August 29, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78 of Malolos, Bulacan, in Crim. Case No. 888-M-2000, convicting herein appellants Alberto Tabarnero (Alberto) and Gary Tabarnero (Gary) of the crime of Murder.
Apellants contended that the court a quo gravely erred in not considering the justifying circumstance of self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender interposed by accused-appellant Gary Tabarnero.
Issue:
Are the contentions meritorious?
Ruling:
No. The justifying circumstance of self-defense on the part of Gary cannot be considered
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel aggression.
The defense invokes the said justifying circumstance, claiming that all of the above three elements are present in the case at bar. There was allegedly unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto when the latter delivered the first blow with the lead pipe. According to the defense, the means Gary used to defend himself was reasonable, and the shouting shouted professions of his feelings for about Mary Jane could not be considered provocation sufficient for Ernesto to make the unlawful aggression.
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement of self-defense of self-defense. As ruled by the Court of Appeals, the evidence presented by Gary to prove the alleged unlawful aggression, namely, his own testimony, is insufficient and self-serving. The alleged sudden appearance of Ernesto and his first attack with the lead pipe the very moment Gary decided to leave seems to this Court to be all too convenient, considering that there was no one around to witness the start of the fight.
It also bears to emphasize that by invoking self-defense, Gary, in effect, admitted killing Ernesto, thus, shifting upon him the burden of evidence to prove the elements of the said justifying circumstance. A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful in itself.
The defense further argues that assuming that Gary is not qualified to avail of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he would nevertheless be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
The first assignment of error presents another issue for the consideration of this Court. The defense argues that Gary’s yielding to Alarma should be credited as a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The Solicitor General agreed with the defense on this point. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed, and held that the delay of six months before surrendering negates spontaneity, a requisite for voluntary surrender to be considered mitigating.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited to the accused, the following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses in capturing him.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Edgar Esqueda vs. People of the Philippines
GR 170222, June 18, 2009
Defense of Alibi
Facts:
Edgar Esqueda and one John Doe were charged with two (2) counts of Frustrated Murder in two (2) separate Amended Informations. Accused Edgar entered a plea of not guilty. Accused John Doe remains at-large.
On December 12, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 33, rendered a Decision acquitting the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 14612 and convicting him in Criminal Case No. 14609. The CA rendered a Decision dated August 19, 2004 dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition assigning the following error:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING HIS DEFENSE.
Petitioner's defense is anchored on alibi and denial. His witnesses, Claudio, Domingo and Viviana, aver that during the time of the incident, petitioner was out at sea fishing. Petitioner, when called to the witness stand, denied having committed the crime.
Issue:
Should the petition be granted?
Ruling:
No. We have unfailingly held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. In the present case, petitioner was positively identified by Venancia and Gaudencio as the author of the crime.
Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Where there is least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.
Aside from the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses that he was fishing at Cawitan, Sta. Catalina from 8 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999 until 2 o'clock in the morning the following day, petitioner was unable to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
During the trial of the case, both the prosecution and defense witnesses testified that Nagbinlod and Cawitan, Sta. Catalina, were merely more than 5 kilometers apart which would only take about 20 to 40 minutes’ ride. Thus, it was not physically impossible for the petitioner to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.
People vs. Bucayo
G.R. No. 178770, June 13, 2008
Murder qualified by the use of superior strength
Facts:
Jonathan Perez and childhood friend Edison Buencillo, Jr. were on their way to visit Jonathan’s common-law wife, Princess, who lived in Tondo. As they were walking along A. Rivera St., they passed by the group of Fernando and Hector Bucayo and Cesar and Jayson Ortiz, all of whom Jonathan recognized. The group asked Jonathan and Edison to join them but the two declined the invitation and proceeded to Princess’ house where they stayed for 15 minutes. They took the same route home and on their way, the group, joined by a certain Pamboy, Fortune, and some others, surrounded and blocked them. As the group taunted and shouted invectives at Jonathan and Edison, a rumble ensued. Jonathan attempted to flee but was dragged back to the melee by Hector. Jonathan saw Hector and Jayson gang up on Edison, as Fernando struck Jonathan repeatedly with a steel chair. As Jonathan was trying to escape, he got hold of a barbecue stick and stabbed Hector with it. Jonathan said he witnessed the assault on Edison and threw stones at the group to make them stop but his attempts were futile. Neither was his call for help heard. He asked for police assistance, and ran to Edison’s house to inform the latter’s mother of the melee. Edison expired at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Hospital.
After trial, on March 16, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision finding the accused Fernando and Hector guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by superior strength for the death of Edison. The case against Cesar and Jayson were archived to be revived upon their arrest.
On April 30, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.
The lone issue presented before this Court is:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE.
Accused-appellants asserted that the testimony of Jonathan was not credible because he could not have witnessed everything that was happening because he was himself under attack.
Issue:
Is accused-appellants’ assertion meritorious?
Ruling:
No. Essentially, accused-appellants’ claim, that the testimony of Jonathan ought not to be believed simply because Jonathan could not have witnessed the mauling of Edison since he himself was under attack, has no basis. Both the trial and appellate courts found Jonathan’s testimony credible and their findings should be given full faith and credit. Time and again, we said that the findings by the RTC should be respected as the trial court judge was in the best position to determine the witness’ credibility. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the determination of credibility of witnesses is properly within the domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe their demeanor. This conclusion becomes all the more pressing when the appellate court affirms the findings of the trial court.
It also bears remembering that people react differently in different situations and there is no standard human response when one is confronted with a strange and frightful experience. Even if a witness is himself attacked, he is still in a position to later on describe what has transpired. In some situations, when under siege, one’s power of observation becomes even more acute and heightened. Recall that at that time Edison was being mauled to death with a steel chair, Jonathan was not himself under siege and even testified that at that time, he was even hurling stones at Edison’s maulers.
Lastly, the CA found that Jonathan had no reason to fabricate what he witnessed. As against Jonathan’s straightforward and convincing testimony, the alibi of Fernando that he was asleep in his house and the denial of Hector that they confronted and assaulted Jonathan and Edison miserably fail. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses and as against positive identification by prosecution witnesses, alibi is worthless. Just as alibi is an inherently weak defense, so is denial since these are self-serving negative evidence that cannot be accorded much evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellants Fernando and Hector Bucayo is DISMISSED. The April 30, 2007 Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
People of the Phil. Vs. Zaldy Garcia Y Ancheta
G.R. No.174479, June 17, 2008
Crime of murder qualified by treachery
Facts:
The prosecution charged the accused-appellant Zaldy Garcia y Ancheta for the murder of Major Opina qualified by treachery, attended by the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, under two separate informations. The charge for violating R.A. 6425 is no longer under review after the RTC acquitted the appellant on ground of reasonable doubt. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges laid.
On August 26, 2003, the RTC convicted the accused of the crime of murder. The case was elevated to this Court on automatic appeal but was remanded to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with People v. Mateo. The CA decision of May 31, 2006 affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
In his brief, the appellant argues that the RTC erred –
1. in convicting him after the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
2. in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery;
3. in failing to recognize the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in imposing the penalty.
Issue:
Should the appeal be granted?
Ruling:
No.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The appellant contends, as his first point, that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt; no one really testified that it was he who shot Major Opina.
We clarify at the outset that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not solely established by direct evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may present circumstantial evidence that, under given conditions, may meet the evidentiary standard of "proof beyond reasonable doubt" in criminal cases. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The conclusions that can be drawn from the chain of proven circumstances rather than their number are material to prove the guilt of the accused. What is paramount is that facts be proven from which inferences may be drawn - with all the circumstances being consistent with one other - that the accused is guilty and this inference is consistent with no other conclusion except that of guilt.
The records of this case show that evidence of who actually shot Major Opina is not lacking. In fact, the evidence is the strongest there is, as the appellant himself admitted in open court that he was the one who wielded the gun and pulled the trigger.
The Presence of Treachery
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender’s deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution.
The appellant seeks to negate these elements of treachery by claiming to have acted out of fear and nervousness; he was allegedly under these stresses because persons who were armed, dressed in civilian clothes and who did not identify themselves as members of the police, scaled his fence. He simply reacted to the intrusion and had no plan to shoot one of those who so approached his house. Hence, he concludes that there was no treachery and the killing could not have been attended by this qualifying circumstance. He posits that the court a quo should have recognized all these.
What are the undisputed facts?
First, it is not disputed that the appellant went out of his house to see for himself the two men who came. Second, by his own testimony, he returned to his house to get his gun. Third, no immediate shooting took place. The two policemen still called for backup assistance, waited and conferred on what to do, and only after the backup came did they scale the fence. Twenty minutes must have elapsed from the time the appellant went inside the house up to the time of the actual shooting. Fourth, Major Opina was almost at the door of the appellant’s house when the shot that killed him rang out. Fifth, the shot came from inside the house through a closed chicken wire screen door that effectively hid a man from inside the house from someone from the outside. Sixth, the first and fatal shot was sudden, immediately hitting Major Opina.
We conclude from all these established facts that indeed treachery had attended the killing of Major Opina. While the original initiative originated from the police who sought to arrest the appellant, the latter’s response was an attack which showed, by its method and manner, that it did not come at the spur of the moment. The appellant was duly forewarned about the identities of Major Opina and SPO4 Oriña. Not only was he forewarned, he had ample time to reflect on what to do. His immediate response was to arm himself and to lie in wait – in ambush, literally - and to fire from a position of concealment and relative safety at the two policemen who were fully exposed and in the open at the time. The shooting distance of a little more than a meter effectively gave Major Opina no chance. This, in our view, is a classic example of treachery under the definition of the Revised Penal Code of the term.
Voluntary Surrender
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without these reasons and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender is the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender cannot be spontaneous and cannot be the "voluntary surrender" that serves as a mitigating circumstance.
Again, to hark back to the undisputed facts, no surrender immediately took place after the shooting of Major Opina; what followed was an exchange of shots between the appellant and SPO4 Oriña, after which the appellant holed out in his kitchen for some two to three hours. It was only after negotiations with Chief Inspector Lusad that he gave himself up. Thus, SPO3 Benavidez testified that the negotiation was "quite long." SPO4 Oriña, on the other hand, testified that the appellant even made demands before he surrendered. When he did surrender, the police had been in place for some time, fully surrounding his house so that he could not have escaped without a major and direct confrontation with them. Then, too, he did not acknowledge liability for the killing of Major Opina even after his surrender to Chief Inspector Lusad. Under these circumstances, none of the attendant elements that would make the surrender a mitigating circumstance was present. The appellant surrendered simply because there was no other way out without risking his own life and limb in a battle with the police.
People of the Philippines Vs. Agustino Tamolon, et al.
G.R. No. 180169, February 27, 2009
Multiple Murder
Facts:
Appellants, with several others, were charged with Multiple Murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-377 (93), before the RTC, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, in an Information which reads:
That sometime last March of 1984, in the Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with guns and bolos, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of superior strength conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot, hack and massacre Jaime Malabarbas, Ely Malabarbas, Judith Malabarbas, Wilfredo Panton and Gerry Panton, the herein victims/offended parties[,] which gunshot and hack wounds caused to their instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting both appellants of multiple murder. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC’s with Modification.
Thus, this appeal, assigning the following error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AGUSTINO TAMOLON AND ANTONIO CABAGAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MULTIPLE MURDER ON THE LONE, FABRICATED, ILL-MOTIVATED, AND POLLUTED TESTIMONY OF MODESTO LANDAS.
Issue:
Is the appeal meritorious?
Ruling:
No. The appellants cast aspersion on the credibility of lone prosecution witness, Modesto Landas, who admitted having been with the armed group that massacred the Malabarbas family. Moreover, they question the motive of Landas who, they said, told the authorities of the alleged criminal activities of the group only after he had been arrested and detained, nine years after the alleged incident. They then submit that "the evidence presented by the prosecution came from a polluted source," harping on Landas being with the roving team at the time of the commission of the crime, making him a co-conspirator.
However, the trial court gave full weight and credence to Landas’ testimony. Evaluating the same, the court said:
Witness Modesto Landas was likewise very positive, direct, straight-forward and convincing in his testimony against accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan. This witness never faltered or wavered in his claim about the participation of accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan in the massacre of the Malabarbas family and in setting fire to the dr[y]er of Vilma Ganad.
The CA also held that, by way of exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient for conviction when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and is full of details by which their nature could not have been the result of a deliberate afterthought.
In this regard, worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses, since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings on and assessment of the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on an appellate tribunal. A trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
As to the appellants’ defense which is based mainly on denial and alibi, nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the witness.
People vs. Domingo
G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009
Murder and Frustrated Murder, Exemption of Criminal Liability in View of Insanity
Facts:
Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511, modifying the Decision dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000.
The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution, Raquel Indon, is assailed by appellant for not being credible due to an inconsistency in her testimony and a lack of conformity with the experience of ordinary men.
Appellant also asserts that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the commission of the alleged crimes, and therefore should be exempted from criminal liability in accordance with Article 12, Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Are appellant’s contention meritorious?
Ruling:
No.
First contention. Appellant refers to Raquel’s testimony during cross-examination wherein she narrated that after the appellant entered her bedroom, she screamed. Her sister-in-law, who lived next door, responded by asking Raquel who her assailant was, and the latter identified the appellant. Appellant claims that the conversation between Raquel and her sister-in-law was contrary to the ordinary course of things, and that the initial reaction of people in such a situation would be to ask for help from other people in order to save those who are in danger. Secondly, Raquel also testified during cross-examination that the appellant stabbed the front of her legs when she fell down. It is also argued that the appellant could not have stabbed the front of her legs, since she would be lying on front of her legs when she fell down.
This Court finds no merit in these arguments. To begin with, there was nothing out of the ordinary as regards Raquel’s testimony on these two matters. First, there was nothing unusual about the sister-in-law’s query as to who was attacking Raquel. Considering that the exchange merely consisted of this question and the reply to it, it would not even be accurate to refer to it as a "conversation." Secondly, it was not impossible for the appellant to stab the front of Raquel’s legs, had her legs been positioned sideways when she fell. But more importantly, these are peripheral details that do not affect the substantial aspects of the incident. Raquel clearly and positively testified that she was carrying her son Marvin when she rushed to the gate and fell down, and the appellant stabbed her legs and thereafter proceeded to stab Marvin who later died from the stab wounds. Her testimony was supported by the Medico-Legal Reports marked as Exhibits "E" and "F." Any inconsistencies in such peripheral details would not exculpate the appellant.
Second contention. His claim is not supported by evidence. Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that he was insane at the time he committed the crime. He testified that nine days before he committed the crime, he suffered from lack of appetite, sleeplessness, and anxiety. In addition, he allegedly heard voices ordering him to kill bad people. He claims that he does not remember anything that happened on 29 March 2000, when the crimes were committed, and that he was already detained when he became conscious of his surroundings.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.
Even assuming that appellant’s testimony is credible, his sleeplessness, lack of appetite, nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular conception of the word "crazy" is used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he is legally insane and will not grant him or her absolution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANSELMO BERONDO JR.
G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009
Murder to Homicide
Facts:
At around 11:30 p.m. of February 13, 1999, after joining the Miss Gay competition at New Danao, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Herbert Nietes, Jr. walked home to Puntian, Quezon, Bukidnon. While on the way, he suddenly heard a gunshot from nearby. Feeling afraid, he ran towards the grassy area by the roadside to hide. After about five minutes, he saw BERONDO, Julie Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario, each holding a knife, walk towards the road and take turns in stabbing a person who was already slumped on the ground. He recognized the three as they are his townmates. Thereafter, he ran away from the area and went to Bato-Bato, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, where he spent the night. The next day, he learned that the person stabbed was GENARO LAGUNA. He later testified that he did not reveal what he had witnessed to anyone because he was afraid of getting involved.
Two years after the incident, Nietes and Tero (another witness) admitted to Dolores, Laguna’s widow, that they had witnessed the crime.
Trial proceeded only against accused-appellant BERONDO for murder, because the two other accused remained at-large, where he was convicted. The CA affirmed conviction, but ruled that BERONDO was liable only for homicide.
ISSUES:
1. Does the belated reporting of Nietes of what he witnessed defeat his credibility as a witness?
2. Was the CA correct in holding that BERONDO was liable only for homicide?
HELD:
1. No. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given.No standard form of behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience. Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family; while others shy away when those involved in the crime are their relatives or townmates. And where there is delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay.
Despite the delay in reporting the identities of the malefactors, Nietes testified in a categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous manner, and remained consistent even under grueling cross-examination. Such bears the marks of a credible witness.
2. Yes. The Court finds error in the Trial Court’s finding that the killing of the deceased was committed with abuse of superior strength, because no evidence was presented to prove that the accused purposely took advantage of their numerical superiority. Absent clear and convincing evidence of any qualifying circumstance, conviction should only be for homicide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO SATONERO @ RUBEN
G.R. No. 186233, October 2, 2009
Murder; Self-Defense
FACTS:
At around five o’clock in the afternoon of December 25, 1997, Leticia and her nephew, Ramon Amigable were in Brgy. La Esperanza, Tulunan waiting for a tricycle ride to a place called M’lang. Leticia had just received a gift from her sister. Accused-appellant Romeo SATONERO, Leticia’s nephew too, happened to be nearby. Accused-appellant, upon seeing the gift Leticia was holding, inquired where it came from. When told of the source, accused-appellant mocked the gift-giver for giving more to those who have more in life. Accused-appellant then asked Leticia if she knew who he was, followed by a remark that he would throw her into the irrigation ditch.
At that moment, Leticia told Ramon not to mind accused-appellant because he was drunk. When Ramon was about to board the tricycle, accused-appellant followed him, shot him three times with a short-barreled gun, then stabbed him several times. All told, Ramon sustained nine stab wounds on different parts of his body. Ramon died as a result.
On May 16, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of murder, discrediting the SATONERO’s theory of self-defense. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC and CA err in not appreciating self-defense?
HELD:
No. The conviction was proper. There was no self-defense.
The Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the finding of the CA, confirmatory of that of the RTC, that there was no self-defense on the part of accused-appellant in the instant case.
One who admits killing another in the name of self-defense bears the onus of proving the justifiability of the killing. The accused, therefore, must convincingly prove the following elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. While all three elements must concur to support a claim of complete self-defenese, self-defense relies first and foremost on a showing of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Absent clear proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, self-defense may not be successfully pleaded
In the instant case, accused-appellant failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression. From a perusal of the trial court’s decision, the prosecution’s testimonial evidence, notably Leticia’s testimony, had been carefully weighed and was found by the trial court to be more credible and convincing than the bare and self-serving testimony of accused-appellant as to who initiated the fight and what transpired after the initial assault ensued. The testimony of a single eyewitness to a killing, if worthy of credence, is sufficient to support a conviction for homicide or murder, as the case may be.
The allegation of accused-appellant which pictured Ramon as purportedly pulling out a knife and attempting to stab the former came uncorroborated, although several onlookers––potential witnesses all––were at the situs of the crime. And while claiming to have grappled for some time with Ramon for the possession of the knife, accused-appellant managed to stay unscathed, which in itself is incredible.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO LUSABIO, JR.
G.R. No. 186119, Oct. 27, 2009
Murder
FACTS:
For the death of Edwin Labini on 12 June 2001, an information was filed on 14 September 2001 before Branch 65 of the RTC of Bulan, Sorsogon, charging accused-appellant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., Tomasito de los Santos and one John Doe with Murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-459.
The Information reads:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2001, at Barangay Biton, municipality of Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stabbed one Edwin Labini, who sustained mortal/fatal injuries that caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
On 24 September 2001, based on a complaint of accused-appellant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., an information was filed before the same court charging Tomasito de los Santos, alias Guapo, and Ronnie Dig, alias Tabong, with Attempted Murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-464.
In Criminal Case No. 01-459 (Murder), the prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Doris Labini, Dr. Irene V. Ella, Jose Labini and Elsie Gocoyo. In Criminal Case No. 01-464 (Attempted Murder), private complainant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., Dr. Antonio Lopezand Ricardo Cabrera took the witness stand.
The RTC convicted Labini for murder. As to Tomasito de los Santos, the trial court ruled that he had no participation whatsoever in the stabbing of Edwin Labini. The decision was questioned before the CA, alleging insufficiency of evidence, and questioning the credibility of the deceased’s wife. The decision was however affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Is the conviction for murder proper?
HELD:
Yes. Accused-appellant brands Doris Labini as a biased witness, thus unreliable, because she was the wife of Edwin Labini. The fact that she was the wife of the victim did not necessarily make her a partial witness. It is well-settled that mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair the witness’ credibility. On the contrary, a witness’ relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.
In the case at bar, Doris Labini positively identified Pablo Lusabio, Jr. as the one who stabbed her husband. Such declaration was corroborated by the testimony of Tomasito de los Santos that it was, indeed, Lusabio who inflicted the stab wounds on Edwin Labini. Doris Labini was eight meters away from her husband when the latter was stabbed by Lusabio. Aside from this, the crime scene was well-lighted, making it easy for her to identify Lusabio as the perpetrator.
Finally, accused-appellant submits that if ever he committed a crime, he merely committed homicide. He maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately and consciously adopted a particular mode of attack in order to eliminate the risk to his person from any defense that Edwin Labini might offer.
The lower court was correct in appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. It was clearly established that Edwin Labini, while talking to Pablo Lusabio, Jr. face to face, was suddenly stabbed by the latter with a ten-inch bladed weapon for no reason at all. The suddenness of the stabbing and the fact that Edwin Labini was unarmed gave him no opportunity to defend himself. It is likewise apparent that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack, making sure that the victim would have no chance to defend himself by reason of the surprise attack.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARLON DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 174658, February 24, 2009
Anti-Carnapping; Robbery with Homicide (Can one absorb the other?)
FACTS:
Two Informations, one for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (the Anti-Carnapping Law), and the other for Robbery with Homicide, were filed against 1) appellant Marlon dela Cruz (DELA CRUZ), together with 2) Adriano Melecio (Melecio), 3) Jessie Reyes (REYES), and 4) Jepoy Obello (Obello) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. Melecio and Obello have remained at large.
From information gathered from bystanders, the police learned that de la Cruz, a notorious thief who had previously been convicted for theft, and an unidentified man were seen riding on a red Yamaha motorcycle on June 4, 2001, that from a surveillance conducted, de la Cruz was not in his Dagupan residence; and that his mother Maria Rosario (Maria) is living in the municipality of San Quintin. The carnapped motorcycle was owned by a certain Juliana Tamin.
De la Cruz’s friends Angelica Perez (Angelica) and Anna Datlag (Anna), who were at the time staying at Maria’s house, were invited for questioning.
Anna further related: On June 6, 2001, she asked de la Cruz who owns the red motorcycle to which he replied that he took it from an old man who was sleeping after he hit the old man with a stone and Melecio stabbed him at the right side of his body, following which they took the money of the old man.
Upon the other hand, de la Cruz put up alibi, claiming that he was asleep in his house at Callejon Extension, Dagupan City on the night of January 3, 2001; that on waking up the following day, January 4, 2001, Obello and Melecio arrived and invited him to, as he did join them to San Quintin on board a motorcycle which the two claimed belongs to their uncle; that the group went first to Lupao, Nueva Ecija where they met Anna and Angelica who, on his invitation, joined them in San Quintin where they stayed for a few days.
After trial, Branch 43 of the Dagupan City RTC convicted DELA CRUZ of both charges. It acquitted Reyes. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Among others, DELA CRUZ argues that even if the allegation on the loss of some cash were true, the same should be absorbed in carnapping since carnapping and robbery have the same element of taking with intent to gain.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of DELA CRUZ tenable?
HELD:
No. Carnapping refers specifically to the taking of a motor vehicle. It does not cover the taking of cash or personal property which is not a motor vehicle. As the Court of Appeals noted:
x x x Two (2) articles were taken from TEOFILLO, SR., his tricycle and some cash. The taking of the tricycle constitutes a violation of the anti-carnapping law, RA 6539, while the taking of the cash from tEOFILO, SR. by hitting him with a stone and stabbing him in the chest constitutes the crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
MUPAS & MUAPAS VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 172834, February 6, 2008
Frustrated Homicide to Slight Physical Injuries
FACTS:
Petitioners JUN and GIL (aka Bajno) MUPAS were found guilty of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 2314 in the Decision dated 22 November 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Malaoan, La Union.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Rogelio Murao (Rogelio - victim), Flaviano Murao (Flaviano) and Dr. Arsenio B. Martinez (Dr. Martinez).
Rogelio testified that at around 7:30 in the morning of 18 February 1993, he was walking to school with his companion Eduardo Murao, Jr. when Jun suddenly stopped and stabbed him using a 29-inch Batangas knife. Meantime, Banjo bodily restrained him but luckily Rogelio was able to avoid the blow. Next, Banjo and Jun hurled stones at him and hit him on the leg while Rogelio was running eastward. Rogelio then flagged down a motorized tricycle but the two assailants continued to pursue him. While inside the tricycle, Banjo held Rogelio by his neck and punched him while Jun stabbed him several times. Then, Rogelio alighted from the tricycle and ran home. Afterwards, his father and mother accompanied him to the hospital. There, Dr. Martinez attended to Rogelio, and found that the wounds may take TWO WEEKS to HEAL.
Prior to the incident, Rogelio recalled that in January of the same year, he had a misunderstanding with Jun where he and the latter hurled invectives at each other. Rogelio suspected that this event gave rise to the subject incident.
Jun and Gil were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Before the Court of Appeals, Jun and Gil argued that the trial court erred in: (1) finding Gil guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding Jun guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide instead of physical injuries only. The convictions were however affirmed.
ISSUES:
Is the affirmation of the conviction for frustrated homicide proper?
HELD:
No. The trial court solely hinged its judgment of conviction on the victim Rogelio’s lone and uncorroborated testimony. While it is true that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if such testimony establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court rules in this case that the testimony of one witness in this case is not sufficient for this purpose. It appears then that Rogelio had at his disposal many witnesses who could have supported his allegations but curiously and without any explanation, none of these so-called witnesses were presented. It is thus Rogelio’s word against the attestations of others. Such omission already raises a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the petitioners.
Assuming that Gil alias Banjo had any participation, there is likewise no evidence that he or Jun had intent to kill Rogelio. Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of commission. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.
Although it can be fairly assumed that the injuries suffered by Rogelio were sustained during the fistfight, it is not conclusive that the same were inflicted purposely to kill him. For one, if Jun in fact had been carrying a bolo with intent of killing Rogelio, and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun, it is no small wonder why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than mortal, more mild than grave.
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to sustain the claim that petitioners had any intention to kill Rogelio. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical injuries only and in this case, less serious physical injuries considering the attending physician’s opinion that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks to heal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEODEGARIO BASCUGIN
GR 184704, June 30, 2009
Rape with Homicide; constant change in plea (from guilty to not guilty, and so on);
When circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
FACTS:
In an information dated June 21, 1999, BASCUGIN was charged with rape with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 1999 at about 7:45 o’clock in the evening, at Barangay [XXX], Municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed instrument and a hard object, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will and consent and by reason or on the occasion of the said rape, accused with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed and hit the said AAA, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds and other injuries on the different parts of her body, which caused her instantaneous death.
With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, BASCUGIN pleaded guilty upon arraignment on August 5, 1999. Since he was facing a charge for a capital offense, the trial court asked him if his plea was voluntarily given and whether he understood the consequences of his plea. The case then proceeded to trial.
In the automatic review by the Supreme Court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and BASCUGIN challenged the proceedings in the trial court, specifically the invalid arraignment of BASCUGIN. They contended that the consultation made by the counsel de oficio was hasty; and BASCUGIN was not sufficiently apprised of the nature of his case and the consequences of his plea. Finding merit in the OSG’s stand, the SUPREME COURT remanded the case to the court a quo for appropriate proceedings.
Upon re-arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued.
On September 8, 2003, before the prosecution could rest its case, the defense manifested that BASCUGIN wishes to change his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The trial court set his re-arraignment to September 29, 2003 to allow him more time to consider his plea. He was then arraigned on September 29, 2003, and he pleaded guilty to the charge. Then On November 12, 2003, BASCUGIN moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. This was granted by the trial court in an order dated November 17, 2003. He was re-arraigned on December 1, 2003 and he pleaded "not guilty."
He was still found guilty and sentenced to death. This was affirmed by the CA. The appellate court concurred with the trial court’s finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to him as the culprit.
BASCUGIN went to the SC alleging that there was insufficient evidence to hold him guilty BEYOND reasonable doubt as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE:
Is BASCUGIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD:
Yes. The decisive factor in BASCUGIN’s conviction was his admission to the crime when he was examined by his lawyer in court. He testified as follows:
xxx
Q: Did you feel any remorse or resentment to what happened with you and [AAA]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I noticed also, Mr. Witness, that at the course of the proceedings of this case you are always changing your plea of not guilty/to guilty. Why is it so, Mr. Witness?
A: Because I am bothered by my conscience and I was always changing my plea but I feel responsible for what I did, sir.
Q: Do you know fully the consequences of your testimony, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHAVEZ: I have no more questions, Your Honor.
xxx
BASCUGIN’s confession was freely, intelligently, and deliberately given. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. The presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Admission of guilt constitutes evidence against the accused pursuant to the following provisions of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, BASCUGIN’s confession is consistent with the evidence. We agree with the trial and appellate courts’ finding that the chain of events constitutes circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to support a conviction. From the testimonies of witnesses and the physical evidence gathered, it was established that the victim was last seen with BASCUGIN in his tricycle; his tricycle was seen parked near a waiting shed in the premises of which the victim’s personal belongings were later found; his pieces of clothing were found positive for human blood that matches the victim’s; and the medico-legal report states that BASCUGIN had sexual intercourse with the victim.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. According to Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inference is based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In the case at bar, the circumstantial pieces of evidence enumerated by the trial court all point to BASCUGIN as the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUFINO UMANITO
G.R. No. 172607, April 16, 2009
Use of DNA Evidence in Rape
FACTS:
In a Supreme Court Resolution dated 26 October 2007, the Court Resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules)in a case pending before it – this case. The SC remanded the case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance with the terms of said Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the first application of the procedure, directed Deputy Court Administrator Reuben Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic reports on the implementation of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.
To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito (UMANITO) was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. UMANITO was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. UMANITO appealed the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged "many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense."At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by UMANITO, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not UMANITO is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal.
There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino UMANITO y Millares and [BBB].
NOTE:
UMANITO in this case filed an action to withdraw appeal.
HELD:
By filing such motion, UMANITO is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny UMANITO’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise be deemed final if the appeal is not withdrawn.
Note: IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS
Nov. 17, 2004
It was argued in this case that DNA analysis on paternity shows conclusively that petitioner de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza; his conviction for rape, based on the fact that Leahlyn was sired as a result of the alleged rape, cannot stand and must be set aside.
HELD: Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases.The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEONEL PASAOL PALAC
G.R. No. 175600, April 23, 2008
Rape; Alibi as weak defense
On or about the 14th day of May 1996 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused LEONEL PASAOL PALAC alias Joy Joy Talac, in conspiracy with his co-accused REY ARGENTILLO and JOJO VILARDE, by means of force and intimidation they employed upon the person of one [AAA], a minor, 15 years of age, feloniously lay with and have carnal knowledge of said complainant [AAA] against the latter's will, while the two other acc[u]sed watched and stood guard while waiting for [their] turn to have sexual intercourse with the aforesaid [AAA], to her damage and prejudice.
The RTC convicted all three. But PALAC appealed to the CA, pleading defense on the basis of 1) alibi and 2) inconsistencies in the statement of the victim, AAA. The CA however affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE:
Does PALAC’s appeal have merit?
HELD:
No. Appellant cites the inconsistencies allegedly committed by [AAA]. Allegedly, during her direct examination, [AAA] testified that it was at "6:00 p.m.," when VILARDE offered her a drink, while in paragraph 6 of her Affidavit, she stated it was at 9:00 p.m. [AAA] also contradicted herself on direct examination when she stated that she knocked at the door of the photo[shop] which was opened by ARGENTILLO, when in paragraph 7 of her [A]ffidavit, she alleged that it was VILARDE who knocked at the door and it was appellant who opened the same.A circumspect examination of the record shows that when confronted with the foregoing inconsistencies on cross-examination, [AAA] clarified that it was at 6:00 p.m., not 9:00 p.m., when she was offered a drink by VILARDE; and that it was not she but VILARDE who knocked at the door which appellant opened.
In any event, inconsistencies on matters that transpired prior to the actual commission of the crime and have no bearing to the elements of the crime charged are not treated as proof of a feigning witness but as hallmark of an unrehearsed testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor and serve to strengthen rather than destroy [AAA]'s credibility.
As for appellant's alibi, it does not prosper for he failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that he was in a place other than the place of the crime such that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime. The photoshop where AAA was raped was only 15 meters away from the Aragon Compound where the house of CCC in which appellant spent the night on the same date of the incidents.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJIE RESURRECCION
G.R. No. 185389
Rape
FACTS:
On 20 June 2001, BENJIE was charged before the RTC with Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. He allegedly raped AAA, an 11 year-old girl.
Dr. Marlyn Valdez-Agbayani examined AAA and found that the victim had no laceration in her external organ or her hymen. The former also testified that there were no spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina. Despite these findings, Dr. Valdez-Agbayani clarified that if the hymen of a woman is elastic and so thin, as in AAA’s case, laceration may not be present. As to the absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina, Dr. Valdez-Agbayani said that it was possible that the victim washed her genitalia, especially since she was examined only after two days following the alleged rape incident.
BENJIE was convicted by the RTC, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA. Upon appeal to the SC, BENJIE points out that 1) the testimony of AAA on how he allegedly raped her was highly improbable, and 2) the negative findings of spermatozoa and laceration must acquit him.
ISSUE:
Is BENJIE guilty of rape?
HELD:
Yes. This Court itself, in its desire to unveil the truth as borne out by the records, has painstakingly pored over the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case, and like the RTC, finds the victim’s testimony of the incident candid and straightforward, indicative of an untainted and realistic narration of what transpired on that fateful day.
BENJIE tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning the odd position at which the rape was done. While BENJIE’s position, i.e., covering AAA’s mouth with his left hand and pinning her down with the right hand, may be considered difficult, such does not exclude the possibility that rape can be consummated under said situation. Depraved individuals stop at nothing in order to accomplish their purpose. Perverts are not used to the easy way of satisfying their wicked cravings. It should be noted that the victim was a very young and fragile 11-year-old, who was easy to be subdued by an abuser who was used to manual labor and was already 18 or 19 years old.
In his last-ditch effort to be exculpated, BENJIE calls this Court’s attention to the medical findings that no sperm cells were present in the victim’s vagina just two days following the rape. He intimates that no rape occurred because of the absence of the sperm cells.
This contention is not well-taken. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s genitalia does not negate rape, the slightest penetration even without emission being sufficient to constitute and consummate the offense. The mere touching of the labia of the woman’s pudendum or lips of the female organ by the male sexual organ consummates the act.
Note: The court laid down these GUIDING PRINCIPLES in Rape:
To ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases of rape, the courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles, namely: (a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. In its prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis thereof; otherwise, he should be acquitted of the crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NORBERTO MATEO
G.R. No. 170569, September 30, 2008
Rape
FACTS:
In a Complaint dated November 2, 1995, AAA, assisted by her father, BBB, charged Norberto MATEO (appellant) with rape by means of force and intimidation. The Assistant City Prosecutor certified that it was filed with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Upon medical examination, Dr. Reyes testified that AAA could have been laid on a rough surface as shown by the multiple linear abrasions found at her back and the anterum medial aspect of her thigh;that she had been sexually penetrated possibly with the use of force and violence; that he noticed that AAA was suffering from some form of mental retardation as she was not responding to his question like a 17-year old girl should, compelling him to refer her to a neuro-psychiatrist for examination; that based on the result forwarded to him, AAA had a mental age of 5 years and 8 months with an IQ of 38.
After trial, the RTC found MATEO guilty of raping a mental retardate. This was affirmed by the CA.
MATEO questioned the affirmation of the CA in the SC, arguing that 1) there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt – there was no physical struggle by the victim, and 2) the court a quo erred in finding that the victim AAA was a mental retardate.
ISSUE:
Is MATEO guilty of rape?
HELD:
Yes. Appellant's claim that the records do not show any sign or presence of struggle is irrelevant. Physical resistance is not an essential element of the felony, and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. It is enough that the malefactor intimidated the complainant into submission. Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary the complainant's submission to the criminal acts of the accused.Furthermore, not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone.
During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to show that AAA was a mental retardate. It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape, which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction.
In any event, the prosecution presented adequate evidence which showed that the appellant used force and intimidation in committing the crime of rape, and which the RTC relied upon in convicting appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODRIGO AWID AND MADUM GANIH
G.R. No. 185388, June 16, 2010
Kidnapping for ransom
FACTS: On January 9, 2000 only Mrs. Lee was left in the house, accompanied by three housemaids, and the accused Ernesto Andagao, a gardener-houseboy. They all slept in an extension of the main house, which extension had three rooms. Mrs. Lee was in one with her 11 Japanese Spitz puppies. Next to hers was the room where Andagao slept, and then there was the room of the housemaids.
Part of Mrs. Lee’s night routine was to let her puppies out of her room about midnight so they could take a leak. At the early dawn of January 10, 2000, after opening the door of her room to let her puppies out, Mrs. Lee was surprised to see a stranger, a man, standing a few meters from her door. She immediately went back in and tried to shut her door close but the man succeeded in pushing the door open and pulling her out of the room just as another man appeared. Someone struck Mrs. Lee with a gun on both shoulders and kicked her on the ribs. When she fell down, she received a kick on her buttocks.
Although she cannot recognized the faces of her abductors because she was blindfolded and covered by black cloth, she noticed that they left Zamboanga City. After traveling three to four hours, they arrived in a house which she later knew that it belonged to a certain Suod Hussain. On January 10, 2000, Mrs. Lee met accused Madum Ganih. She was held for 20 days and during that time she communicated her husband with the order of Ganih to prepare a ransom of P15,000,000. Mr. Lee asked the kidnappers to lower the amount since he could only raise an amount of P1,000,000. Calling her family a third time, the kidnappers reduced their demand to P4 million and threatened to cut off Mrs. Lee’s head unless this was paid.
In the evening of May 5, 2000, Ganih told Mrs. Lee that they would release her the next day. At about 4:00 a.m. of May 6, 2000, her abductors brought Mrs. Lee to Arena Blanco in Zamboanga City where Ganih gave her P100.00 for fare and an M203 bullet as memento. She eventually got home.
Sometime after, the police arrested some men which in a police line-up, Mrs. Lee later positively identified as her abductors. For his part, Ganih denied the allegations and claimed an alibi that he was in his house at the said incident.
On May 21, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment,convicting Ganih of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The RTC, however, acquitted Awid for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: Is accused Ganih, in conspiracy with others, guilty of kidnapping for ransom?
RULING: To prove the crime charged, the prosecution had to show (a) that the accused was a private person; (b) that he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (c) that the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (d) that the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. All these have been proved in this case.
Significantly, Ganih offered nothing but his bare denial and unsubstantiated alibi to counter the overwhelming evidence that the prosecution adduced against him. His other contention is that the police made Mrs. Lee identify him, not in a proper police line-up but in a mere show-up after giving her some improper suggestions.
What the Court condemns are prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified. Besides, granting that the out-of-court identification was irregular, Mrs. Lee’s court testimony clearly shows that she positively identified Ganih independently of the previous identification she made in front of the police station. Mrs. Lee could not have made a mistake in identifying him since she had ample opportunities to study the faces and peculiar body movements of her kidnappers in her almost four months of ordeal with them.Indeed, she was candid and direct in her recollection, narrating events as she saw them take place. Her testimony, including her identification of the appellant, was positive, straightforward, and categorical.
The totality of the prosecution’s evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Ganih and the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee for ransom. The crime was punishable by death at the time of its commission but, with the enactment of Republic Act 9346 that prohibits the imposition of such penalty, the CA was correct in lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO ESTACIO AND MARITESS ANG
G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009
Kidnapping with murder
FACTS: At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and Sumipo, arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon City where the three of them would meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her debt to the victim and then "deretsong dukot na rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim]." Sumipo assumed, however, that Maritess was just joking.
Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the victim complied, Estacio, with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the backseat, sat beside the victim, tied the victim’s hands behind his back, and placed tape on his mouth. While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they replied that they would kill the victim so that he would not take revenge. On Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced.
After which, they called the victim’s mother and demanded money from her. The victim’s mother having agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as they were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing them to leave and part ways. Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun, watch, and necklace from the proceeds of which he was given P7,000.
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23, 1996, Estacio surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victim’s mother that Estacio had admitted having killed her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the crime scene.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom?
RULING: In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That appellants’ intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create noise.The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants’ prior acts as kidnapping.
where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DOMINGO REYES, ALVIN ARNALDO AND JOSELITO FLORES
G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009
Kidnapping for ransom
FACTS: The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape.
Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellant’s call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon CitY.Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered.
ISSUE: Are the appellants guilty of kidnapping?
RULING: After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTC’s ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. Prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial.
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their respective testimonies were consistent with one another. They were steadfast in recounting their ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony with the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against appellants.
Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was, nevertheless, shown that it took appellants and their cohorts about 10 minutes before all members of the Yao family were blindfolded. During this considerable length of time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to take a good look at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert narrated that their respective blindfolds loosened several times, giving them the opportunity to have a glimpse at the faces of appellants and their cohorts.
It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed as a result of the kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would point to appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers if such were not true. A witness’ relationship to the victim of a crime makes his testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. Relationship with a victim of a crime would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. His natural and usual interest would be to identify the real malefactor and secure his conviction to obtain true justice for the death of a relative. Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double homicide since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during the kidnapping.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALVINO SUMINGWA
G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009
Acts of Lasciviousness; Rape; Attempted Rape; Unjust Vexation
FACTS: Sometime in 1999, appellant showed his desire to touch the victim. He fondled the victim’s breast. On the following month thereafter, appellant removed the garments of the victim and fondle his penis until it ejaculated. Another incident was on August 2000, wherein the appellant grabbed and lie her down and went top of her and then rubbed her penis into her vaginal orifice, and partially inserted his penis into her vagina. The acts of the appellant continued wherein he would successfully rubbed his organ to her genitalia without penetration. This time, the victim confided to her bestfriend.
On December 20, 2000, when the victim and her bestfriend were doing their school work, appellant grabbed the victim, pulled her inside the house and kissed her on the lips.
The last incident occurred inside the comfort room of their house on May 27, 2001. When the victim entered, appellant pulled down her short pants and panty, unzipped his trousers, brought out his penis, then repeatedly rubbed it on her vagina while they were in a standing position.
The victim decided to report the sexual abuses to her grandmother who forthwith brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation where she was examined by the medico-legal officer. It was found during the examination that there were no extragenital physical injuries on the victim’s body but there were old, healed, and incomplete hymenal lacerations.
Appellant denied all the accusations against him and stated an alibi in his defense.
ISSUE: Is the appellant guilty of the abovementioned cases?
RULING: In her direct testimony, the victim stated that appellant removed her short pants and panty, went on top of her and rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice. She resisted by crossing her legs but her effort was not enough to prevent appellant from pulling her leg and eventually inserting his penis into her vagina. Clearly, there was penetration.
It is noteworthy that appellant pulled victim’s leg, so that he could insert his penis into her vagina. This adequately shows that appellant employed force in order to accomplish his purpose. Moreover, in rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires, and no further proof need be shown to prove lack of the victim’s consent to her own defilement.
While appellant’s conviction was primarily based on the prosecution’s testimonial evidence, the same was corroborated by physical evidence consisting of the medical findings of the medico-legal officer that there were hymenal lacerations. When a rape victim’s account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.
Aside from the fact of commission of rape, the prosecution likewise established that appellant is the biological father of the victim and that the latter was then fifteen (15) 42 years old. Thus, the CA aptly convicted him of qualified rape, defined and penalized by Article 266-B of the RPC.
In Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654, although appellant was charged with qualified rape allegedly committed on the second week of November 2000 and May 27, 2001, he should be convicted with Acts of Lasciviousness committed against a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. The testified that in November 2000, while she and appellant were inside the bedroom, he went on top of her and rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice until he ejaculated. She likewise stated in open court that on May 27, 2001, while inside their comfort room, appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina while they were in a standing position. In both instances, there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert his penis into her vagina.
The aforesaid acts of the appellant are covered by the definitions of "sexual abuse" and "lascivious conduct" under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of R.A. 7610.
Appellant’s acts of embracing, dragging and kissing the in front of her friend annoyed the victim. The filing of the case against appellant proved that the victim was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of appellant.
The appellant is guilty of the following: qualified rape, acts of lasciviousness and unjust vexation.
ELMER DIAMANTE AND TANNY BOY STA. TERESA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180992, September 4, 2009
Robbery and carnapping
FACTS: In the afternoon of July 9, 2000, Cadorniga was in his clinic inside his house when the accused entered knocked therein to seek dental check up. He let them in; he went inside and fix his things. As he got out, he noticed there were already five people inside. He went on with his check up when someone grabbed him and announced hold-up. The assailants soon ransacked the clinic for around 15 minutes and left carrying Cadorniga’s personal effects. Cadorniga thereafter heard his car alarm sound off, putting him on notice that his car, a Daewoo racer, was likewise taken.
At about 10:00 to 11:00 p.m. of the following day, Gerardo turned up at the clinic and advised Cadorniga that they had to rush to Pandacan because his car would be sold to a buyer in Cavite. Accompanied by officers of the Manila police, Gerardo led Cadorniga and his brother to the house of Sta. Teresa who promptly confessed being one of those who had robbed Cadorniga. Sta. Teresa subsequently led them to the house of Loza where the other accused were hiding. The police thus apprehended Sta. Teresa, Diamante, Maricar, and Lintag and brought them to the police station. Some of the stolen items, including the Daewoo racer, were recovered.
Lintag admitted his involvement in the robbery but denied participation in the carnapping. Dela Rosa and Diamante, on the other hand, denied participation and proffered alibi. Meanwhile, Sta. Teresa averred that he was merely helping Maricar and her boyfriend moving things from her mother’s house to her new apartment.
ISSUE: Are the assailants guilty of the crime charged?
RULING: The trial and appellate courts found that petitioners were among those who committed robbery and carnapping against Cadorniga as shown by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which both courts considered to be straightforward, clear, and consistent. The Court finds no cogent reason to rule otherwise.
That Cadorniga was tied down to a stool at gun point to facilitate the commission of the crimes speaks unequivocally that petitioners and their cohorts employed violence and intimidation in taking away Cadorniga’s personal effects and the Daewoo racer without his consent and with intent to gain. This is clear from the testimony of Cadorniga alone which, as reflected earlier, is categorical on all material points. The records being barren of proof of any ill motive on the part of Cadorniga to testify falsely against petitioners, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Well settled is the rule that the testimony of a single, trustworthy, and credible witness is sufficient for conviction.
Gerardo’s testimony should thus not be doubted merely because his participation was limited to bringing his passengers to their destination. He positively identified petitioners as among those he had brought to the clinic of Cadorniga and who entered the same on the day of the incident. At the very least, this is further proof of petitioners’ presence at the crime scene when the robbery and carnapping were committed, belying all uncorroborated allegations to the contrary.
The assailants are guilty of both simple robbery and carnapping.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEO QUEMEGGEN
G. R. No. 178205, July 25, 2009
Robbery with homicide
FACTS: Noel Tabernilla was driving a passenger jeepney when four of the passengers announced hold-up. After taking the things, the hold-uppers then alighted the jeepney.
From there, Tabernilla and his passengers went to the nearest police detachment to report the incident. Three policemen accompanied them to the scene of the crime. While there, the policemen chanced upon the robbers riding a pedicab. Socrates Kagalingan, one of the passengers-victims, recognized the perpetrators, since one of them was still wearing the belt bag that was taken from him. The policemen were able to arrest three suspects, including Janito de Luna, but Leo Quemeggen was able to escape. The three suspects were left under the care of a police officer, Emelito Suing, while the other police officers pursued Quemeggen. Taking advantage of the situation, the three suspects ganged up on Suing; de Luna held his hand, while the other suspect known as "Weng-Weng" shot him on the head.The suspects thereafter escaped.
Upon the return of the two policemen who unsuccessfully pursued Quemeggen, Suing was brought to the hospital where he eventually died by a gunshot wound in his head. Appellants Quemeggen and de Luna were eventually arrested through follow-up operations undertaken by the Navotas Police.
Appellants interposed the defense of alibi. They maintained that they were elsewhere when the robbery and shooting incident took place. They claimed that they were in their respective houses: Quemeggen was helping his grandmother cut pieces of cloth used in making rugs, while de Luna was sleeping with his wife.
ISSUE: Can the accused be convicted of a complex crime of robbery with homicide?
RULING: Given the circumstances surrounding the instant case, we agree with the CA that appellants cannot be convicted of Robbery with Homicide. Indeed, the killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery. And it is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. However, essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are committed at the same time.
From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we cannot see the connection between the robbery and the homicide. It must be recalled that after taking the passengers’ personal belongings, appellants (and two other suspects) alighted from the jeepney. At that moment, robbery was consummated. Some of the passengers, however, decided to report the incident to the proper authorities; hence, they went to the nearest police station. There, they narrated what happened. The police eventually decided to go back to the place where the robbery took place. Initially, they saw no one; then finally, Kagalingan saw the suspects on board a pedicab. De Luna and two other suspects were caught and left under the care of Suing. It was then that Suing was killed. Clearly, the killing was distinct from the robbery. There may be a connection between the two crimes, but surely, there was no "direct connection."
Though appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide, we find Quemeggen guilty of robbery, and de Luna of two separate crimes of robbery and homicide. It is axiomatic that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the designation of the specific crime, but by the facts alleged in the information. Controlling in an information should not be the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.33 There should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or more crimes erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate complaints or information.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NESTOR BAJADA, VICTOR CALISAY AND JOHN DOE
G.R. No. 180507, November 20, 2008
Robbery with homicide
FACTS: On December 22, 1999, around 11:30 p.m., while 81-year old Villamayor was at home with his 24 year-old live-in partner, Anabelle Asaytono, they heard someone call for Villamayor asking for coffee. The caller introduced himself as "Hector," Villamayor's grandson, but Asaytono recognized the voice as Bajada's. As Villamayor opened the door, the caller, "Hector," pushed the door open with the barrel of a two-foot long gun. Asaytono recognized "Hector" as Bajada because of his average physique, repulsive smell, the black bonnet which he often wore at work, the deep-set eyes, mouth, a lump on his cheek, and the green shirt which was given to him by Villamayor. Asaytono likewise recognized one of the men as Calisay, noting his hair cut, eye bags, and voice. Calisay wore a red handkerchief across his face and carried a 14-inch knife in his right hand. The third unidentified man, John Doe, wore a bonnet and carried a 2 ½ foot long gun with a magazine.
Upon entering the house, John Doe said, "There are many people in Calumpang who are angry at you because you are a usurer engaged in 5-6, so give me PhP 100,000 right now." John Doe made Villamayor sit down but when the latter refused, John Doe made him lie face down on the floor and kicked his back several times. Meanwhile, Bajada pointed his gun at Asaytono and demanded for money. Asaytono denied having any money. She was then made to lie face down on the ground and was kicked. John Doe asked from Villamayor the key to the cabinet which was a meter away from the latter. Villamayor brought out a key from his pocket and handed it to Bajada. Asaytono, who was able to stand up, saw the three accused unlock Villamayor's cabinet and took out its contents which consisted of documents and clothes. Accused-appellants also opened the drawer and took jewelry valued at PhP 80,000 and the PhP 20,000 and USD 500 cash.
Thereafter, Bajada pushed Asaytono towards Villamayor, laying her head sideways on Villamayor's head. In this position, Asaytono was able to see Calisay repeatedly stab Villamayor on the back. Calisay then stabbed Asaytono on her left breast. Asaytono pretended to be dead as she lied on Villamayor who was still moving. The three men then hurriedly left the house. Asaytono stood up and saw through the three men move towards the rice field. She noticed that Villamayor's dog wagged its tail as it followed the three men, the way it did when accused-appellants would visit Villamayor.
Dr. Marilou Cordon, the medico-legal officer, testified that Villamayor's death was caused by hypovolemic shock secondary to stab wounds. She opined that the stab wounds may have been caused by a single bladed knife inflicted by one person. She added that the stab which pierced the right lung may have caused his instantaneous death due to blood loss.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide?
RULING: In any case, Asaytono was able to sufficiently identify Bajada as one of the perpetrators to the satisfaction of the trial court. Asaytono's familiarity with Bajada cannot be denied; she has known Bajada and Calisay for more than a year prior to the incident. The two accused were also frequent visitors at the victim's house. Hence, Asaytono was acquainted with Bajada's physical features. The trial court found her testimony to be credible, frank, straightforward, and consistent throughout the trial. We see no reason to disturb this finding since trial courts are in a unique position to observe the demeanor of witnesses. The trial court's findings regarding the witness' credibility are accorded the highest degree of respect.
Furthermore, Bajada could not ascribe any plausible ill motive against the witness. His accusation against Asaytono that the latter was interested in inheriting from Villamayor is self-serving and uncorroborated. Even Bajada's own stepson, Calisay, stated that there was no prior misunderstanding between him and Asaytono and that he did not know any reason why Asaytono would accuse them of a crime. The letters allegedly written by an eyewitness who was afraid to testify in trial cannot be given probative value. The letters accused Asaytono as one of the culprits–a defense which was already dismissed by the courts a quo. There was no evidence to support such allegation. The said letters were belatedly submitted, uncorroborated, and cannot be admitted in evidence
Bajada's alibi likewise deserves no merit. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the accused was somewhere else at the time of the commission of the offense and that it was physically impossible for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Bajada himself admitted, however, that the travel time from Bayate, Liliw, Laguna to the crime scene is only 15 minutes by jeep. Hence, it was possible for him to be at the crime scene at or around the time the offense was committed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDWIN GAYETA
G.R. No. 171654, December 17, 2008
Robbery with rape
FACTS: On 24 July 1995, at around 8:00 p.m., spouses Benjamin and Conchita Nicer were drinking tuba when two armed men barged into their house. One of the armed men, later identified as Arnaldo Reano, was wearing a bonnet while the other, identified as appellant, was wearing a hat. The duo announced a hold-up and ordered the spouses to lie down on the floor. Conchita initially refused to lie down until appellant who incidentally had a bayonet in his other hand, poked a gun at her neck. Reano meanwhile kicked and boxed Benjamin until the latter bled and eventually lost consciousness. Appellant then ordered Conchita to hand over their money. Conchita went up to the room to get P2,500.00 and gave it to appellant. When the duo fled, the Nicer couple reported the incident to the barangay officials who immediately sought police assistance.
Meanwhile, spouses BBB and AAA were watching television in their living room when two armed men, also later identified as Reano and appellant, entered their house. They likewise ordered the spouses to lie down and asked them to produce their money. BBB asked AAA to get the money from their store, which was located some twenty (20) meters away from their house. Appellant accompanied AAA to the store while Reano stayed with BBB. Upon reaching the store, AAA took P5,000.00 and gave it to appellant. While in the act of getting the money, appellant inserted one of his hands inside AAA's short pants. Afterwards, appellant ordered her to undress and lie down on the floor. Appellant also removed his pants, lay on top of AAA, and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. They went back to the house where appellant also forced AAA to hand over several pieces of jewelry. AAA immediately told BBB that appellant had sexually abused her.
The duo fled but came back a few minutes later. Upon seeing them, BBB took the bayonet and tried to stab appellant, but it was deflected by a hard object and fell on the floor. BBB then tried to grab appellant's gun and they grappled for its possession. The gun fired, hitting BBB on his shoulder but he managed to successfully take possession of the gun and fired it twice.
ISSUE: Is the guilt of the appellant was established beyond reasonable ground?
RULING: The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the inconsistencies in prosecution witness' statements for being trivial and for not having the effect of impairing her credibility as a witness. Inconsistencies as to minor details and peripheral or collateral matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses or the probative weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility, as they negate any suspicion that their testimonies are fabricated or rehearsed. Appellant also assails AAA's narration of the rape incident and insinuates that she should have fought off her attacker, given the numerous opportunities presented to her, such as failing to use the bayonet or the bottles that were within her reach to fight off the attacker. Suffice it to say that tenacious resistance against rape is not required; neither is a determined or a persistent physical struggle on the part of the victim necessary.
Anent appellant's alibi, it is inherently weak and cannot prevail over a positive identification from a witness found credible by the trial court. Appellant avers that he was doing his rounds as a member of the Voluntary Lakas Brigade in Muntinlupa, which is nine (9) hours away from Oriental Mindoro, making it physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. He presented the barangay logbook to support his alibi. The OSG correctly countered that this document was neither authenticated nor identified by the persons who supposedly issued them.
All told, the guilt of appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAMUEL ALARME AND RIZALDY GELLE
G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009
Robbery with violence against or intimidations against persons
FACTS: Rudy narrated that he slept at the Maricom Detachment Office located in Punta Cabahug, Cadiz City and rode a tricycle bound for Ceres Bus Terminal at around 2:45 a.m. of September 19, 1995 because his service vehicle broke down. As the tricycle passed by the Cadiz City Park, he saw a parked empty tricycle and an old man being stabbed by three (3) persons. Two (2) persons held the victim while the third one stabbed him. Rudy described the person who stabbed the victim to be "white and tall," while the other two (2) who held the victim were "short." The victim was stabbed several times in front and at the back and cried for help as he was being stabbed. The driver of the tricycle he was riding, apparently afraid, increased the vehicle’s speed as they passed the stabbing scene. When they reached the Ceres Bus Terminal, he (Rudy) immediately boarded a bus bound for Sagay. He returned to Cadiz on September 21, 1995 and told Cesar Ladiona (Cesar), a barangay tanod, that he saw a person being stabbed at the park in the morning of September 19. Cesar brought him to the Cadiz City Jail where he was asked whether he could recognize the assailants. He identified the person who stabbed the victim from among the prisoners in jail.
He testified on cross-examination that the tricycle he was riding was "very near" the scene of the stabbing incident, and that the park was very brightly lit that night. He stated that he did not immediately report the stabbing incident upon arriving at the Ceres Bus Terminal because he was afraid and because the Ceres bus bound for Sagay was already leaving. When he reported the stabbing incident to Cesar on September 21, 1995, Cesar asked him if he could identify the assailants. He replied that he could, but only through their faces. Cesar then brought him to the city jail where the Chief of Police asked him to point out the persons responsible for the stabbing he reported. He recognized two (2) of the assailants from among the many prisoners inside the jail. He recalled that the prisoners were not brought out of their cell when he was asked to identify the assailants.
Norman, a tricycle driver residing in Cadiz City, narrated that he brought his passengers to Ester Pharmacy and Villa Consing, respectively, in the early morning of September 19, 1995; afterwards, he went to Cabahug Street and saw Melanie, the wife of a co-driver. Melanie asked him to look for her (Melanie’s) husband. Melanie boarded his tricycle and requested to be brought to the Ester Pharmacy. On the way there, he saw Loreto Batarilan (Loreto) driving his own tricycle and trailing his; he also saw three (3) persons walking towards the direction of the Emergency Clinic. He identified two of them as Rizaldy and "Stingray" both of whom he had known for a long time. He went back towards the direction of the City Hall after Melanie alighted at the Ester Pharmacy. He saw Loreto’s parked tricycle as he passed by the City Hall on Cabahug Street; he then saw Loreto’s body full of blood lying on the street. He also saw Rizaldy, "Stingray," and a certain John Doe, about "two (2) extended arms length" away from the victim’s body, walking towards the park carrying a belt bag. He recalled that there were no other persons in the park during that time. He went to the police headquarters to report the incident, but the headquarters was closed. He then went to the Ester Pharmacy and requested the security guard to call the police.
ISSUE: Is the appellant guilty of the crime charged?
RULING: Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In the case before us, the RTC convicted the appellants of robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of Rudy, Alicia, and Norman. The CA affirmed this finding without any explanation on how the crime came to be the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. To be sure, Rudy’s testimony clinched the case against the appellants with respect to the victim’s stabbing and resulting death. The lower courts apparently deduced the intent to rob from the testimonies of Alicia and Norman.
Rizaldy Gelle is convicted of separate crimes of robbery and theft.
PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009
Robbery with intimidation of person
FACTS: At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private complainant Nelia R. Silvestre, together with Maria Viovicente and Veronica Amar , boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying "Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin." Appellant added "Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala, sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita." Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which, according to an "alajera" in the province, was of 18k gold, and which was worth P3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying "Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo. Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!"
Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall where they were advised to undergo medical examination. They, however, repaired to the Police Station, Precinct 8 in Comembo, Makati City and reported the incident. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to return in a few days when any injuries they suffered were expected to manifest. Nine days after the incident or on June 16, 1999, Nelia submitted a medico-legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator.
Appellant averred that he and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros. Nelia is his godmother. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be remitted. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was partial towards her, her parents disliked his family. Nelia’s father even filed a case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and, on learning of the maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their house and filed a case against him for grave threats and another for light threats which were dismissed or in which he was acquitted.
ISSUE: Has the prosecution proved that they accused herein is guilty beyond reasonable ground?
RULING: Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. It may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties, the taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on appellant’s part. That intent to gain on appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested by, among other things, the filing of complaints6 against him by Nelia and her family which were subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal. Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie against him. He is not necessarily scot-free, however.
From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one hand, and appellant and family on the other, and under the circumstances related above attendant to the incidental encounter of the parties, appellant’s taking of Nelia’s necklace could not have been animated with animus lucrandi. Appellant is, however, just the same, criminally liable.
The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination. Hence, appellant is guilty of grave coercion and not robbery with intimidation to persons.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO ORTIZ, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 179944, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009
ROBERRY WITH RAPE
Facts:
The accused-appellant Antonio Ortiz, Charito Chavez and Edwin Dasilio were charged with the crime of robbery with multiple rape. Under the facts, the above-named accused, armed with guns, use force and intimidation against the persons of BBB and AAA at their residence and willfully stole and carried away items of the victims. In addition before leaving, with violence, force and intimidation, at gunpoint succeeded in having carnal knowledge with AAA, one after the other, in taking their turns in satisfying their carnal desires, against her will. The accused alleged alibi as their defense that they were at a place other than Brgy. Xxx, at the time the crime was committed. The trial court ruled that the accused were guilty of the crime charged, under Article 294 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659, and considering the aggravating circumstance that it was committed by an armed band, and with ignominy, sentences all of them, to death. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification, instead of the penalty of death; the CA reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants’ guilt for the crime of Robbery with Rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 294, Robbery with rape is committed when the following elements concur: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
The first three elements were proven by the following established facts: the victims categorically identified appellants as the ones who threatened them and took their personal belongings; all appellants held weapons; appellants entered the house of Candido, herded Candido and his son, Dennis, in a corner of their house and tied their hands; BBB heard the cries of Dennis and when he checked where the cries were coming from, appellants intercepted him and tied his hands as well; appellants entered the house of BBB and AAA, and thereafter ransacked the said house taking valuable items. From the foregoing, it is clear that the crime of robbery was committed.
As to the attendant rape, the courts find the testimony of AAA worthy of full faith and credence. First, records show that AAA cried during her direct examination. Such spontaneous emotional outburst strengthens her credibility. The Supreme Court has held that the crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience. Second, although the examination of Dr. Fajardo of AAA’s genital area revealed no laceration in her hymen, it is a settled rule that laceration is not an element of the crime of rape. Simply put, the absence of lacerations does not negate rape. Moreover, hymenal lacerations after sexual congress normally occur on women who have had no prior sexual experience. In this case, AAA is a married woman, who has had prior sexual experience. In the case of People v. Llanita, the Supreme Court noted that the strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Third, the Supreme Court has held, time and time again, that no woman in her right mind would declare to the whole world that she was raped, unless she is telling the truth. Finally, in the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of private complainant AAA to falsely testify against appellants, her testimony deserves great weight and credence.
Regarding appellants’ defense of alibi, the same cannot prevail over the positive identification of appellants as perpetrators of the crime charged. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the appellants to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed. They must further demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, appellants interposed the alibi that they were at a place other than Brgy. xxx, at the time the crime was committed; however, no one corroborated their testimonies.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FO1 FELIPE DELA CRUZ et al
G.R. No. 168173, DECEMBER 24, 2008
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, ROBBERY IN BAND
Facts:
This is a review on automatic appeal of the decision of the CA that fully affirmed the decisionof the RTC. The RTC decision found the accused-appellants FO1 dela Cruz, Audie, Alfredo, Eduardo, Bernardo, Joemari, Dominador, and Robert guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and robbery in band. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced them to suffer the death penalty for robbery with homicide, and an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, for robbery in band.
Issue:
Is appellant guilty of the crime charged?
Ruling:
I. Criminal Case No. Q-99-85788 (Robbery in Band)
In the present case, the prosecution witnesses, at one time or another during the hearing, testified that Joemari, Bernardo, Diosdado and FO1 dela Cruz were all armed. However, we cannot recognize the commission of robbery by a band as an aggravating circumstance since this circumstance was not specifically alleged in the body of the Information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances
Ruben, the driver of the vehicle the appellants used and who saw the robberies from the start to its bloody end, positively and with full details identified in his testimony of September 28, 1999 the appellants Robert, Eduardo, Audie, Bernardo, Dominador, Joemari, Alfredo, and Diosdado as the robbers. At gunpoint, they boarded his jeepney in Monumento; ordered him to refuel at Petron Gas Station in Commonwealth, Quezon City and robbed this establishment; and then ordered him to stop at the 7-Eleven Convenience Store along Mindanao and Tandang Sora Avenue for another robbery. Rommel, in his testimony of October 21, 1999, corroborated the testimony of Ruben and likewise gave his own details of how the robbery was committed. He identified Audie, FO1 dela Cruz, Diosdao and Joemari as the passengers of the jeepney whom he recognized.
These testimonies, which we considered in light of the appellants’ defenses discussed below, more than amply constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery as charged.
II. Criminal Case No. Q-99-85787 (Robbery with Homicide)
In the case before us, the prosecution proved that the appellants’ original intention was to rob the 7-Eleven Convenience Store. A careful examination of the testimonies of the various prosecution witnesses, all of them cited above, reveals the following facts showing the appellants’ intent: appellants Joemarie, Bernardo and Robert entered the 7-Eleven Convenience Store pretending to be customers; witness Kuraishi entered the store and met appellant Bernardo, who was carrying a gun; Elmer, who went out of his car to follow Kuraishi, was shot in the chest by Diosdado; appellant FO1 dela Cuz fired at the security guard, Nestor, through the glass door but missed; Nestor exchanged shots with FO1 dela Cruz; Joemari pulled down Edwin and took his wallet and watch; Diosdado peeped through the glass panel of the 7-Eleven Convenience Store, shot Nestor and entered the store; Joemari dragged Edwin towards the counter and told him to open the cash register; Diosdado went outside the store, approached the two (2) taxis parked in front of King Dimsum and held up the drivers; FO1 dela Cruz entered the store, dragged the cashier, Rose, towards the backroom and asked who kept the keys of the cash register; Joemarie, Bernardo, Robert and FO1 dela Cruz took the cash register and went back to their companions who were waiting inside the jeepney; thereafter, appellants proceeded to Paniqui, Tarlac.
From the foregoing, the overriding intention of the appellants could not but be to rob the 7-Eleven Convenience Store; the killings were merely incidental, resulting by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Nestor was killed because he was the man who would have resisted the robbery; Elmer was killed because he simply happened to be there as the robbery was taking place.
G.R. No. 167461, February 19, 2008
BP 22
Facts:
Petitioner obtained from Presas a loan of P450,000, for which the petitioner issued as payment three postdated PhilBank checks. The three checks were all payable to cash. Presas testified she did not deposit the checks on their due dates upon petitioner’s request and assurance that they would be replaced with cash. When she could not wait any longer, Presas deposited Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 in her Westmont Bank account, only to be notified later that the checks were dishonored because the account had been closed. Presas said she did not deposit Check No. 026137 after she agreed to petitioner’s request to withhold its deposit as it had not yet been funded. After receiving notice that Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 had been dishonored, Presas immediately informed petitioner thereof and demanded payment for the value of the checks. This demand, however, went unheeded.
In a letter, Presas through counsel, demanded from petitioner the settlement of P367,602, representing the total value of the three checks, within five days from receipt. Petitioner, however, did not comply. Thus, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of a violation of BP 22?
Ruling:
NO. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes as malum prohibitum the mere issuance of a worthless check, provided the other elements of the offense are proved. Section 1 enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22, as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Upon careful examination of the records, however, the Court found that only the first and third elements have been established by the prosecution. By her own admission, petitioner issued the three subject checks, two of which were presented to PhilBank but were dishonored and stamped for the reason “Account Closed”. Under Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22, the introduction in evidence of the dishonored check, having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuing of the said checks and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks.
As to the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.
Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. But in criminal cases, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioner through registered mail and the registry return card. There was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of petitioner or her authorized agent remains a mystery. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. Unfortunately, the prosecution presented only the testimony of Presas to prove mailing and receipt of the demand letter
JAMES SVENDSEN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175381, February 26, 2008
BP 22
Facts:
Cristina Reyes (Cristina) extended a loan to petitioner in the amount of P200,000, to bear interest at 10% a month. After petitioner had partially paid his obligation, he failed to settle the balance thereof which had reached P380,000 inclusive of interest.
Cristina thus filed a collection suit against petitioner, which was eventually settled when petitioner paid her P200,000 and issued in her favor an International Exchange Bank check postdated February 2, 1999 (the check) in the amount of P160,000 representing interest. The check was co-signed by one Wilhelm Bolton.
When the check was presented for payment on February 9, 1999, it was dishonored for having been Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF).
Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to petitioner by registered mail informing him that the check was dishonored by the drawee bank, and demanding that he make it good within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
No settlement having been made by petitioner, an Information for violation of BP 22 was filed against the two.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of a violation of BP 22?
Ruling:
NO. For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites must thus concur: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to Cristina. The check, however, was dishonored when deposited for payment in Banco de Oro due to DAIF. Hence, the first and the third elements obtain in the case.
The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second element. While the registry receipt, which is said to cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of demand sent to petitioner, was presented, there is no proof that he or a duly authorized agent received the same. Receipts for registered letters including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
Petitioner is civilly liable, however. For in a criminal case, the social injury is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, whereas with respect to the personal injury of the victim, it is sought to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in nature.
ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 147578-85, January 28, 2008
Direct Bribery
Facts:
Rolando L. Balderama was employed with the Land Transportation Commission (LTO) assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento, respondent, operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units.
Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport discriminate against passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on a “contract” basis, the LTO created a team to look into the veracity of the complaints.
The team flagged down for inspection an “SJ Taxi” owned by respondent. The team impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon inspection and testing by the LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the meter waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was functioning normally. The vehicle was released to respondent.
Respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioner. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting “protection money” from him.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of direct bribery?
Ruling:
YES. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as “protection money” from respondent on several dates. As against the prosecution’s evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and denial, the weakest of defenses.
To hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners and Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of respondent, causing him undue injury.
Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. We found none of these exceptions in the present cases.
ZENON R. PEREZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008
Malversation of Public Funds
Facts:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine.
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation?
Ruling:
YES. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was accountable for the public funds under his custody or control. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.
Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion. Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision.
However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed. In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or control.
RAUL S. TELLO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165781, June 5, 2009
Malversation of Public Funds
Facts:
Raul S. Tello was a Telegraph Operator and Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Lordino Tomampos Saligumba, Commission on Audit Auditor II assigned at the office of the Provincial Auditor of Agusan del Sur, received an order directing him and Dionisio Virtudazo to conduct an audit examination of petitioner’s accounts. Saligumba and Virtudazo conducted an audit where it was initially determined that petitioner had a shortage in the total amount of P6,152.90. When the auditors questioned petitioner on the official receipts of the bank to confirm the remittance advices, petitioner informed them that they were sent to the regional office of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Saligumba wrote the unit auditor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), San Francisco, Agusan del Sur branch, requesting for confirmation of petitioner’s remittances and a list of validated remittances from 1 January to 9 December 1986. In a letter dated 10 December 1986, PNB’s branch auditor informed Saligumba that petitioner did not make any remittance to the bank from 31 July 1985 to 30 October 1986. Saligumba secured copies of the official receipts and compared them with the remittance advices submitted by petitioner and found that the bank’s official receipts did not correspond with petitioner’s remittance advices. The auditors found that the total shortage incurred by petitioner amounted to P204,607.70. Petitioner failed to submit his explanation and to produce or restitute the missing funds. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the RPC.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation?
Ruling:
YES. The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the RPC are:
1. that the offender is a public officer; 2. that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; 3. that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and 4. that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
In this case, all the elements of the crime are present. Petitioner is a public officer. He took his Oath of Office as Acting Operator-in-Charge on 13 January 1982. Regional Office Order No. 35 dated 27 September 1984 designated petitioner as Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge aside from his regular duties as Acting Operator-in-Charge of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. He was appointed Telegraph Operator effective 1 March 1986.
As Telegraph Operator and Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge, petitioner was in charge of the collections which he was supposed to remit to the PNB. The funds are public funds for which petitioner was accountable. It was also established that petitioner misappropriated the money. He failed to remit his cash collections and falsified the entries in the cashbooks to make it appear that he remitted the money to PNB. Petitioner failed to explain the discrepancies and shortage in his accounts and he failed to restitute the missing amount upon demand. It was also established that petitioner stopped reporting to work starting 8 December 1986.
Petitioner did not present any testimonial evidence for his defense. Instead, he merely manifested that he only incurred a shortage of P6,152.90, the initial shortage found by the auditors.
The last paragraph of Article 217 of the RPC states: “The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.”
In this case, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of malversation. He did not present testimonial evidence to defend himself. He practically admitted the shortage except that he manifested, contrary to the evidence presented by the prosecution, that only the amount of P6,152.90 was missing. He did not report to his office when the audit examination started. We sustain the Sandiganbayan’s finding that petitioner’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
VIOLETA BAHILIDAD VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010
Malversation of Public Funds
Facts: Acting on a complaint filed by a “Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province” with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants and donations using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its investigation from June 1 to July 31, 2003. Included in the list of alleged fictitious associations that benefited from the financial assistance given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), People’s Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in the amount of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof. Based on its findings, the Special Audit Team recommended the filing of charges of malversation through falsification of public documents against the officials involved. Issue: Is petitioner guilty of malversation of public funds? Ruling: NO. In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The trial court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction.
In the instant case, we find petitioner’s participation in the crime not adequately proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her name. A cursory look at the disbursement voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals the following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz certifying that the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision; signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and propriety of the supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash advances; signature of Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of Provincial Treasurer Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is available; signature of Constantino, with the initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name, certifying that the disbursement is approved for payment, and with petitioner’s signature as the payee.
The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioner’s name and, as payee, she had the authority to encash it. All told, there is reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an accused must be acquitted even though his innocence may not have been fully established. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, exoneration must be granted as a matter of right. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO CALONGE G.R. No. 182793, July 5, 2010 Parricide Facts: Rosita A. Calonge was appellant’s legitimate wife, with whom he had three children. On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning, the Villaverde Police Station received a radio call from the barangay captain of Cabuluan that a massacre took place in their locality. Rosita’s bloodied body was found lying on the ground about fifteen (15) meters away from their house. Her right hand was loosely clasping a knife. Lying on his back near the stairs was appellant who was also wounded but still conscious. Beside him were a bolo and a flashlight, both stained with blood. While the windows of the house were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door was already opened. Inside the two “bedrooms” of the house separated only by a curtain, they found the lifeless bodies of the two young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other child, Melody, was also bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought Melody to the Veterans Regional Hospital where she was treated and confined for seventeen days. Melody’s grandparents said they knew it was appellant because they had heard Rosita shouting that appellant will kill them. On the other hand, when appellant was asked what happened and who attacked him, he answered he does not know. Appellant was charged with parricide and frustrated parricide. Issue: Is the accused guilty of the crime charged? Ruling: YES. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Even granting arguendo that Melody did not see the actual stabbing of her mother and two (2) sisters, the attendant circumstances point to no one else but the appellant as the perpetrator. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his guilt. The oft-repeated rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. In the killing of victims in this case, the trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the attack is so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself. Indeed, nothing can be more sudden and unexpected than when a father stabs to death his two young daughters while they were sound asleep and totally defenseless. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS LUIS ANTONIO GARCHITORENA G.R. No. 184172, May 8, 2009 Parricide Facts: On appeal is the 21 January 2008 Decision of the Court of affirming the conviction of appellant Luis Antonio Garchitorena of the crime of parricide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the16th day of [August 2000], in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, being then the legitimate husband of FLORDELIZA TABLA GARCHITORENA, with intent to kill, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of said FLORDELIZA TABL[A] GARCHITORENA, his wife, by then and there shooting her with a gun, hitting her on the head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wound, which was the direct and immediate cause of her untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FLORDELIZA TABLA GARCHITORENA.
Issue: Is accused guilty of parricide? Ruling: YES.The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. It was stipulated during the pre-trial that appellant and the victim are married on 24 August 1999. That the appellant killed the victim was proven specifically by circumstantial evidence.
As aptly stated by the trial court:
In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances warrant a finding that accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fact that accused and the deceased were the only persons in the bedroom when the shooting incident occurred is undisputed. Secondly, there was an argument between the spouses, as narrated by the accused to the police investigator and during trial. Thirdly, accused, giving no logical excuse, got a gun. In this, the Court finds criminal purpose. Also, there is a finding by this Court of improbability of the deceased shooting herself.
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of the deceased by the accused, the established circumstances aforestated, however, constituted an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other [hypothesis] that he is not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inaccurate and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RENATO ESPAÑOL
G.R. No. 175603, February 13, 2009
Parricide Facts: At about 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, Domingo Petilla was waiting for his companions at Pantal Road, Dagupan City on their way to Manila. All of a sudden, he heard two successive gunshots. A few moments later, a yellow tricycle sped past him along Pantal Road headed towards Sitio Guibang, Dagupan City. The tricycle was driven by a man wearing a dark-colored long-sleeved shirt. Petilla’s companions arrived shortly thereafter on board a van. As they started loading their things, they saw, through the lights of their vehicle, a person lying on the pavement along Pantal Road. Upon closer scrutiny, they discovered the lifeless body of Gloria Español. The gunshots were also heard by Harold Villanueva, a boatman working at the Pantal River, while he was waiting for passengers at the dock about 100 meters away from the crime scene. The shots were followed by the sound of a motorcycle’s revving engine. He then saw a speeding yellow tricycle. The tricycle bore the name “Rina” in front of its cab. Its driver was wearing a dark jacket and blue pants. Out of curiosity, he (the boatman) went there and recognized the victim as one of his regular passengers. Appellant arrived at the scene and Villanueva noticed that the appellant seemed to be wearing the same clothes as those worn by the driver of the speeding tricycle. He was subsequently charged of parricide. Issue: Is the accused guilty of parricide? Ruling: YES. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, parricide is the killing of one’s legitimate or illegitimate father, mother, child, any ascendant, descendant or spouse and is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. None of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual killing of the victim by appellant. However, their separate and detailed accounts of the surrounding circumstances reveal only one conclusion: that it was appellant who killed his wife. Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is accorded great respect in the absence of proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily or that the trial court overlooked material facts. The rationale behind this rule is that the credibility of a witness can best be determined by the trial court since it has the direct opportunity to observe the candor and demeanor of the witnesses at the witness stand and detect if they are telling the truth or not. The Court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. In sum, the guilt of appellant was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence. Reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed considering that there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present. The heirs of the victim are entitled to a civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of the accused for the death.
People vs. Tabuelog
G.R. No. 178059, January 22, 2008
Murder
Facts:
An Information was filed charging appellant with murder. The accused admits that he stabbed Clinton Badinas on or about that time on said place and as a consequence of the wound he sustained Clinton Badinas died. However, he claimed that he acted in self-defense.
The trial court found the version of the prosecution credible thus rejecting appellant’s theory of self-defense. On May 6, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of murder.
Appellant alleges that the justifying circumstance of self-defense was not properly considered in his favor; that assuming the killing was committed not in self-defense, still the courts below erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Issue:
Is appellant’s contention meritorious?
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
In invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence since he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act. One who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. If the accused’s evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail.
We agree with the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the defense miserably
In the instant case, appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; moreover, his narration of the events was unbelievable. As correctly observed by the trial court, considering the alleged disadvantageous position of the appellant and the relentless assault from the victim, it is surprising that appellant remained unscathed. The presence of a pitcher and a knife conveniently within the reach of appellant was highly suspect and coincidental. As noted by the trial court, "the presence of a pitcher of water which the accused picked up to repel the attack of the deceased and the knife which the accused was able to grasp and swung it to the (victim) hitting him near the left armpit seems to suggest that pitchers and knives are scattered around Fort Ilocandia."11 Moreover, if it were true that the victim was pursuing Roger Domingo with a broken bottle, then it is preposterous for the appellant to shout at and order Domingo, instead of the victim, to stop, thus putting Domingo’s life at risk. Further, if Domingo stopped as narrated by appellant, then it is inconceivable that he was not harmed by his alleged pursuer.
In fine, the trial court correctly held that the defense failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There being no unlawful aggression, there is no need to discuss whether the means employed to repel the attack was reasonable or whether appellant sufficiently provoked the victim into attacking him.
However, we cannot agree with the findings of the trial court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because "the attack by the accused upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any possible way for the victim to defend himself." Nevertheless, mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.
It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him. In the instant case, there was no proof that appellant consciously adopted the mode of attack, hence he may only be held liable for homicide, not murder.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant guilty of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds appellant guilty of Homicide.
People vs. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010
Murder, Self-defense
Facts:
On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three (3) counts of attempted murder were filed against appellant.
When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts.
Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence. He admits having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.
Issue:
Did the accused act in self-defense?
Ruling:
No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:
One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.
In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge has the best opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such exceptions obtains in this case.
In Razon v. People, we held:
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellant’s plea of self-defense.
This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.
The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that treachery was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and appellant’s testimony that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 is correct.
We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated murder, in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his death had medical help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death.
People vs. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010
Murder qualified by Treachery
Facts:
In an Information filed on August 11, 2003, accused-appellant Leozar Dela Cruz y Balobal was indicted for the crime of murder of Vincent Pimentel under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On September 5, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Leozar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder attended by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. On February 27, 2008, the CA rendered the appealed decision, affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction of Leozar but modifying the award of damages.
Accused raises the same assignment of errors as in his Brief, to wit: first, that the courts a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery; and second, that the courts a quo gravely erred in convicting him of murder instead of homicide.
Issue:
Was there treachery?
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that Leozar and Vincent did not quarrel prior to the killing is indicative of the treachery employed by Leozar. After Vincent paid Leozar some money, he left and went inside the alley. When Vincent came back to Mockingbird St. from the alley, Leozar deliberately employed means with treachery affording Vincent no opportunity to defend himself, i.e., Leozar draped his arm around Vincent and slash/slit his neck using a 24-inch bladed samurai. The fatal neck wound caused Vincent’s death, described in his death certificate as "hemorrhagic shock secondary to an incised wound of the neck." All told, the victim was unaware of the imminent attempt on his life, and was not in a position to defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
People vs. Tabarnero
G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010
Self-defense, Voluntary Surrender
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027 dated April 29, 2005. In said Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the August 29, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78 of Malolos, Bulacan, in Crim. Case No. 888-M-2000, convicting herein appellants Alberto Tabarnero (Alberto) and Gary Tabarnero (Gary) of the crime of Murder.
Apellants contended that the court a quo gravely erred in not considering the justifying circumstance of self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender interposed by accused-appellant Gary Tabarnero.
Issue:
Are the contentions meritorious?
Ruling:
No. The justifying circumstance of self-defense on the part of Gary cannot be considered
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel aggression.
The defense invokes the said justifying circumstance, claiming that all of the above three elements are present in the case at bar. There was allegedly unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto when the latter delivered the first blow with the lead pipe. According to the defense, the means Gary used to defend himself was reasonable, and the shouting shouted professions of his feelings for about Mary Jane could not be considered provocation sufficient for Ernesto to make the unlawful aggression.
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement of self-defense of self-defense. As ruled by the Court of Appeals, the evidence presented by Gary to prove the alleged unlawful aggression, namely, his own testimony, is insufficient and self-serving. The alleged sudden appearance of Ernesto and his first attack with the lead pipe the very moment Gary decided to leave seems to this Court to be all too convenient, considering that there was no one around to witness the start of the fight.
It also bears to emphasize that by invoking self-defense, Gary, in effect, admitted killing Ernesto, thus, shifting upon him the burden of evidence to prove the elements of the said justifying circumstance. A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful in itself.
The defense further argues that assuming that Gary is not qualified to avail of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he would nevertheless be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
The first assignment of error presents another issue for the consideration of this Court. The defense argues that Gary’s yielding to Alarma should be credited as a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The Solicitor General agreed with the defense on this point. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed, and held that the delay of six months before surrendering negates spontaneity, a requisite for voluntary surrender to be considered mitigating.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited to the accused, the following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses in capturing him.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Edgar Esqueda vs. People of the Philippines
GR 170222, June 18, 2009
Defense of Alibi
Facts:
Edgar Esqueda and one John Doe were charged with two (2) counts of Frustrated Murder in two (2) separate Amended Informations. Accused Edgar entered a plea of not guilty. Accused John Doe remains at-large.
On December 12, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 33, rendered a Decision acquitting the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 14612 and convicting him in Criminal Case No. 14609. The CA rendered a Decision dated August 19, 2004 dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition assigning the following error:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING HIS DEFENSE.
Petitioner's defense is anchored on alibi and denial. His witnesses, Claudio, Domingo and Viviana, aver that during the time of the incident, petitioner was out at sea fishing. Petitioner, when called to the witness stand, denied having committed the crime.
Issue:
Should the petition be granted?
Ruling:
No. We have unfailingly held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. In the present case, petitioner was positively identified by Venancia and Gaudencio as the author of the crime.
Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Where there is least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.
Aside from the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses that he was fishing at Cawitan, Sta. Catalina from 8 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999 until 2 o'clock in the morning the following day, petitioner was unable to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
During the trial of the case, both the prosecution and defense witnesses testified that Nagbinlod and Cawitan, Sta. Catalina, were merely more than 5 kilometers apart which would only take about 20 to 40 minutes’ ride. Thus, it was not physically impossible for the petitioner to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.
People vs. Bucayo
G.R. No. 178770, June 13, 2008
Murder qualified by the use of superior strength
Facts:
Jonathan Perez and childhood friend Edison Buencillo, Jr. were on their way to visit Jonathan’s common-law wife, Princess, who lived in Tondo. As they were walking along A. Rivera St., they passed by the group of Fernando and Hector Bucayo and Cesar and Jayson Ortiz, all of whom Jonathan recognized. The group asked Jonathan and Edison to join them but the two declined the invitation and proceeded to Princess’ house where they stayed for 15 minutes. They took the same route home and on their way, the group, joined by a certain Pamboy, Fortune, and some others, surrounded and blocked them. As the group taunted and shouted invectives at Jonathan and Edison, a rumble ensued. Jonathan attempted to flee but was dragged back to the melee by Hector. Jonathan saw Hector and Jayson gang up on Edison, as Fernando struck Jonathan repeatedly with a steel chair. As Jonathan was trying to escape, he got hold of a barbecue stick and stabbed Hector with it. Jonathan said he witnessed the assault on Edison and threw stones at the group to make them stop but his attempts were futile. Neither was his call for help heard. He asked for police assistance, and ran to Edison’s house to inform the latter’s mother of the melee. Edison expired at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Hospital.
After trial, on March 16, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision finding the accused Fernando and Hector guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by superior strength for the death of Edison. The case against Cesar and Jayson were archived to be revived upon their arrest.
On April 30, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.
The lone issue presented before this Court is:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE.
Accused-appellants asserted that the testimony of Jonathan was not credible because he could not have witnessed everything that was happening because he was himself under attack.
Issue:
Is accused-appellants’ assertion meritorious?
Ruling:
No. Essentially, accused-appellants’ claim, that the testimony of Jonathan ought not to be believed simply because Jonathan could not have witnessed the mauling of Edison since he himself was under attack, has no basis. Both the trial and appellate courts found Jonathan’s testimony credible and their findings should be given full faith and credit. Time and again, we said that the findings by the RTC should be respected as the trial court judge was in the best position to determine the witness’ credibility. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the determination of credibility of witnesses is properly within the domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe their demeanor. This conclusion becomes all the more pressing when the appellate court affirms the findings of the trial court.
It also bears remembering that people react differently in different situations and there is no standard human response when one is confronted with a strange and frightful experience. Even if a witness is himself attacked, he is still in a position to later on describe what has transpired. In some situations, when under siege, one’s power of observation becomes even more acute and heightened. Recall that at that time Edison was being mauled to death with a steel chair, Jonathan was not himself under siege and even testified that at that time, he was even hurling stones at Edison’s maulers.
Lastly, the CA found that Jonathan had no reason to fabricate what he witnessed. As against Jonathan’s straightforward and convincing testimony, the alibi of Fernando that he was asleep in his house and the denial of Hector that they confronted and assaulted Jonathan and Edison miserably fail. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses and as against positive identification by prosecution witnesses, alibi is worthless. Just as alibi is an inherently weak defense, so is denial since these are self-serving negative evidence that cannot be accorded much evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellants Fernando and Hector Bucayo is DISMISSED. The April 30, 2007 Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
People of the Phil. Vs. Zaldy Garcia Y Ancheta
G.R. No.174479, June 17, 2008
Crime of murder qualified by treachery
Facts:
The prosecution charged the accused-appellant Zaldy Garcia y Ancheta for the murder of Major Opina qualified by treachery, attended by the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, under two separate informations. The charge for violating R.A. 6425 is no longer under review after the RTC acquitted the appellant on ground of reasonable doubt. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges laid.
On August 26, 2003, the RTC convicted the accused of the crime of murder. The case was elevated to this Court on automatic appeal but was remanded to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with People v. Mateo. The CA decision of May 31, 2006 affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
In his brief, the appellant argues that the RTC erred –
1. in convicting him after the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
2. in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery;
3. in failing to recognize the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in imposing the penalty.
Issue:
Should the appeal be granted?
Ruling:
No.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The appellant contends, as his first point, that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt; no one really testified that it was he who shot Major Opina.
We clarify at the outset that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not solely established by direct evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may present circumstantial evidence that, under given conditions, may meet the evidentiary standard of "proof beyond reasonable doubt" in criminal cases. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The conclusions that can be drawn from the chain of proven circumstances rather than their number are material to prove the guilt of the accused. What is paramount is that facts be proven from which inferences may be drawn - with all the circumstances being consistent with one other - that the accused is guilty and this inference is consistent with no other conclusion except that of guilt.
The records of this case show that evidence of who actually shot Major Opina is not lacking. In fact, the evidence is the strongest there is, as the appellant himself admitted in open court that he was the one who wielded the gun and pulled the trigger.
The Presence of Treachery
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender’s deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution.
The appellant seeks to negate these elements of treachery by claiming to have acted out of fear and nervousness; he was allegedly under these stresses because persons who were armed, dressed in civilian clothes and who did not identify themselves as members of the police, scaled his fence. He simply reacted to the intrusion and had no plan to shoot one of those who so approached his house. Hence, he concludes that there was no treachery and the killing could not have been attended by this qualifying circumstance. He posits that the court a quo should have recognized all these.
What are the undisputed facts?
First, it is not disputed that the appellant went out of his house to see for himself the two men who came. Second, by his own testimony, he returned to his house to get his gun. Third, no immediate shooting took place. The two policemen still called for backup assistance, waited and conferred on what to do, and only after the backup came did they scale the fence. Twenty minutes must have elapsed from the time the appellant went inside the house up to the time of the actual shooting. Fourth, Major Opina was almost at the door of the appellant’s house when the shot that killed him rang out. Fifth, the shot came from inside the house through a closed chicken wire screen door that effectively hid a man from inside the house from someone from the outside. Sixth, the first and fatal shot was sudden, immediately hitting Major Opina.
We conclude from all these established facts that indeed treachery had attended the killing of Major Opina. While the original initiative originated from the police who sought to arrest the appellant, the latter’s response was an attack which showed, by its method and manner, that it did not come at the spur of the moment. The appellant was duly forewarned about the identities of Major Opina and SPO4 Oriña. Not only was he forewarned, he had ample time to reflect on what to do. His immediate response was to arm himself and to lie in wait – in ambush, literally - and to fire from a position of concealment and relative safety at the two policemen who were fully exposed and in the open at the time. The shooting distance of a little more than a meter effectively gave Major Opina no chance. This, in our view, is a classic example of treachery under the definition of the Revised Penal Code of the term.
Voluntary Surrender
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without these reasons and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender is the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender cannot be spontaneous and cannot be the "voluntary surrender" that serves as a mitigating circumstance.
Again, to hark back to the undisputed facts, no surrender immediately took place after the shooting of Major Opina; what followed was an exchange of shots between the appellant and SPO4 Oriña, after which the appellant holed out in his kitchen for some two to three hours. It was only after negotiations with Chief Inspector Lusad that he gave himself up. Thus, SPO3 Benavidez testified that the negotiation was "quite long." SPO4 Oriña, on the other hand, testified that the appellant even made demands before he surrendered. When he did surrender, the police had been in place for some time, fully surrounding his house so that he could not have escaped without a major and direct confrontation with them. Then, too, he did not acknowledge liability for the killing of Major Opina even after his surrender to Chief Inspector Lusad. Under these circumstances, none of the attendant elements that would make the surrender a mitigating circumstance was present. The appellant surrendered simply because there was no other way out without risking his own life and limb in a battle with the police.
People of the Philippines Vs. Agustino Tamolon, et al.
G.R. No. 180169, February 27, 2009
Multiple Murder
Facts:
Appellants, with several others, were charged with Multiple Murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. XXI-377 (93), before the RTC, Branch 21, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, in an Information which reads:
That sometime last March of 1984, in the Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with guns and bolos, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of superior strength conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot, hack and massacre Jaime Malabarbas, Ely Malabarbas, Judith Malabarbas, Wilfredo Panton and Gerry Panton, the herein victims/offended parties[,] which gunshot and hack wounds caused to their instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting both appellants of multiple murder. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC’s with Modification.
Thus, this appeal, assigning the following error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AGUSTINO TAMOLON AND ANTONIO CABAGAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MULTIPLE MURDER ON THE LONE, FABRICATED, ILL-MOTIVATED, AND POLLUTED TESTIMONY OF MODESTO LANDAS.
Issue:
Is the appeal meritorious?
Ruling:
No. The appellants cast aspersion on the credibility of lone prosecution witness, Modesto Landas, who admitted having been with the armed group that massacred the Malabarbas family. Moreover, they question the motive of Landas who, they said, told the authorities of the alleged criminal activities of the group only after he had been arrested and detained, nine years after the alleged incident. They then submit that "the evidence presented by the prosecution came from a polluted source," harping on Landas being with the roving team at the time of the commission of the crime, making him a co-conspirator.
However, the trial court gave full weight and credence to Landas’ testimony. Evaluating the same, the court said:
Witness Modesto Landas was likewise very positive, direct, straight-forward and convincing in his testimony against accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan. This witness never faltered or wavered in his claim about the participation of accused Agustino Tamolon and Antonio Cabagan in the massacre of the Malabarbas family and in setting fire to the dr[y]er of Vilma Ganad.
The CA also held that, by way of exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient for conviction when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and is full of details by which their nature could not have been the result of a deliberate afterthought.
In this regard, worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses, since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings on and assessment of the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on an appellate tribunal. A trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
As to the appellants’ defense which is based mainly on denial and alibi, nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the witness.
People vs. Domingo
G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009
Murder and Frustrated Murder, Exemption of Criminal Liability in View of Insanity
Facts:
Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511, modifying the Decision dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000.
The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution, Raquel Indon, is assailed by appellant for not being credible due to an inconsistency in her testimony and a lack of conformity with the experience of ordinary men.
Appellant also asserts that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the commission of the alleged crimes, and therefore should be exempted from criminal liability in accordance with Article 12, Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Are appellant’s contention meritorious?
Ruling:
No.
First contention. Appellant refers to Raquel’s testimony during cross-examination wherein she narrated that after the appellant entered her bedroom, she screamed. Her sister-in-law, who lived next door, responded by asking Raquel who her assailant was, and the latter identified the appellant. Appellant claims that the conversation between Raquel and her sister-in-law was contrary to the ordinary course of things, and that the initial reaction of people in such a situation would be to ask for help from other people in order to save those who are in danger. Secondly, Raquel also testified during cross-examination that the appellant stabbed the front of her legs when she fell down. It is also argued that the appellant could not have stabbed the front of her legs, since she would be lying on front of her legs when she fell down.
This Court finds no merit in these arguments. To begin with, there was nothing out of the ordinary as regards Raquel’s testimony on these two matters. First, there was nothing unusual about the sister-in-law’s query as to who was attacking Raquel. Considering that the exchange merely consisted of this question and the reply to it, it would not even be accurate to refer to it as a "conversation." Secondly, it was not impossible for the appellant to stab the front of Raquel’s legs, had her legs been positioned sideways when she fell. But more importantly, these are peripheral details that do not affect the substantial aspects of the incident. Raquel clearly and positively testified that she was carrying her son Marvin when she rushed to the gate and fell down, and the appellant stabbed her legs and thereafter proceeded to stab Marvin who later died from the stab wounds. Her testimony was supported by the Medico-Legal Reports marked as Exhibits "E" and "F." Any inconsistencies in such peripheral details would not exculpate the appellant.
Second contention. His claim is not supported by evidence. Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that he was insane at the time he committed the crime. He testified that nine days before he committed the crime, he suffered from lack of appetite, sleeplessness, and anxiety. In addition, he allegedly heard voices ordering him to kill bad people. He claims that he does not remember anything that happened on 29 March 2000, when the crimes were committed, and that he was already detained when he became conscious of his surroundings.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.
Even assuming that appellant’s testimony is credible, his sleeplessness, lack of appetite, nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular conception of the word "crazy" is used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he is legally insane and will not grant him or her absolution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANSELMO BERONDO JR.
G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009
Murder to Homicide
Facts:
At around 11:30 p.m. of February 13, 1999, after joining the Miss Gay competition at New Danao, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Herbert Nietes, Jr. walked home to Puntian, Quezon, Bukidnon. While on the way, he suddenly heard a gunshot from nearby. Feeling afraid, he ran towards the grassy area by the roadside to hide. After about five minutes, he saw BERONDO, Julie Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario, each holding a knife, walk towards the road and take turns in stabbing a person who was already slumped on the ground. He recognized the three as they are his townmates. Thereafter, he ran away from the area and went to Bato-Bato, Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, where he spent the night. The next day, he learned that the person stabbed was GENARO LAGUNA. He later testified that he did not reveal what he had witnessed to anyone because he was afraid of getting involved.
Two years after the incident, Nietes and Tero (another witness) admitted to Dolores, Laguna’s widow, that they had witnessed the crime.
Trial proceeded only against accused-appellant BERONDO for murder, because the two other accused remained at-large, where he was convicted. The CA affirmed conviction, but ruled that BERONDO was liable only for homicide.
ISSUES:
1. Does the belated reporting of Nietes of what he witnessed defeat his credibility as a witness?
2. Was the CA correct in holding that BERONDO was liable only for homicide?
HELD:
1. No. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given.No standard form of behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience. Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in criminal investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family; while others shy away when those involved in the crime are their relatives or townmates. And where there is delay, it is more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of delay.
Despite the delay in reporting the identities of the malefactors, Nietes testified in a categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous manner, and remained consistent even under grueling cross-examination. Such bears the marks of a credible witness.
2. Yes. The Court finds error in the Trial Court’s finding that the killing of the deceased was committed with abuse of superior strength, because no evidence was presented to prove that the accused purposely took advantage of their numerical superiority. Absent clear and convincing evidence of any qualifying circumstance, conviction should only be for homicide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO SATONERO @ RUBEN
G.R. No. 186233, October 2, 2009
Murder; Self-Defense
FACTS:
At around five o’clock in the afternoon of December 25, 1997, Leticia and her nephew, Ramon Amigable were in Brgy. La Esperanza, Tulunan waiting for a tricycle ride to a place called M’lang. Leticia had just received a gift from her sister. Accused-appellant Romeo SATONERO, Leticia’s nephew too, happened to be nearby. Accused-appellant, upon seeing the gift Leticia was holding, inquired where it came from. When told of the source, accused-appellant mocked the gift-giver for giving more to those who have more in life. Accused-appellant then asked Leticia if she knew who he was, followed by a remark that he would throw her into the irrigation ditch.
At that moment, Leticia told Ramon not to mind accused-appellant because he was drunk. When Ramon was about to board the tricycle, accused-appellant followed him, shot him three times with a short-barreled gun, then stabbed him several times. All told, Ramon sustained nine stab wounds on different parts of his body. Ramon died as a result.
On May 16, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of murder, discrediting the SATONERO’s theory of self-defense. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC and CA err in not appreciating self-defense?
HELD:
No. The conviction was proper. There was no self-defense.
The Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the finding of the CA, confirmatory of that of the RTC, that there was no self-defense on the part of accused-appellant in the instant case.
One who admits killing another in the name of self-defense bears the onus of proving the justifiability of the killing. The accused, therefore, must convincingly prove the following elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. While all three elements must concur to support a claim of complete self-defenese, self-defense relies first and foremost on a showing of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Absent clear proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, self-defense may not be successfully pleaded
In the instant case, accused-appellant failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression. From a perusal of the trial court’s decision, the prosecution’s testimonial evidence, notably Leticia’s testimony, had been carefully weighed and was found by the trial court to be more credible and convincing than the bare and self-serving testimony of accused-appellant as to who initiated the fight and what transpired after the initial assault ensued. The testimony of a single eyewitness to a killing, if worthy of credence, is sufficient to support a conviction for homicide or murder, as the case may be.
The allegation of accused-appellant which pictured Ramon as purportedly pulling out a knife and attempting to stab the former came uncorroborated, although several onlookers––potential witnesses all––were at the situs of the crime. And while claiming to have grappled for some time with Ramon for the possession of the knife, accused-appellant managed to stay unscathed, which in itself is incredible.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO LUSABIO, JR.
G.R. No. 186119, Oct. 27, 2009
Murder
FACTS:
For the death of Edwin Labini on 12 June 2001, an information was filed on 14 September 2001 before Branch 65 of the RTC of Bulan, Sorsogon, charging accused-appellant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., Tomasito de los Santos and one John Doe with Murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-459.
The Information reads:
That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2001, at Barangay Biton, municipality of Magallanes, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stabbed one Edwin Labini, who sustained mortal/fatal injuries that caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
On 24 September 2001, based on a complaint of accused-appellant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., an information was filed before the same court charging Tomasito de los Santos, alias Guapo, and Ronnie Dig, alias Tabong, with Attempted Murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-464.
In Criminal Case No. 01-459 (Murder), the prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Doris Labini, Dr. Irene V. Ella, Jose Labini and Elsie Gocoyo. In Criminal Case No. 01-464 (Attempted Murder), private complainant Pablo Lusabio, Jr., Dr. Antonio Lopezand Ricardo Cabrera took the witness stand.
The RTC convicted Labini for murder. As to Tomasito de los Santos, the trial court ruled that he had no participation whatsoever in the stabbing of Edwin Labini. The decision was questioned before the CA, alleging insufficiency of evidence, and questioning the credibility of the deceased’s wife. The decision was however affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Is the conviction for murder proper?
HELD:
Yes. Accused-appellant brands Doris Labini as a biased witness, thus unreliable, because she was the wife of Edwin Labini. The fact that she was the wife of the victim did not necessarily make her a partial witness. It is well-settled that mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair the witness’ credibility. On the contrary, a witness’ relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.
In the case at bar, Doris Labini positively identified Pablo Lusabio, Jr. as the one who stabbed her husband. Such declaration was corroborated by the testimony of Tomasito de los Santos that it was, indeed, Lusabio who inflicted the stab wounds on Edwin Labini. Doris Labini was eight meters away from her husband when the latter was stabbed by Lusabio. Aside from this, the crime scene was well-lighted, making it easy for her to identify Lusabio as the perpetrator.
Finally, accused-appellant submits that if ever he committed a crime, he merely committed homicide. He maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately and consciously adopted a particular mode of attack in order to eliminate the risk to his person from any defense that Edwin Labini might offer.
The lower court was correct in appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. It was clearly established that Edwin Labini, while talking to Pablo Lusabio, Jr. face to face, was suddenly stabbed by the latter with a ten-inch bladed weapon for no reason at all. The suddenness of the stabbing and the fact that Edwin Labini was unarmed gave him no opportunity to defend himself. It is likewise apparent that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack, making sure that the victim would have no chance to defend himself by reason of the surprise attack.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARLON DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 174658, February 24, 2009
Anti-Carnapping; Robbery with Homicide (Can one absorb the other?)
FACTS:
Two Informations, one for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (the Anti-Carnapping Law), and the other for Robbery with Homicide, were filed against 1) appellant Marlon dela Cruz (DELA CRUZ), together with 2) Adriano Melecio (Melecio), 3) Jessie Reyes (REYES), and 4) Jepoy Obello (Obello) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. Melecio and Obello have remained at large.
From information gathered from bystanders, the police learned that de la Cruz, a notorious thief who had previously been convicted for theft, and an unidentified man were seen riding on a red Yamaha motorcycle on June 4, 2001, that from a surveillance conducted, de la Cruz was not in his Dagupan residence; and that his mother Maria Rosario (Maria) is living in the municipality of San Quintin. The carnapped motorcycle was owned by a certain Juliana Tamin.
De la Cruz’s friends Angelica Perez (Angelica) and Anna Datlag (Anna), who were at the time staying at Maria’s house, were invited for questioning.
Anna further related: On June 6, 2001, she asked de la Cruz who owns the red motorcycle to which he replied that he took it from an old man who was sleeping after he hit the old man with a stone and Melecio stabbed him at the right side of his body, following which they took the money of the old man.
Upon the other hand, de la Cruz put up alibi, claiming that he was asleep in his house at Callejon Extension, Dagupan City on the night of January 3, 2001; that on waking up the following day, January 4, 2001, Obello and Melecio arrived and invited him to, as he did join them to San Quintin on board a motorcycle which the two claimed belongs to their uncle; that the group went first to Lupao, Nueva Ecija where they met Anna and Angelica who, on his invitation, joined them in San Quintin where they stayed for a few days.
After trial, Branch 43 of the Dagupan City RTC convicted DELA CRUZ of both charges. It acquitted Reyes. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Among others, DELA CRUZ argues that even if the allegation on the loss of some cash were true, the same should be absorbed in carnapping since carnapping and robbery have the same element of taking with intent to gain.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of DELA CRUZ tenable?
HELD:
No. Carnapping refers specifically to the taking of a motor vehicle. It does not cover the taking of cash or personal property which is not a motor vehicle. As the Court of Appeals noted:
x x x Two (2) articles were taken from TEOFILLO, SR., his tricycle and some cash. The taking of the tricycle constitutes a violation of the anti-carnapping law, RA 6539, while the taking of the cash from tEOFILO, SR. by hitting him with a stone and stabbing him in the chest constitutes the crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
MUPAS & MUAPAS VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 172834, February 6, 2008
Frustrated Homicide to Slight Physical Injuries
FACTS:
Petitioners JUN and GIL (aka Bajno) MUPAS were found guilty of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 2314 in the Decision dated 22 November 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Malaoan, La Union.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Rogelio Murao (Rogelio - victim), Flaviano Murao (Flaviano) and Dr. Arsenio B. Martinez (Dr. Martinez).
Rogelio testified that at around 7:30 in the morning of 18 February 1993, he was walking to school with his companion Eduardo Murao, Jr. when Jun suddenly stopped and stabbed him using a 29-inch Batangas knife. Meantime, Banjo bodily restrained him but luckily Rogelio was able to avoid the blow. Next, Banjo and Jun hurled stones at him and hit him on the leg while Rogelio was running eastward. Rogelio then flagged down a motorized tricycle but the two assailants continued to pursue him. While inside the tricycle, Banjo held Rogelio by his neck and punched him while Jun stabbed him several times. Then, Rogelio alighted from the tricycle and ran home. Afterwards, his father and mother accompanied him to the hospital. There, Dr. Martinez attended to Rogelio, and found that the wounds may take TWO WEEKS to HEAL.
Prior to the incident, Rogelio recalled that in January of the same year, he had a misunderstanding with Jun where he and the latter hurled invectives at each other. Rogelio suspected that this event gave rise to the subject incident.
Jun and Gil were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Before the Court of Appeals, Jun and Gil argued that the trial court erred in: (1) finding Gil guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding Jun guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide instead of physical injuries only. The convictions were however affirmed.
ISSUES:
Is the affirmation of the conviction for frustrated homicide proper?
HELD:
No. The trial court solely hinged its judgment of conviction on the victim Rogelio’s lone and uncorroborated testimony. While it is true that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if such testimony establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court rules in this case that the testimony of one witness in this case is not sufficient for this purpose. It appears then that Rogelio had at his disposal many witnesses who could have supported his allegations but curiously and without any explanation, none of these so-called witnesses were presented. It is thus Rogelio’s word against the attestations of others. Such omission already raises a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the petitioners.
Assuming that Gil alias Banjo had any participation, there is likewise no evidence that he or Jun had intent to kill Rogelio. Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of commission. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.
Although it can be fairly assumed that the injuries suffered by Rogelio were sustained during the fistfight, it is not conclusive that the same were inflicted purposely to kill him. For one, if Jun in fact had been carrying a bolo with intent of killing Rogelio, and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun, it is no small wonder why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than mortal, more mild than grave.
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to sustain the claim that petitioners had any intention to kill Rogelio. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical injuries only and in this case, less serious physical injuries considering the attending physician’s opinion that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks to heal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEODEGARIO BASCUGIN
GR 184704, June 30, 2009
Rape with Homicide; constant change in plea (from guilty to not guilty, and so on);
When circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
FACTS:
In an information dated June 21, 1999, BASCUGIN was charged with rape with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 1999 at about 7:45 o’clock in the evening, at Barangay [XXX], Municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed instrument and a hard object, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA], against her will and consent and by reason or on the occasion of the said rape, accused with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed and hit the said AAA, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds and other injuries on the different parts of her body, which caused her instantaneous death.
With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, BASCUGIN pleaded guilty upon arraignment on August 5, 1999. Since he was facing a charge for a capital offense, the trial court asked him if his plea was voluntarily given and whether he understood the consequences of his plea. The case then proceeded to trial.
In the automatic review by the Supreme Court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and BASCUGIN challenged the proceedings in the trial court, specifically the invalid arraignment of BASCUGIN. They contended that the consultation made by the counsel de oficio was hasty; and BASCUGIN was not sufficiently apprised of the nature of his case and the consequences of his plea. Finding merit in the OSG’s stand, the SUPREME COURT remanded the case to the court a quo for appropriate proceedings.
Upon re-arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued.
On September 8, 2003, before the prosecution could rest its case, the defense manifested that BASCUGIN wishes to change his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The trial court set his re-arraignment to September 29, 2003 to allow him more time to consider his plea. He was then arraigned on September 29, 2003, and he pleaded guilty to the charge. Then On November 12, 2003, BASCUGIN moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. This was granted by the trial court in an order dated November 17, 2003. He was re-arraigned on December 1, 2003 and he pleaded "not guilty."
He was still found guilty and sentenced to death. This was affirmed by the CA. The appellate court concurred with the trial court’s finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to him as the culprit.
BASCUGIN went to the SC alleging that there was insufficient evidence to hold him guilty BEYOND reasonable doubt as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE:
Is BASCUGIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD:
Yes. The decisive factor in BASCUGIN’s conviction was his admission to the crime when he was examined by his lawyer in court. He testified as follows:
xxx
Q: Did you feel any remorse or resentment to what happened with you and [AAA]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I noticed also, Mr. Witness, that at the course of the proceedings of this case you are always changing your plea of not guilty/to guilty. Why is it so, Mr. Witness?
A: Because I am bothered by my conscience and I was always changing my plea but I feel responsible for what I did, sir.
Q: Do you know fully the consequences of your testimony, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHAVEZ: I have no more questions, Your Honor.
xxx
BASCUGIN’s confession was freely, intelligently, and deliberately given. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. The presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Admission of guilt constitutes evidence against the accused pursuant to the following provisions of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, BASCUGIN’s confession is consistent with the evidence. We agree with the trial and appellate courts’ finding that the chain of events constitutes circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to support a conviction. From the testimonies of witnesses and the physical evidence gathered, it was established that the victim was last seen with BASCUGIN in his tricycle; his tricycle was seen parked near a waiting shed in the premises of which the victim’s personal belongings were later found; his pieces of clothing were found positive for human blood that matches the victim’s; and the medico-legal report states that BASCUGIN had sexual intercourse with the victim.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. According to Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inference is based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In the case at bar, the circumstantial pieces of evidence enumerated by the trial court all point to BASCUGIN as the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUFINO UMANITO
G.R. No. 172607, April 16, 2009
Use of DNA Evidence in Rape
FACTS:
In a Supreme Court Resolution dated 26 October 2007, the Court Resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules)in a case pending before it – this case. The SC remanded the case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance with the terms of said Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the first application of the procedure, directed Deputy Court Administrator Reuben Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic reports on the implementation of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.
To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito (UMANITO) was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. UMANITO was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. UMANITO appealed the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged "many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense."At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by UMANITO, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not UMANITO is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal.
There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino UMANITO y Millares and [BBB].
NOTE:
UMANITO in this case filed an action to withdraw appeal.
HELD:
By filing such motion, UMANITO is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny UMANITO’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise be deemed final if the appeal is not withdrawn.
Note: IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS
Nov. 17, 2004
It was argued in this case that DNA analysis on paternity shows conclusively that petitioner de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza; his conviction for rape, based on the fact that Leahlyn was sired as a result of the alleged rape, cannot stand and must be set aside.
HELD: Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases.The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEONEL PASAOL PALAC
G.R. No. 175600, April 23, 2008
Rape; Alibi as weak defense
On or about the 14th day of May 1996 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused LEONEL PASAOL PALAC alias Joy Joy Talac, in conspiracy with his co-accused REY ARGENTILLO and JOJO VILARDE, by means of force and intimidation they employed upon the person of one [AAA], a minor, 15 years of age, feloniously lay with and have carnal knowledge of said complainant [AAA] against the latter's will, while the two other acc[u]sed watched and stood guard while waiting for [their] turn to have sexual intercourse with the aforesaid [AAA], to her damage and prejudice.
The RTC convicted all three. But PALAC appealed to the CA, pleading defense on the basis of 1) alibi and 2) inconsistencies in the statement of the victim, AAA. The CA however affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE:
Does PALAC’s appeal have merit?
HELD:
No. Appellant cites the inconsistencies allegedly committed by [AAA]. Allegedly, during her direct examination, [AAA] testified that it was at "6:00 p.m.," when VILARDE offered her a drink, while in paragraph 6 of her Affidavit, she stated it was at 9:00 p.m. [AAA] also contradicted herself on direct examination when she stated that she knocked at the door of the photo[shop] which was opened by ARGENTILLO, when in paragraph 7 of her [A]ffidavit, she alleged that it was VILARDE who knocked at the door and it was appellant who opened the same.A circumspect examination of the record shows that when confronted with the foregoing inconsistencies on cross-examination, [AAA] clarified that it was at 6:00 p.m., not 9:00 p.m., when she was offered a drink by VILARDE; and that it was not she but VILARDE who knocked at the door which appellant opened.
In any event, inconsistencies on matters that transpired prior to the actual commission of the crime and have no bearing to the elements of the crime charged are not treated as proof of a feigning witness but as hallmark of an unrehearsed testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor and serve to strengthen rather than destroy [AAA]'s credibility.
As for appellant's alibi, it does not prosper for he failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that he was in a place other than the place of the crime such that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime. The photoshop where AAA was raped was only 15 meters away from the Aragon Compound where the house of CCC in which appellant spent the night on the same date of the incidents.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJIE RESURRECCION
G.R. No. 185389
Rape
FACTS:
On 20 June 2001, BENJIE was charged before the RTC with Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. He allegedly raped AAA, an 11 year-old girl.
Dr. Marlyn Valdez-Agbayani examined AAA and found that the victim had no laceration in her external organ or her hymen. The former also testified that there were no spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina. Despite these findings, Dr. Valdez-Agbayani clarified that if the hymen of a woman is elastic and so thin, as in AAA’s case, laceration may not be present. As to the absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina, Dr. Valdez-Agbayani said that it was possible that the victim washed her genitalia, especially since she was examined only after two days following the alleged rape incident.
BENJIE was convicted by the RTC, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA. Upon appeal to the SC, BENJIE points out that 1) the testimony of AAA on how he allegedly raped her was highly improbable, and 2) the negative findings of spermatozoa and laceration must acquit him.
ISSUE:
Is BENJIE guilty of rape?
HELD:
Yes. This Court itself, in its desire to unveil the truth as borne out by the records, has painstakingly pored over the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case, and like the RTC, finds the victim’s testimony of the incident candid and straightforward, indicative of an untainted and realistic narration of what transpired on that fateful day.
BENJIE tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning the odd position at which the rape was done. While BENJIE’s position, i.e., covering AAA’s mouth with his left hand and pinning her down with the right hand, may be considered difficult, such does not exclude the possibility that rape can be consummated under said situation. Depraved individuals stop at nothing in order to accomplish their purpose. Perverts are not used to the easy way of satisfying their wicked cravings. It should be noted that the victim was a very young and fragile 11-year-old, who was easy to be subdued by an abuser who was used to manual labor and was already 18 or 19 years old.
In his last-ditch effort to be exculpated, BENJIE calls this Court’s attention to the medical findings that no sperm cells were present in the victim’s vagina just two days following the rape. He intimates that no rape occurred because of the absence of the sperm cells.
This contention is not well-taken. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s genitalia does not negate rape, the slightest penetration even without emission being sufficient to constitute and consummate the offense. The mere touching of the labia of the woman’s pudendum or lips of the female organ by the male sexual organ consummates the act.
Note: The court laid down these GUIDING PRINCIPLES in Rape:
To ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases of rape, the courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles, namely: (a) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. In its prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis thereof; otherwise, he should be acquitted of the crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NORBERTO MATEO
G.R. No. 170569, September 30, 2008
Rape
FACTS:
In a Complaint dated November 2, 1995, AAA, assisted by her father, BBB, charged Norberto MATEO (appellant) with rape by means of force and intimidation. The Assistant City Prosecutor certified that it was filed with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Upon medical examination, Dr. Reyes testified that AAA could have been laid on a rough surface as shown by the multiple linear abrasions found at her back and the anterum medial aspect of her thigh;that she had been sexually penetrated possibly with the use of force and violence; that he noticed that AAA was suffering from some form of mental retardation as she was not responding to his question like a 17-year old girl should, compelling him to refer her to a neuro-psychiatrist for examination; that based on the result forwarded to him, AAA had a mental age of 5 years and 8 months with an IQ of 38.
After trial, the RTC found MATEO guilty of raping a mental retardate. This was affirmed by the CA.
MATEO questioned the affirmation of the CA in the SC, arguing that 1) there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt – there was no physical struggle by the victim, and 2) the court a quo erred in finding that the victim AAA was a mental retardate.
ISSUE:
Is MATEO guilty of rape?
HELD:
Yes. Appellant's claim that the records do not show any sign or presence of struggle is irrelevant. Physical resistance is not an essential element of the felony, and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. It is enough that the malefactor intimidated the complainant into submission. Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary the complainant's submission to the criminal acts of the accused.Furthermore, not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone.
During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to show that AAA was a mental retardate. It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape, which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction.
In any event, the prosecution presented adequate evidence which showed that the appellant used force and intimidation in committing the crime of rape, and which the RTC relied upon in convicting appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODRIGO AWID AND MADUM GANIH
G.R. No. 185388, June 16, 2010
Kidnapping for ransom
FACTS: On January 9, 2000 only Mrs. Lee was left in the house, accompanied by three housemaids, and the accused Ernesto Andagao, a gardener-houseboy. They all slept in an extension of the main house, which extension had three rooms. Mrs. Lee was in one with her 11 Japanese Spitz puppies. Next to hers was the room where Andagao slept, and then there was the room of the housemaids.
Part of Mrs. Lee’s night routine was to let her puppies out of her room about midnight so they could take a leak. At the early dawn of January 10, 2000, after opening the door of her room to let her puppies out, Mrs. Lee was surprised to see a stranger, a man, standing a few meters from her door. She immediately went back in and tried to shut her door close but the man succeeded in pushing the door open and pulling her out of the room just as another man appeared. Someone struck Mrs. Lee with a gun on both shoulders and kicked her on the ribs. When she fell down, she received a kick on her buttocks.
Although she cannot recognized the faces of her abductors because she was blindfolded and covered by black cloth, she noticed that they left Zamboanga City. After traveling three to four hours, they arrived in a house which she later knew that it belonged to a certain Suod Hussain. On January 10, 2000, Mrs. Lee met accused Madum Ganih. She was held for 20 days and during that time she communicated her husband with the order of Ganih to prepare a ransom of P15,000,000. Mr. Lee asked the kidnappers to lower the amount since he could only raise an amount of P1,000,000. Calling her family a third time, the kidnappers reduced their demand to P4 million and threatened to cut off Mrs. Lee’s head unless this was paid.
In the evening of May 5, 2000, Ganih told Mrs. Lee that they would release her the next day. At about 4:00 a.m. of May 6, 2000, her abductors brought Mrs. Lee to Arena Blanco in Zamboanga City where Ganih gave her P100.00 for fare and an M203 bullet as memento. She eventually got home.
Sometime after, the police arrested some men which in a police line-up, Mrs. Lee later positively identified as her abductors. For his part, Ganih denied the allegations and claimed an alibi that he was in his house at the said incident.
On May 21, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment,convicting Ganih of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The RTC, however, acquitted Awid for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: Is accused Ganih, in conspiracy with others, guilty of kidnapping for ransom?
RULING: To prove the crime charged, the prosecution had to show (a) that the accused was a private person; (b) that he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (c) that the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (d) that the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. All these have been proved in this case.
Significantly, Ganih offered nothing but his bare denial and unsubstantiated alibi to counter the overwhelming evidence that the prosecution adduced against him. His other contention is that the police made Mrs. Lee identify him, not in a proper police line-up but in a mere show-up after giving her some improper suggestions.
What the Court condemns are prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified. Besides, granting that the out-of-court identification was irregular, Mrs. Lee’s court testimony clearly shows that she positively identified Ganih independently of the previous identification she made in front of the police station. Mrs. Lee could not have made a mistake in identifying him since she had ample opportunities to study the faces and peculiar body movements of her kidnappers in her almost four months of ordeal with them.Indeed, she was candid and direct in her recollection, narrating events as she saw them take place. Her testimony, including her identification of the appellant, was positive, straightforward, and categorical.
The totality of the prosecution’s evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Ganih and the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee for ransom. The crime was punishable by death at the time of its commission but, with the enactment of Republic Act 9346 that prohibits the imposition of such penalty, the CA was correct in lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO ESTACIO AND MARITESS ANG
G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009
Kidnapping with murder
FACTS: At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and Sumipo, arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon City where the three of them would meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her debt to the victim and then "deretsong dukot na rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim]." Sumipo assumed, however, that Maritess was just joking.
Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the victim complied, Estacio, with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the backseat, sat beside the victim, tied the victim’s hands behind his back, and placed tape on his mouth. While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they replied that they would kill the victim so that he would not take revenge. On Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced.
After which, they called the victim’s mother and demanded money from her. The victim’s mother having agreed to the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as they were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing them to leave and part ways. Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun, watch, and necklace from the proceeds of which he was given P7,000.
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23, 1996, Estacio surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victim’s mother that Estacio had admitted having killed her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the crime scene.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of kidnapping for ransom?
RULING: In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That appellants’ intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create noise.The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants’ prior acts as kidnapping.
where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DOMINGO REYES, ALVIN ARNALDO AND JOSELITO FLORES
G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009
Kidnapping for ransom
FACTS: The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape.
Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellant’s call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon CitY.Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered.
ISSUE: Are the appellants guilty of kidnapping?
RULING: After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTC’s ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. Prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial.
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their respective testimonies were consistent with one another. They were steadfast in recounting their ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony with the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against appellants.
Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was, nevertheless, shown that it took appellants and their cohorts about 10 minutes before all members of the Yao family were blindfolded. During this considerable length of time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to take a good look at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert narrated that their respective blindfolds loosened several times, giving them the opportunity to have a glimpse at the faces of appellants and their cohorts.
It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed as a result of the kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would point to appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers if such were not true. A witness’ relationship to the victim of a crime makes his testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. Relationship with a victim of a crime would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. His natural and usual interest would be to identify the real malefactor and secure his conviction to obtain true justice for the death of a relative. Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double homicide since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during the kidnapping.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALVINO SUMINGWA
G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009
Acts of Lasciviousness; Rape; Attempted Rape; Unjust Vexation
FACTS: Sometime in 1999, appellant showed his desire to touch the victim. He fondled the victim’s breast. On the following month thereafter, appellant removed the garments of the victim and fondle his penis until it ejaculated. Another incident was on August 2000, wherein the appellant grabbed and lie her down and went top of her and then rubbed her penis into her vaginal orifice, and partially inserted his penis into her vagina. The acts of the appellant continued wherein he would successfully rubbed his organ to her genitalia without penetration. This time, the victim confided to her bestfriend.
On December 20, 2000, when the victim and her bestfriend were doing their school work, appellant grabbed the victim, pulled her inside the house and kissed her on the lips.
The last incident occurred inside the comfort room of their house on May 27, 2001. When the victim entered, appellant pulled down her short pants and panty, unzipped his trousers, brought out his penis, then repeatedly rubbed it on her vagina while they were in a standing position.
The victim decided to report the sexual abuses to her grandmother who forthwith brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation where she was examined by the medico-legal officer. It was found during the examination that there were no extragenital physical injuries on the victim’s body but there were old, healed, and incomplete hymenal lacerations.
Appellant denied all the accusations against him and stated an alibi in his defense.
ISSUE: Is the appellant guilty of the abovementioned cases?
RULING: In her direct testimony, the victim stated that appellant removed her short pants and panty, went on top of her and rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice. She resisted by crossing her legs but her effort was not enough to prevent appellant from pulling her leg and eventually inserting his penis into her vagina. Clearly, there was penetration.
It is noteworthy that appellant pulled victim’s leg, so that he could insert his penis into her vagina. This adequately shows that appellant employed force in order to accomplish his purpose. Moreover, in rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires, and no further proof need be shown to prove lack of the victim’s consent to her own defilement.
While appellant’s conviction was primarily based on the prosecution’s testimonial evidence, the same was corroborated by physical evidence consisting of the medical findings of the medico-legal officer that there were hymenal lacerations. When a rape victim’s account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.
Aside from the fact of commission of rape, the prosecution likewise established that appellant is the biological father of the victim and that the latter was then fifteen (15) 42 years old. Thus, the CA aptly convicted him of qualified rape, defined and penalized by Article 266-B of the RPC.
In Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654, although appellant was charged with qualified rape allegedly committed on the second week of November 2000 and May 27, 2001, he should be convicted with Acts of Lasciviousness committed against a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. The testified that in November 2000, while she and appellant were inside the bedroom, he went on top of her and rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice until he ejaculated. She likewise stated in open court that on May 27, 2001, while inside their comfort room, appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina while they were in a standing position. In both instances, there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert his penis into her vagina.
The aforesaid acts of the appellant are covered by the definitions of "sexual abuse" and "lascivious conduct" under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of R.A. 7610.
Appellant’s acts of embracing, dragging and kissing the in front of her friend annoyed the victim. The filing of the case against appellant proved that the victim was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of appellant.
The appellant is guilty of the following: qualified rape, acts of lasciviousness and unjust vexation.
ELMER DIAMANTE AND TANNY BOY STA. TERESA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180992, September 4, 2009
Robbery and carnapping
FACTS: In the afternoon of July 9, 2000, Cadorniga was in his clinic inside his house when the accused entered knocked therein to seek dental check up. He let them in; he went inside and fix his things. As he got out, he noticed there were already five people inside. He went on with his check up when someone grabbed him and announced hold-up. The assailants soon ransacked the clinic for around 15 minutes and left carrying Cadorniga’s personal effects. Cadorniga thereafter heard his car alarm sound off, putting him on notice that his car, a Daewoo racer, was likewise taken.
At about 10:00 to 11:00 p.m. of the following day, Gerardo turned up at the clinic and advised Cadorniga that they had to rush to Pandacan because his car would be sold to a buyer in Cavite. Accompanied by officers of the Manila police, Gerardo led Cadorniga and his brother to the house of Sta. Teresa who promptly confessed being one of those who had robbed Cadorniga. Sta. Teresa subsequently led them to the house of Loza where the other accused were hiding. The police thus apprehended Sta. Teresa, Diamante, Maricar, and Lintag and brought them to the police station. Some of the stolen items, including the Daewoo racer, were recovered.
Lintag admitted his involvement in the robbery but denied participation in the carnapping. Dela Rosa and Diamante, on the other hand, denied participation and proffered alibi. Meanwhile, Sta. Teresa averred that he was merely helping Maricar and her boyfriend moving things from her mother’s house to her new apartment.
ISSUE: Are the assailants guilty of the crime charged?
RULING: The trial and appellate courts found that petitioners were among those who committed robbery and carnapping against Cadorniga as shown by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which both courts considered to be straightforward, clear, and consistent. The Court finds no cogent reason to rule otherwise.
That Cadorniga was tied down to a stool at gun point to facilitate the commission of the crimes speaks unequivocally that petitioners and their cohorts employed violence and intimidation in taking away Cadorniga’s personal effects and the Daewoo racer without his consent and with intent to gain. This is clear from the testimony of Cadorniga alone which, as reflected earlier, is categorical on all material points. The records being barren of proof of any ill motive on the part of Cadorniga to testify falsely against petitioners, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Well settled is the rule that the testimony of a single, trustworthy, and credible witness is sufficient for conviction.
Gerardo’s testimony should thus not be doubted merely because his participation was limited to bringing his passengers to their destination. He positively identified petitioners as among those he had brought to the clinic of Cadorniga and who entered the same on the day of the incident. At the very least, this is further proof of petitioners’ presence at the crime scene when the robbery and carnapping were committed, belying all uncorroborated allegations to the contrary.
The assailants are guilty of both simple robbery and carnapping.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEO QUEMEGGEN
G. R. No. 178205, July 25, 2009
Robbery with homicide
FACTS: Noel Tabernilla was driving a passenger jeepney when four of the passengers announced hold-up. After taking the things, the hold-uppers then alighted the jeepney.
From there, Tabernilla and his passengers went to the nearest police detachment to report the incident. Three policemen accompanied them to the scene of the crime. While there, the policemen chanced upon the robbers riding a pedicab. Socrates Kagalingan, one of the passengers-victims, recognized the perpetrators, since one of them was still wearing the belt bag that was taken from him. The policemen were able to arrest three suspects, including Janito de Luna, but Leo Quemeggen was able to escape. The three suspects were left under the care of a police officer, Emelito Suing, while the other police officers pursued Quemeggen. Taking advantage of the situation, the three suspects ganged up on Suing; de Luna held his hand, while the other suspect known as "Weng-Weng" shot him on the head.The suspects thereafter escaped.
Upon the return of the two policemen who unsuccessfully pursued Quemeggen, Suing was brought to the hospital where he eventually died by a gunshot wound in his head. Appellants Quemeggen and de Luna were eventually arrested through follow-up operations undertaken by the Navotas Police.
Appellants interposed the defense of alibi. They maintained that they were elsewhere when the robbery and shooting incident took place. They claimed that they were in their respective houses: Quemeggen was helping his grandmother cut pieces of cloth used in making rugs, while de Luna was sleeping with his wife.
ISSUE: Can the accused be convicted of a complex crime of robbery with homicide?
RULING: Given the circumstances surrounding the instant case, we agree with the CA that appellants cannot be convicted of Robbery with Homicide. Indeed, the killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery. And it is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. However, essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are committed at the same time.
From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we cannot see the connection between the robbery and the homicide. It must be recalled that after taking the passengers’ personal belongings, appellants (and two other suspects) alighted from the jeepney. At that moment, robbery was consummated. Some of the passengers, however, decided to report the incident to the proper authorities; hence, they went to the nearest police station. There, they narrated what happened. The police eventually decided to go back to the place where the robbery took place. Initially, they saw no one; then finally, Kagalingan saw the suspects on board a pedicab. De Luna and two other suspects were caught and left under the care of Suing. It was then that Suing was killed. Clearly, the killing was distinct from the robbery. There may be a connection between the two crimes, but surely, there was no "direct connection."
Though appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide, we find Quemeggen guilty of robbery, and de Luna of two separate crimes of robbery and homicide. It is axiomatic that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the designation of the specific crime, but by the facts alleged in the information. Controlling in an information should not be the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.33 There should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or more crimes erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate complaints or information.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NESTOR BAJADA, VICTOR CALISAY AND JOHN DOE
G.R. No. 180507, November 20, 2008
Robbery with homicide
FACTS: On December 22, 1999, around 11:30 p.m., while 81-year old Villamayor was at home with his 24 year-old live-in partner, Anabelle Asaytono, they heard someone call for Villamayor asking for coffee. The caller introduced himself as "Hector," Villamayor's grandson, but Asaytono recognized the voice as Bajada's. As Villamayor opened the door, the caller, "Hector," pushed the door open with the barrel of a two-foot long gun. Asaytono recognized "Hector" as Bajada because of his average physique, repulsive smell, the black bonnet which he often wore at work, the deep-set eyes, mouth, a lump on his cheek, and the green shirt which was given to him by Villamayor. Asaytono likewise recognized one of the men as Calisay, noting his hair cut, eye bags, and voice. Calisay wore a red handkerchief across his face and carried a 14-inch knife in his right hand. The third unidentified man, John Doe, wore a bonnet and carried a 2 ½ foot long gun with a magazine.
Upon entering the house, John Doe said, "There are many people in Calumpang who are angry at you because you are a usurer engaged in 5-6, so give me PhP 100,000 right now." John Doe made Villamayor sit down but when the latter refused, John Doe made him lie face down on the floor and kicked his back several times. Meanwhile, Bajada pointed his gun at Asaytono and demanded for money. Asaytono denied having any money. She was then made to lie face down on the ground and was kicked. John Doe asked from Villamayor the key to the cabinet which was a meter away from the latter. Villamayor brought out a key from his pocket and handed it to Bajada. Asaytono, who was able to stand up, saw the three accused unlock Villamayor's cabinet and took out its contents which consisted of documents and clothes. Accused-appellants also opened the drawer and took jewelry valued at PhP 80,000 and the PhP 20,000 and USD 500 cash.
Thereafter, Bajada pushed Asaytono towards Villamayor, laying her head sideways on Villamayor's head. In this position, Asaytono was able to see Calisay repeatedly stab Villamayor on the back. Calisay then stabbed Asaytono on her left breast. Asaytono pretended to be dead as she lied on Villamayor who was still moving. The three men then hurriedly left the house. Asaytono stood up and saw through the three men move towards the rice field. She noticed that Villamayor's dog wagged its tail as it followed the three men, the way it did when accused-appellants would visit Villamayor.
Dr. Marilou Cordon, the medico-legal officer, testified that Villamayor's death was caused by hypovolemic shock secondary to stab wounds. She opined that the stab wounds may have been caused by a single bladed knife inflicted by one person. She added that the stab which pierced the right lung may have caused his instantaneous death due to blood loss.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide?
RULING: In any case, Asaytono was able to sufficiently identify Bajada as one of the perpetrators to the satisfaction of the trial court. Asaytono's familiarity with Bajada cannot be denied; she has known Bajada and Calisay for more than a year prior to the incident. The two accused were also frequent visitors at the victim's house. Hence, Asaytono was acquainted with Bajada's physical features. The trial court found her testimony to be credible, frank, straightforward, and consistent throughout the trial. We see no reason to disturb this finding since trial courts are in a unique position to observe the demeanor of witnesses. The trial court's findings regarding the witness' credibility are accorded the highest degree of respect.
Furthermore, Bajada could not ascribe any plausible ill motive against the witness. His accusation against Asaytono that the latter was interested in inheriting from Villamayor is self-serving and uncorroborated. Even Bajada's own stepson, Calisay, stated that there was no prior misunderstanding between him and Asaytono and that he did not know any reason why Asaytono would accuse them of a crime. The letters allegedly written by an eyewitness who was afraid to testify in trial cannot be given probative value. The letters accused Asaytono as one of the culprits–a defense which was already dismissed by the courts a quo. There was no evidence to support such allegation. The said letters were belatedly submitted, uncorroborated, and cannot be admitted in evidence
Bajada's alibi likewise deserves no merit. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the accused was somewhere else at the time of the commission of the offense and that it was physically impossible for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Bajada himself admitted, however, that the travel time from Bayate, Liliw, Laguna to the crime scene is only 15 minutes by jeep. Hence, it was possible for him to be at the crime scene at or around the time the offense was committed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDWIN GAYETA
G.R. No. 171654, December 17, 2008
Robbery with rape
FACTS: On 24 July 1995, at around 8:00 p.m., spouses Benjamin and Conchita Nicer were drinking tuba when two armed men barged into their house. One of the armed men, later identified as Arnaldo Reano, was wearing a bonnet while the other, identified as appellant, was wearing a hat. The duo announced a hold-up and ordered the spouses to lie down on the floor. Conchita initially refused to lie down until appellant who incidentally had a bayonet in his other hand, poked a gun at her neck. Reano meanwhile kicked and boxed Benjamin until the latter bled and eventually lost consciousness. Appellant then ordered Conchita to hand over their money. Conchita went up to the room to get P2,500.00 and gave it to appellant. When the duo fled, the Nicer couple reported the incident to the barangay officials who immediately sought police assistance.
Meanwhile, spouses BBB and AAA were watching television in their living room when two armed men, also later identified as Reano and appellant, entered their house. They likewise ordered the spouses to lie down and asked them to produce their money. BBB asked AAA to get the money from their store, which was located some twenty (20) meters away from their house. Appellant accompanied AAA to the store while Reano stayed with BBB. Upon reaching the store, AAA took P5,000.00 and gave it to appellant. While in the act of getting the money, appellant inserted one of his hands inside AAA's short pants. Afterwards, appellant ordered her to undress and lie down on the floor. Appellant also removed his pants, lay on top of AAA, and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. They went back to the house where appellant also forced AAA to hand over several pieces of jewelry. AAA immediately told BBB that appellant had sexually abused her.
The duo fled but came back a few minutes later. Upon seeing them, BBB took the bayonet and tried to stab appellant, but it was deflected by a hard object and fell on the floor. BBB then tried to grab appellant's gun and they grappled for its possession. The gun fired, hitting BBB on his shoulder but he managed to successfully take possession of the gun and fired it twice.
ISSUE: Is the guilt of the appellant was established beyond reasonable ground?
RULING: The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the inconsistencies in prosecution witness' statements for being trivial and for not having the effect of impairing her credibility as a witness. Inconsistencies as to minor details and peripheral or collateral matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses or the probative weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility, as they negate any suspicion that their testimonies are fabricated or rehearsed. Appellant also assails AAA's narration of the rape incident and insinuates that she should have fought off her attacker, given the numerous opportunities presented to her, such as failing to use the bayonet or the bottles that were within her reach to fight off the attacker. Suffice it to say that tenacious resistance against rape is not required; neither is a determined or a persistent physical struggle on the part of the victim necessary.
Anent appellant's alibi, it is inherently weak and cannot prevail over a positive identification from a witness found credible by the trial court. Appellant avers that he was doing his rounds as a member of the Voluntary Lakas Brigade in Muntinlupa, which is nine (9) hours away from Oriental Mindoro, making it physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. He presented the barangay logbook to support his alibi. The OSG correctly countered that this document was neither authenticated nor identified by the persons who supposedly issued them.
All told, the guilt of appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAMUEL ALARME AND RIZALDY GELLE
G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009
Robbery with violence against or intimidations against persons
FACTS: Rudy narrated that he slept at the Maricom Detachment Office located in Punta Cabahug, Cadiz City and rode a tricycle bound for Ceres Bus Terminal at around 2:45 a.m. of September 19, 1995 because his service vehicle broke down. As the tricycle passed by the Cadiz City Park, he saw a parked empty tricycle and an old man being stabbed by three (3) persons. Two (2) persons held the victim while the third one stabbed him. Rudy described the person who stabbed the victim to be "white and tall," while the other two (2) who held the victim were "short." The victim was stabbed several times in front and at the back and cried for help as he was being stabbed. The driver of the tricycle he was riding, apparently afraid, increased the vehicle’s speed as they passed the stabbing scene. When they reached the Ceres Bus Terminal, he (Rudy) immediately boarded a bus bound for Sagay. He returned to Cadiz on September 21, 1995 and told Cesar Ladiona (Cesar), a barangay tanod, that he saw a person being stabbed at the park in the morning of September 19. Cesar brought him to the Cadiz City Jail where he was asked whether he could recognize the assailants. He identified the person who stabbed the victim from among the prisoners in jail.
He testified on cross-examination that the tricycle he was riding was "very near" the scene of the stabbing incident, and that the park was very brightly lit that night. He stated that he did not immediately report the stabbing incident upon arriving at the Ceres Bus Terminal because he was afraid and because the Ceres bus bound for Sagay was already leaving. When he reported the stabbing incident to Cesar on September 21, 1995, Cesar asked him if he could identify the assailants. He replied that he could, but only through their faces. Cesar then brought him to the city jail where the Chief of Police asked him to point out the persons responsible for the stabbing he reported. He recognized two (2) of the assailants from among the many prisoners inside the jail. He recalled that the prisoners were not brought out of their cell when he was asked to identify the assailants.
Norman, a tricycle driver residing in Cadiz City, narrated that he brought his passengers to Ester Pharmacy and Villa Consing, respectively, in the early morning of September 19, 1995; afterwards, he went to Cabahug Street and saw Melanie, the wife of a co-driver. Melanie asked him to look for her (Melanie’s) husband. Melanie boarded his tricycle and requested to be brought to the Ester Pharmacy. On the way there, he saw Loreto Batarilan (Loreto) driving his own tricycle and trailing his; he also saw three (3) persons walking towards the direction of the Emergency Clinic. He identified two of them as Rizaldy and "Stingray" both of whom he had known for a long time. He went back towards the direction of the City Hall after Melanie alighted at the Ester Pharmacy. He saw Loreto’s parked tricycle as he passed by the City Hall on Cabahug Street; he then saw Loreto’s body full of blood lying on the street. He also saw Rizaldy, "Stingray," and a certain John Doe, about "two (2) extended arms length" away from the victim’s body, walking towards the park carrying a belt bag. He recalled that there were no other persons in the park during that time. He went to the police headquarters to report the incident, but the headquarters was closed. He then went to the Ester Pharmacy and requested the security guard to call the police.
ISSUE: Is the appellant guilty of the crime charged?
RULING: Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In the case before us, the RTC convicted the appellants of robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of Rudy, Alicia, and Norman. The CA affirmed this finding without any explanation on how the crime came to be the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. To be sure, Rudy’s testimony clinched the case against the appellants with respect to the victim’s stabbing and resulting death. The lower courts apparently deduced the intent to rob from the testimonies of Alicia and Norman.
Rizaldy Gelle is convicted of separate crimes of robbery and theft.
PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009
Robbery with intimidation of person
FACTS: At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private complainant Nelia R. Silvestre, together with Maria Viovicente and Veronica Amar , boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying "Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin." Appellant added "Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala, sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita." Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which, according to an "alajera" in the province, was of 18k gold, and which was worth P3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying "Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo. Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!"
Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall where they were advised to undergo medical examination. They, however, repaired to the Police Station, Precinct 8 in Comembo, Makati City and reported the incident. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to return in a few days when any injuries they suffered were expected to manifest. Nine days after the incident or on June 16, 1999, Nelia submitted a medico-legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator.
Appellant averred that he and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros. Nelia is his godmother. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be remitted. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was partial towards her, her parents disliked his family. Nelia’s father even filed a case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and, on learning of the maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their house and filed a case against him for grave threats and another for light threats which were dismissed or in which he was acquitted.
ISSUE: Has the prosecution proved that they accused herein is guilty beyond reasonable ground?
RULING: Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. It may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental encounter of the parties, the taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain on appellant’s part. That intent to gain on appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested by, among other things, the filing of complaints6 against him by Nelia and her family which were subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal. Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie against him. He is not necessarily scot-free, however.
From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one hand, and appellant and family on the other, and under the circumstances related above attendant to the incidental encounter of the parties, appellant’s taking of Nelia’s necklace could not have been animated with animus lucrandi. Appellant is, however, just the same, criminally liable.
The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination. Hence, appellant is guilty of grave coercion and not robbery with intimidation to persons.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO ORTIZ, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 179944, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009
ROBERRY WITH RAPE
Facts:
The accused-appellant Antonio Ortiz, Charito Chavez and Edwin Dasilio were charged with the crime of robbery with multiple rape. Under the facts, the above-named accused, armed with guns, use force and intimidation against the persons of BBB and AAA at their residence and willfully stole and carried away items of the victims. In addition before leaving, with violence, force and intimidation, at gunpoint succeeded in having carnal knowledge with AAA, one after the other, in taking their turns in satisfying their carnal desires, against her will. The accused alleged alibi as their defense that they were at a place other than Brgy. Xxx, at the time the crime was committed. The trial court ruled that the accused were guilty of the crime charged, under Article 294 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659, and considering the aggravating circumstance that it was committed by an armed band, and with ignominy, sentences all of them, to death. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification, instead of the penalty of death; the CA reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt appellants’ guilt for the crime of Robbery with Rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 294, Robbery with rape is committed when the following elements concur: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
The first three elements were proven by the following established facts: the victims categorically identified appellants as the ones who threatened them and took their personal belongings; all appellants held weapons; appellants entered the house of Candido, herded Candido and his son, Dennis, in a corner of their house and tied their hands; BBB heard the cries of Dennis and when he checked where the cries were coming from, appellants intercepted him and tied his hands as well; appellants entered the house of BBB and AAA, and thereafter ransacked the said house taking valuable items. From the foregoing, it is clear that the crime of robbery was committed.
As to the attendant rape, the courts find the testimony of AAA worthy of full faith and credence. First, records show that AAA cried during her direct examination. Such spontaneous emotional outburst strengthens her credibility. The Supreme Court has held that the crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience. Second, although the examination of Dr. Fajardo of AAA’s genital area revealed no laceration in her hymen, it is a settled rule that laceration is not an element of the crime of rape. Simply put, the absence of lacerations does not negate rape. Moreover, hymenal lacerations after sexual congress normally occur on women who have had no prior sexual experience. In this case, AAA is a married woman, who has had prior sexual experience. In the case of People v. Llanita, the Supreme Court noted that the strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Third, the Supreme Court has held, time and time again, that no woman in her right mind would declare to the whole world that she was raped, unless she is telling the truth. Finally, in the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of private complainant AAA to falsely testify against appellants, her testimony deserves great weight and credence.
Regarding appellants’ defense of alibi, the same cannot prevail over the positive identification of appellants as perpetrators of the crime charged. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the appellants to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed. They must further demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, appellants interposed the alibi that they were at a place other than Brgy. xxx, at the time the crime was committed; however, no one corroborated their testimonies.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FO1 FELIPE DELA CRUZ et al
G.R. No. 168173, DECEMBER 24, 2008
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, ROBBERY IN BAND
Facts:
This is a review on automatic appeal of the decision of the CA that fully affirmed the decisionof the RTC. The RTC decision found the accused-appellants FO1 dela Cruz, Audie, Alfredo, Eduardo, Bernardo, Joemari, Dominador, and Robert guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and robbery in band. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced them to suffer the death penalty for robbery with homicide, and an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, for robbery in band.
Issue:
Is appellant guilty of the crime charged?
Ruling:
I. Criminal Case No. Q-99-85788 (Robbery in Band)
In the present case, the prosecution witnesses, at one time or another during the hearing, testified that Joemari, Bernardo, Diosdado and FO1 dela Cruz were all armed. However, we cannot recognize the commission of robbery by a band as an aggravating circumstance since this circumstance was not specifically alleged in the body of the Information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances
Ruben, the driver of the vehicle the appellants used and who saw the robberies from the start to its bloody end, positively and with full details identified in his testimony of September 28, 1999 the appellants Robert, Eduardo, Audie, Bernardo, Dominador, Joemari, Alfredo, and Diosdado as the robbers. At gunpoint, they boarded his jeepney in Monumento; ordered him to refuel at Petron Gas Station in Commonwealth, Quezon City and robbed this establishment; and then ordered him to stop at the 7-Eleven Convenience Store along Mindanao and Tandang Sora Avenue for another robbery. Rommel, in his testimony of October 21, 1999, corroborated the testimony of Ruben and likewise gave his own details of how the robbery was committed. He identified Audie, FO1 dela Cruz, Diosdao and Joemari as the passengers of the jeepney whom he recognized.
These testimonies, which we considered in light of the appellants’ defenses discussed below, more than amply constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery as charged.
II. Criminal Case No. Q-99-85787 (Robbery with Homicide)
In the case before us, the prosecution proved that the appellants’ original intention was to rob the 7-Eleven Convenience Store. A careful examination of the testimonies of the various prosecution witnesses, all of them cited above, reveals the following facts showing the appellants’ intent: appellants Joemarie, Bernardo and Robert entered the 7-Eleven Convenience Store pretending to be customers; witness Kuraishi entered the store and met appellant Bernardo, who was carrying a gun; Elmer, who went out of his car to follow Kuraishi, was shot in the chest by Diosdado; appellant FO1 dela Cuz fired at the security guard, Nestor, through the glass door but missed; Nestor exchanged shots with FO1 dela Cruz; Joemari pulled down Edwin and took his wallet and watch; Diosdado peeped through the glass panel of the 7-Eleven Convenience Store, shot Nestor and entered the store; Joemari dragged Edwin towards the counter and told him to open the cash register; Diosdado went outside the store, approached the two (2) taxis parked in front of King Dimsum and held up the drivers; FO1 dela Cruz entered the store, dragged the cashier, Rose, towards the backroom and asked who kept the keys of the cash register; Joemarie, Bernardo, Robert and FO1 dela Cruz took the cash register and went back to their companions who were waiting inside the jeepney; thereafter, appellants proceeded to Paniqui, Tarlac.
From the foregoing, the overriding intention of the appellants could not but be to rob the 7-Eleven Convenience Store; the killings were merely incidental, resulting by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Nestor was killed because he was the man who would have resisted the robbery; Elmer was killed because he simply happened to be there as the robbery was taking place.
LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL VS. HON, ZEUS C. ABROGAR etc, et al.
G.R. NO. 155076, JANUARY 13, 2009
THEFT
Facts:
Petitioner Luis P. Laurel is charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the RPC. Under the facts, petitioner, with intent to gain and without consent from Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), stole and use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT. Petitioner filed a motion to quash, on the ground that the factual allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court.
Issue:
Is petitioner’s act constitute theft of respondent PLDT’s business and service?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 308 of RPC, Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)." To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through the use of the offenders’ own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as an access device or card as in the instant case.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction. The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft:
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently appraised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.
ERNESTO PIDELI vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
THEFT
Facts:
Placido and Wilson entered into a verbal partnership agreement to subcontract a rip-rapping and spillway project. Petitioner Pideli, brother to Wilson and neighbor and friend to Placido, offered the duo the use of his credit line with the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH) in La Trinidad, Benguet. With the said arrangement, Wilson and Placido, with the assistance of petitioner, were able to secure an assortment of construction materials for the rip-rap and spillway contract. After the completion of the project, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their expenses and arrived at a net income of P130,000.00. Placido, as partner, claimed one-half (1/2) or P65,000.00 of the net amount as his share in the project. Petitioner, however, advised the two to first settle their accountabilities for the construction materials taken from the hardware store. Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full amount to petitioner, with express instructions to pay MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them. The following day Placido attempted but failed to contact petitioner. He had hoped to obtain his share of the partnership income. Placido got hold of petitioner the next morning. Unexpectedly, petitioner informed Placido that nothing was left of the proceeds after paying off the supplier.Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to give Placido his share in the net income of the contract.
Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a complaint for theft against petitioner Ernesto Pideli. The trial court found petitioner guilty of theft and upon appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in finding petitioner guilty of theft?
Ruling:
No. Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows: That there be taking of personal property; That said property belongs to another; That the taking be done with intent to gain; That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the construction contract.
Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v. De Vera, the Court has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined: The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa. The record bears out that private complainant originally claimed P65,000.00 as his share in the partnership. However, he admitted receiving the total amount of P15,500.00, on two separate occasions, from Wilson Pideli. Verily, only P49,500.00 is due private complainant.
Hence, the imposable penalty is the maximum period of prision mayor minimum and medium prescribed in the abovequoted first paragraph of Article 309. That period ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, plus one (1) year for every additional ten thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00, which in this case is two (2) years for the excess amount of P27,500.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term could be twelve (12) years while the minimum term would fall under the next lower penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years), to be imposed in any of its periods.
ROSE AOAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 155339, MARCH 3, 2008
THEFT
Facts:
Petitioner Rose Aoas was charged for the crime of theft of eighteen (18) sacks of red and white beans, all valued at P24,720.00 belonging to NATY MADON-EP. During the trial, prosecution presented two witnesses, the private complainant and barangay tanod Gregorio Garcia. In summary, private complainant testified that she was engaged in the business of selling assorted beans, and adjacent of her stall in the market was that of accused appellant. She reported the matter to the authorities that 18 sacks of red and white beans were missing. Upon inquiry from the persons in the city market she was informed by a certain Gregorio Garcia that the accused-appellant was the culprit. The defense proffered an explanation which, unfortunately, was not given credence. Defense witness Imelda Bautista testified that she was also engaged in the buying and selling of beans. Her goods were also kept at the second floor/mezzanine of petitioner's stall. Petitioner testified that she brought out sacks of beans from her stall because one Ronda Sabado bought them from Imelda Bautista. The trial court held petitioner guilty of the crime of theft. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Issue:
Is petitioner guilty of the crime of theft?
Ruling:
No. Considering that there is no direct evidence pointing to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. In order that conviction be had, the following must concur: 1. There is more than one circumstance; 2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; 3. The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with one other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. The circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the offense.
After a careful review, the court finds that the aforesaid circumstantial evidence does not pass this test of moral certainty as to warrant petitioner's conviction. Complainant testified that 18 sacks of beans which she stored in the mezzanine of her stall were missing. She discovered the loss in the morning when she saw red and white beans scattered on the floor in front of her stall and that of petitioner.She accused herein petitioner as the culprit after being informed by barangay tanod Gregorio Garcia that he saw petitioner in the evening riding in a jeepney loaded with sacks of beans. Garcia alleged that he was only 30 meters away from the jeepney and the place was sufficiently lighted, enough for him to recognize that the sacks loaded in the jeepney contained beans. The fact that beans were scattered on the floor inside and in front of the stall of petitioner and in the parking lot does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that petitioner is the perpetrator of the crime.
The prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked completely discount the possibility that persons other than petitioner could have perpetrated the crime. Thus, where the proven facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to convict the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REYNALDO BAYON Y RAMOS
G.R. NO. 168627, JULY 2, 2010
QUALIFIED THEFT
Facts:
Appellant Reynaldo Bayon Y Ramos was charged of the crime of theft for having stolen; 1 Rado Diastar wrist watch, 1 Seiko Diver’s watch and 1bolo belonging to Eduardo Cunnanan . He was also charged with the crime of qualified theft for being, then a stay-in helper of Arturo Limoso y Loot at his residence and for having stolen valuable items belonging to him. The pre-trial was terminated without stipulations. Thereafter, joint trial of the cases ensued. The trial court held appellant guilty for the crime of qualified theft. However, for the crime of theft, he was acquitted for the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the circumstantial evidence presented against him by the prosecution was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that there was nothing whatsoever that would link him to the commission of the crime of theft. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 310 of the RPC, heft becomes qualified "if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance."
In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conviction of appellant based on circumstantial evidence. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction, the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the circumstances are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
The two pieces of circumstantial evidence cited by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court do not form an unbroken chain that point to appellant as the author of the crime; hence, their conclusion becomes merely conjectural. Notably, the prosecution failed to establish the element of unlawful taking by appellant. Since appellant’s statement during the custodial investigation was inadmissible in evidence as he was not assisted by counsel, the prosecution could have presented the person to whom appellant allegedly sold the pieces of jewelry as witness, but it did not do so. It could have been the missing link that would have strengthened the evidence of the prosecution.
The Court finds the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial and appellate courts in convicting appellant to be insufficient in proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt absent any substantial evidence of unlawful taking by appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODOLFO GALLO Y GADOT
G.R. NO. 187730, JUNE 29, 2010
ESTAFA
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo was charged with illegal recruitment and estafa. For the crime of estafa, under the facts the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA to give and deliver to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations. Accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a factory worker. The RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa. On appeal, the CA held the totality of the prosecution’s evidence showed that the accused-appellant, together with others, engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and representations to Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the actions of a mere errand boy. The evidence presented establishes his liability for estafa under paragragh 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of estafa?
Ruling:
No. The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz: – Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned herein below… 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the power and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations without informing complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODOLFO GALLO
G.R. NO. 185277, MARCH 18, 2010
ESTAFA
Facts:
Appellant Rodolfo Gallo (Gallo), together with Pilar Manta (Manta) and Fides Pacardo (Pacardo), was originally charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa filed before the Regional Trial Court. The prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of the promissory notes and official receipts issued by the agency to the private complainants. Also presented was a certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, stating that according to its records, the New Filipino Manpower Development and Services, Inc. had an expired license and that its application for the re-issuance of a new license was denied. For his defense, appellant Gallo alleged that he was not an employee of MPM but was himself an applicant for overseas work. The trial court rendered a decision convicting him of the crimes charged. Accused Manta and Pacardo were acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence presented against them. In view of the penalty imposed, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. However, the Court resolved to transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review. The CA rendered the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of estafa?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, appellant’s guilt for estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: 1. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a)By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under the above-quoted provision, there are three (3) ways of committing estafa: (1) by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits.To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value.
In the case before us, appellant and Martir led the private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, qualifications and means to provide work in Korea. During the trial of these cases, it was clearly shown that, together with Martir, appellant discussed with private complainants the fact of their being deployed abroad for a job if they pay the processing fee, and that he actually received payments from private complainants. Thus, it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the three private complainants were deceived into believing that there were jobs waiting for them in a factory in Korea when in fact there were none. Because of the assurances of appellant, each of the private complainants parted with their money and suffered damages as a result of their being unable to leave for Korea. The elements of estafa ─ deceit and damage ─ are thus indisputably present, making the conviction for estafa appropriate.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LOURDES LO, GRACE CALIMON AND AIDA COMILA
G.R. NO. 175229, JANUARY 29, 2009
ESTAFA
Facts:
Three separate complaints were filed charging Lourdes Lo (Lo) and accused-appellants Grace Calimon (Calimon) and Aida Comila (Comila) with illegal recruitment andestafa. Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellants pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. Accused Lo, however, has not yet been apprehended and has remained at large. Accused-appellant Calimon denied the accusations against her. She claimed that she was also an applicant for overseas job placement and that she never promised any work abroad to private complainants. She averred that it was Lo who recruited her and private complainants. Accused-appellant Comila, on the other hand, denied having known or seen Lo. However, she maintained that it was accused Lo who recruited and received money from private complainants. She averred she could not have recruited private complainants because she gave birth in Baguio. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting the appellants of the crimes charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC but with modifications.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants for the crime of estafa?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court was likewise convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants are guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
There are three ways of committing estafa under the above-quoted provision: (1) by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. In the present case, the deceit consists of accused-appellants’ false statement or fraudulent representation which was made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the money by the complainants. To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value.
Accused-appellants led private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, means and legal qualifications to provide the latter with work in Italy, when in fact they did not. Private complainants parted with their hard-earned money and suffered damage by reason of accused-appellants deceitful and illegal acts. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence their conviction for estafa was proper.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO BANDIN
G.R. NO. 176531, APRIL 24, 2009
RAPE
Facts:
Accused-appellant Romeo Bandin was charged for the crime of rape against complainant-victim, AAA, a 16 year old woman, against her will. Under the facts, AAA woke up at past midnight because she felt a heavy burden on top of her. It was a naked man who was holding her tightly and who uttered in a commanding voice, "Don’t move!" She recognized the man’s voice as belonging to her brother-in-law, the appellant in this case. Thereafter, appellant removed the victim’s short pants and underwear. AAA covered her genitals with her right hand and pleaded with her brother-in-law to stop. Appellant, however, proceeded to remove AAA’s hand from her genitals, spread her legs and immediately inserted his penis inside her vagina. She shouted for help several times but no one responded. She was too frightened to resist appellant because he was armed with a long firearm which he placed beside her. Appellant’s defense hinged on denial and alibi. He contended that he did not rape AAA. He claimed that he was sleeping in the bunker of the CAFGU station in Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, which was about two kilometers away from AAA's house. His testimony was corroborated by Encoy and Baal. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modifications. It held that since the complaint contained no allegations pertaining to the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of deadly weapon, the same cannot be appreciated in the imposition of the penalty.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in convicting appellant for the crime of rape?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court finds no reason to overturn the conclusion arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the CA. It held that AAA's testimony was credible as she delivered her testimony in a clear, direct and positive manner. Through his voice, she positively identified appellant as the man who sexually abused her. Identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted, particularly in cases where, as in this case, the victim has known the perpetrator for a long time.
Consequently, appellant's defense of denial and alibi must crumble in the face of AAA's positive and clear identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial and alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.
People of the Philippines vs. Rolly Canares y Almanares
G.R. No. 174065, February 18, 2009
Statutory Rape
Facts:
The accused was a helper in the victim’s grandmother’s house. When the victim was only about 9 or 10 years old, the accused, while she was sleeping undressed her, pulled her shorts and panty and had sexual intercourse with her. This was repeated on several occasions but the victim can no longer recall the exact dates. An information for rape under RA 7610 was filed against the accused.
Issue:
Was statutory rape committed?
Held:
Yes. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it.55 Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary; force is not an element of statutoryrape and the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the complainant is below the age of twelve.56 The law presumes that a woman below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.57
To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant.58
The first and second elements have been established by the presentation of a Certification from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Silang, Cavite dated April 21, 1999 stating that VICTIM was born on September 8, 1982.59Hence, she was only 9, or at most 10, years old when the rape was committed in 1992. In and out of court, she consistently identified Canares as her rapist.60
Carnal knowledge is proven by proof of the entry or introduction of the male organ into the female organ; the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia constitutes consummated rape.61 The prosecution proved this element when VICTIM narrated during the trial the details of her rape, committed sometime in 1992. VICTIM’s testimony is supported by physical and supporting testimonial evidence. There was the healed laceration found in her hymen which is remarkably compatible with her claim of sexual molestation. Dr. Madrid, in testifying on the healed laceration, stated that it could have been caused by a penis.
People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Buban
G.R. No. 172710, October 30, 2009
Statutory Rape
Facts:
The victim was an orphaned minor who lived in her cousin’s house after her parents died. In four occasions, she was forced by the accused to have carnal knowledge with him. As a result, four informations of rape were filed against him. The accused defended himself that there was no rape because according to him, they were in fact lovers. He was unable, however, to show any love letter or picture which would prove that fact. After trial of the four informations, the trial court found the accused guilty on all four counts. On appeal, the accused interposed a number of defenses. Accused-appellant puts at issue the credibility of VICTIM, specifically as regards the third rape which occurred on January 29, 1996. He avers that it is contrary to human nature and experience that after having been previously raped twice, VICTIM would still feel comfortable, in the presence of appellant, as she was able to speak to him casually as if nothing traumatic happened between them and she even managed to sleep in her room without locking its door while accused-appellant was in the sala watching television.
Accused-appellant also relies on the inconsistencies between VICTIM’s testimony as to the date of the commission of the four (4) rape incidents and as stated in the four (4) Informations. He alleged that on direct examination, VICTIM declared that she was sexually abused on October 12, 1995, November 15, 1995, November 24, 1995 and January 29, 1996, while the four (4) Informations clearly stated that the rape incidents took place on October 12, 1995, November 15, 1995, January 29, 1996 and the last one on February 24, 1996.
Accused-appellant further asserts that there could be no rape where the sexual act was consensual. He maintains that if the sexual intercourse was truly against VICTIM’s will, she could have easily cried for help when he was pulling her on the bed and she could have prevented the second rape by not going in the room knowing fully well that she was alone with the accused-appellant at that time
Issue:
Was rape committed?
Held:
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The credibility of the offended party is crucial in determining the guilt of a person accused of rape. By the very nature of this crime, it is usually only the victim who can testify as to its occurrence. Thus, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Else wise stated, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, suffices to warrant a conviction for rape. Guided by these judicial doctrines, the Court scrutinized all the pieces of evidence on record, especially the testimony of VICTIM and we find no reason to overturn the trial court’s assessment of her credibility, which had the opportunity of observing VICTIM’s manner and demeanor on the witness stand. VICTIM’s testimony was indeed candid, spontaneous and consistent. just as the trial court observed.
Well-established is the rule that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force employed be so great or be of such character that it could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. In other words, force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produced fear -- fear that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. In the present case, there can be no doubt that accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate rape. At the time rape incidents took place, the victim was only seventeen (17) years old, while accused-appellant was more or less twenty-seven years old and in his prime. The obvious disparity between their physical strengths manifests the futility of any resistance.
We also reject the argument of accused-appellant that it is simply contrary to human nature and experience for VICTIM who, after having been previously ravished twice, remained calm talking to him and even slept in her room without locking its door, knowing fully well that he was still in the living room watching television. VICTIM reasoned out that she did not lock her room because her aunt, who was then watching betamax movie in their neighbor, is going to sleep in that room. Accused-appellant failed to show any ill motive, on the part of the victim to fabricate such a story. The testimony of accused-appellant that the reason for the filing of these charges against him was because of the quarrel between her wife and VICTIM after the former learned about his illicit relationship with VICTIM is opposed to what he declared in open court that the only time his wife came to know about their relationship was after the complaints were filed because he told her about it when he was already in jail. Since there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the complainant to testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
As regards the alleged discrepancies as to the dates of the commission of the rape, the rule is well settled that in rape cases, the date or time of the incident is not an essential element of the offense and therefore need not be accurately stated
People of the Philippines vs. Ignacio Poras
G.R. No. 177747, Feb. 16, 2010
Rape lowered to Acts of Lasciviousness
Facts:
The victim was made to drink coffee (which was drugged) by the accused which caused her to sleep. When she woke up, she saw the accused moving on top of her and touching her private parts. She also noticed that the strap of her bra had been removed, and her panty already lowered to her knees. When she pushed the appellant, the latter raised his brief and went to his room, threatening to kill her if she would disclose the incident to anyone. She did not call for help because she felt weak. On the witness stand, she also said that she felt pain in her vagina. The trial court found the accused guilty of rape.
Issue:
Do the facts show beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of rape was committed?
Held:
No. We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. We convict him instead of the lesser of acts of lasciviousness, included in rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime. In the present case, the lower courts convicted the appellant of rape based on the following circumstances: (a) the appellant made VICTIM drink coffee which made her fall asleep; (b) VICTIM saw the appellant lying beside her, moving on top of her, and touching her private parts when she woke up; (c) VICTIM’s panty had been lowered to her knees, and the strap of her bra had been removed; (d) the appellant put on his briefs and shorts after VICTIM pushed her; (e) VICTIM felt pain in her private parts, and saw blood stains on her panty; (f) the appellant threatened to kill VICTIM if she disclosed the incident to anyone; and (g) the examining physician found deep-healed lacerations in VICTIM’s vagina.
After due consideration of the evidence adduced, that the circumstantial evidence failed to clearly establish an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the appellant raped VICTIM.
We cannot equate a ruptured hymen with rape. medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to show that the latter had lost her virginity. Consequently, standing alone, a physician’s finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been established.
Thus, while the healed lacerations are undisputed, they can only prove, in the absence of any other evidence, that VICTIM has had prior sexual experience. Specific proof of penile contact, on or about the time the appellant allegedly raped her, is missing.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the appellant succeeded in inserting his fingers in VICTIM’s vagina, this act still would not suffice to convict the appellant of rape. In 1994, the insertion of one or more fingers into a woman’s vagina without her consent did not constitute rape. It was only in 1997 that the law on rape was expanded to include this act.
We find it highly unlikely that the appellant inserted his penis into VICTIM’s vagina while the latter’s panty was lowered to her knees. Common sense and ordinary human experience show that penile penetration is extremely difficult, if not almost impossible under this situation, unless the victim’s legs were spread apart.
Considering that VICTIM was an unmarried 13-year old, she would have been in unusually deep sleep in order not to feel the pain and sensation reasonably expected from the insertion of a penis into her young, vaginal canal. We are baffled how could she have slept through a consummated sexual intercourse and awakened only after its completion. The conviction in a rape case though must rest on evidence, not on mere possibility.
We cannot equate VICTIM’s testimony of pain in her private parts with rape. Carnal knowledge, not pain, is the element of consummated rape and we believe that it would be a dangerous proposition to equate a victim’s testimony of pain, in the absence of any other evidence, with carnal knowledge. The peril lies in the facility of asserting pain. Pain, too, can come from various reasons other than carnal knowledge; it is also subjective and is easy to feign.
Finally, we cannot help but observe that VICTIM, in her direct testimony, revealed that she merely came to the conclusion that the appellant had raped her afterbeing told by the examining physician that the result of the medical examination was “positive,” and that something had happened to her.
In view of the foregoing, the findings of conviction is vacated. Accused is instead found guilty of crime of acts of lasciviousness.
People of the Philippines vs. Felix Ortoa y Obia
G.R. No. February 23, 2009
Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness
Facts:
The accused has two daughters, Victim 1 and Victim 2. When Victim 1 was only three years (3) old, the accused would make her lie down and insert his finger into her vagina until she cries. As she grew older, these incidents were repeated a number of times. When Victim 1 turned the age of six (6) the accused started to have sexual intercourse with her by undressing her and inserting his penis into her vagina, making push and pull movements until he ejaculates. The last time the accused did this was when Victim 1 was already 13 years old. Insofar as Victim 2 is concerned, the accused started to have sexual encounter with her when she was already eight (8) years old. In one instance, the accused partially inserted his penis into the labia of her vagina and in another instance, fully penetrated her. On appeal, the accused contended among many others that it is inconceivable for the Victims to not report the crimes immediately after each incident considering that as children the natural reaction would have to report it immediately to a relative. Furthermore, he argued that the physical examination of the victims have shown that their hymen are still intact.
Issue:
Were the two counts of rape and acts of lasciviousness proven beyond reasonable doubt under the facts of the case?
Held:
Yes. The Court is not persuaded by appellant's arguments that it is inconceivable for VICTIM to only report her rape and molestation to the authorities when she was already 13 years old, considering that she claimed that appellant started to sexually assault her when she was only 3 years old; that her natural reaction would be to tell her ordeal to her mother right away; that if complainants really wanted to protect themselves, it was uncharacteristic for them not to tell their molestation to anyone as there was no threat to their lives, nor was there anything that would have prevented them from divulging their sufferings.
Silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape have not always been construed as indications of a false accusation.44 This principle applies with greater force where, as in this case, the victims were of tender age at the time of the rape incidents and were therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical harm, especially from a close relative.
The Court is not persuaded by appellant's contention that VICTIM was never sexually abused because the medico-legal findings showed that she was still in a virgin state when she was examined. The medico-legal expert who examined VICTIM testified that it was possible for a male organ to penetrate the labia minora and leave the hymen still intact. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape.53 Even the fact that the hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility of rape.54Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus.
With respect to the crime of acts of lasciviousness, it is settled that the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.63 Such are the testimonies of victims who are young, immature, and have no motive to falsely testify against the accused, as in the instant case. Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial.
PO3 Benito Sombilon vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
Acts of Lasciviousness
Fact:
The victim was brought to the police station for investigation in connection with a complaint for theft. To extract a confession from the victim (who was 15 years old), the accused, who was a police officer, brought her inside one of the rooms in the police station, pointed a gun at her; she was interrogated and electrocuted. Not satisfied, the police officer asked her: “Dalaga ka na ba?” And was told by the officer: “I am single too”. Thereafter, the police officer touched different parts of her body, mashed her breast, kissed her in the cheek and touched her private parts. An information for acts of lasciviousness was filed against the police officer. She was found by the trial court guilty as charged. In handing its judgment, the trial court, despite its absence in the information, appreciated the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position. On appeal the accused contended that there was no lewdness in his acts hence, the best that can imposed upon him is the crime of unjust vexation and not acts of lasciviousness. Further he contended that since the aggravating circumstance of public position was not alleged, the same must not be appreciated against him.
Issues:
1) Were the trial and the appellate courts correct in convicting the accused?
2) Were the trial and appellate courts correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of public position?
Held:
On the first issue, the trial and appellate courts were correct in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged. For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under the foregoing provision, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age. The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
Undoubtedly, petitioner committed acts which fall within the above described lascivious conduct. It cannot be viewed as mere unjust vexation as petitioner would have the Court do. The intention of petitioner was intended neither to merely annoy or irritate the victim nor to force her to confess the theft. He could have easily achieved that when he electrocuted the latter. Petitioner intended to gratify his sexual desires. Undeniably, appellant committed lewd acts against AAA. "Lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. The evidence shows that appellant committed lewd acts against AAA when he touched her "all over her body" which includes mashing her breasts, touching her private parts, and kissing her on the cheek. These acts were clearly done with lewd designs as appellant even previously asked AAA, as if it was a prelude for things to come, "Dalaga ka na ba?" and thereafter conveyed to her that "he is single too."14
Moreover, appellant employed force and intimidation when he committed these acts on AAA. In fact, as found by the trial court, appellant pointed a gun at the forehead of AAA as evidenced by the bruises on her forehead. Further, the medical Certificate shows that AAA suffered slight physical injuries which include "multiple slight contusion of bilateral breast areas" which supports AAA’s claim.
Petitioner’s assertion that the locus criminis i.e., the police station makes it unlikely for him to commit the crime of acts of lasciviousness is specious. The presence of other policemen on duty and of the victim’s mother outside the room where the incident took place does not render commission of the offense impossible
As to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position, petitioner points out that said circumstance was not alleged in the information. It is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial.19 A reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating circumstance.
Judgement was therefore affirmed with modification of the penalty by eliminating the appreciation of the above-discussed aggravating circumstance.
Victoria Jarillo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
Bigamy
Facts:
The petitioner was previously convicted of bigamy which was affirmed all the way up to the Supreme Court. In her motion for reconsideration, she posits that since petitioner's marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
Issue:
Should her conviction be reversed?
Held:
No. which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.4
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,5 the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite – usually the marriage license – and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy. x x x lawphil
The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and this, the Court shall never sanction. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's asseveration, that Article 40 of the Family Code should not be applied to her case, cannot be upheld.
Hector Villanueva vs. Philippine Daily Inquirer
G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009
Libel
Facts:
On March of 1990, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections. Said petition, however, was denied by the COMELEC. Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story:
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayor’s office of Bais City
A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayor’s office in the city.
Villanueva filed a case for damages due to malicious publication claiming that because of said false publications, he lost the election. The trial court found the respondents guilty but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision saying that no malice was proven in making such publications. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court alleging that since his complaint was one for quasi-delict and not for libel, malice need not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand the respondents argued that since the petitioner alleged “malicious” publication, he cannot now change his theory from that of libel to that of quasi-delict.
Issue:
Was the CA correct in reversing the finding of guilt by the trial court?
Held:
Yes. Basic is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. The complaint was denominated as one for "damages", and a perusal of its content reveals that the factual allegations constituted a complaint for damages based on malicious publication. Petitioner sought that respondents be declared guilty of irresponsible and malicious publication and be made liable for damages. The fact that petitioner later on changed his theory to quasi-delict does not change the nature of petitioner’s complaint and convert petitioner’s action into quasi-delict. The complaint remains to be one for damages based on malicious publication. found to be untrue, this does not necessarily render the same malicious.
To fully appreciate the import of the complaint alleging malice and damages, we must recall the essence of libel. Libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." Any of these imputations is defamatory and under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious.
In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published articles in question were written with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of what was false or not. According to Manila Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story from a fellow reporter who told him that the disqualification case against petitioner was granted. PDI, on the other hand, said that they got the story from a press release the very same day the Manila Bulletin published the same story. PDI claims that the press release bore COMELEC’s letterhead, signed by one Sonia Dimasupil, who was in-charge of COMELEC press releases. They also tried to contact her but she was out of the office. Since the news item was already published in the Manila Bulletin, they felt confident the press release was authentic. Following the narration of events narrated by respondents, it cannot be said that the publications, were published with reckless disregard of what is false or not.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language.
MERIDA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008
Violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife. Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed to the CA reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals did not admit his motion for having been filed late. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner is liable for cutting timber in private property without permit.Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. Petitioner stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private landwithout x x x the necessary permitx x x" thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x x timber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit. We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
AGUSTIN vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158788 April 30, 2008
Violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms
On October 1, 1995 an armed men robbed the house of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to P600,000.00. Forthwith, the spouses reported the matter to the police, who, in turn, immediately applied for a search warrant with the MTC of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The MTC issued Search Warrant directing a search of the items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used by the perpetrators. One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime. Armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's house. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.
The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house.
Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own a gun. Lorna testified that she saw a "military" man planting the gun. After trial, the RTC find petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Issue: whether the prosecution established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
Weighing the findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's claim that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of its witnesses, the Court finds, after a meticulous examination of the records that the lower courts, indeed, committed a reversible error in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was charged with. The RTC and the CA have overlooked certain facts and circumstances that would have interjected serious apprehensions absolutely impairing the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and conducted the search, who "discovered" the gun, and who witnessed the "discovery" are material matters because they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. As held in United States v. Estraña, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.
The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses. In the face of the vehement and consistent protestations of frame-up by petitioner and his wife, the trial court and the CA erred in overlooking or misappreciating these inconsistencies. The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses further muddled the prosecution evidence with more inconsistencies as to matters material to the determination of whether a gun had in fact been found in the house of petitioner. SPO4 Peneyra testified that Yabes stayed outside of the house during the search; whereas SPO1 Jara testified that Yabes was inside, at the sala, but the latter saw the gun only when SPO1 Cabaya raised it. Such inconsistencies on the material details of the firearm's discovery are so glaring that they ought not to have been ignored or brushed aside by the lower courts. The contradictions of the prosecution witnesses not only undermine all efforts to reconstruct the event in question, but altogether erode the evidentiary value of the prosecution evidence.
Given the incoherent story presented by the prosecution, it is hardly persuasive that SPO1 Cabaya indeed found the firearm in a regular manner. Serious doubts are raised on whether petitioner really possessed or owned that weapon and hid it in his house. On the face of the contradicting evidence presented by the prosecution, petitioner's denial and his wife's emphatic claim of frame-up from day one, that is, at the time and on the very spot of the alleged discovery of the gun, gained substantial significance.
BORJA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164298 April 30, 2008
Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
Facts:
In three Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna, Branch 30, petitioner Engr. Roger F. Borja, in his capacity as General Manager C of the San Pablo Water District, was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On January 13, 2003, Borja filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment. Borja alleged that there is a pending civil case entitled Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, which involves the issue of whether local water districts are private or government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). He argued that the issue is a prejudicial question, the resolution of which determines whether or not the criminal actions against him may proceed. If this Court resolves that local water districts are private corporations, the graft cases against him will not prosper since then he would not be a public officer covered by Rep. Act No. 3019.
On February 18, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. Later it also denied his motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Borja filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, however, dismissed his petition for lack of merit after noting the previous cases wherein we held that local water districts are GOCCs. Borja sought reconsideration, but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that there was no prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the proceedings of the graft cases?
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit. Borja's contention that a prejudicial question exists in his case is clearly devoid of any legal basis, considering that it had been settled, long before the Feliciano case, that local water districts are GOCCs, and not private corporations. This is because local water districts do not derive their existence from the Corporation Code, but from Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended. Thus, being a public officer, Borja can certainly be indicted for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019. Moreover, it did not also escape our notice that at the time Borja filed his petition before us on July 21, 2004, he no longer has any basis to question the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. This is because more than six months have elapsed by then since we had decided the Feliciano case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE vs. PAJARO
G.R. Nos. 167860-65 June 17, 2008
Malversation of public funds
Facts;
The Sandiganbayan which found appellants guilty of four (4) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents and two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Appellant Teddy M. Pajaro (Pajaro) was the Municipal Mayor of Lantapan, Bukidnon from 1989 to 1998; while appellants Crispina Aben (Aben) and Flor S. Libertad (Libertad) served as acting Municipal Accountant and Municipal Treasurer respectively. During their term of office, they allegedly caused the irregular disbursement of public funds as financial assistance pursuant to livelihood projects and IEC-Peace and Order Program in the respective amounts of P179,000.00 and P140,000.00. In a special audit of certain disbursements made during Pajaro's administration, State Auditor Rogelio Tero (Auditor Tero) noted that P74,000.00 of the money disbursed was not actually received by the intended beneficiaries who were chosen arbitrarily; and that the disbursements were irregularly processed and released to the prejudice of the local government.
For his part, appellant Pajaro claimed that the disbursements were properly made pursuant to approved resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Municipal Development Council and were provided for in the Municipal Budget Plan for 1998. He stated that as municipal mayor, his role was limited to approving the vouchers with respect to the disbursement of local funds and he usually does not have any personal knowledge whether the amounts disbursed were received by the intended beneficiaries except in the case of Penar whom he personally know and Lacerna whose brother received the money on her behalf. He insisted that the subject documents were executed according to procedure save for the budget officer's certification because the municipal budget officer unjustifiably refused to affix his signature on the documents despite the supporting attachments.
On January 19, 2005, the Sandiganbayan finds the three accused, Teddy Pajaro, Crispina Aben, and Flor Libertad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the six (6) informations. Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence this appeal.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellants are charged, in conspiracy with each other, with the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:
a.) The offender is a public officer;
b.) He has custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.) The funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
d.) He has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
It is undisputed that appellants are all public officers and the funds allegedly misappropriated are public in character. Appellant Libertad, by reason of her office as Municipal Treasurer had custody and control of such funds and is therefore accountable for the same. Ordinarily, a municipality's mayor and accountant are not accountable public officers as defined under the law. However, a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of his official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation, as in the instant case. In finding that appellants misappropriated the said public funds, the Sandiganbayan ruled on the authenticity of the signatures of the alleged beneficiaries Penar and Lacerna on the disbursement vouchers.
There is no doubt that appellants facilitated the illegal release of the funds by signing the subject vouchers. Without their signatures, said monies could not have been disbursed. Pajaro, as Mayor, initiated the request for obligation of allotments and certified and approved the disbursement vouchers; Aben, as Acting Municipal Accountant, obligated the allotments despite lack of prior certification from the budget officer. Municipal Treasurer Libertad certified to the availability of funds and released the money even without the requisite budget officer's certification. Their combined acts, coupled with the falsification of the signatures of Penar and Lacerna, all lead to the conclusion that appellants conspired to defraud the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 19, 2005 Decision of the Sandiganbayan finding appellants guilty of four (4) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents and two (2) counts of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the March 21, 2005 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE vs. LUNA
G.R. No. 181318 April 16, 2009
R. A. 9165
Facts:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, finds the appellant German Agojo y Luna guilty of violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425. Appellant was charged with illegal sale of shabu in an Information. That on or about the 27th day of August 1999 at about 11:30 o’clock in the evening at Poblacion, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, and deliver (4) plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," weighing 51.00, 51.10, 52.67 and 51.55 grams, with a total weight of 206.32 grams, a regulated dangerous drug. Appellant was also charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 in an Information.
Thereafter, trial ensued. In a Decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge against him for violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 and acquitted him of the charge of violation of P.D. No. 1866 for lack of sufficient evidence. The case was brought on automatic review before the Supreme Court, since appellant was sentenced to death by the trial court.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
The errors raised by the appellant boil down to the issue of whether appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as well as to the question whether appellant was framed-up by the buy-bust team. A thorough review of the records clearly shows that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant sold the shabu to the poseur-buyer. The testimony of Alonzo on the sale of illegal drugs and the identification of appellant as the seller is clear and straightforward. The testimony of Alonzo was corroborated by members of the buy-bust team, who both testified that they saw appellant hand Alonzo the VHS tape containing the shabu despite only partial payment for the shabu.
Appellant’s assertion that he was framed-up has no merit. In almost every case involving a buy-bust operation, the accused puts up the defense of frame-up. This court has repeatedly emphasized that the defense of "frame-up" is viewed with disfavor, since the defense is easily concocted and is a common ploy of the accused. Therefore, clear and convincing evidence of the frame-up must be shown for such a defense to be given merit.
SANCHEZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179090 June 5, 2009
Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603
Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse. That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, the above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV], a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial. Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610. Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that appellant never admitted that he hit VVV. The RTC, however, denied the motion. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA.
On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment before the RTC belied appellant's contention that his defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a manifestation of appellant's counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative defense because the act of hitting VVV was unintentional. Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed by appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence to the factual findings of the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed against appellant was not defective inasmuch as the allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA held that the prosecution had fully established the elements of the offense charged.
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this Petition, claiming among others that the CA erred in sustaining the conviction of the accused of the crime charged (violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. NO. 7610) notwithstanding that the act complained of is obviously covered by the RPC as slight physical injury.
Ruling:
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
UnderSubsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. --
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
In this connection, our ruling in Araneta v. People is instructive:
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
ARANETA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174205, June 27, 2008
Section 10(1) RA 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse)
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 or Anti-Child Abuse. Prosecution was able to establish that at the time of the commission of the crime, AAA was 17 years old.
At around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of April 10, 1998, while AAA and her two younger sisters, BBB and EEE were sitting on a bench at the waiting shed located near her boarding house, petitioner approached her. Petitioner, who had been incessantly courting AAA from the time she was still 13 years old, again expressed his feelings for her and asked her to accept his love and even insisted that she must accept him because he had a job. She did not like what she heard from petitioner and tried to hit him with a broom but the latter was able to dodge the strike. She and her two sisters dashed to the boarding house which was five meters away and went inside the room. When they were about to close the door, the petitioner, who was following them, forced himself inside. The three tried to bar petitioner from entering the room by pushing the door to his direction. Their efforts, however, proved futile as petitioner was able to enter. There petitioner embraced AAA, who struggled to extricate herself from his hold. AAA then shouted for help. Meanwhile, petitioner continued hugging her and tried to threaten her with these words: "Ug dili ko nimo sugton, patyon tika. Akong ipakita nimo unsa ko ka buang" (If you will not accept my love I will kill you. I will show you how bad I can be). BBB, tried to pull petitioner away from her sister AAA, but to no avail. Andrew Tubilag, who was also residing in the same house, arrived and pulled petitioner away from AAA. AAA closed the door of the room and there she cried. She then went to the police station to report the incident.
RTC rendered a decision it that petitioner’s act of forcibly embracing the victim against her will wrought injury on the latter’s honor and constituted child abuse as defined under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of child abuse as defined under RA 7610?
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 10 of RA 7610 provides that:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
The evidence of the prosecution proved that petitioner, despite the victim’s protestation, relentlessly followed the latter from the waiting shed to her boarding house and even to the room where she stayed. He forcibly embraced her and threatened to kill her if she would not accept his love for her. Indeed, such devious act must have shattered her self-esteem and womanhood and virtually debased, degraded or demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity. As a young and helpless lass at that time, being away from her parents, the victim must have felt desecrated and sexually transgressed, especially considering the fact that the incident took place before the very eyes of her two younger, innocent sisters. Petitioner who was old enough to be the victim’s grandfather, did not only traumatize and gravely threaten the normal development of such innocent girl; he was also betraying the trust that young girls place in the adult members of the community who are expected to guide and nurture the well-being of these fragile members of the society.
VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009
R.A. No. 8294; Illegal possession of firearms
Facts:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 by having in his possession and control one cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo. without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
RTC convicted Valeroso as charged. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision. Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation recommending Valeroso’s acquittal. The OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution.
Issue: Was the arrest lawful?
Ruling:
NO. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco. The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet where they found the subject firearm and ammunition. With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.
VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 159703, March 3, 2008
RA No. 8294; Illegal possession of firearms
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bais City with illegal possession of firearms. The first prosecution witness in the person of PO3 Mariano Labe testified that on or about 3:35 in the afternoon of January 3, 1999, while they were at the Police Station, they received a telephone call from a concerned citizen from Tavera Street, Bais City, informing them that one unidentified person was inside Abueva's Repair Shop located at Tavera Street, tucking a handgun on his waist. They immediately went to the aforementioned place, and upon their arrival thereat, they saw one unidentified person tucking a handgun on his right side waistline. They approached the unidentified person and asked him if he had a license to possess said firearm, but the answer was in the negative. At this juncture, they immediately effected the arrest, and confiscated from his possession and custody a Caliber 9MM marked "SIGSAUER P299" with 14 live ammunitions with Serial No. AE 25171.
For his defense, petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject firearm and ammunitions when he was apprehended but he insists that he had the requisite permits to carry the same by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (Non-expendable Property) and a Mission Order from one RICARDO B. BAYHON, Major (INF) PAFS 743 Commander.In the present Petition, petitioner insists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and it was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm and ammunitions from the AFP.
Issue: Is the charge for illegal possession of firearms correct?
Ruling:
YES. It is noted that the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, allude to "memorandum receipts" covering government-owned firearms. While said rules do not define the term, we can derive its meaning from Section 492 of the Government Auditing and Accounting Manual (Volume I: Government Auditing Rules and Regulations) to wit:
Section 492. Issues of equipment to officers and employees. - Equipment issued by the property officer for official use of officials and employees shall be covered by Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (MR) which shall be renewed every January of the third year after issue. MRs not renewed after three years shall not be considered in making physical count of the equipment.
From the foregoing discussion, therefore, the rules governing memorandum receipts and mission orders covering the issuance to and the possession and/or carrying of government-owned firearms by special or confidential civilian agents may be synthesized as follows: First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of any government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving regular compensation for services rendered are not exempt from the requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a permit to carry the same outside of residence; Second, said special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and possess government-owned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of a memorandum receipt for equipment covering said government-owned firearms. Neither will they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a regular firearms license and a permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-owned firearms covered by a memorandum receipt; and Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry firearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of their residence.
The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in possession of or bearing private-owned firearms that are duly licensed and covered by permits to carry the same outside of residence. It is clear that petitioner is not authorized to possess and carry the subject firearm and ammunition, notwithstanding the memorandum receipt and mission order which were illegally issued to him. Petitioner is a planter who was recruited to assist in the counter-insurgency campaign of the AFP. However, as he offered no evidence that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or that he is receiving regular compensation from said agency, he cannot be considered a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent as defined under Section 6(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866. As such, he was not authorized to receive the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did not legitimize his possession thereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EVORA
G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009
Possession and sale of dangerous drugs
Facts:
Appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations before the Regional RTC with possession and sale of shabu.PO3 Tougan testified for the prosecution and narrated that the police received an information from an informant that a certain Parto was selling shabu at Sta. Barbara Subdivision, Brgy. Ampid I, San Mateo, Rizal. Parto had apparently been under surveillance by the police for selling prohibited drugs. They immediately planned a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Tougan acting as the poseur-buyer. Tougan received a P100.00 bill from the police chief and placed the serial numbers of the bill on the police blotter.
PO3 Tougan, together with PO2 Pontilla and the civilian informant then proceeded to Sta. Maria Subdivision. However, before the actual buy-bust operation, the group responded to a commotion in the area where they arrested a certain Noel Samaniego. Thereafter, they went to Neptune corner Jupiter Street and spotted Parto in the tricycle terminal. The informant initially approached appellant. The latter then went near the tricycle where PO3 Tougan was in and asked him, "How much[?]" PO3 Tougan replied, "Piso lang," which means P100.00. Upon exchange of the money and the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance, PO3 Tougan immediately alighted from the tricycle, grabbed Parto’s hand and introduced himself as a policeman. PO3 Tougan was able to recover another plastic sachet from the hand of Parto.
At the police station, the two (2) plastic sachets confiscated from Parto were marked. After marking, the police immediately prepared the request for laboratory examination. Chemistry Report No. D-2157-02E confirmed that the two (2) plastic sachets seized from appellant were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
The trial court convicted appellant beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Issue: Did the apprehending team comply with the requirements in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs?
Ruling:
NO. In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. PO3 Tougan stated that he marked the two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance in the police station. PO3 Tougan did not mark the seized drugs immediately after he arrested appellant in the latter's presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of appellant. There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed.
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team, yet these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by PO3 Tougan for his failure to observe the rule.
Furthermore, while PO3 Tougan admitted to have in his possession the shabu from the time appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of PO3 Tougan. PO3 Tougan mentioned a certain Inspector Manahan as the one who signed the request for laboratory examination. He did not however relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over. Furthermore, the evidence of the prosecution did not reveal the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. The failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody is fatal to its cause.
All told, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accused was acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REVILLEZA
G.R. No. 177148, June 30, 2009
Violation of Sec 16, Art 3 of RA 6425, as amended by RA 9165
Facts:
Raul R. Nuñez was formally charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los Baños Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuñez based on reports of drug possession.
Before proceeding to appellant’s residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellant’s house, Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed Nuñez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellant’s room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing P4,610 inside appellant’s dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which appellant signed.
In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant.
Issue: Is appellant is guilty of possession of dangerous drugs?
Ruling:
YES. To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. All these were found present in the instant case.
While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with disfavor as it can easily be fabricated and is commonly used as a facile refuge in drug cases. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellant’s bed, appellant had not advanced any reason to account for the thirty-one (31) packets of shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in his room. Instead, he readily signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification of Orderly Search. Neither did appellant’s daughter identify the police officer who allegedly planted evidence. Absent any compelling proof why SPO1 Ilagan would falsely testify against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands and we agree that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions the non-presentation of the barangay officials who purportedly observed the search. The matter of presentation of witnesses, however, is neither for accused nor even for the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State should present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as witness. It bears stressing that by no means did the barangay officials become part of the prosecution when they were asked to witness the search. Hence, even the accused could have presented them to testify thereon.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CURATIVO
G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009
Violations of Secs. 15 and 16 of RA 9165
Facts:
Two informations both dated 21 September 2000 were filed before the RTC of Negros Oriental charging petitioner Quinicot with violation of Sections 16 and 15, respectively, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
A confidential informant/agent called the petitioner by phone. Thereafter, PO1 Marchan talked to petitioner and informed the latter that he was buying P300.00 worth of shabu. At around 12:20 p.m., they went to Chin Loong Restaurant and conducted the buy-bust operation.
PO2 Germodo was positioned in front of the restaurant, five to ten meters away from PO1 Marchan and petitioner. PO1 Marchan saw petitioner and a woman sitting on a stool in the bar. PO1 Marchan approached petitioner and asked him if he had shabu worth P300.00. Petitioner answered in the affirmative. PO1 Marchan gave the P300.00 marked money, and in return, petitioner gave him a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. When PO1 Marchan executed the pre-arranged signal – touching his hat – PO2 Germodo rushed towards petitioner and PO1 Marchan and identified themselves as police officers. Petitioner was informed he violated the law on selling shabu. PO2 Germodo bodily searched petitioner and recovered two plastic sachets from the brown belt purse of the latter. He likewise recovered from petitioner the marked money, a disposable lighter, and a tooter. The petitioner was brought to the police station. PO1 Marchan issued a receipt1 for the items recovered from the him. The Chemistry Report showed that the specimens contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
The trial court found petitioner to have violated Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, when he sold one plastic sachet containing .0119 gram of shabu to poseur-buyer PO1 Marchan; and that PO2 Germodo recovered from petitioner, inter alia, the marked money used in the buy-bust operation amounting to P300.00 and two more plastic sachets containing 2.1832 grams and 2.6355 grams of shabu.
Issue: Is the accused guilty as charged?
Ruling:
YES. Petitioner was charged with violations of Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425. He was charged with violation of Section 15 for selling 0.119 gram of shabu. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. The poseur-buyer and his back-up described how the buy-bust happened, and the shabu sold was presented and identified in court. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Domingo Marchan, identified petitioner as the seller of the shabu. His testimony was corroborated by PO2 Allen June Germodo. The white crystalline substance weighing 0.119 gram, which was bought from petitioner for P300.00, was found to contain shabu per Chemistry Report No. D-146-2000.
Petitioner was likewise charged under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 with possession of two sachets (2.1832 grams and 2.6355 grams) of shabu with a total weight of 4.8187 grams. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. All these elements have been established.
Moreover, in the case before us, it is not indispensable for the confidential informant to take the witness stand, considering that the poseur-buyer testified regarding the illegal sale made by petitioner. Furthermore, none of the above circumstances that necessitate the presentation of the informant obtains in this case. While petitioner denies selling shabu, there are no material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers. Petitioner failed to show that the two police officers had motives to testify falsely against him. As admitted by petitioner, prior to 21 September 2000, he neither knew nor had any quarrel or misunderstanding with any or both of them. Lastly, the sale and the subsequent recovery of two more sachets of shabu from petitioner were adequately shown and proved by the prosecution witnesses, who were present and who dealt with the petitioner in the crime scene.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 185164, June 22, 2009
Violations of Sections 5 and 11, Art 2 of RA 9165
Facts:
On June 3, 2004, in the RTC of Mandaluyong City, two (2) separate informations were filed against appellant charging him, in the first, with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. On May 23, 2004, Police Senior Inspector Gadiano, Chief of the Intelligence Unit of Mandaluyong City Police, received information from a confidential asset that a man named Richie was conducting illegal activities at Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Acting on the information, the team conducted a surveillance and confirmed that appellant was involved in selling illegal drugs at his home in 741 Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. A team was organized to conduct a buy-bust operation at the target site.
PO1 Climacosa approached appellant who was then standing by the gate of 741 Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City and said, "Pre, iskor ako ng dalawang piso pang gamit lang." Appellant replied "sandali lang." PO1 Climacosa gave appellant the two marked P100.00 bills. Appellant, in turn, handed to PO1 Climacosa a sachet containing a white crystalline substance. PO1 Climacosa removed his cap to signal the consummation of the sale transaction to the other team members who were positioned some 10 meters away.
Thereafter, PO1 Climacosa introduced himself and informed appellant that he was under arrest. Appellant resisted and ran away, but he was eventually accosted by PO1 Climacosa and the other members of the team.PO1 Antipasado then frisked appellant and found the marked money and another sachet of white crystalline substance in appellant’s pocket.
Immediately, the team apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant was, thereafter, brought to the Mandaluyong Medical Center for medical check-up. From the hospital, appellant was turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong City Police Station. In the said office, the confiscated sachets were marked as "MC" and "MC-1" by PO1 Climacosa and PO1 Antipasado, respectively. The marked two (2) P100.00 bills were turned over to the evidence custodian, while the two (2) confiscated sachets were immediately brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Eastern Police District (EPD) for laboratory examination. PSI Lourdeliza Cejes, Forensic Chemist, found the two (2) sachets of white crystalline substance to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Accordingly, appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with the RTC of Mandaluyong City.
Appellant primarily assails the non-presentation of the confidential asset to establish that he was indeed peddling drugs. Thus, he insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Is the presentation of the confidential informant an indispensible requisite in dangerous drugs prosecution?
Ruling:
NO. That the informant was not presented by the prosecution does not prejudice the State's case, as all the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu by appellant were satisfactorily proved by testimonial, documentary and object evidence. At best, the testimony of the informant would only have been corroborative. It is not indispensable.
As held by this Court in People v. Lopez: In general, the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of the informer would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.
Thus, in People v. Marilyn Naquita, we rejected a similar contention, holding that: The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The failure of the prosecution to present the informant does not vitiate its cause as the latter's testimony is not indispensable to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing, since his testimony would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug. Failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment, especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation has indeed been conducted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SY
G.R. No. 185284, June 22, 2009
Violation of Sec 15, Art 3 of RA 6425 as amended by RA 9165
Facts:
Accused-appellant Jason Sy was charged before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 47, with illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
During arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY." The prosecution established, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 2000, he reported to Camp Olivas on instructions of their team leader, Major Julian Caesar Mana. The latter told them that PO2 Christian Trambulo, together with a civilian informant, were negotiating a drug-deal with a certain person allegedly named Jason Sy. Consequently, at around 2:00 o’clock of the next morning, December 3, 2000, Major Mana conducted a briefing regarding a possible buy-bust operation. Those presents were Major Mana, Captain Julieto Culili and six (6) other police officers. He was designated as back-up of PO2 Trambulo. His duty was to assist in apprehending the suspect. After the briefing, they proceeded to the designated area at the Chowking Food Chain located at the Gapan-Olongapo Road, Dolores, City of San Fernando, Pampanga. The proceeded thereat in four (4) vehicles. Two vehicles were parked at the parking lot located in front of Chowking Fast Food. One used by PO2 Trambulo and the informer while the other was used by him and PO3 Vasquez. They were ten to fifteen meters away from Trambulo. The two other vehicles were parked along Gapan-Olongapo Road within viewing distance. The place was well-lighted. Lights emanated from the Chowking Fast Food and from a spotlight in the building beside the restaurant. Witness narrated further that at around 3:00 o’clock of the said morning, a color red Nissan Altima arrived at the parking lot. A male person, who was later identified as accused Jason Sy, alighted and walked towards the car where PO2 Trambulo was. Jason Sy and PO2 Trambulo talked for awhile. Then PO2 Trambulo removed his bull cap, which was the pre-arranged signal that the sale has already been consummated. As soon as he saw the signal, he immediately rushed to the place where PO2 Trambulo was standing. At this moment, PO2 Trambulo has already placed Jason Sy under arrest by holding the latter’s hand. He recovered the Php5,000.00 marked money and the boodle money from the possession of Jason Sy and apprised him of his constitutional rights. He then turned over possession of the boodle money to PO2 Trambulo. Subsequently, they brought Jason Sy to their office at Camp Olivas. PO2 Trambulo turned over custody of Jason Sy, the buy-bust money and a transparent plastic packed inside of which was a paper bag with the label Jacob Fish cracker, allegedly containing shabu, to the police investigator. He also identified the join-affidavit (x x x) which he and PO2 Trambulo executed.
During cross-examination, he recounted that it was Major Mana who gave the P5,000.00 marked money to PO2 Trambulo but it was the latter who prepared the boodle money. At the time PO2 Trambulo removed his bull-cap, he, Amontos, was standing beside their car while Narciso Valdez was inside the vehicle. Their superior officers, Julius Caesar Mana and Julieto Culili, who were in two separate cars, later joined them. He informed Jason Sy of his constitutional rights in English because according to the informant Jason is a Chinese National. He asked Jason whether he understand (sic) English and the latter nodded his head.
Senior Inspector Maria Luisa Gundran-David, the Crime Laboratory forensic chemical officer, testified that she conducted a qualitative examination of the shabu specimen by weighing it. The specimen weighs 987.32263 grams. She also conducted a test reaction by Simons Reagent. There was a blue coloration indicating that the sample was positive for shabu. She next conducted a confirmatory test using the TLC method, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:
Issue: Did prosecution discharge its burden to support accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged?
Ruling:
YES. In dealing with prosecutions for the illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug as evidence. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses adequately establish these elements. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or not. The Court has no reason to doubt the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of the prosecution and defense witnesses. The testimony of the buy-bust team established than an entrapment operation against accused-appellant was legitimately and successfully carried out on 3 December 2000, where accused-appellant was caught selling 987.32265 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. A scrutiny of the accounts of PO3 Ricardo Amontos, PO2 Christian Trambulo and Senior Inspector Culili, detailing how PO2 Trambulo negotiated, thru cellphone, with accused-appellant on the purchase price and the amount of shabu to be delivered, actual delivery of the shabu, the giving to the accused the marked and boodle money and the subsequent arrest of the accused show that these were testified to in a clear, straightforward manner. Their testimonies are further bolstered by the physical evidence consisting of the shabu presented as evidence before the court.
The case at bar presents a predicament considering that the RTC found evidence to support that the police officers exacted money from accused-appellant after his arrest in order to facilitate his immediate discharge. In the same case, however, the RTC still found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged, based on the totality of evidence adduced by the prosecution. The Court of Appeals, however, did not give credence to accused-appellant’s allegations of extortion.
PEOPLE VS QUIGOD
G.R. No. 186419, April 23, 2010
Violation of Sec 5, Art II of RA 9165
Facts:
Accused Darlene Quigod was charged with the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 for selling 2 sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, weighing zero point four six seven zero (0.4670) grams, to SPO2 Antonio Paloma Jamila (acting as poseur-buyer), which is a dangerous drug during the buy-bust operation.
Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Quigod guilty of the crime charged. The accused contends that the CA erred in convicting her because the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the accused contends that the chain of custody was not properly established because there was failure on the part of the police officers who allegedly conducted the buy-bust operation to properly make an inventory of the shabu allegedly recovered from her. She further argues that the failure of the police officers to photograph and mark the shabu immediately after the alleged buy-bust operation creates doubt as to the identity of the shabu. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Was the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Was the chain of custody properly established?
3. Will a defense of denial in cases of violations of RA 9165 prosper?
Ruling:
1. YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture accused-appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug, was valid. It has been established that it was the police informant who made the initial contact with accused-appellant when he introduced SPO2 Jamila as a buyer for shabu. SPO2 Jamila then ordered two (2) sachets of shabu which accused-appellant agreed to sell at PhP 1,000 per sachet. Accused-appellant left for a while and shortly thereafter, she came back with the two (2) sachets containing a white crystalline substance which was later identified as shabu and gave them to SPO2 Jamila. The latter then paid her with the previously marked money he brought with him. Subsequently, upon giving the pre-arranged signal, the accused-appellant was arrested. Evidently, the facts themselves demonstrate a valid buy-bust operation that is within the bounds of a fair and reasonable administration of justice.
2. YES. In the prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court has reiterated the essential elements in People v. Pendatun, to wit: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug. All these elements were ably proven by the prosecution in the instant case. The accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP 2,000 to SPO2 Jamila posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the marked money and contraband; and finally, the accused-appellant was fully aware that she was selling and delivering a prohibited drug.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, and the integrity of the drugs seized from the accused-appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that after SPO2 Jamila seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money, the accused-appellant was immediately arrested and brought to the police station for investigation.
Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance marked as “RPM1” and “RPM2,” respectively, together with a letter of request for examination, was submitted by SPO2 Jamila to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination to determine the presence of any dangerous drug. The crime laboratory found that the specimen submitted contained Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
3. NO. Denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt, particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt. Also, in the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused-appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty stands.
PEOPLE VS JOEY TION
G.R. No. 172092, December 16, 2009
Violation of Section 4, RA 9165
Facts:
Test buys were conducted on March 2 and 3, 1999. The police informant bought marijuana on March 2, while P/Insp. Castillo was able to buy marijuana on March 3 after being introduced to Joey and Allan by two police informants. The deal for the purchase of five kilos of marijuana was agreed upon on March 3, 1999. The "marked money" was then prepared with the help of then Mayor Tumaru and Clerk of Court Calanoga who photocopied and authenticated it. In the morning of March 4, 1999, P/Insp. Castillo, with the two police informants, confirmed the purchase of the five kilos and paid half the price with the PhP 6,250 "marked money." And upon delivery by Joey of the 5.2 kilograms bricks of marijuana in the agreed place at 5:00 p.m. on March 4, 1999, he was arrested along with Allan and Ronald. Confiscated from Joey were the bricks of marijuana and three PhP 100 bills, which were among those from the PhP 6,250 "marked money" earlier paid to him by P/Insp. Castillo
Issues:
1. Was there a valid buy bust operation?
2. Is Joey guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling marijuana?
3. When is the crime of illegal sale of drugs consummated?
Ruling:
1. YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment legally employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense. Such police operation has judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due respect to constitutional and legal safeguards. There is no rigid or textbook method in conducting buy-bust operations.
As aptly quoted by the appellate court, People v. Doria provides the "objective" test in scrutinizing buy-bust operations in this wise:
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
There was neither instigation nor inducement in the case at bar. The fact that two test buys were made on March 2 and 3, 1999 shows that Joey was involved in selling marijuana. When asked to provide for a large quantity of marijuana, he agreed to deliver five kilos of it at the price of PhP 2,500 per kilo. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s finding that Joey would not have readily agreed and admitted to poseur-buyer P/Insp. Castillo that he can sell large quantities of marijuana if he (Joey) is not selling marijuana and did not know how to source the illegal drug. The fact is, as can be gleaned from the sale of five kilos of marijuana, Joey stands to profit from such a sale. It is, thus, clear to us that the mens rea came from Joey, who was neither instigated nor induced. What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and delivery of prohibited drugs.
2. YES. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proved: (1) that the transaction took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. With respect to illegal sale of marijuana, its essential elements are: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.The foregoing elements were duly proved during the trial.
3. The well-entrenched principle is that the accused commits the crime of illegal sale of drugs as soon as he consummates the sale transaction whether payment precedes or follows delivery of the drugs sold.
CARINO & ANDES VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009
Violation of Section 11, Article 2, RA 9165
Facts:
Petitioners were apprehended on two separate but related incidents by apprehending officers. Both petitioners were arrested without a warrant for allegedly having in their possession plastic sachets containing shabu. After the arrest and investigation, petitioners were charged in two separate informations with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
A police officer spotted Carinoholding a plastic sachet in his hand. Right there and then, they placed Carino under arrest and Eugenio immediately seized the plastic sachet. They asked Carino who the source of the plastic sachet was and the latter immediately identified petitioner Andes. They approached Andes, and she allegedly became hysterical when the policemen introduced themselves to her. It was then that Tayaban noticed the woman inserting something inside the pocket of her 5-year old male child. Tayaban was suspicious so he inspected the right pocket of the child and found a plastic sachet inside it containing shabu. Petitioners were immediately brought to the Galas Police Station. The plastic sachets were allegedly submitted to the desk officer and then to the station investigator who in the presence of Tayaban marked each of the specimens with the initials "JT-RA" and "AE-RC." The markings purportedly represented the initials of Eugenio and Tayaban and the initials of petitioners from whom they were seized.
Issue:
Was the identity of the prohibited drug established beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
NO. The mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence is insufficient to provide that assurance, for all the people who made contact with the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioners, only Tayaban and Eugenio were able to testify in court as to the identity of the evidence. The desk officer at the police station to whom the specimens were purportedly surrendered by Tayaban and Eugenio was not even presented in court to observe the identity and uniqueness of the evidence. Even more to the point is the fact that the testimony of the investigator, who had taken custody of the plastic sachets after the same were reported to the desk officer, was likewise not offered in court to directly observe the evidence and admit the specific markings thereon as his own. The same is true with respect to Jabonillo, the forensic chemist at the crime laboratory who administered the chemical examination on the specimens and who could have testified on the circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for analysis and testing, as well as on the conduct of the examination which was administered on the specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and custody.
In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant, it can be reasonably concluded that the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect failed to obliterate the hypothesis of petitioners’ guiltlessness.
Moreover, the members of the arresting team in this case, do not seem to have complied with the guidelines under Section 21 of RA 9165. The prosecution has not even shown that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the statutory requirements in handling the evidence. From the testimonies of Tayaban and Eugenio, it is clear that after the arrest of petitioners they immediately seized the plastic sachets, took custody thereof and brought the same to the police station together with petitioners. It was at the police station—and not at the place where the item was seized from appellant—where, according to Tayaban and Eugenio, the unnamed police investigator had placed the markings on the specimens. What is more telling is the admission made by Tayaban to the effect that the markings were placed on the plastic sachet in his presence and not in the presence of petitioners as required by law.
These flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from petitioners, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibits before they were offered in evidence in court, militate against the prosecution’s cause because they not only cast doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti but also tend to negate, if not totally discredit, the claim of regularity in the conduct of official police operation advanced by the OSG. Thus, the accused-petitioners are acquitted on reasonable doubt.
ZALAMEDA VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009
Violation of Section 11 and 12, RA 9165
Facts:
Zalameda was found guilty by the RTC of violating Section 11 of RA 9165. Police Officer Orbeta received a phone call from a concerned citizen regarding an on-going "pot session" in a certain area. The house number was specified. Acting on the information the police officers went to the place to while they were in uniform to verify the report. When they reached the intended destination they found the door of the house slightly open. The police officer peeped inside and saw petitioner and Villaflor sniffing smoke while sitting on a bed. Upon signal, they immediately rushed inside the house and frisked the them in accordance with police procedure. They recovered from petitioner’s right pocket a rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances. The police likewise found on top of the bed aluminum foils (later confirmed to have traces of shabu), three (3) plastic sachets containing traces of white crystalline substance, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter, a bag with a plastic zipper, and an improvised tooter. The police handcuffed the petitioner and Villaflor, informed them of their rights and their violation of R.A. No. 9165, and brought them to the police station. At the police station, the confiscated items were marked and submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. The examination found the seized items to be positive for the presence of shabu. Urine tests conducted on the petitioner also yielded a positive result.
The petitioner denied that he and Villaflor were caught sniffing shabu, and maintained that they were just talking to each other when the police arrived at his house. Moreover petitioner claimed that they were just framed-up by the police officers.
Issue:
1. Is the defense of denial and extortion tenable?
2. Was the chain of custody of the seized items properly established?
Ruling:
1. NO. Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed. One such positive evidence is the result of the laboratory examination conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory on the various drug and drug paraphernalia recovered from the petitioner and Villaflor which revealed that the following confiscated items tested positive for the presence of shabu: (a) one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "GSZ" containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance; (b) two aluminum foil strips both with markings "AHV," each containing white crystalline substance; and (c) three unsealed transparent plastic sachets all with markings "RSG" each containing white crystalline substance. In addition, the drug tests conducted on the petitioner and Villaflor both yielded positive results.
Petitioner’s claim of extortion is similarly untenable. An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police officers is a common and standard defense in most dangerous drug cases. It is viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To substantiate such a defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing.
2. YES. The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
Contrary to what the petitioner wants to portray, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drug was shown not to have been broken. After the seizure of the rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance from the petitioner’s possession and of the various drug paraphernalia on top of the petitioner’s bed, the police immediately brought the petitioner and Villaflor to the police station, together with the seized items. PO2 De Guzman himself brought these items to the police station and marked them. When the prosecution presented these marked specimens in court, PO2 De Guzman positively identified them to be the same items he seized from the petitioner and which he later marked at the police station, from where the seized items were turned over to the laboratory for examination based on a duly prepared request. Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were first discovered until they were brought for examination.
LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO, and CRISANTO AMBITO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009
Complex Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents
Facts:
Petitioners Liberata Ambito, Basilio Ambito were convicted of the crime of multiple charges of the complex offense of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were the principal owners of two rural banks in the province of Iloilo namely, the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in the municipality of Leon, and the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. in the municipality of Banate. In addition, the spouses Ambito were the owners of Casette Enterprises, a commercial establishment in Jaro, Iloilo City engaged in procuring farm implements intended for the use of the agricultural loan borrowers of the said banks. The spouses Ambito obtained their supply of farm implements and spare parts from the Iloilo City branch of Pacific Star Inc. (PSI) which was then engaged in selling ‘Yanmar’ machineries and spare parts.
On several occasions in 1979, the spouses Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito transacted business with Pacific Star, Inc. whereby they purchased Yanmar machineries and spare parts from the said company allegedly for the use of the loan borrowers of their banks. In these transactions, the spouses Ambito made down payments in their purchases either in case, in checks or in certificates of time deposit issued by the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.
On three separate occasions, Liberata Ambito forced the cashier of the Rural Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign several blank certificates of time deposit and to give the same to her alleging that she needed the said certificates in connection with some transactions involving the bank. The same thing happened to Reynaldo Baron, the cashier of the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. who was asked by the spouses Ambito as well as the manager of the bank, Crisanto Ambito, to sign and give blank certificates of time deposit to them.
The blank certificates of time deposit of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained by the spouses Basilio and Liberata Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up with the amounts of deposit and the name of the Pacific Star, Inc. as depositor and used by the spouses as down payments of the purchase price of the machineries and spare parts purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc.
The said certificates of time deposit supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of the Banate, Inc. and the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded and not covered by any deposit so that when presented for redemption by Pacific Star, Inc., the same were not honored. As a consequence, Pacific Star, Inc. (PSI) suffered actual damages in the amounts representing the total value of the machineries and spare parts sold and delivered by the complainant to the Ambitos and the latter failed and refused to pay the same despite demands on them.
Subsequently, on complaint of Pacific Star, Inc., the Ambitos were charged of, among others, Falsification and Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
The main argument of the Petitioners before the Supreme Court is that they could not be convicted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents because PSI was not deceived by their issuance of the credit certificates of time deposit (CCTD).
Issue:
Are the petitioners guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents?
Ruling:
YES. In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.
In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that they will pay the unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners’ banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay the amount of deposit stated thereon. It is established that petitioners employed deceit when they were able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment through down payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and RBLI issued in PSI’s name with interest thereon. It was later found out that petitioners never made any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI.
As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is indubitable that petitioners’ representations were outright distortions of the truth perpetrated by them for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and deliver to co-petitioner Basilio Ambito machineries and equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits were ever made with RBBI and RBLI under the name of PSI, as represented by the subject CCTDs, since they did not intend to deposit any amount to pay for the machineries. PSI was an innocent victim of deceit, machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners which resulted in its pecuniary damage and, thus, confirming the lower courts’ finding that petitioners are guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
The pronouncement by the appeals court that a complex crime had been committed by petitioners is proper because, whenever a person carries out on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to perpetrate another crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two crimes.
G.R. NO. 155076, JANUARY 13, 2009
THEFT
Facts:
Petitioner Luis P. Laurel is charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the RPC. Under the facts, petitioner, with intent to gain and without consent from Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), stole and use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT. Petitioner filed a motion to quash, on the ground that the factual allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court.
Issue:
Is petitioner’s act constitute theft of respondent PLDT’s business and service?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 308 of RPC, Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
Since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)." To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed through the use of the offenders’ own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such as an access device or card as in the instant case.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction. The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft:
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently appraised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution.
ERNESTO PIDELI vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
THEFT
Facts:
Placido and Wilson entered into a verbal partnership agreement to subcontract a rip-rapping and spillway project. Petitioner Pideli, brother to Wilson and neighbor and friend to Placido, offered the duo the use of his credit line with the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH) in La Trinidad, Benguet. With the said arrangement, Wilson and Placido, with the assistance of petitioner, were able to secure an assortment of construction materials for the rip-rap and spillway contract. After the completion of the project, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their expenses and arrived at a net income of P130,000.00. Placido, as partner, claimed one-half (1/2) or P65,000.00 of the net amount as his share in the project. Petitioner, however, advised the two to first settle their accountabilities for the construction materials taken from the hardware store. Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full amount to petitioner, with express instructions to pay MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them. The following day Placido attempted but failed to contact petitioner. He had hoped to obtain his share of the partnership income. Placido got hold of petitioner the next morning. Unexpectedly, petitioner informed Placido that nothing was left of the proceeds after paying off the supplier.Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to give Placido his share in the net income of the contract.
Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a complaint for theft against petitioner Ernesto Pideli. The trial court found petitioner guilty of theft and upon appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in finding petitioner guilty of theft?
Ruling:
No. Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows: That there be taking of personal property; That said property belongs to another; That the taking be done with intent to gain; That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the construction contract.
Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v. De Vera, the Court has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined: The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa. The record bears out that private complainant originally claimed P65,000.00 as his share in the partnership. However, he admitted receiving the total amount of P15,500.00, on two separate occasions, from Wilson Pideli. Verily, only P49,500.00 is due private complainant.
Hence, the imposable penalty is the maximum period of prision mayor minimum and medium prescribed in the abovequoted first paragraph of Article 309. That period ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, plus one (1) year for every additional ten thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00, which in this case is two (2) years for the excess amount of P27,500.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term could be twelve (12) years while the minimum term would fall under the next lower penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years), to be imposed in any of its periods.
ROSE AOAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 155339, MARCH 3, 2008
THEFT
Facts:
Petitioner Rose Aoas was charged for the crime of theft of eighteen (18) sacks of red and white beans, all valued at P24,720.00 belonging to NATY MADON-EP. During the trial, prosecution presented two witnesses, the private complainant and barangay tanod Gregorio Garcia. In summary, private complainant testified that she was engaged in the business of selling assorted beans, and adjacent of her stall in the market was that of accused appellant. She reported the matter to the authorities that 18 sacks of red and white beans were missing. Upon inquiry from the persons in the city market she was informed by a certain Gregorio Garcia that the accused-appellant was the culprit. The defense proffered an explanation which, unfortunately, was not given credence. Defense witness Imelda Bautista testified that she was also engaged in the buying and selling of beans. Her goods were also kept at the second floor/mezzanine of petitioner's stall. Petitioner testified that she brought out sacks of beans from her stall because one Ronda Sabado bought them from Imelda Bautista. The trial court held petitioner guilty of the crime of theft. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Issue:
Is petitioner guilty of the crime of theft?
Ruling:
No. Considering that there is no direct evidence pointing to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. In order that conviction be had, the following must concur: 1. There is more than one circumstance; 2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; 3. The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with one other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. The circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the offense.
After a careful review, the court finds that the aforesaid circumstantial evidence does not pass this test of moral certainty as to warrant petitioner's conviction. Complainant testified that 18 sacks of beans which she stored in the mezzanine of her stall were missing. She discovered the loss in the morning when she saw red and white beans scattered on the floor in front of her stall and that of petitioner.She accused herein petitioner as the culprit after being informed by barangay tanod Gregorio Garcia that he saw petitioner in the evening riding in a jeepney loaded with sacks of beans. Garcia alleged that he was only 30 meters away from the jeepney and the place was sufficiently lighted, enough for him to recognize that the sacks loaded in the jeepney contained beans. The fact that beans were scattered on the floor inside and in front of the stall of petitioner and in the parking lot does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that petitioner is the perpetrator of the crime.
The prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked completely discount the possibility that persons other than petitioner could have perpetrated the crime. Thus, where the proven facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to convict the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REYNALDO BAYON Y RAMOS
G.R. NO. 168627, JULY 2, 2010
QUALIFIED THEFT
Facts:
Appellant Reynaldo Bayon Y Ramos was charged of the crime of theft for having stolen; 1 Rado Diastar wrist watch, 1 Seiko Diver’s watch and 1bolo belonging to Eduardo Cunnanan . He was also charged with the crime of qualified theft for being, then a stay-in helper of Arturo Limoso y Loot at his residence and for having stolen valuable items belonging to him. The pre-trial was terminated without stipulations. Thereafter, joint trial of the cases ensued. The trial court held appellant guilty for the crime of qualified theft. However, for the crime of theft, he was acquitted for the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the circumstantial evidence presented against him by the prosecution was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that there was nothing whatsoever that would link him to the commission of the crime of theft. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 310 of the RPC, heft becomes qualified "if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance."
In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conviction of appellant based on circumstantial evidence. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction, the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the circumstances are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
The two pieces of circumstantial evidence cited by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court do not form an unbroken chain that point to appellant as the author of the crime; hence, their conclusion becomes merely conjectural. Notably, the prosecution failed to establish the element of unlawful taking by appellant. Since appellant’s statement during the custodial investigation was inadmissible in evidence as he was not assisted by counsel, the prosecution could have presented the person to whom appellant allegedly sold the pieces of jewelry as witness, but it did not do so. It could have been the missing link that would have strengthened the evidence of the prosecution.
The Court finds the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial and appellate courts in convicting appellant to be insufficient in proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt absent any substantial evidence of unlawful taking by appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODOLFO GALLO Y GADOT
G.R. NO. 187730, JUNE 29, 2010
ESTAFA
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo was charged with illegal recruitment and estafa. For the crime of estafa, under the facts the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA to give and deliver to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations. Accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a factory worker. The RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa. On appeal, the CA held the totality of the prosecution’s evidence showed that the accused-appellant, together with others, engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and representations to Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the actions of a mere errand boy. The evidence presented establishes his liability for estafa under paragragh 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of estafa?
Ruling:
No. The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz: – Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned herein below… 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the power and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations without informing complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODOLFO GALLO
G.R. NO. 185277, MARCH 18, 2010
ESTAFA
Facts:
Appellant Rodolfo Gallo (Gallo), together with Pilar Manta (Manta) and Fides Pacardo (Pacardo), was originally charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa filed before the Regional Trial Court. The prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of the promissory notes and official receipts issued by the agency to the private complainants. Also presented was a certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, stating that according to its records, the New Filipino Manpower Development and Services, Inc. had an expired license and that its application for the re-issuance of a new license was denied. For his defense, appellant Gallo alleged that he was not an employee of MPM but was himself an applicant for overseas work. The trial court rendered a decision convicting him of the crimes charged. Accused Manta and Pacardo were acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence presented against them. In view of the penalty imposed, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. However, the Court resolved to transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review. The CA rendered the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of estafa?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, appellant’s guilt for estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: 1. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a)By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under the above-quoted provision, there are three (3) ways of committing estafa: (1) by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits.To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value.
In the case before us, appellant and Martir led the private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, qualifications and means to provide work in Korea. During the trial of these cases, it was clearly shown that, together with Martir, appellant discussed with private complainants the fact of their being deployed abroad for a job if they pay the processing fee, and that he actually received payments from private complainants. Thus, it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the three private complainants were deceived into believing that there were jobs waiting for them in a factory in Korea when in fact there were none. Because of the assurances of appellant, each of the private complainants parted with their money and suffered damages as a result of their being unable to leave for Korea. The elements of estafa ─ deceit and damage ─ are thus indisputably present, making the conviction for estafa appropriate.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LOURDES LO, GRACE CALIMON AND AIDA COMILA
G.R. NO. 175229, JANUARY 29, 2009
ESTAFA
Facts:
Three separate complaints were filed charging Lourdes Lo (Lo) and accused-appellants Grace Calimon (Calimon) and Aida Comila (Comila) with illegal recruitment andestafa. Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellants pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. Accused Lo, however, has not yet been apprehended and has remained at large. Accused-appellant Calimon denied the accusations against her. She claimed that she was also an applicant for overseas job placement and that she never promised any work abroad to private complainants. She averred that it was Lo who recruited her and private complainants. Accused-appellant Comila, on the other hand, denied having known or seen Lo. However, she maintained that it was accused Lo who recruited and received money from private complainants. She averred she could not have recruited private complainants because she gave birth in Baguio. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting the appellants of the crimes charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC but with modifications.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants for the crime of estafa?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court was likewise convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants are guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
There are three ways of committing estafa under the above-quoted provision: (1) by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. In the present case, the deceit consists of accused-appellants’ false statement or fraudulent representation which was made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the money by the complainants. To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value.
Accused-appellants led private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, means and legal qualifications to provide the latter with work in Italy, when in fact they did not. Private complainants parted with their hard-earned money and suffered damage by reason of accused-appellants deceitful and illegal acts. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence their conviction for estafa was proper.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO BANDIN
G.R. NO. 176531, APRIL 24, 2009
RAPE
Facts:
Accused-appellant Romeo Bandin was charged for the crime of rape against complainant-victim, AAA, a 16 year old woman, against her will. Under the facts, AAA woke up at past midnight because she felt a heavy burden on top of her. It was a naked man who was holding her tightly and who uttered in a commanding voice, "Don’t move!" She recognized the man’s voice as belonging to her brother-in-law, the appellant in this case. Thereafter, appellant removed the victim’s short pants and underwear. AAA covered her genitals with her right hand and pleaded with her brother-in-law to stop. Appellant, however, proceeded to remove AAA’s hand from her genitals, spread her legs and immediately inserted his penis inside her vagina. She shouted for help several times but no one responded. She was too frightened to resist appellant because he was armed with a long firearm which he placed beside her. Appellant’s defense hinged on denial and alibi. He contended that he did not rape AAA. He claimed that he was sleeping in the bunker of the CAFGU station in Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, which was about two kilometers away from AAA's house. His testimony was corroborated by Encoy and Baal. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modifications. It held that since the complaint contained no allegations pertaining to the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of deadly weapon, the same cannot be appreciated in the imposition of the penalty.
Issue:
Did the trial court erred in convicting appellant for the crime of rape?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court finds no reason to overturn the conclusion arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the CA. It held that AAA's testimony was credible as she delivered her testimony in a clear, direct and positive manner. Through his voice, she positively identified appellant as the man who sexually abused her. Identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted, particularly in cases where, as in this case, the victim has known the perpetrator for a long time.
Consequently, appellant's defense of denial and alibi must crumble in the face of AAA's positive and clear identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial and alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.
People of the Philippines vs. Rolly Canares y Almanares
G.R. No. 174065, February 18, 2009
Statutory Rape
Facts:
The accused was a helper in the victim’s grandmother’s house. When the victim was only about 9 or 10 years old, the accused, while she was sleeping undressed her, pulled her shorts and panty and had sexual intercourse with her. This was repeated on several occasions but the victim can no longer recall the exact dates. An information for rape under RA 7610 was filed against the accused.
Issue:
Was statutory rape committed?
Held:
Yes. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it.55 Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary; force is not an element of statutoryrape and the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the complainant is below the age of twelve.56 The law presumes that a woman below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.57
To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant.58
The first and second elements have been established by the presentation of a Certification from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Silang, Cavite dated April 21, 1999 stating that VICTIM was born on September 8, 1982.59Hence, she was only 9, or at most 10, years old when the rape was committed in 1992. In and out of court, she consistently identified Canares as her rapist.60
Carnal knowledge is proven by proof of the entry or introduction of the male organ into the female organ; the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia constitutes consummated rape.61 The prosecution proved this element when VICTIM narrated during the trial the details of her rape, committed sometime in 1992. VICTIM’s testimony is supported by physical and supporting testimonial evidence. There was the healed laceration found in her hymen which is remarkably compatible with her claim of sexual molestation. Dr. Madrid, in testifying on the healed laceration, stated that it could have been caused by a penis.
People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Buban
G.R. No. 172710, October 30, 2009
Statutory Rape
Facts:
The victim was an orphaned minor who lived in her cousin’s house after her parents died. In four occasions, she was forced by the accused to have carnal knowledge with him. As a result, four informations of rape were filed against him. The accused defended himself that there was no rape because according to him, they were in fact lovers. He was unable, however, to show any love letter or picture which would prove that fact. After trial of the four informations, the trial court found the accused guilty on all four counts. On appeal, the accused interposed a number of defenses. Accused-appellant puts at issue the credibility of VICTIM, specifically as regards the third rape which occurred on January 29, 1996. He avers that it is contrary to human nature and experience that after having been previously raped twice, VICTIM would still feel comfortable, in the presence of appellant, as she was able to speak to him casually as if nothing traumatic happened between them and she even managed to sleep in her room without locking its door while accused-appellant was in the sala watching television.
Accused-appellant also relies on the inconsistencies between VICTIM’s testimony as to the date of the commission of the four (4) rape incidents and as stated in the four (4) Informations. He alleged that on direct examination, VICTIM declared that she was sexually abused on October 12, 1995, November 15, 1995, November 24, 1995 and January 29, 1996, while the four (4) Informations clearly stated that the rape incidents took place on October 12, 1995, November 15, 1995, January 29, 1996 and the last one on February 24, 1996.
Accused-appellant further asserts that there could be no rape where the sexual act was consensual. He maintains that if the sexual intercourse was truly against VICTIM’s will, she could have easily cried for help when he was pulling her on the bed and she could have prevented the second rape by not going in the room knowing fully well that she was alone with the accused-appellant at that time
Issue:
Was rape committed?
Held:
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The credibility of the offended party is crucial in determining the guilt of a person accused of rape. By the very nature of this crime, it is usually only the victim who can testify as to its occurrence. Thus, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Else wise stated, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, suffices to warrant a conviction for rape. Guided by these judicial doctrines, the Court scrutinized all the pieces of evidence on record, especially the testimony of VICTIM and we find no reason to overturn the trial court’s assessment of her credibility, which had the opportunity of observing VICTIM’s manner and demeanor on the witness stand. VICTIM’s testimony was indeed candid, spontaneous and consistent. just as the trial court observed.
Well-established is the rule that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force employed be so great or be of such character that it could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. In other words, force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produced fear -- fear that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. In the present case, there can be no doubt that accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate rape. At the time rape incidents took place, the victim was only seventeen (17) years old, while accused-appellant was more or less twenty-seven years old and in his prime. The obvious disparity between their physical strengths manifests the futility of any resistance.
We also reject the argument of accused-appellant that it is simply contrary to human nature and experience for VICTIM who, after having been previously ravished twice, remained calm talking to him and even slept in her room without locking its door, knowing fully well that he was still in the living room watching television. VICTIM reasoned out that she did not lock her room because her aunt, who was then watching betamax movie in their neighbor, is going to sleep in that room. Accused-appellant failed to show any ill motive, on the part of the victim to fabricate such a story. The testimony of accused-appellant that the reason for the filing of these charges against him was because of the quarrel between her wife and VICTIM after the former learned about his illicit relationship with VICTIM is opposed to what he declared in open court that the only time his wife came to know about their relationship was after the complaints were filed because he told her about it when he was already in jail. Since there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the complainant to testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
As regards the alleged discrepancies as to the dates of the commission of the rape, the rule is well settled that in rape cases, the date or time of the incident is not an essential element of the offense and therefore need not be accurately stated
People of the Philippines vs. Ignacio Poras
G.R. No. 177747, Feb. 16, 2010
Rape lowered to Acts of Lasciviousness
Facts:
The victim was made to drink coffee (which was drugged) by the accused which caused her to sleep. When she woke up, she saw the accused moving on top of her and touching her private parts. She also noticed that the strap of her bra had been removed, and her panty already lowered to her knees. When she pushed the appellant, the latter raised his brief and went to his room, threatening to kill her if she would disclose the incident to anyone. She did not call for help because she felt weak. On the witness stand, she also said that she felt pain in her vagina. The trial court found the accused guilty of rape.
Issue:
Do the facts show beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of rape was committed?
Held:
No. We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. We convict him instead of the lesser of acts of lasciviousness, included in rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime. In the present case, the lower courts convicted the appellant of rape based on the following circumstances: (a) the appellant made VICTIM drink coffee which made her fall asleep; (b) VICTIM saw the appellant lying beside her, moving on top of her, and touching her private parts when she woke up; (c) VICTIM’s panty had been lowered to her knees, and the strap of her bra had been removed; (d) the appellant put on his briefs and shorts after VICTIM pushed her; (e) VICTIM felt pain in her private parts, and saw blood stains on her panty; (f) the appellant threatened to kill VICTIM if she disclosed the incident to anyone; and (g) the examining physician found deep-healed lacerations in VICTIM’s vagina.
After due consideration of the evidence adduced, that the circumstantial evidence failed to clearly establish an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the appellant raped VICTIM.
We cannot equate a ruptured hymen with rape. medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to show that the latter had lost her virginity. Consequently, standing alone, a physician’s finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been established.
Thus, while the healed lacerations are undisputed, they can only prove, in the absence of any other evidence, that VICTIM has had prior sexual experience. Specific proof of penile contact, on or about the time the appellant allegedly raped her, is missing.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the appellant succeeded in inserting his fingers in VICTIM’s vagina, this act still would not suffice to convict the appellant of rape. In 1994, the insertion of one or more fingers into a woman’s vagina without her consent did not constitute rape. It was only in 1997 that the law on rape was expanded to include this act.
We find it highly unlikely that the appellant inserted his penis into VICTIM’s vagina while the latter’s panty was lowered to her knees. Common sense and ordinary human experience show that penile penetration is extremely difficult, if not almost impossible under this situation, unless the victim’s legs were spread apart.
Considering that VICTIM was an unmarried 13-year old, she would have been in unusually deep sleep in order not to feel the pain and sensation reasonably expected from the insertion of a penis into her young, vaginal canal. We are baffled how could she have slept through a consummated sexual intercourse and awakened only after its completion. The conviction in a rape case though must rest on evidence, not on mere possibility.
We cannot equate VICTIM’s testimony of pain in her private parts with rape. Carnal knowledge, not pain, is the element of consummated rape and we believe that it would be a dangerous proposition to equate a victim’s testimony of pain, in the absence of any other evidence, with carnal knowledge. The peril lies in the facility of asserting pain. Pain, too, can come from various reasons other than carnal knowledge; it is also subjective and is easy to feign.
Finally, we cannot help but observe that VICTIM, in her direct testimony, revealed that she merely came to the conclusion that the appellant had raped her afterbeing told by the examining physician that the result of the medical examination was “positive,” and that something had happened to her.
In view of the foregoing, the findings of conviction is vacated. Accused is instead found guilty of crime of acts of lasciviousness.
People of the Philippines vs. Felix Ortoa y Obia
G.R. No. February 23, 2009
Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness
Facts:
The accused has two daughters, Victim 1 and Victim 2. When Victim 1 was only three years (3) old, the accused would make her lie down and insert his finger into her vagina until she cries. As she grew older, these incidents were repeated a number of times. When Victim 1 turned the age of six (6) the accused started to have sexual intercourse with her by undressing her and inserting his penis into her vagina, making push and pull movements until he ejaculates. The last time the accused did this was when Victim 1 was already 13 years old. Insofar as Victim 2 is concerned, the accused started to have sexual encounter with her when she was already eight (8) years old. In one instance, the accused partially inserted his penis into the labia of her vagina and in another instance, fully penetrated her. On appeal, the accused contended among many others that it is inconceivable for the Victims to not report the crimes immediately after each incident considering that as children the natural reaction would have to report it immediately to a relative. Furthermore, he argued that the physical examination of the victims have shown that their hymen are still intact.
Issue:
Were the two counts of rape and acts of lasciviousness proven beyond reasonable doubt under the facts of the case?
Held:
Yes. The Court is not persuaded by appellant's arguments that it is inconceivable for VICTIM to only report her rape and molestation to the authorities when she was already 13 years old, considering that she claimed that appellant started to sexually assault her when she was only 3 years old; that her natural reaction would be to tell her ordeal to her mother right away; that if complainants really wanted to protect themselves, it was uncharacteristic for them not to tell their molestation to anyone as there was no threat to their lives, nor was there anything that would have prevented them from divulging their sufferings.
Silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape have not always been construed as indications of a false accusation.44 This principle applies with greater force where, as in this case, the victims were of tender age at the time of the rape incidents and were therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical harm, especially from a close relative.
The Court is not persuaded by appellant's contention that VICTIM was never sexually abused because the medico-legal findings showed that she was still in a virgin state when she was examined. The medico-legal expert who examined VICTIM testified that it was possible for a male organ to penetrate the labia minora and leave the hymen still intact. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape.53 Even the fact that the hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility of rape.54Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus.
With respect to the crime of acts of lasciviousness, it is settled that the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.63 Such are the testimonies of victims who are young, immature, and have no motive to falsely testify against the accused, as in the instant case. Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial.
PO3 Benito Sombilon vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
Acts of Lasciviousness
Fact:
The victim was brought to the police station for investigation in connection with a complaint for theft. To extract a confession from the victim (who was 15 years old), the accused, who was a police officer, brought her inside one of the rooms in the police station, pointed a gun at her; she was interrogated and electrocuted. Not satisfied, the police officer asked her: “Dalaga ka na ba?” And was told by the officer: “I am single too”. Thereafter, the police officer touched different parts of her body, mashed her breast, kissed her in the cheek and touched her private parts. An information for acts of lasciviousness was filed against the police officer. She was found by the trial court guilty as charged. In handing its judgment, the trial court, despite its absence in the information, appreciated the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position. On appeal the accused contended that there was no lewdness in his acts hence, the best that can imposed upon him is the crime of unjust vexation and not acts of lasciviousness. Further he contended that since the aggravating circumstance of public position was not alleged, the same must not be appreciated against him.
Issues:
1) Were the trial and the appellate courts correct in convicting the accused?
2) Were the trial and appellate courts correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of public position?
Held:
On the first issue, the trial and appellate courts were correct in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged. For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under the foregoing provision, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age. The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
Undoubtedly, petitioner committed acts which fall within the above described lascivious conduct. It cannot be viewed as mere unjust vexation as petitioner would have the Court do. The intention of petitioner was intended neither to merely annoy or irritate the victim nor to force her to confess the theft. He could have easily achieved that when he electrocuted the latter. Petitioner intended to gratify his sexual desires. Undeniably, appellant committed lewd acts against AAA. "Lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. The evidence shows that appellant committed lewd acts against AAA when he touched her "all over her body" which includes mashing her breasts, touching her private parts, and kissing her on the cheek. These acts were clearly done with lewd designs as appellant even previously asked AAA, as if it was a prelude for things to come, "Dalaga ka na ba?" and thereafter conveyed to her that "he is single too."14
Moreover, appellant employed force and intimidation when he committed these acts on AAA. In fact, as found by the trial court, appellant pointed a gun at the forehead of AAA as evidenced by the bruises on her forehead. Further, the medical Certificate shows that AAA suffered slight physical injuries which include "multiple slight contusion of bilateral breast areas" which supports AAA’s claim.
Petitioner’s assertion that the locus criminis i.e., the police station makes it unlikely for him to commit the crime of acts of lasciviousness is specious. The presence of other policemen on duty and of the victim’s mother outside the room where the incident took place does not render commission of the offense impossible
As to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position, petitioner points out that said circumstance was not alleged in the information. It is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial.19 A reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating circumstance.
Judgement was therefore affirmed with modification of the penalty by eliminating the appreciation of the above-discussed aggravating circumstance.
Victoria Jarillo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
Bigamy
Facts:
The petitioner was previously convicted of bigamy which was affirmed all the way up to the Supreme Court. In her motion for reconsideration, she posits that since petitioner's marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
Issue:
Should her conviction be reversed?
Held:
No. which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.4
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,5 the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite – usually the marriage license – and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy. x x x lawphil
The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and this, the Court shall never sanction. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's asseveration, that Article 40 of the Family Code should not be applied to her case, cannot be upheld.
Hector Villanueva vs. Philippine Daily Inquirer
G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009
Libel
Facts:
On March of 1990, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections. Said petition, however, was denied by the COMELEC. Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story:
The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayor’s office of Bais City
A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came out with a similar story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayor’s office in the city.
Villanueva filed a case for damages due to malicious publication claiming that because of said false publications, he lost the election. The trial court found the respondents guilty but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision saying that no malice was proven in making such publications. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court alleging that since his complaint was one for quasi-delict and not for libel, malice need not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand the respondents argued that since the petitioner alleged “malicious” publication, he cannot now change his theory from that of libel to that of quasi-delict.
Issue:
Was the CA correct in reversing the finding of guilt by the trial court?
Held:
Yes. Basic is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. The complaint was denominated as one for "damages", and a perusal of its content reveals that the factual allegations constituted a complaint for damages based on malicious publication. Petitioner sought that respondents be declared guilty of irresponsible and malicious publication and be made liable for damages. The fact that petitioner later on changed his theory to quasi-delict does not change the nature of petitioner’s complaint and convert petitioner’s action into quasi-delict. The complaint remains to be one for damages based on malicious publication. found to be untrue, this does not necessarily render the same malicious.
To fully appreciate the import of the complaint alleging malice and damages, we must recall the essence of libel. Libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." Any of these imputations is defamatory and under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious.
In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published articles in question were written with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of what was false or not. According to Manila Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story from a fellow reporter who told him that the disqualification case against petitioner was granted. PDI, on the other hand, said that they got the story from a press release the very same day the Manila Bulletin published the same story. PDI claims that the press release bore COMELEC’s letterhead, signed by one Sonia Dimasupil, who was in-charge of COMELEC press releases. They also tried to contact her but she was out of the office. Since the news item was already published in the Manila Bulletin, they felt confident the press release was authentic. Following the narration of events narrated by respondents, it cannot be said that the publications, were published with reckless disregard of what is false or not.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language.
MERIDA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008
Violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife. Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed to the CA reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals did not admit his motion for having been filed late. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner is liable for cutting timber in private property without permit.Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. Petitioner stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private landwithout x x x the necessary permitx x x" thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x x timber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit. We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
AGUSTIN vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158788 April 30, 2008
Violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms
On October 1, 1995 an armed men robbed the house of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to P600,000.00. Forthwith, the spouses reported the matter to the police, who, in turn, immediately applied for a search warrant with the MTC of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The MTC issued Search Warrant directing a search of the items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used by the perpetrators. One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime. Armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's house. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.
The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house.
Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own a gun. Lorna testified that she saw a "military" man planting the gun. After trial, the RTC find petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Issue: whether the prosecution established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
Weighing the findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's claim that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of its witnesses, the Court finds, after a meticulous examination of the records that the lower courts, indeed, committed a reversible error in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was charged with. The RTC and the CA have overlooked certain facts and circumstances that would have interjected serious apprehensions absolutely impairing the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and conducted the search, who "discovered" the gun, and who witnessed the "discovery" are material matters because they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. As held in United States v. Estraña, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.
The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses. In the face of the vehement and consistent protestations of frame-up by petitioner and his wife, the trial court and the CA erred in overlooking or misappreciating these inconsistencies. The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses further muddled the prosecution evidence with more inconsistencies as to matters material to the determination of whether a gun had in fact been found in the house of petitioner. SPO4 Peneyra testified that Yabes stayed outside of the house during the search; whereas SPO1 Jara testified that Yabes was inside, at the sala, but the latter saw the gun only when SPO1 Cabaya raised it. Such inconsistencies on the material details of the firearm's discovery are so glaring that they ought not to have been ignored or brushed aside by the lower courts. The contradictions of the prosecution witnesses not only undermine all efforts to reconstruct the event in question, but altogether erode the evidentiary value of the prosecution evidence.
Given the incoherent story presented by the prosecution, it is hardly persuasive that SPO1 Cabaya indeed found the firearm in a regular manner. Serious doubts are raised on whether petitioner really possessed or owned that weapon and hid it in his house. On the face of the contradicting evidence presented by the prosecution, petitioner's denial and his wife's emphatic claim of frame-up from day one, that is, at the time and on the very spot of the alleged discovery of the gun, gained substantial significance.
BORJA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164298 April 30, 2008
Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
Facts:
In three Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna, Branch 30, petitioner Engr. Roger F. Borja, in his capacity as General Manager C of the San Pablo Water District, was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On January 13, 2003, Borja filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment. Borja alleged that there is a pending civil case entitled Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, which involves the issue of whether local water districts are private or government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). He argued that the issue is a prejudicial question, the resolution of which determines whether or not the criminal actions against him may proceed. If this Court resolves that local water districts are private corporations, the graft cases against him will not prosper since then he would not be a public officer covered by Rep. Act No. 3019.
On February 18, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. Later it also denied his motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Borja filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, however, dismissed his petition for lack of merit after noting the previous cases wherein we held that local water districts are GOCCs. Borja sought reconsideration, but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that there was no prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the proceedings of the graft cases?
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit. Borja's contention that a prejudicial question exists in his case is clearly devoid of any legal basis, considering that it had been settled, long before the Feliciano case, that local water districts are GOCCs, and not private corporations. This is because local water districts do not derive their existence from the Corporation Code, but from Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended. Thus, being a public officer, Borja can certainly be indicted for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019. Moreover, it did not also escape our notice that at the time Borja filed his petition before us on July 21, 2004, he no longer has any basis to question the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. This is because more than six months have elapsed by then since we had decided the Feliciano case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE vs. PAJARO
G.R. Nos. 167860-65 June 17, 2008
Malversation of public funds
Facts;
The Sandiganbayan which found appellants guilty of four (4) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents and two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Appellant Teddy M. Pajaro (Pajaro) was the Municipal Mayor of Lantapan, Bukidnon from 1989 to 1998; while appellants Crispina Aben (Aben) and Flor S. Libertad (Libertad) served as acting Municipal Accountant and Municipal Treasurer respectively. During their term of office, they allegedly caused the irregular disbursement of public funds as financial assistance pursuant to livelihood projects and IEC-Peace and Order Program in the respective amounts of P179,000.00 and P140,000.00. In a special audit of certain disbursements made during Pajaro's administration, State Auditor Rogelio Tero (Auditor Tero) noted that P74,000.00 of the money disbursed was not actually received by the intended beneficiaries who were chosen arbitrarily; and that the disbursements were irregularly processed and released to the prejudice of the local government.
For his part, appellant Pajaro claimed that the disbursements were properly made pursuant to approved resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Municipal Development Council and were provided for in the Municipal Budget Plan for 1998. He stated that as municipal mayor, his role was limited to approving the vouchers with respect to the disbursement of local funds and he usually does not have any personal knowledge whether the amounts disbursed were received by the intended beneficiaries except in the case of Penar whom he personally know and Lacerna whose brother received the money on her behalf. He insisted that the subject documents were executed according to procedure save for the budget officer's certification because the municipal budget officer unjustifiably refused to affix his signature on the documents despite the supporting attachments.
On January 19, 2005, the Sandiganbayan finds the three accused, Teddy Pajaro, Crispina Aben, and Flor Libertad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the six (6) informations. Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence this appeal.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellants are charged, in conspiracy with each other, with the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:
a.) The offender is a public officer;
b.) He has custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.) The funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
d.) He has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
It is undisputed that appellants are all public officers and the funds allegedly misappropriated are public in character. Appellant Libertad, by reason of her office as Municipal Treasurer had custody and control of such funds and is therefore accountable for the same. Ordinarily, a municipality's mayor and accountant are not accountable public officers as defined under the law. However, a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of his official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation, as in the instant case. In finding that appellants misappropriated the said public funds, the Sandiganbayan ruled on the authenticity of the signatures of the alleged beneficiaries Penar and Lacerna on the disbursement vouchers.
There is no doubt that appellants facilitated the illegal release of the funds by signing the subject vouchers. Without their signatures, said monies could not have been disbursed. Pajaro, as Mayor, initiated the request for obligation of allotments and certified and approved the disbursement vouchers; Aben, as Acting Municipal Accountant, obligated the allotments despite lack of prior certification from the budget officer. Municipal Treasurer Libertad certified to the availability of funds and released the money even without the requisite budget officer's certification. Their combined acts, coupled with the falsification of the signatures of Penar and Lacerna, all lead to the conclusion that appellants conspired to defraud the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 19, 2005 Decision of the Sandiganbayan finding appellants guilty of four (4) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents and two (2) counts of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the March 21, 2005 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE vs. LUNA
G.R. No. 181318 April 16, 2009
R. A. 9165
Facts:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, finds the appellant German Agojo y Luna guilty of violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425. Appellant was charged with illegal sale of shabu in an Information. That on or about the 27th day of August 1999 at about 11:30 o’clock in the evening at Poblacion, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, and deliver (4) plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," weighing 51.00, 51.10, 52.67 and 51.55 grams, with a total weight of 206.32 grams, a regulated dangerous drug. Appellant was also charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No. 1866) as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 in an Information.
Thereafter, trial ensued. In a Decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge against him for violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 and acquitted him of the charge of violation of P.D. No. 1866 for lack of sufficient evidence. The case was brought on automatic review before the Supreme Court, since appellant was sentenced to death by the trial court.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
The errors raised by the appellant boil down to the issue of whether appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as well as to the question whether appellant was framed-up by the buy-bust team. A thorough review of the records clearly shows that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant sold the shabu to the poseur-buyer. The testimony of Alonzo on the sale of illegal drugs and the identification of appellant as the seller is clear and straightforward. The testimony of Alonzo was corroborated by members of the buy-bust team, who both testified that they saw appellant hand Alonzo the VHS tape containing the shabu despite only partial payment for the shabu.
Appellant’s assertion that he was framed-up has no merit. In almost every case involving a buy-bust operation, the accused puts up the defense of frame-up. This court has repeatedly emphasized that the defense of "frame-up" is viewed with disfavor, since the defense is easily concocted and is a common ploy of the accused. Therefore, clear and convincing evidence of the frame-up must be shown for such a defense to be given merit.
SANCHEZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179090 June 5, 2009
Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603
Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse. That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, the above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV], a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial. Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610. Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that appellant never admitted that he hit VVV. The RTC, however, denied the motion. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA.
On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment before the RTC belied appellant's contention that his defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a manifestation of appellant's counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative defense because the act of hitting VVV was unintentional. Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed by appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence to the factual findings of the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed against appellant was not defective inasmuch as the allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA held that the prosecution had fully established the elements of the offense charged.
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this Petition, claiming among others that the CA erred in sustaining the conviction of the accused of the crime charged (violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. NO. 7610) notwithstanding that the act complained of is obviously covered by the RPC as slight physical injury.
Ruling:
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
UnderSubsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. --
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
In this connection, our ruling in Araneta v. People is instructive:
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
ARANETA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174205, June 27, 2008
Section 10(1) RA 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse)
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 or Anti-Child Abuse. Prosecution was able to establish that at the time of the commission of the crime, AAA was 17 years old.
At around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of April 10, 1998, while AAA and her two younger sisters, BBB and EEE were sitting on a bench at the waiting shed located near her boarding house, petitioner approached her. Petitioner, who had been incessantly courting AAA from the time she was still 13 years old, again expressed his feelings for her and asked her to accept his love and even insisted that she must accept him because he had a job. She did not like what she heard from petitioner and tried to hit him with a broom but the latter was able to dodge the strike. She and her two sisters dashed to the boarding house which was five meters away and went inside the room. When they were about to close the door, the petitioner, who was following them, forced himself inside. The three tried to bar petitioner from entering the room by pushing the door to his direction. Their efforts, however, proved futile as petitioner was able to enter. There petitioner embraced AAA, who struggled to extricate herself from his hold. AAA then shouted for help. Meanwhile, petitioner continued hugging her and tried to threaten her with these words: "Ug dili ko nimo sugton, patyon tika. Akong ipakita nimo unsa ko ka buang" (If you will not accept my love I will kill you. I will show you how bad I can be). BBB, tried to pull petitioner away from her sister AAA, but to no avail. Andrew Tubilag, who was also residing in the same house, arrived and pulled petitioner away from AAA. AAA closed the door of the room and there she cried. She then went to the police station to report the incident.
RTC rendered a decision it that petitioner’s act of forcibly embracing the victim against her will wrought injury on the latter’s honor and constituted child abuse as defined under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of child abuse as defined under RA 7610?
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 10 of RA 7610 provides that:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
The evidence of the prosecution proved that petitioner, despite the victim’s protestation, relentlessly followed the latter from the waiting shed to her boarding house and even to the room where she stayed. He forcibly embraced her and threatened to kill her if she would not accept his love for her. Indeed, such devious act must have shattered her self-esteem and womanhood and virtually debased, degraded or demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity. As a young and helpless lass at that time, being away from her parents, the victim must have felt desecrated and sexually transgressed, especially considering the fact that the incident took place before the very eyes of her two younger, innocent sisters. Petitioner who was old enough to be the victim’s grandfather, did not only traumatize and gravely threaten the normal development of such innocent girl; he was also betraying the trust that young girls place in the adult members of the community who are expected to guide and nurture the well-being of these fragile members of the society.
VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009
R.A. No. 8294; Illegal possession of firearms
Facts:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 by having in his possession and control one cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo. without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
RTC convicted Valeroso as charged. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision. Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation recommending Valeroso’s acquittal. The OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution.
Issue: Was the arrest lawful?
Ruling:
NO. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco. The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet where they found the subject firearm and ammunition. With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.
VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 159703, March 3, 2008
RA No. 8294; Illegal possession of firearms
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bais City with illegal possession of firearms. The first prosecution witness in the person of PO3 Mariano Labe testified that on or about 3:35 in the afternoon of January 3, 1999, while they were at the Police Station, they received a telephone call from a concerned citizen from Tavera Street, Bais City, informing them that one unidentified person was inside Abueva's Repair Shop located at Tavera Street, tucking a handgun on his waist. They immediately went to the aforementioned place, and upon their arrival thereat, they saw one unidentified person tucking a handgun on his right side waistline. They approached the unidentified person and asked him if he had a license to possess said firearm, but the answer was in the negative. At this juncture, they immediately effected the arrest, and confiscated from his possession and custody a Caliber 9MM marked "SIGSAUER P299" with 14 live ammunitions with Serial No. AE 25171.
For his defense, petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject firearm and ammunitions when he was apprehended but he insists that he had the requisite permits to carry the same by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (Non-expendable Property) and a Mission Order from one RICARDO B. BAYHON, Major (INF) PAFS 743 Commander.In the present Petition, petitioner insists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and it was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm and ammunitions from the AFP.
Issue: Is the charge for illegal possession of firearms correct?
Ruling:
YES. It is noted that the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, allude to "memorandum receipts" covering government-owned firearms. While said rules do not define the term, we can derive its meaning from Section 492 of the Government Auditing and Accounting Manual (Volume I: Government Auditing Rules and Regulations) to wit:
Section 492. Issues of equipment to officers and employees. - Equipment issued by the property officer for official use of officials and employees shall be covered by Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (MR) which shall be renewed every January of the third year after issue. MRs not renewed after three years shall not be considered in making physical count of the equipment.
From the foregoing discussion, therefore, the rules governing memorandum receipts and mission orders covering the issuance to and the possession and/or carrying of government-owned firearms by special or confidential civilian agents may be synthesized as follows: First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of any government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving regular compensation for services rendered are not exempt from the requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a permit to carry the same outside of residence; Second, said special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and possess government-owned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of a memorandum receipt for equipment covering said government-owned firearms. Neither will they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a regular firearms license and a permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-owned firearms covered by a memorandum receipt; and Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry firearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of their residence.
The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in possession of or bearing private-owned firearms that are duly licensed and covered by permits to carry the same outside of residence. It is clear that petitioner is not authorized to possess and carry the subject firearm and ammunition, notwithstanding the memorandum receipt and mission order which were illegally issued to him. Petitioner is a planter who was recruited to assist in the counter-insurgency campaign of the AFP. However, as he offered no evidence that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or that he is receiving regular compensation from said agency, he cannot be considered a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent as defined under Section 6(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866. As such, he was not authorized to receive the subject government-owned firearm and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties did not legitimize his possession thereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EVORA
G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009
Possession and sale of dangerous drugs
Facts:
Appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations before the Regional RTC with possession and sale of shabu.PO3 Tougan testified for the prosecution and narrated that the police received an information from an informant that a certain Parto was selling shabu at Sta. Barbara Subdivision, Brgy. Ampid I, San Mateo, Rizal. Parto had apparently been under surveillance by the police for selling prohibited drugs. They immediately planned a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Tougan acting as the poseur-buyer. Tougan received a P100.00 bill from the police chief and placed the serial numbers of the bill on the police blotter.
PO3 Tougan, together with PO2 Pontilla and the civilian informant then proceeded to Sta. Maria Subdivision. However, before the actual buy-bust operation, the group responded to a commotion in the area where they arrested a certain Noel Samaniego. Thereafter, they went to Neptune corner Jupiter Street and spotted Parto in the tricycle terminal. The informant initially approached appellant. The latter then went near the tricycle where PO3 Tougan was in and asked him, "How much[?]" PO3 Tougan replied, "Piso lang," which means P100.00. Upon exchange of the money and the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance, PO3 Tougan immediately alighted from the tricycle, grabbed Parto’s hand and introduced himself as a policeman. PO3 Tougan was able to recover another plastic sachet from the hand of Parto.
At the police station, the two (2) plastic sachets confiscated from Parto were marked. After marking, the police immediately prepared the request for laboratory examination. Chemistry Report No. D-2157-02E confirmed that the two (2) plastic sachets seized from appellant were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
The trial court convicted appellant beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Issue: Did the apprehending team comply with the requirements in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs?
Ruling:
NO. In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. PO3 Tougan stated that he marked the two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance in the police station. PO3 Tougan did not mark the seized drugs immediately after he arrested appellant in the latter's presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of appellant. There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed.
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team, yet these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by PO3 Tougan for his failure to observe the rule.
Furthermore, while PO3 Tougan admitted to have in his possession the shabu from the time appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of PO3 Tougan. PO3 Tougan mentioned a certain Inspector Manahan as the one who signed the request for laboratory examination. He did not however relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over. Furthermore, the evidence of the prosecution did not reveal the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. The failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody is fatal to its cause.
All told, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accused was acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REVILLEZA
G.R. No. 177148, June 30, 2009
Violation of Sec 16, Art 3 of RA 6425, as amended by RA 9165
Facts:
Raul R. Nuñez was formally charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los Baños Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuñez based on reports of drug possession.
Before proceeding to appellant’s residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellant’s house, Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed Nuñez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellant’s room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing P4,610 inside appellant’s dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which appellant signed.
In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant.
Issue: Is appellant is guilty of possession of dangerous drugs?
Ruling:
YES. To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. All these were found present in the instant case.
While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with disfavor as it can easily be fabricated and is commonly used as a facile refuge in drug cases. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellant’s bed, appellant had not advanced any reason to account for the thirty-one (31) packets of shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in his room. Instead, he readily signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification of Orderly Search. Neither did appellant’s daughter identify the police officer who allegedly planted evidence. Absent any compelling proof why SPO1 Ilagan would falsely testify against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands and we agree that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions the non-presentation of the barangay officials who purportedly observed the search. The matter of presentation of witnesses, however, is neither for accused nor even for the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State should present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as witness. It bears stressing that by no means did the barangay officials become part of the prosecution when they were asked to witness the search. Hence, even the accused could have presented them to testify thereon.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CURATIVO
G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009
Violations of Secs. 15 and 16 of RA 9165
Facts:
Two informations both dated 21 September 2000 were filed before the RTC of Negros Oriental charging petitioner Quinicot with violation of Sections 16 and 15, respectively, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
A confidential informant/agent called the petitioner by phone. Thereafter, PO1 Marchan talked to petitioner and informed the latter that he was buying P300.00 worth of shabu. At around 12:20 p.m., they went to Chin Loong Restaurant and conducted the buy-bust operation.
PO2 Germodo was positioned in front of the restaurant, five to ten meters away from PO1 Marchan and petitioner. PO1 Marchan saw petitioner and a woman sitting on a stool in the bar. PO1 Marchan approached petitioner and asked him if he had shabu worth P300.00. Petitioner answered in the affirmative. PO1 Marchan gave the P300.00 marked money, and in return, petitioner gave him a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. When PO1 Marchan executed the pre-arranged signal – touching his hat – PO2 Germodo rushed towards petitioner and PO1 Marchan and identified themselves as police officers. Petitioner was informed he violated the law on selling shabu. PO2 Germodo bodily searched petitioner and recovered two plastic sachets from the brown belt purse of the latter. He likewise recovered from petitioner the marked money, a disposable lighter, and a tooter. The petitioner was brought to the police station. PO1 Marchan issued a receipt1 for the items recovered from the him. The Chemistry Report showed that the specimens contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
The trial court found petitioner to have violated Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, when he sold one plastic sachet containing .0119 gram of shabu to poseur-buyer PO1 Marchan; and that PO2 Germodo recovered from petitioner, inter alia, the marked money used in the buy-bust operation amounting to P300.00 and two more plastic sachets containing 2.1832 grams and 2.6355 grams of shabu.
Issue: Is the accused guilty as charged?
Ruling:
YES. Petitioner was charged with violations of Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425. He was charged with violation of Section 15 for selling 0.119 gram of shabu. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. The poseur-buyer and his back-up described how the buy-bust happened, and the shabu sold was presented and identified in court. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Domingo Marchan, identified petitioner as the seller of the shabu. His testimony was corroborated by PO2 Allen June Germodo. The white crystalline substance weighing 0.119 gram, which was bought from petitioner for P300.00, was found to contain shabu per Chemistry Report No. D-146-2000.
Petitioner was likewise charged under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 with possession of two sachets (2.1832 grams and 2.6355 grams) of shabu with a total weight of 4.8187 grams. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. All these elements have been established.
Moreover, in the case before us, it is not indispensable for the confidential informant to take the witness stand, considering that the poseur-buyer testified regarding the illegal sale made by petitioner. Furthermore, none of the above circumstances that necessitate the presentation of the informant obtains in this case. While petitioner denies selling shabu, there are no material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers. Petitioner failed to show that the two police officers had motives to testify falsely against him. As admitted by petitioner, prior to 21 September 2000, he neither knew nor had any quarrel or misunderstanding with any or both of them. Lastly, the sale and the subsequent recovery of two more sachets of shabu from petitioner were adequately shown and proved by the prosecution witnesses, who were present and who dealt with the petitioner in the crime scene.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 185164, June 22, 2009
Violations of Sections 5 and 11, Art 2 of RA 9165
Facts:
On June 3, 2004, in the RTC of Mandaluyong City, two (2) separate informations were filed against appellant charging him, in the first, with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. On May 23, 2004, Police Senior Inspector Gadiano, Chief of the Intelligence Unit of Mandaluyong City Police, received information from a confidential asset that a man named Richie was conducting illegal activities at Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Acting on the information, the team conducted a surveillance and confirmed that appellant was involved in selling illegal drugs at his home in 741 Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. A team was organized to conduct a buy-bust operation at the target site.
PO1 Climacosa approached appellant who was then standing by the gate of 741 Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City and said, "Pre, iskor ako ng dalawang piso pang gamit lang." Appellant replied "sandali lang." PO1 Climacosa gave appellant the two marked P100.00 bills. Appellant, in turn, handed to PO1 Climacosa a sachet containing a white crystalline substance. PO1 Climacosa removed his cap to signal the consummation of the sale transaction to the other team members who were positioned some 10 meters away.
Thereafter, PO1 Climacosa introduced himself and informed appellant that he was under arrest. Appellant resisted and ran away, but he was eventually accosted by PO1 Climacosa and the other members of the team.PO1 Antipasado then frisked appellant and found the marked money and another sachet of white crystalline substance in appellant’s pocket.
Immediately, the team apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant was, thereafter, brought to the Mandaluyong Medical Center for medical check-up. From the hospital, appellant was turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong City Police Station. In the said office, the confiscated sachets were marked as "MC" and "MC-1" by PO1 Climacosa and PO1 Antipasado, respectively. The marked two (2) P100.00 bills were turned over to the evidence custodian, while the two (2) confiscated sachets were immediately brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Eastern Police District (EPD) for laboratory examination. PSI Lourdeliza Cejes, Forensic Chemist, found the two (2) sachets of white crystalline substance to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Accordingly, appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with the RTC of Mandaluyong City.
Appellant primarily assails the non-presentation of the confidential asset to establish that he was indeed peddling drugs. Thus, he insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Is the presentation of the confidential informant an indispensible requisite in dangerous drugs prosecution?
Ruling:
NO. That the informant was not presented by the prosecution does not prejudice the State's case, as all the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu by appellant were satisfactorily proved by testimonial, documentary and object evidence. At best, the testimony of the informant would only have been corroborative. It is not indispensable.
As held by this Court in People v. Lopez: In general, the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of the informer would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.
Thus, in People v. Marilyn Naquita, we rejected a similar contention, holding that: The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The failure of the prosecution to present the informant does not vitiate its cause as the latter's testimony is not indispensable to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing, since his testimony would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug. Failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment, especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation has indeed been conducted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SY
G.R. No. 185284, June 22, 2009
Violation of Sec 15, Art 3 of RA 6425 as amended by RA 9165
Facts:
Accused-appellant Jason Sy was charged before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 47, with illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
During arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY." The prosecution established, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 2000, he reported to Camp Olivas on instructions of their team leader, Major Julian Caesar Mana. The latter told them that PO2 Christian Trambulo, together with a civilian informant, were negotiating a drug-deal with a certain person allegedly named Jason Sy. Consequently, at around 2:00 o’clock of the next morning, December 3, 2000, Major Mana conducted a briefing regarding a possible buy-bust operation. Those presents were Major Mana, Captain Julieto Culili and six (6) other police officers. He was designated as back-up of PO2 Trambulo. His duty was to assist in apprehending the suspect. After the briefing, they proceeded to the designated area at the Chowking Food Chain located at the Gapan-Olongapo Road, Dolores, City of San Fernando, Pampanga. The proceeded thereat in four (4) vehicles. Two vehicles were parked at the parking lot located in front of Chowking Fast Food. One used by PO2 Trambulo and the informer while the other was used by him and PO3 Vasquez. They were ten to fifteen meters away from Trambulo. The two other vehicles were parked along Gapan-Olongapo Road within viewing distance. The place was well-lighted. Lights emanated from the Chowking Fast Food and from a spotlight in the building beside the restaurant. Witness narrated further that at around 3:00 o’clock of the said morning, a color red Nissan Altima arrived at the parking lot. A male person, who was later identified as accused Jason Sy, alighted and walked towards the car where PO2 Trambulo was. Jason Sy and PO2 Trambulo talked for awhile. Then PO2 Trambulo removed his bull cap, which was the pre-arranged signal that the sale has already been consummated. As soon as he saw the signal, he immediately rushed to the place where PO2 Trambulo was standing. At this moment, PO2 Trambulo has already placed Jason Sy under arrest by holding the latter’s hand. He recovered the Php5,000.00 marked money and the boodle money from the possession of Jason Sy and apprised him of his constitutional rights. He then turned over possession of the boodle money to PO2 Trambulo. Subsequently, they brought Jason Sy to their office at Camp Olivas. PO2 Trambulo turned over custody of Jason Sy, the buy-bust money and a transparent plastic packed inside of which was a paper bag with the label Jacob Fish cracker, allegedly containing shabu, to the police investigator. He also identified the join-affidavit (x x x) which he and PO2 Trambulo executed.
During cross-examination, he recounted that it was Major Mana who gave the P5,000.00 marked money to PO2 Trambulo but it was the latter who prepared the boodle money. At the time PO2 Trambulo removed his bull-cap, he, Amontos, was standing beside their car while Narciso Valdez was inside the vehicle. Their superior officers, Julius Caesar Mana and Julieto Culili, who were in two separate cars, later joined them. He informed Jason Sy of his constitutional rights in English because according to the informant Jason is a Chinese National. He asked Jason whether he understand (sic) English and the latter nodded his head.
Senior Inspector Maria Luisa Gundran-David, the Crime Laboratory forensic chemical officer, testified that she conducted a qualitative examination of the shabu specimen by weighing it. The specimen weighs 987.32263 grams. She also conducted a test reaction by Simons Reagent. There was a blue coloration indicating that the sample was positive for shabu. She next conducted a confirmatory test using the TLC method, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:
Issue: Did prosecution discharge its burden to support accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged?
Ruling:
YES. In dealing with prosecutions for the illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug as evidence. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses adequately establish these elements. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded the highest respect, because it had the advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a better position to discern if they were telling the truth or not. The Court has no reason to doubt the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of the prosecution and defense witnesses. The testimony of the buy-bust team established than an entrapment operation against accused-appellant was legitimately and successfully carried out on 3 December 2000, where accused-appellant was caught selling 987.32265 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. A scrutiny of the accounts of PO3 Ricardo Amontos, PO2 Christian Trambulo and Senior Inspector Culili, detailing how PO2 Trambulo negotiated, thru cellphone, with accused-appellant on the purchase price and the amount of shabu to be delivered, actual delivery of the shabu, the giving to the accused the marked and boodle money and the subsequent arrest of the accused show that these were testified to in a clear, straightforward manner. Their testimonies are further bolstered by the physical evidence consisting of the shabu presented as evidence before the court.
The case at bar presents a predicament considering that the RTC found evidence to support that the police officers exacted money from accused-appellant after his arrest in order to facilitate his immediate discharge. In the same case, however, the RTC still found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged, based on the totality of evidence adduced by the prosecution. The Court of Appeals, however, did not give credence to accused-appellant’s allegations of extortion.
PEOPLE VS QUIGOD
G.R. No. 186419, April 23, 2010
Violation of Sec 5, Art II of RA 9165
Facts:
Accused Darlene Quigod was charged with the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 for selling 2 sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, weighing zero point four six seven zero (0.4670) grams, to SPO2 Antonio Paloma Jamila (acting as poseur-buyer), which is a dangerous drug during the buy-bust operation.
Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Quigod guilty of the crime charged. The accused contends that the CA erred in convicting her because the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the accused contends that the chain of custody was not properly established because there was failure on the part of the police officers who allegedly conducted the buy-bust operation to properly make an inventory of the shabu allegedly recovered from her. She further argues that the failure of the police officers to photograph and mark the shabu immediately after the alleged buy-bust operation creates doubt as to the identity of the shabu. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Was the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Was the chain of custody properly established?
3. Will a defense of denial in cases of violations of RA 9165 prosper?
Ruling:
1. YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture accused-appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug, was valid. It has been established that it was the police informant who made the initial contact with accused-appellant when he introduced SPO2 Jamila as a buyer for shabu. SPO2 Jamila then ordered two (2) sachets of shabu which accused-appellant agreed to sell at PhP 1,000 per sachet. Accused-appellant left for a while and shortly thereafter, she came back with the two (2) sachets containing a white crystalline substance which was later identified as shabu and gave them to SPO2 Jamila. The latter then paid her with the previously marked money he brought with him. Subsequently, upon giving the pre-arranged signal, the accused-appellant was arrested. Evidently, the facts themselves demonstrate a valid buy-bust operation that is within the bounds of a fair and reasonable administration of justice.
2. YES. In the prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court has reiterated the essential elements in People v. Pendatun, to wit: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug. All these elements were ably proven by the prosecution in the instant case. The accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP 2,000 to SPO2 Jamila posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the marked money and contraband; and finally, the accused-appellant was fully aware that she was selling and delivering a prohibited drug.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, and the integrity of the drugs seized from the accused-appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that after SPO2 Jamila seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money, the accused-appellant was immediately arrested and brought to the police station for investigation.
Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance marked as “RPM1” and “RPM2,” respectively, together with a letter of request for examination, was submitted by SPO2 Jamila to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination to determine the presence of any dangerous drug. The crime laboratory found that the specimen submitted contained Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
3. NO. Denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt, particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt. Also, in the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused-appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty stands.
PEOPLE VS JOEY TION
G.R. No. 172092, December 16, 2009
Violation of Section 4, RA 9165
Facts:
Test buys were conducted on March 2 and 3, 1999. The police informant bought marijuana on March 2, while P/Insp. Castillo was able to buy marijuana on March 3 after being introduced to Joey and Allan by two police informants. The deal for the purchase of five kilos of marijuana was agreed upon on March 3, 1999. The "marked money" was then prepared with the help of then Mayor Tumaru and Clerk of Court Calanoga who photocopied and authenticated it. In the morning of March 4, 1999, P/Insp. Castillo, with the two police informants, confirmed the purchase of the five kilos and paid half the price with the PhP 6,250 "marked money." And upon delivery by Joey of the 5.2 kilograms bricks of marijuana in the agreed place at 5:00 p.m. on March 4, 1999, he was arrested along with Allan and Ronald. Confiscated from Joey were the bricks of marijuana and three PhP 100 bills, which were among those from the PhP 6,250 "marked money" earlier paid to him by P/Insp. Castillo
Issues:
1. Was there a valid buy bust operation?
2. Is Joey guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling marijuana?
3. When is the crime of illegal sale of drugs consummated?
Ruling:
1. YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment legally employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense. Such police operation has judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due respect to constitutional and legal safeguards. There is no rigid or textbook method in conducting buy-bust operations.
As aptly quoted by the appellate court, People v. Doria provides the "objective" test in scrutinizing buy-bust operations in this wise:
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
There was neither instigation nor inducement in the case at bar. The fact that two test buys were made on March 2 and 3, 1999 shows that Joey was involved in selling marijuana. When asked to provide for a large quantity of marijuana, he agreed to deliver five kilos of it at the price of PhP 2,500 per kilo. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s finding that Joey would not have readily agreed and admitted to poseur-buyer P/Insp. Castillo that he can sell large quantities of marijuana if he (Joey) is not selling marijuana and did not know how to source the illegal drug. The fact is, as can be gleaned from the sale of five kilos of marijuana, Joey stands to profit from such a sale. It is, thus, clear to us that the mens rea came from Joey, who was neither instigated nor induced. What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and delivery of prohibited drugs.
2. YES. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proved: (1) that the transaction took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. With respect to illegal sale of marijuana, its essential elements are: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.The foregoing elements were duly proved during the trial.
3. The well-entrenched principle is that the accused commits the crime of illegal sale of drugs as soon as he consummates the sale transaction whether payment precedes or follows delivery of the drugs sold.
CARINO & ANDES VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009
Violation of Section 11, Article 2, RA 9165
Facts:
Petitioners were apprehended on two separate but related incidents by apprehending officers. Both petitioners were arrested without a warrant for allegedly having in their possession plastic sachets containing shabu. After the arrest and investigation, petitioners were charged in two separate informations with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
A police officer spotted Carinoholding a plastic sachet in his hand. Right there and then, they placed Carino under arrest and Eugenio immediately seized the plastic sachet. They asked Carino who the source of the plastic sachet was and the latter immediately identified petitioner Andes. They approached Andes, and she allegedly became hysterical when the policemen introduced themselves to her. It was then that Tayaban noticed the woman inserting something inside the pocket of her 5-year old male child. Tayaban was suspicious so he inspected the right pocket of the child and found a plastic sachet inside it containing shabu. Petitioners were immediately brought to the Galas Police Station. The plastic sachets were allegedly submitted to the desk officer and then to the station investigator who in the presence of Tayaban marked each of the specimens with the initials "JT-RA" and "AE-RC." The markings purportedly represented the initials of Eugenio and Tayaban and the initials of petitioners from whom they were seized.
Issue:
Was the identity of the prohibited drug established beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
NO. The mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence is insufficient to provide that assurance, for all the people who made contact with the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioners, only Tayaban and Eugenio were able to testify in court as to the identity of the evidence. The desk officer at the police station to whom the specimens were purportedly surrendered by Tayaban and Eugenio was not even presented in court to observe the identity and uniqueness of the evidence. Even more to the point is the fact that the testimony of the investigator, who had taken custody of the plastic sachets after the same were reported to the desk officer, was likewise not offered in court to directly observe the evidence and admit the specific markings thereon as his own. The same is true with respect to Jabonillo, the forensic chemist at the crime laboratory who administered the chemical examination on the specimens and who could have testified on the circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for analysis and testing, as well as on the conduct of the examination which was administered on the specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and custody.
In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant, it can be reasonably concluded that the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect failed to obliterate the hypothesis of petitioners’ guiltlessness.
Moreover, the members of the arresting team in this case, do not seem to have complied with the guidelines under Section 21 of RA 9165. The prosecution has not even shown that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the statutory requirements in handling the evidence. From the testimonies of Tayaban and Eugenio, it is clear that after the arrest of petitioners they immediately seized the plastic sachets, took custody thereof and brought the same to the police station together with petitioners. It was at the police station—and not at the place where the item was seized from appellant—where, according to Tayaban and Eugenio, the unnamed police investigator had placed the markings on the specimens. What is more telling is the admission made by Tayaban to the effect that the markings were placed on the plastic sachet in his presence and not in the presence of petitioners as required by law.
These flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from petitioners, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibits before they were offered in evidence in court, militate against the prosecution’s cause because they not only cast doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti but also tend to negate, if not totally discredit, the claim of regularity in the conduct of official police operation advanced by the OSG. Thus, the accused-petitioners are acquitted on reasonable doubt.
ZALAMEDA VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009
Violation of Section 11 and 12, RA 9165
Facts:
Zalameda was found guilty by the RTC of violating Section 11 of RA 9165. Police Officer Orbeta received a phone call from a concerned citizen regarding an on-going "pot session" in a certain area. The house number was specified. Acting on the information the police officers went to the place to while they were in uniform to verify the report. When they reached the intended destination they found the door of the house slightly open. The police officer peeped inside and saw petitioner and Villaflor sniffing smoke while sitting on a bed. Upon signal, they immediately rushed inside the house and frisked the them in accordance with police procedure. They recovered from petitioner’s right pocket a rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances. The police likewise found on top of the bed aluminum foils (later confirmed to have traces of shabu), three (3) plastic sachets containing traces of white crystalline substance, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter, a bag with a plastic zipper, and an improvised tooter. The police handcuffed the petitioner and Villaflor, informed them of their rights and their violation of R.A. No. 9165, and brought them to the police station. At the police station, the confiscated items were marked and submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. The examination found the seized items to be positive for the presence of shabu. Urine tests conducted on the petitioner also yielded a positive result.
The petitioner denied that he and Villaflor were caught sniffing shabu, and maintained that they were just talking to each other when the police arrived at his house. Moreover petitioner claimed that they were just framed-up by the police officers.
Issue:
1. Is the defense of denial and extortion tenable?
2. Was the chain of custody of the seized items properly established?
Ruling:
1. NO. Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed. One such positive evidence is the result of the laboratory examination conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory on the various drug and drug paraphernalia recovered from the petitioner and Villaflor which revealed that the following confiscated items tested positive for the presence of shabu: (a) one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "GSZ" containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance; (b) two aluminum foil strips both with markings "AHV," each containing white crystalline substance; and (c) three unsealed transparent plastic sachets all with markings "RSG" each containing white crystalline substance. In addition, the drug tests conducted on the petitioner and Villaflor both yielded positive results.
Petitioner’s claim of extortion is similarly untenable. An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police officers is a common and standard defense in most dangerous drug cases. It is viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To substantiate such a defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing.
2. YES. The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
Contrary to what the petitioner wants to portray, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drug was shown not to have been broken. After the seizure of the rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance from the petitioner’s possession and of the various drug paraphernalia on top of the petitioner’s bed, the police immediately brought the petitioner and Villaflor to the police station, together with the seized items. PO2 De Guzman himself brought these items to the police station and marked them. When the prosecution presented these marked specimens in court, PO2 De Guzman positively identified them to be the same items he seized from the petitioner and which he later marked at the police station, from where the seized items were turned over to the laboratory for examination based on a duly prepared request. Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were first discovered until they were brought for examination.
LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO, and CRISANTO AMBITO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009
Complex Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents
Facts:
Petitioners Liberata Ambito, Basilio Ambito were convicted of the crime of multiple charges of the complex offense of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were the principal owners of two rural banks in the province of Iloilo namely, the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in the municipality of Leon, and the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. in the municipality of Banate. In addition, the spouses Ambito were the owners of Casette Enterprises, a commercial establishment in Jaro, Iloilo City engaged in procuring farm implements intended for the use of the agricultural loan borrowers of the said banks. The spouses Ambito obtained their supply of farm implements and spare parts from the Iloilo City branch of Pacific Star Inc. (PSI) which was then engaged in selling ‘Yanmar’ machineries and spare parts.
On several occasions in 1979, the spouses Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito transacted business with Pacific Star, Inc. whereby they purchased Yanmar machineries and spare parts from the said company allegedly for the use of the loan borrowers of their banks. In these transactions, the spouses Ambito made down payments in their purchases either in case, in checks or in certificates of time deposit issued by the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.
On three separate occasions, Liberata Ambito forced the cashier of the Rural Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign several blank certificates of time deposit and to give the same to her alleging that she needed the said certificates in connection with some transactions involving the bank. The same thing happened to Reynaldo Baron, the cashier of the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. who was asked by the spouses Ambito as well as the manager of the bank, Crisanto Ambito, to sign and give blank certificates of time deposit to them.
The blank certificates of time deposit of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained by the spouses Basilio and Liberata Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up with the amounts of deposit and the name of the Pacific Star, Inc. as depositor and used by the spouses as down payments of the purchase price of the machineries and spare parts purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc.
The said certificates of time deposit supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of the Banate, Inc. and the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded and not covered by any deposit so that when presented for redemption by Pacific Star, Inc., the same were not honored. As a consequence, Pacific Star, Inc. (PSI) suffered actual damages in the amounts representing the total value of the machineries and spare parts sold and delivered by the complainant to the Ambitos and the latter failed and refused to pay the same despite demands on them.
Subsequently, on complaint of Pacific Star, Inc., the Ambitos were charged of, among others, Falsification and Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
The main argument of the Petitioners before the Supreme Court is that they could not be convicted of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents because PSI was not deceived by their issuance of the credit certificates of time deposit (CCTD).
Issue:
Are the petitioners guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents?
Ruling:
YES. In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.
In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that they will pay the unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners’ banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay the amount of deposit stated thereon. It is established that petitioners employed deceit when they were able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment through down payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and RBLI issued in PSI’s name with interest thereon. It was later found out that petitioners never made any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI.
As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is indubitable that petitioners’ representations were outright distortions of the truth perpetrated by them for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and deliver to co-petitioner Basilio Ambito machineries and equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits were ever made with RBBI and RBLI under the name of PSI, as represented by the subject CCTDs, since they did not intend to deposit any amount to pay for the machineries. PSI was an innocent victim of deceit, machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners which resulted in its pecuniary damage and, thus, confirming the lower courts’ finding that petitioners are guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
The pronouncement by the appeals court that a complex crime had been committed by petitioners is proper because, whenever a person carries out on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to perpetrate another crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two crimes.
GOMA & UMALE VS CA
G.R. No. 168437, January 8, 2009
Falsification of Public Document [Article 171 (2)]
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Laurinio and Natalio, who as barangay chairperson and secretary, respectively, allegedly falsified a barangay Resolution T-95 dated September 24, 1995, allocating the amount of PhP 18,000 as disbursement for a seminar for the two officials.
The petitioners made it appear in the Barangay resolution that all members of the Sangguniang Barangay deliberated upon and unanimously approved the questioned resolution, when in fact no such deliberation and approval occurred. The non-participation of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay in the passage of the resolution was established by the 15 October 1995 resolution issued by 7 of the 8 members of the Sangguniang Barangay denying that the challenged resolution was passed upon and approved by the council.
Issue:
1. Is a barangay resolution a public document?
2. Are petitioners liable for falsification of public document?
3. When is the crime of falsification of public document deemed consummated?
Ruling:
1. YES. Under Sec. 19(a) of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, public documents include "[t]he written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country." Verily, resolutions and ordinances of sanggunians, be they of the sanggunian panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan,or barangay,come within the pale of the above provision, such issuances being their written official acts in the exercise of their legislative authority. As a matter of common practice, an action appropriating money for some public purpose or creating liability takes the form of an ordinance or resolution.
Black defines a public document as "a document of public interest issued or published by a political body or otherwise connected with public business." The term is also described as a document in the execution of which a person in authority or notary public takes part. There can be no denying that the public money-disbursing and seemingly genuine Res. T-95, in the preparation of which petitioners, in their official capacity, had a hand, is, in context, a public document in a criminal prosecution for falsification of public document. And it bears to stress that in falsification under Art. 171(2) of the RPC, it is not necessary that there be a genuine document; it is enough that the document fabricated or simulated has the appearance of a true and genuine document or of apparent legal efficacy
2. YES. The elements of the crime of falsification of public documents are:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding.
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.
The first two elements clearly obtain, petitioners, during the period material, being local government elected officials who, by reason of their position, certified, as Natalio did, as to the holding of a barangay session and falsely attested, as Laurinio did, as to the veracity of a resolution supposedly taken up therein. The other two elements are likewise present.
Petitioners’ bid to pass off the resolution in question as a mere proposal or a draft cannot be accorded merit in the light of the manner they worded and made it appear. Indeed, the contents and appearance of Res. T- 95 argue against the very idea of its being merely a proposal or a draft barangay enactment. Res ipsa loquitur. A draft resolution would not be numbered or be carrying certificatory and attestative signatures, let alone impressed with the dry seal of the barangay. It would not also include such particulars as the attendance of all members of the sanggunian and the identity of the moving and seconding kagawads relative to the passage of the resolution, for such details are not certain; unless they have been rehearsed or planned beforehand. But the notion that a plan had been arranged by the sanggunian as a body would be negated by subsequent development which saw the approval of a resolution dated October 15, 1995 duly signed by seven kagawads virtually trashing Res. T-95 as a falsity. The sequence of events would readily show that petitioners falsified the subject resolution, but only to be exposed by private complainants.
3. Falsification of a public document is consummated upon the execution of the false document. And criminal intent is presumed upon the execution of the criminal act. Erring public officers’ failure to attain their objectives, if that really be the case, is not determinative of their guilt or innocence. The simulation of a public document, done in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity, constitutes the crime of falsification.
In fine, the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a document’s integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of public documents. What is punished in falsification of public document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. In this particular crime, therefore, the controlling consideration lies in the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.
PEOPLE VS EVANGELINE SITON & KRYSTEL SARAGANO
G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009
Vagrants and Prostitutes [Article 202 (2)]
Facts:
Petitioners were arrestedon the basis of the surveillance previously conducted on the accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Petitioners were charged with vagrancy for having willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means to support themselves nor lawful and justifiable purpose.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
Issue:
Is the Article 202 (2) unconstitutional?
Ruling:
NO. In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant" as "every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support." The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general terms – public or semi-public places.
In the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. The requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). For this reason, we are not moved by respondents’ trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their case.
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your-car" boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity.
The streets must be protected. This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.
Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional.
LT. COL. PACIFICO G. ALEJO VS PEOPLE
GR No. 173360, March 28, 2008
Malversation of Public Property
Facts:
Petitiner Alejo was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City of the crime of Malversation of Public Property under Paragraph 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The conviction was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan.
At the time of the commission of the crime, Alejo was the Task Force Commander of the Task Force Sagip Likas Yaman (TFSLY). TFSLY is composed of the military, as the armed component, and the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resource of the Department of Environment and Natural Resouces (DENR), as the civilian element, in the drive against illegal logging. At the same time, petitioner was the Commanding Officer of the Real Estate Preservation Economic Welfare Center (REPEWC), 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Palayan City. As a higher unit, REPEWC controls smaller units, one of which is Task Force Sagip Likas Yaman (TFSLY).
On June 1992, there were 46 logs, measuring about 10 to 12 meters, stockpiled at Atate Detachment, the detachment which was primarily created to confiscate illegally-transported logs. The prosecution witnesses testified that petitioner ordered them to have these logs, valued at P20,000 delivered to his house, which logs were received therein by the petitioner.
After the Sandiganbayan affirmed the decision of the RTC, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. Petitioner’s main argument is that the prosecution failed to present any documentary evidence showing that the confiscated logs actually existed and were included in the inventory of the DENR as confiscated logs, which were turned over to the custody of the TFSLY and which were subsequently lost. Petitioner insists that the audit or inventory of confiscated logs under the possession and custody of the TFSLY is crucial to the case and in the absence thereof, the charge of malversation must fail. He adds that the prosecution’s failure to establish that there were indeed confiscated logs could mean acquittal.
Issue:
Is the inventory of the confiscated logs necessary to prove the crime of malversation of public property?
Ruling:
NO. Contrary to petitioner’s postulation, it is sufficient that the prosecution established by competent evidence that there existed confiscated logs under the control and custody of petitioner and that he misappropriated the same. Inventory or audit of the confiscated logs under the custody of the TFSLY is not necessary, since the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged. There is no requirement under the law that for one to be convicted of malversation of public property, such property must first be inventoried or audited.
To justify conviction for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property, and that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. Here, the prosecution was able to muster direct evidence that petitioner had misappropriated the subject confiscated logs. Three prosecution witnesses, Rodolfo Estremos, Nelson Flores and Amrodin Sultan, all of whom were petitioner’s subordinates, corroborated each other in declaring categorically that it was petitioner who ordered them to pick up the confiscated lumber and to deliver the same to his residence.
PEOPLE VS. TEOFILO G. PANTALEON, JR. and JAIME F. VALLEJOS
G.R. Nos. 158694-96, March 13, 2009
Complex Crime of Malversation of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents
Facts:
The appellants Teofilo G. Pantaleon, Jr. (Pantaleon) and Jaime F. Vallejos (Vallejos), former Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, were found by the Sandiganbayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 217, in relation with Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The joint affidavit-complaints filed by municipal officials, led by the town’s vice-mayor, before the Office of the Special Prosecutor of Zambales alleged that the appellants, Ken Swan Tiu, and Engr. Ramos conspired to illegally disburse and misappropriate the public funds of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales in the amounts of P166,242.72 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-328), P154,634.27 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-349), and P90,464.21 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9804-415), by falsifying the supporting documents relating to three (3) fictitious or "ghost" construction projects, namely: (a) the upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc, Nagbayan, Magsaysay, and San Pablo; (b) the upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc proper-Casagatan, Nagbayan proper-Angeles, and San Pablo-Sitio San Isidro; and (c) the construction of market stalls at the public market of Castillejos.
The affidavit-complaints further alleged that the disbursement vouchers were not signed by the municipal accountant and budget officer; that the Sangguniang Bayan did not adopt a resolution authorizing Pantaleon to enter into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken Swan Tiu; and that no projects were actually undertaken by the Municipality of Castillejos.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) recommended the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against the appellants and Ken Swan Tiu, and the dismissal of the complaint against Engr. Ramos.The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon approved the Joint Resolution of the OSP, with the modification that the complaint against Ken Swan Tiu be dismissed for lack of probable cause. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the Review Action of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
During trial Vallejos argued that the signature of the accountant did not appear in the three (3) vouchers because the accountant simply refused to sign it. He also insisted that the budget officer’s signature likewise did not appear in the vouchers because she was always out of her office. He explained that he paid the vouchers despite the absence of the accountant’s signature because the projects were already completed and the sub-contractor was already demanding payment and was threatening to sue him if he would not pay.
Pantaleon testified that he signed the vouchers and allowed the treasurer to pay the amounts stated because the accountant and the budget officer were reluctant to sign. He also claimed that the signatures of the accountant and budget officer were not important. He added that he approved the release of the money because the treasurer told him that there was an appropriation in the approved annual budget. He also insisted that the owner of La Paz Construction entered into a contact with the municipality. He maintained that he physically inspected the projects, and ordered the treasurer to pay because the project in Nagbayan road had been completed
Issue:
Did the accused commit the complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents?
Ruling:
YES. All the elements of the crime charged are present in these cases.
The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are the following:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Pantaleon and Vallejos were the municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Castillejos at the time of the crimes charged. In short, they were public officers within the meaning of the term as defined above.
As a required standard procedure, the signatures of the mayor and the treasurer are needed before any disbursement of public funds can be made. The appellants, therefore, in their capacities as mayor and treasurer, had control and responsibility over the funds of the Municipality of Castillejos.
The funds for which malversation the appellants stand charged were sourced from the development fund of the municipality. They were funds belonging to the municipality, for use by the municipality, and were under the collective custody of the municipality’s officials who had to act together to disburse the funds for their intended municipal use. The funds were therefore public funds for which the appellants as mayor and municipal treasurer were accountable.
Through the appellant’s explicit admissions, the witnesses’ testimonies, and the documentary evidence submitted, the prosecution duly established the fourth element of the crime of malversation. It is settled that a public officer is liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, if he allows another to take the funds, or through abandonment or negligence, allow such taking. The felony may be committed, not only through the misappropriation or the conversion of public funds or property to one’s personal use, but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate the funds. The felony may thus be committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence.
The appellants were likewise guilty of falsification under paragraph 5 of Article 171. Engr. Ramos testified that Pantaleon and Vallejos instructed him to place the dates January 5, 1998 on the first and third programs of work, and January 14, 1998 on the second program of work, although he prepared the programs only in March 1998. Thereafter, the appellants affixed their signatures on these programs of work. The projects covered by these programs of work served as basis for the issuance of the disbursement vouchers. The falsification was a necessary means to commit the crime of malversation.
G.R. No. 184702 October 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CHRISTOPHER TALITA
Murder
FACTS: At about 2:00 p.m. on August 7, 1998, Marty Sarte parked his car before his house on 1st Street, Meliton Ave., Barangay San Antonio, Parañaque, Metro Manila. As his wife, Sunshine Sarte, was about to board the car, she saw appellant Talita walking from behind the car toward its windows. Marty was then at the driver’s seat while her aunt, Marilou Tolentino, occupied the backseat. Sunshine’s grandmother, Maxima Alejandro, stood in front of the house, bidding goodbye to those who were about to leave.
Suddenly, appellant Talita turned around, pulled out a caliber .38 revolver, fired at least six shots through the window at those in the car, and left. Once the firing ceased, Sunshine saw Marty and Marilou wounded and motionless. She moved toward the driver’s side of the car. But Talita returned, this time astride the motorcycle that someone wearing a helmet drove for him. He fired his gun at her but hit the car’s hood instead. The motorcycle riders then fled. Marilou died but Marty received first aid treatment. Enriqueta De Ocampo, a traffic enforcer directing traffic along Sucat Intersection, noticed two men riding a motorcycle. She was unable to see the face of the driver who wore a helmet but she later identified his passenger as appellant Talita. The police arrested Talita and Cinto. Marty, Sunshine and Maxima later identified Talita in a police line-up. For their part, appellant Talita and Cinto denied having committed the crimes of which they were charged.
Talita and Cinto guilty of murder, qualified by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, frustrated murder, and for attempted murder.
ISSUE: Whether appellants are guilty?
RULING: Sunshine and Maxima’s identification of appellant Talita as the assailant is corroborated by the testimonies of Marty, Sunshine’s wounded husband, and Enriqueta De Ocampo, the traffic enforcer, who also identified him. For this reason, the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court from such testimonies are usually entitled to much weight.What is more, the trial court found that soon after the police arrested Talita and his co-accused, both Sunshine and Maxima identified them at the police line-up. No doubt, their recollections of what happened were then still fresh in their minds. The possibility of their committing a mistake is somewhat remote.
The absence of proof that appellant Talita had a motive to commit the crime is of course not indispensable to conviction since the witnesses positively identified him and described with definiteness his role in the crime. Likewise, the fact that Talita did not go into hiding cannot be considered proof of innocence. While it has been held that flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight does not necessarily mean non-guilt or innocence. Evidence of flight is usually taken into account merely to strengthen a finding of guilt. Non-flight cannot be singularly considered as evidence of innocence.
Talita mainly relied on denial which, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense because it can easily be fabricated.
HOWEVER, Cinto is acquitted for failure to prove his identity beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant Christopher Talita is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,of Frustrated Murder, and of Attempted Murder.
G.R. No. 185012 March 5, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. VICTOR VILLARINO y MABUTE
Rape with Homicide
FACTS: On April 28, 1995, "BBB", together with her 10-year old daughter "AAA" and her younger son "CCC" went to the house of their relative in Barangay "D" to attend the fiesta to be held the next day. While personally serving food and drinks to appellant, SP04 Genoguin noticed that the latter was wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant. One Rodrigo also noticed appellant wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant and wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt (sando).
While at the house of "BBB’s" aunt, "BBB" also noticed that he was dressed in a white sando and that he wore jewelry consisting of a bracelet and a necklace with pendant.He was later seen wearing the same sando and jewelry while drinking at the basketball court in Barangay "D". "BBB" told "AAA" to go home to Barangay "D1" to get a t-shirt for her brother. "AAA" obeyed. However, she no longer returned. While "BBB" was anxiously waiting for "AAA" in the house of her aunt in Barangay "D",she received information that a dead child had been found in Barangay "D1". She proceeded to the area where she identified the child’s body as that of her daughter, "AAA"
"AAA’s" lifeless body lay face up with her buttocks on top of a small rock. Her body was slanted downward with her legs spread apart and dangling on the sides of the small boulder. She was no longer wearing short pants and panty, and blood oozed from her vagina. Wrapped around her right hand, which was positioned near her right ear, was a white sando." A bracelet and a pendant were also recovered from the crime scene. On the same day, the appellant was found near the seashore of Barangay "D1". He was drunk and violent. He resisted arrest and had to be bodily carried to the motorboat that would take him to the municipal building in Almagro, Samar. The arresting team made the appellant take off his clothes since they were wet. When he complied, his briefs revealed bloodstains.
The police brought appellant to Calbayog City for medical examination since he had scratches and abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat ride the appellant voluntarily admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he committed the crime charged. He also told SPO4 Genoguin that he could keep the pendant and bracelet if he would retrieve the t-shirt and throw it into the sea. He further offered to give SPO4 Genoguin P20,000.00 if he would throw the sando into the sea. However, the police officer ignored the offer and instead reported the matter to the Chief of Police. Later, the appellant’s mother, Felicidad Mabute y Legaspi, asked SPO4 Genoguin not to testify against her son.
ISSUE: Is the confession of the accused to the officer admissible?
RULING: Yes. In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman. When the victim is a minor, however, it is sufficient that the evidence proves that the appellant had sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with the victim.
When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and no force or intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously made and not elicited through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the complex crime of rape with homicide through circumstantial evidence which were credible and sufficient, and led to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to the appellant as the culprit. First. Prior to the incident, three witnesses saw the appellant wearing the white sleeveless t-shirt, a necklace with pendant and a bracelet Second. The pendant and bracelet were later recovered a few meters away from the lifeless body of "AAA". The white sando was also found clasped in the right hand of the victim. Third. The appellant could no longer produce the sando and pieces of jewelry after his arrest. Fourth. The physical examination on the appellant revealed 10 healed abrasions and two linear abrasions or scratches on his breast, knees and ears which could have been caused by the fingernails of the victim. Fifth. The victim had blood oozing from her vaginal orifice, while the appellant had human blood-stains on his briefs. Sixth. The appellant attempted to bribe SPO4 Genoguin and the policemen who were escorting him to Calbayog City, by offering them P20,000.00 in exchange for the disposal of his white sleeveless t-shirt found in the crime scene. Seventh. The appellant’s mother requested SPO4 Genoguin not to testify against her son.
G.R. No. 173510 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ERPASCUAL DIEGA y PAJARES
Rape with Homicide
FACTS: The victim, "AAA", was a 13-year old girl residing with her family in Rodriguez, Rizal. She was a 1st year high school student and would usually leave her home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning and walk for about a kilometer to a terminal where she could take a ride to school. The path towards the terminal passes a farm within a 50-hectare plantation located at Upper Ciudad Real, Araneta, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, where the appellant was employed as a stay-in security guard. "AAA" uses the same route on her way home.
On March 17, 1995, "AAA" failed to return home at the usual time. Her parents frantically searched for her, but it was only on the next day, when the dead body of "AAA" was discovered inside the plantation.
"AAA’s" corpse was covered with leaves. A wood vine was tied around her neck and her head bore several wounds. Her school uniform was crumpled and her panty was missing. The medico-legal examination indicated that she died of "asphyxia by strangulation, hemorrhages as a result of traumatic injuries, head and body". There were deep, fresh lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00 o’clock positions and a shallow fresh laceration at 7:00 o’clock position in her hymen which "are compatible with recent loss of virginity."
The police investigation revealed that Juanito Manalo III (Juanito) was tending to the grazing carabaos inside the plantation when he saw the appellant stooping down. The appellant stood up clad only in his shorts and waved his pistol to call Juanito. As Juanito approached, he saw that the appellant had a menacing look and noticed "AAA" lying unconscious on the ground. The appellant then pointed his pistol to Juanito and ordered him to touch the body of "AAA" and to tie a vine around her neck. Out of fear, Juanito obeyed and discovered that "AAA" no longer had undergarments. He was permitted to leave, but only after the appellant threatened to kill him and his family if he would reveal to anyone what he witnessed. As Juanito fled from the scene, he was seen by Martin Gailan (Martin) and Arnel Alminana (Arnel) who were also privy to the death threats made by the appellant. The police investigation also revealed that prior to the commission of the crime, "AAA" and her aunt used to pass by the plantation and every time the appellant would see them, especially when he was drunk, he would whistle at "AAA" and even touch her upper arm. At one time, the appellant uttered to "AAA’s" aunt, "Misis, ingatan mo ang iyong pamangkin." Pending trial, appellant absconded and remained at-large until his arrest in his hometown in Baybay Gamay in Northern Samar
ISSUE: Can the guilt be proven by circumstantial evidence?
RULING: Yes. In a special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.Both rape and homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering that there were no witnesses to the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even in the absence of an eyewitness, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant Erpascual Diega y Pajares is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of "AAA" civil indemnity.
G.R. No. 182460
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA
Arson and Frustrated Homicide
FACTS: Eulogio Quilates (Eulogio) is the owner of a two-storey house in Paringao, Bauang, La Union. Among the occupants of his house were his sister Felicidad Quilates (Felicidad); another sister Alicia Manlupig (Alicia); and nephew Herminio Manlupig (Herminio). Appellant, who is the adopted son of Felicidad, occupied one room in the house. At around 3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was having a drinking spree with his cousin Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey Viduya and Ricky Viduya (Ricky) in front of their house. Appellant and Herminio were arguing over the matter of caring for Felicidad while the latter was confined in the hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two. Appellant was then seen going inside the house to get a bolo. When he emerged from the house ten (10) minutes later, he ran after Herminio but the latter managed to escape unscathed. Appellant again went back to the house.
Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed drinking. A few minutes later, he saw smoke coming from the room of appellant. As Ricky was about to enter the house, he met appellant at the door. Appellant apparently tried to stab Ricky but was unsuccessful. Ricky witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia. Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the smoke. He peeped through the small window of the house and witnessed appellant burning some clothes and boxes in the sala. Herminio immediately went inside the house to save his personal belongings. Upon emerging from the house, Herminio saw his mother, Alicia, bloodied. Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she saw smoke coming out of appellant’s room. Before she could react, appellant came charging at her and stabbed her. She sustained wounds on her upper thigh, arms, below her breast and on her ear. Alicia was still able to ask for help, and her daughter-in-law brought her to the hospital.
Appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide, hence the review is limited to the crime of arson.
ISSUE: Is circumstamtial evidence enough to prove the guilt of appellant?
RULING: Yes. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.
Indeed, appellant was last seen inside the house before the fire started. Eulogio and Ricky saw smoke emanating from the room of appellant. Herminio testified that he saw appellant burning clothes in his room. Appellant then went on a stabbing rampage while the house was on fire. While nobody directly saw appellant burn the house, these circumstances would yield to a logical conclusion that the fire that gutted eight (8) houses was authored by appellant.
A close examination of the records, as well as description of the crime as stated in the information, reveals that the crime committed is in fact simple arson because the burned properties are residential houses.
G.R. No. 187049
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs LITO MACAPANAS y ECIJA
Rape
FACTS: At around 7:30 a.m. on December 7, 1999, AAA, a student of Eastern Samar State Agricultural College, was walking on the feeder road of Barangay XXX, Salcedo, Eastern Samar going to the waiting shed where she was to take a ride to school. She was 50 to 60 meters away from the waiting shed when the appellant, wearing a makeshift ski mask and armed with a bladed weapon locally known as sundang, grabbed her hair. Appellant poked the sundang on her side and pulled her towards a grassy area. She tried to free herself and pleaded for mercy, but to no avail.
When they reached a nearby stream, appellant shoved AAA towards an uninhabited house with the knife. Inside, appellant told her to undress, but AAA did not obey. She asked appellant to remove his mask so she could identify him. Appellant acceded and removed his mask. Then, he ordered her anew to remove her dress. When she refused, appellant grabbed her skirt and forcibly removed the buttons to open her skirt. Appellant then pushed her to the floor where he removed her panty. He mounted her and succeeded in having intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, appellant allowed AAA to put on her dress with a warning that he would kill her if she tells anyone about what happened.
When AAA saw plenty of people on the road, she shouted for help. Appellant then stabbed her at the back and fled. AAA was brought to the Southern Samar General Hospital where she was confined for nine (9) days.
On the third day of AAA’s confinement, they suspected that something more had happened to AAA, but she merely cried and did not answer their questions. On her sixth day of confinement, AAA, accompanied by her mother, admitted she was also raped.
ISSUE: Whether appellant’s guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: Yes. The fact that AAA did not immediately reveal that she was raped by appellant does not necessarily impair AAA’s credibility. How the victim comported herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape. Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.
In this case, the delay in reporting the sexual assault was reasonable and explained. AAA adequately explained that she did not immediately inform anyone of her ordeal because she was ashamed and afraid because appellant had threatened to kill her. Thus, her reluctance that caused the delay should not be taken against her. Neither can it be used to diminish her credibility nor undermine the charge of rape.
While appellant was not placed in a police line-up for identification by AAA, the absence of such police line-up does not make AAA’s identification of appellant as the one (1) who raped her, unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification in every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable identification as long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. What is crucial is for the witness to positively declare during trial that the person charged was the malefactor.
For one (1) to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one (1) of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, must be alleged in the Information and duly proved during the trial. In the case at bar, appellant used a sharp-pointed bolo locally known as sundang in consummating the salacious act. This circumstance was alleged in the Information and duly proved during trial. Being in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, “use of a deadly weapon” increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty. This so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. As such, the presence of generic aggravating and mitigating circumstances will determine whether the lesser or higher penalty shall be imposed. When, as in this case, neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the minimum penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should be the penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, both trial and appellate courts properly imposed on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Exemplary damages should likewise be awarded pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon attended the commission of the rape.
G.R. No. 190616
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PASTOR LLANAS, JR. y BELCHES
Rape
FACTS: Appellant is legally married to BBB, AAA’s mother, and that he is the father of AAA, his and BBB’s only child.
The first incident happened sometime in 1998 when AAA was only a 9-year old grade III schoolgirl. On the fateful day of that year, appellant tricked AAA into going with him to a “camalig” to play. Once inside, appellant laid her on the bamboo floor and removed her garments. In all her innocence, AAA asked why she is being undressed only to be told by the appellant not to report anything, else he would kill her and BBB. After taking off his clothes, appellant parted AAA’s legs, went on top of her, inserted his sex organ to hers and made the usual push-and-pull routine.
One day the following year, appellant again sexually abused AAA, now 10 years old. In the witness box, AAA could not recall whether the incident happened in the morning or in the afternoon, but she distinctly remembered that it occurred in 1999, being in Grade IV at that time and it was the year the family moved to another house in the same barrio.
Then on August 4, 2005, at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while BBB was out of the house, appellant approached AAA, now 15 years old, to ask her to play. This remark frightened AAA, as this was the same line used when she was abused in the past. AAA spurned the invitation to play, but the insistent appellant told her that: “para lang yan. It’s just that. You are not going to be pregnant because I’m withdrawing my semen.” There and then, appellant brought her to a room, stripped her of her shorts and panty and likewise removed his garments. What happened next was a virtual repeat of what appellant did in 1998 and 1999 after he asked AAA to play. Responding later to BBB’s questioning why she was crying, AAA disclosed everything to her mother. Thereafter, BBB, with AAA in tow, proceeded to the local police station to report about the incidents, after which BBB repaired to the local National Bureau of Investigation office to have AAA physically examined.
The records of the physical examination yielded: “no extragenital physical injury x x x on the body of [AAA] at the time of examination; old healed hymenal lacerations present; and hymenal orifice wide x x x as to allow complete penetration by an average sized adult male organ in full erection without producing hymenal injury.”
ISSUE: Appellant seeks acquittal, predicating his plea principally on the issue of: (1) the credibility of the prosecution’s key witness; and (2) the sufficiency of the People’s evidence.
RULING: Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy involving only two persons and not generally attempted save in secluded places far from prying eyes. By the intrinsic nature of rape cases, the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended girl herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People’s single witness of the actual occurrence.Foremost of these: an offended woman’s testimony hurdling the exacting test of credibility would suffice to convict. In fine, the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in prosecution for rape. Withal, in passing upon the credibility of the victim-witness, the highest degree of respect must be afforded to the evaluation and findings of the trial court.
Appellant’s obvious thesis that a minor rape victim always results in vaginal injury rests on a lot of oversimplification and, hence, must be eschewed. To start with, full penile penetration, which would ordinarily result in hymenal rupture or laceration of the vagina of a girl of tender years, is not a consummating ingredient in the crime of rape. The mere knocking at the door of the pudenda by the accused’s penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape. The medical report on AAA is only corroborative of the finding of rape. The absence of fresh external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration and like vaginal injuries not being, to repeat, an element of the crime of rape. What is more, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is, to repeat, sufficient to convict.
In rape cases, the concurrence, as here, of the victim’s minority (under 18) and her relationship with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance for which the law prescribes the penalty of death underArt. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death, for each count of qualified rape, on appellant who shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is in order in light of R.A. 9346 or the the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
G.R. No. 155850 February 19, 2008
EDGARDO POSTANES, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Slight Physical Injuries
FACTS: On April 9, 1996, at past three o'clock in the afternoon, Pasion and his co-employees, Gines Carmen, Ali Plaza and Armand Juarbal, were walking on the 3rd Floor of the Masagana City Mall when all of a sudden, petitioner appeared and tapped him on the shoulder. When he turned around, petitioner punched him on the face. Pasion fell on the floor, and petitioner kicked him and poked a gun at him. Immediately, Pasion ran toward the LRT station. As a result of the attack, Pasion suffered physical injuries which prevented him from working for ten days. He spent P2,000 for his medical expenses. Pasion's testimony was corroborated by Gines Carmen.
Petitioner was found guilty of slight physical injuries and the court sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty days. Petitioner argues that the CA should have acquitted him because the medical certificate/records presented by Mr. Pasion were not also identified by the physician who issued the same; that the findings of the trial court were overrated, and the judge who penned the decision was not the one who personally heard the testimony of petitioner and his three witnesses; that the CA should not have disregarded the testimony of petitioner's witnesses who identified Mr. Pasion as the assailant and petitioner as the victim; that Mr. Pasion and his witnesses are not credible because they were directly involved in the altercation, and their testimonies are biased and self-serving; and that the CA gravely erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Is the appeal meritorious?
RULING: No. We have constantly reiterated that conclusions and findings of the facts of the trial court as well as the assessment of the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial evidence on record.
The petition fails. Petitioner raises factual issues and credibility issues, which are not appropriate in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 wherein only questions purely of law may be raised.
Petitioner contends that there was an unequal treatment of medical certificates. The record, however, shows that the certificate of Mr. Pasion from the Philippine General Hospital was authenticated by the records custodian who testified, whereas that of petitioner was not authenticated at all.
G.R. No. 178061 January 31, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOHN MONTINOLA @ TONY MONTINOLA
Rape/Acts of Lasciviousness
FACTS: In six informations, the prosecution charged Montinola with raping his minor daughter, AAA, on 29 October 1999, 19 December 1999, February 2000, March 2000, 4 November 2000, and January 2001 and with acts of lasciviousness. AAA was born on 12 October 1987.
He claimed that AAA made up the accusations against him because he often beat her. Moreover, he claimed that, if it were true that he raped her, (1) he would have been caught by people outside the house, if there were any; and (2) she would have sustained injuries in her vagina because his penis has pellets embedded in it. AAA's mother, two brothers, and sister corroborated Montinola's claim that he did not rape AAA.
On appeal, Montinola contended that the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to AAA's testimony and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. He claimed that AAA was not credible: (1) her testimony was inconsistent, (2) her testimony was not in accord with human experience, (3) she failed to immediately report the incidents to her relatives or to the proper authorities, (4) she admitted that there were other people in the house when the alleged incidents took place yet she did not ask them for help, and (5) the medical report did not prove that Montinola was the one who raped AAA.
ISSUE: Is the appeal tenable?
RULING: No. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review. The Court can correct errors unassigned in the appeal.
The Court is not impressed with Montinola's claim that AAA's testimony is not credible because it contains an inconsistency. [M]inor lapses should be expected when a person is made to recall minor details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. After all, the credibility of a rape victim is not destroyed by some inconsistencies in her testimony. Moreover, testimonies of child victims are given full faith and credit.In the instant case, a minor inconsistency is expected especially because (1) AAA was a child witness, (2) she was made to testify on painful and humiliating incidents, (3) she was sexually abused several times, and (4) she was made to recount details and events that happened several years before she testified.
The Court believes AAA. This is a very futile attempt to discredit AAA's testimony. Allowing young children to go outside the house while the rain is pouring is not unbelievable, especially when one is overcome by lust.
AAA's failure to report the incidents immediately was justifiable: (1) Montinola threatened her that he would cut her throat, as well as the throats of her siblings, if she told anyone about the incidents; (2) her mother was at work most of the time; (3) Montinola had moral and physical control over her, kept an eye on her, and interrupted her whenever she attempted to report the incidents to her mother; (4) even if she told her mother, her mother would not have believed her; (5) she was overwhelmed by fear and confusion; (6) telling people that one has been raped by her own father is not easy to do; and (7) a 14-year-old child cannot be expected to know how to go about reporting crimes to the proper authorities.
There is no rule that rape can only be committed in seclusion. In rape cases, the credibility of the complainant's testimony is almost always the single most important issue. When the complainant's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction. AAA revealed that her own father raped her, allowed the examination of her vagina, and willingly underwent a public trial where she divulged in detail her painful experiences.
For the acts of lasciviousness, he should be punished under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Section 5(b) covers acts of lasciviousness while Section 10(a) covers other acts of abuse. Section 5(b) provides:
Under Section 5(b) has three elements: (1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years old.
All three elements are present in the instant case: (1) Montinola caressed AAA's right thigh, slipped his hand under her shorts, and touched her vagina; (2) AAA indulged in lascivious conduct under Montinola's coercion; and (3) AAA was below 18 years old.
Accordingly, the Court modifies the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 02-725. Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Since there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period - reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 187742 April 20, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CRIZALDO PACHECO y VILLANUEVA
Rape
FACTS: AAA lived with her mother, BBB, and accused-appellant, BBB’s live-in partner, in Malabon City. She recalled that accused-appellant had raped her many times, the last of which happened on January 7, 2002 at around 2 o’clock in the morning. At that time, she was awakened from her sleep when accused-appellant was removing her clothes. He then removed his clothes also and proceeded to mount her, inserting his penis into her vagina and repeating a pumping movement. AAA felt pain in her vagina but could not cry out as accused-appellant threatened to maul and box her as he had previously done. After having carnal knowledge of AAA, accused-appellant then went to sleep.
AAA eventually revealed accused-appellant’s lechery to one of her teachers, who accompanied her to Bantay Bata ABS-CBN to ask for help. AAA then gave the police a statement of what had happened to her. P/SInsp. Sabino testified in her capacity as Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Women’s Crime and Child Protection Center. Her ano-genital examination on AAA revealed that the child had deep healed laceration at 6 o’clock position.
On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for erroneously ruling against him even if (1) the rape could not have been committed inside a room where AAA’s mother and other siblings were also sleeping; (2) AAA belatedly reported the rape; (3) the prosecution failed to establish with certainty that the hymenal laceration was the direct result of his raping AAA; (4) AAA could have shouted or resisted if she was really raped; and (5) AAA was motivated by ill feelings in accusing accused-appellant of rape.
ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
RULING: No. The arguments raised by the defense are overused and insubstantial. The Revised Penal Code defines statutory rape as sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age.
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place.
In prosecuting rape cases, we reiterate from previous rulings that the eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges.
Jurisprudence holds that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape. Even the victim’s lack of resistance, especially when intimidated by the offender into submission, does not signify voluntariness or consent. While AAA may not have exerted effort to free herself from her rapist, her actions can be explained by the fear she already had of accused-appellant, who had beat her up on more than one occasion. Accused-appellant’s moral ascendancy over AAA, combined with memories of previous beatings, was more than enough to intimidate AAA and rendered her helpless while she was being victimized.
The burden of going through a rape prosecution is grossly out of proportion to whatever revenge the young girl would be able to exact. The Court has justifiably thus ruled, as the OSG noted, that a girl of tender age would not allow herself to go through the humiliation of a public trial if not to pursue justice for what has happened.
As this Court has previously ruled, accused-appellant can still be convicted of rape on the sole basis of the testimony of the victim. Hence, even if the medical findings are disregarded, in the end, the prosecution has successfully proved the case of rape against accused-appellant on the basis of AAA’s testimony.
The Revised Penal Code punishes statutory rape with reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 177138 January 26, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOEL GUILLERMO
Rape
FACTS: AAA testified that when she was 13 years of age, she and appellant, who is her first cousin, lived at her grandparents’ house. She, with her siblings, slept in the sala illuminated by a kerosene lamp. On three separate occasions, she woke up in the middle of the night to find the appellant wielding a knife and removing her clothes and blanket. He subsequently forced her to engage in sexual intercourse with him. The appellant threatened to kill her and the rest of her family if she reported the incident. Because she believed the threats of the appellant, she kept quiet about the incidents until her elementary school teacher noticed that she was pregnant. AAA revealed to her the dastardly acts of the appellant. She accompanied AAA to report the matter to her father. They then proceeded to the police station to file the complaint. Dr. Ganciñia testified that AAA disclosed that appellant forced her to engage in sexual relations with him. She found that AAA had cervical lacerations and confirmed that AAA was 5 to 6 months pregnant.
BBB testified that on September 28, 1998, when she was 12 years old, appellant sexually abused her. She lived at her grandparents house. At night, she slept in the sala (which was illuminated by a kerosene lamp) beside her siblings. One evening, she woke up as she felt someone licking her genitals. To her surprise, she discovered that her clothes had been removed and appellant was on top of her. Appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Throughout the entire ordeal, appellant was holding a knife and threatening to kill her and her family if she told anyone about the incident. Dr. Ganciñia testified that, after examining BBB she found four healed lacerations in the child’s cervix.
For its part, the defense argued that AAA was the sweetheart of appellant, and they had four sexual encounters when she accepted his love proposal. He insisted on the validity of the affidavit of desistance by AAA.
With respect to BBB’s accusation, appellant said that BBB was like a sister and he treated her accordingly. He was not aware of any reason for her to accuse him of molesting her.
ISSUE: Is the defense of the accused tenable?
RULING: No. The "sweetheart theory" is an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence. Appellant presented no evidence to substantiate his claim.
Furthermore, the Court does not look with favor on affidavits of retraction. Recanted testimony is highly questionable because it can be secured through monetary considerations. It is dangerous for courts to reject testimonies solemnly given before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who made them change their minds later on. Such a rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Here, the affidavit of retraction was precisely executed by AAA in exchange for financial assistance and land (which she never received).
Appellant’s guilt of the crime of simple rape through force or intimidation has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Inasmuch as the minority of both AAA and BBB was not proven and their relationship with appellant was outside the scope of Article 14 of the RPC and Article 266-B of RA No 8353, these circumstances cannot be considered as aggravating circumstances.
Nonetheless, the victims are entitled to exemplary damages since appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the offense. While the use of a deadly weapon is not one of the generic aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the RPC, under Article 266-B thereof, the presence of such circumstance in the commission of rape increases the penalty, provided that it has been alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Thus, even if the use of a deadly weapon is not alleged in the Information but is proven during the trial, it may be appreciated to justify the award of civil liability, particularly exemplary damages.
In this instance, while the Information did not state that appellant possessed a deadly weapon, the prosecution sufficiently established that he threatened his victims with a knife in order to facilitate the commission of his bestial acts and cow his victims into silence. Inasmuch as appellant may not be sentenced to death, the presence of such circumstance justifies the award of exemplary damages.
People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Grande
G.R. No. 170476 December 23, 2009
Facts:
Fifteen year old student [AAA] was renting a room in a boarding house at Purok 1-A, Barangay San Roque, Mercedes, Camarines Norte. In the night of August 21, 1997, [AAA] was roused from her sleep by accused-appellant who was on top of her and in the act of removing her shirt. Accused-appellant who was already naked from the waist down, pressed on [AAA] keeping the latter’s hands crossed on her chest and lowered her loose garter shorts and panty down to her knees. He then inserted his penis inside [AAA]’s private part and made pumping motions causing unbearable pain to the poor teenager. All this time, [AAA] pushed her attacker away but her efforts proved futile for accused-appellant was quite heavy for the fifteen year old. Accused-appellant’s push and pull motion lasted for about five minutes. After satisfying his lust and before leaving, accused-appellant talking slowly threatened [AAA] not to report what happened or he would kill her and the latter’s parents.
For his defense, 25-year old accused-appellant claimed that he and [AAA] were lovers. Still according to accused-appellant, they had gone out on dates and had sexual intercourse with [AAA] before the complained incident. On that fateful night, Accused-appellant claimed that they had sex.
Issue:
Was the accused guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of simple rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Accused’s reliance on the “sweetheart” theory to bolster his defense failed to inspire belief. This much-abused affirmative defense must be established with convincing evidence – by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. Considering that the sweetheart theory is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence, it must be supported by documentary, testimonial and other defense to be worthy of judicial acceptance.
The People of the Philippines vs. Quirino Cabral y Valencia
G.R. No. 179946 December 23, 2009
Facts:
The accused-appellant was charged with five (5) counts of rape committed within the period December 1995 to November 21, 1998 against the complainant who was only 10 to 13 years old at the time. The rape incidents all happened under the following circumstances: (a) the rapes were committed in the family dwelling between 12:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. when the complainant was sleeping with her siblings; (b) the size of the family dwelling was three meters by four meters; (c) the complainant’s mother was not around; (d) the accused-appellant poked a balisong at the complainant’s neck in three instances to compel her to submit to the sexual assaults; and (e) the accused-appellant also threatened to kill the complainant and the rest of the family members in case of disclosure.
The accused-appellant denied the charges against him and claimed that it was impossible for him to commit the rapes, considering that his work schedules as a tricycle driver and as a fisherman compelled him to work at nighttime. The accused-appellant imputed ill-motive on his wife and the complainant. He claimed that the complainant begrudged him for disciplining her; his wife wanted to replace him with another man.
The RTC acquitted the accused-appellant of one (1) count of rape, but convicted him of the four (4) counts charged, and imposed the penalty of death – the penalty qualified rape carries.
Issue:
Whether the court failed to appreciate the doubtful testimony of the complainant, considering her failure to shout for help and the improbability that the rapes could have been committed in a 3 x 4-meter house in the presence of other people.
Ruling:
No. The Court rejected the accused’s claim that it was impossible for him to rape his daughter in a 3 x 4 meter house, in the presence of other people. The Court noted that the close physical proximity of other relatives at the scene of the rape does not negate the commission of the crime. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the victim’s family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. Lust is no respecter of time and place, and is not deterred by age nor relationship.
People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Layco, Sr.
G.R. No. 182191 May 8, 2009
Facts:
Appellant was charged with nine (9) counts of rape committed against his own 11-year old daughter, AAA, on January 1993 and his 7-year old daughter, BBB, sometime in 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.
Both victims testified that they were raped by their father inside their house. On these occasions, each incident of rape was always preceded by physical violence on their persons. AAA saw her sister BBB washing dishes and crying while her father was doing the pumping motion behind her in a standing position. The victims were subjected to physical examination. Dra. Batino noted that AAA’s hymen had sustained several lacerations which were more than a year old counting from the time of examination. Dra. Batino likewise attended to BBB and discovered that she had incomplete lacerations in the hymen.
Appellant interposed denial and alibi. He claims that on the dates when AAA was supposedly raped, the latter was no longer living with him. As to BBB, appellant also alleges that BBB was then living with different relatives.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty as charged.
Issue:
Was the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (1) the age of the complainant; (2) the identity of the accused; and (3) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
All the required elements were proven by the prosecution. The victim’s ages are evidenced by their birth certificates that AAA only 11 years old at the time of the incidents, having been born on 22 May 1982, while BBB was only seven (7) years old and born on 18 April 1986. Their identification of their father as the rapist was positive, clear and categorical. They also gave a vivid description of the sexual acts committed by appellant. Moreover, their accusation finds support in the medical reports on the physical injuries AAA and BBB had sustained.
People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Marcos
G.R. No. 185380 June 18, 2009
Facts:
Rogelio was charged before the RTC with Rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
The victim was 11 years old, when the alleged rape incident took place. AAA was then living with her mother and her stepfather Rogelio, and three younger siblings. On July 2003, while taking care of her younger siblings, as her mother was away working in the farm, Rogelio ordered the victim to go upstairs. AAA obliged her stepfather’s order. As soon as Rogelio was upstairs, he suddenly moved toward AAA and removed her dress, her short pants and panties and put her down. Rogelio undressed himself, mounted AAA and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. Rogelio then made a push and pull motion. As Rogelio was inserting his penis, AAA cried as she felt so much pain. AAA’s wailing continued throughout the entire sexual episode.
After the first rape incident, and in the same month of July, 2003, AAA was again abused by Rogelio. This time, Rogelio did it at the back of the house. The following months, she was subjected to sexual abuse three times every month. The last rape incident was on July 2005.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the oral testimonies of Rogelio and AAA’s mother. The defense claimed that it was AAA who initiated the sexual congress.
The RTC rendered a guilty verdict against Rogelio
Issue:
Was the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Statutory rape, under Article 266-A, par. 1-d, is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman "when the offended party is under 12 years of age." The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape.
In this case, the victim’s age is undisputed. She was below 12 years old. Her Birth Certificate shows that she was born on 15 March 1992. Thus, on 13 July 2003, AAA was only eleven (11) years old.
People of the Philippines vs. Salomon Dioneda y dela Cruz
G.R. NO. 180923 April 30, 2009
Facts:
In the evening of August 2000, AAA, then six (6) years old, she having born on May 14, 1994 went to her neighbor Dajao’s three-storey house with the intention of playing with the latter’s son, Iking. On reaching the first floor, AAA met appellant, a helper of the Dajao family, who told her that Iking was already asleep at the third floor. She thus decided to go home but appellant prevented her from leaving, saying "Sandali lang," he telling her that the two of them were going to play. She refused but appellant held her arm forcing her to return to the second floor. Appellant caught up with her, however, made her lie down on the floor and placed himself on top of her. He then carried her to a double-deck bed where he laid her down, removed her panties, undressed himself, went on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She experienced pain. He then wiped her vagina and warned her not to tell the incident to anybody.
The trial court found appellant guilty of rape as charged under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.
Appellant assails AAA’s credibility, citing her inconsistent answers regarding the circumstances before the commission of the alleged rape, particularly her testimony on direct examination that she stopped at the second floor of the Dajaos’ house where he allegedly told her to wait ("sandali lang") but that on cross-examination she stated that she met appellant at the ground floor.
Issue:
Was the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
Yes. The place where AAA met appellant when she was about to leave the Dajao residence, whether on the ground or second floor is a trivial matter. AAA, a child of tender age, could not be expected to give a perfect recollection of the exact floor of the house where she met appellant.
Forthright witnesses are not immune from committing minor inaccuracies in their narration of events. Trivial inconsistencies and inconsequential discrepancies on minor details in the testimonies of witness do not impair their credibility. They could, in fact, be badges of truth for they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. As long as the inconsistencies are immaterial or irrelevant to the elements of the crime and do not touch on material facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused as in the present case, these are not valid grounds to reverse a conviction.
Appellant’s challenge to the assailed decision having failed, and no circumstance which creates reasonable doubt on his guilt being extant, his conviction must be upheld.
People of the Philippines vs. Nestor Veluz
G.R. No. 167755 November 28, 2008
Facts:
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2535, reads as follows:
That on October 23, 1999 or earlier in x x x, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, and unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge for four times of thirteen year old AAA who has a mental age only of four (4) to five (5) years old and the said accused was then aware of the mental disability and or physical handicap of the said offended party.
The prosecution evidence seeks to establish the following facts:
AAA testified that she was called by Kathleen (appellant’s daughter) to go to the latter’s house; and when inside the house, she was raped by appellant.
Corazon Rivera (Rivera) testified that on October 23, 1999, at around 10 a.m., she went to the house of appellant to ask for saluyot. Upon reaching his house, Rivera peeped through the window and saw appellant and AAA lying on the elevated bamboo platform (papag). Appellant was naked and his buttocks was moving up and down while AAA's blouse was rolled up and both were lying down facing each other side by side. Rivera watched appellant doing the pumping motion for three minutes and then left to call BBB, the aunt of AAA.
Upon reaching the house of appellant, BBB saw appellant and AAA lying naked on the bed. After seeing the scene inside the house of appellant, BBB called appellant and requested that AAA be allowed to go out. Since appellant did not immediately answer, BBB said that she would call a bantay bayan. BBB did not find a bantay bayan but instead she saw Loreto Cuaresma (Cuaresma), one of the barangay kagawads. Cuaresma told BBB to go ahead and that he would follow. When BBB went back to the house of appellant, she saw AAA at the back of the said house, sitting on the ground and perspiring. She asked AAA what happened and the latter answered, “Iniyot ng matagal.” BBB asked AAA when she was “iniyot” and the latter answered, “Nabayagon.”
Furthermore, BBB asked AAA how many times she had intercourse. AAA responded by showing her four fingers. In addition, when AAA told BBB that she had intercourse a long time ago, BBB asked if it happened again on that day and the answer was “wen” or yes.
Cuaresma followed BBB after five minutes. Upon reaching the house of appellant, he saw AAA sitting and perspiring and her hair entangled. Cuaresma observed that AAA looked as if she was out of her mind. Cuaresma asked AAA what appellant did to her and the latter answered, “Iniyot nak.” When asked how many times, AAA raised her four fingers. Cuaresma asked AAA who molested her and the latter answered that it was appellant
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of qualified rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed “when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.” The Information in this case alleges the mental disability of AAA and appellant's knowledge of the same at the time of the commission of the crime of rape. Both allegations were duly established beyond reasonable doubt during trial.
People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Abay y Trinidad
G.R. No. 177752 February 24, 2009
Facts:
Appellant Roberto Abay y Trinidad was charged with rape in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4 under the following Information:
That sometime in December 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, [appellant] by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct against [AAA], a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there kissing her breast and whole body, lying on top of her and inserting his penis into her vagina, thus succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent thereafter threatening to kill her should she report the incident, thereby gravely endangering her survival and normal growth and development, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed against her. The Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecution’s evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
People of the Philippines vs. Fidel Canete
G.R. No. 182193, November 07, 2008
Facts:
Except for the dates and times of the admission of the offense, the six Informations filed against accused-appellant contain the same accusatory portion as the first Information (Criminal Case No. 2557-M-2001), as follows:
That in or about the year 1994, in the municipality of BBB, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the uncle of the offended party, AAA, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of the said AAA, then 9 years old, against her will and without her consent.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of all six (6) counts of rape. Upon appeal,accused-appellant advances the theory of the improbability of the rape incidents having occurred based on certain details in the victim's testimony. He wonders how it was possible for the offenses to have transpired when the victim's relatives were in the same room. He likewise avers that the victim should have cried out for help while she was being raped. He argues that there was no proof that he could inflict immediate harm on AAA as he supposedly did not have a deadly weapon during the rape incidents.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Accused-appellant's exculpatory allegations do not merit concurrence. Rape has been known to be committed not only in seclusion but in public places, inside an occupied house, or even where there are other people around. We have accordingly ruled that rape is not a respecter of people, time, or place. It is not improbable that accused-appellant was able to succumb to his lechery while AAA's grandmother and sister were sound asleep. Moreover, AAA testified that accused-appellant warned her not to tell anyone of the sexual abuse or else he would kill her. It is not unnatural then for AAA to have kept silent during the rape for fear for her personal safety. The failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate the commission of rape.
On the alleged impossibility of inflicting immediate harm on AAA since accused-appellant had no deadly weapon at the time of the rape incidents, we held in People v. Santos that it is common for a young victim of tender age to be fearful in the face of the mildest threat against her life. Although not alleged in the information’s, the moral ascendancy of accused-appellant over his victim as her uncle was more than sufficient to cow her into submission, even without use of a deadly weapon.
People of the Philippines vs. Michael Muro
G.R. No. 176263 December 24, 2008
Facts:
Michael Muro (appellant) was, by Information filed on July 4, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, charged for "rape of a girl under thirteen (13) years of age in relation to violation of Republic Act 7610.
The private complainant AAA, a deaf-mute, gave the following account with the assistance of a sign language interpreter at the witness stand:
At around 10:30 in the evening of June 29, 2000, while she, then of 13 summers and a Grade III pupil, was outside her house n Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City watching people pass by, appellant, whom she identified in open court and who was 22 years old at the time, tapped her and wrote something on his hand which she could not understand. He then gestured to her to go with him, but she refused. He thereupon grabbed her and despite her resistance, he brought her to a vacant lot along J. Rizal Street in Mandaluyong that had a lot of trees and water. She accidentally tripped and fell to the ground. He at once undressed himself and then undressed her. While she resisted, appellant got mad at her and then inserted his penis into her vagina. He thereafter put on his clothes and left.
The RTC found appellant guilty of rape. Upon appeal, appellant argued, inter alia, as follows, quoted verbatim:
x x x The private complainant, in this case, claimed that the accused-appellant forcibly took her to an area filled with trees where he allegedly sexually abused her. The said place was far from where she was taken and they merely walked the distance but surprisingly, she did not run away from the accused even when the latter was walking ahead of her. Likewise intriguing is the private complainant’s statement that she was with some friends when she was watching people pass by at Hulo and yet nobody saw the accused appellant grabbed her. Her well-chosen time to look at passer[s] by is also worth noting. It was already late at night and her mother was already asleep. Then after her alleged ordeal, she did not go home because she was allegedly afraid and decided to sleep in a stranger’s house. Her physical appearance also did not match her claim that she was ravaged in a wet place. Despite her allegation that the accused pulled her, there was no manifestation of any physical abuse. Had the accused really pulled her, her hands should have incurred hematomas.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
No. The uncorroborated testimony of the victim in a rape case may, under certain circumstances, be adequate to warrant conviction. The testimony must, however, be clear, impeccable and ring true throughout or bear the stamp of absolute candor, free from any serious contradictions. Such inexplicable discrepancies on important details vis a vis the result of her physical examination which bears no indication of the commission of sexual intercourse committed hours earlier nag the Court to entertain serious doubts on whether appellant committed the crime charged. The Court’s doubts are reinforced by prosecution witness Berme’s following observation, viz:
ATTY. JAO: Mr. witness, when you saw the victim, [AAA], how [did] she looks [sic]?
A: Very tired, sir.
Q: Was she crying?
A: No, sir.
Q: How about her clothes?
A: A bit alright, sir.
which do not indicate the commission of rape in a watery area. That appellant even fetched BBB and accompanied her to the barangay hall where AAA was, a fact attested even by the prosecution witnesses, seals the doubts on whether he had hours earlier raped AAA.
People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Antonio
G.R. No. 174372 January 20, 2009
Facts:
Appellant Elpidio Antonio was by separate Informations charged with two counts of rape of his minor daughter AAA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Ecija.
Culled from the records of the cases is the following version of the prosecution:
At around 6:00 o’clock in the morning of June 6, 1994, the then 13-year-old AAA who was sleeping with her six siblings at their house in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija awoke to find her father–herein appellant lying beside her, touching her breasts and vagina. Over her resistance, and at the point of a bladed weapon, he undressed her and inserted his penis into her vagina causing it to bleed. And he threatened to kill her if she reveals to anyone what he had done.
In the morning of August 14, 1994, again as AAA was sleeping at their house with her siblings, she awoke to find appellant mashing and sucking her breasts, licking her vagina, pointing a bladed weapon at her, following which, over her resistance, he undressed her and himself and inserted his penis into her vagina. Again blood oozed from her vagina.
Admitting that AAA is his daughter, appellant denied the charges, claiming that they were filed at BBB’s instance in retaliation for his having driven her away from home following an altercation on August 13, 1994. And to show BBB’s motive, appellant presented his mother who claimed that BBB demanded the payment by appellant of P100,000 and the transfer to her of the house and lot she (mother) owned as conditions for the dropping of the charges.
The RTC found appellant guilty of both charges. After the promulgation of the trial court’s judgment, appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for New Trial anchored in the main on, as stated earlier, the purported execution by AAA of an Affidavit of Desistance.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of of rape?
Ruling:
Yes. It bears noting that the affidavit was presented after the judgment of conviction by the trial court was promulgated which, as a rule, the Court frowns upon.
For AAA’s supposed Affidavit of Desistance to warrant a new trial, it must deny the truth of her complaint, not merely seek the withdrawal of appellant’s prosecution. Her statement that there is no sufficient basis for her father to be convicted of rape and it is unjust to convict her father and let him suffer (“walang sapat na batayan at hindi makatarungan na mahatulan at magdusa ang aking amang si Elpidio Antonio”) is just a legal conclusion.
Parenthetically, the affidavit is of doubtful authenticity, for AAA’s purported signature thereon is different from her signature on her Complaint-Affidavit which she identified in open court.
The conviction of appellant for both counts of rape must thus stand.
People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Pascual y Ildefonso
G. R. No. 172326 January 19, 2009
Facts:
Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son and that accused-appellant (who appeared to be already drunk) was also there together with his child; that accused-appellant stayed with them up to 1:00 a.m. of December 25; that during the course of his stay with the group, accused-appellant left twice to go inside the house but kept on coming back to continue drinking; that when accused-appellant left for the third time, he did not come back anymore leaving him (Jundos) alone as his son. Some 20 minutes later, accused-appellant’s wife, Divina, asked him about the whereabouts of the accused-appellant. Having failed to locate accused-appellant, Divina went back inside the house. Soon after, Jundos saw Divina chasing Alfredo running out towards the gate at the same time asked (sic) Jundos for help saying “Kuya, tulungan mo ako, si Boyet” (referring to Alfredo Pascual)). Thinking that Alfredo Pascual was making trouble, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. joined the chase but could not catch up as Alfredo was running very fast. So Divina told him to instead go upstairs as the accused might have done something wrong to Ling-ling.
Together, Jundos and Divina rushed to the second floor. As the place was dark, they switched on the light and there they saw Ling-ling (Lorelyn Pacubas) flat on her back on the floor almost naked with arms and legs open, her panty and shorts down to her ankle and t-shirt pulled up above the breast with blood on the right breast. They tried to wake up Ling-ling but the latter was already dead. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was shocked at what he saw.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide?
Ruling:
Yes. It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.
Considering that no one witnessed the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Verily, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Thus, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the culprit.
Here, the circumstances testified to by the prosecution witnesses lead to the inevitable conclusion that the accused-appellant is the author of the crime charged.
People of the Philippines vs. Joselito a. Lopit
G.R. No. 177742 December 17, 2008
Facts:
In three (3) separate Informations dated September 15, 2003, accused-appellant was charged with three (3) counts of rape committed against his 14-year old daughter AAA. [AAA], then fourteen (14) years old been born on October 2, 1988, is the daughter of the [accused-appellant] and BBB. At that time, their mother [BBB] was in San Julian Elementary School. Suddenly [AAA]'s father [accused-appellant], a farmer, arrived drunk and forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. She struggled but her efforts were in vain since [accused-appellant] was strong. [Accused-appellant] removed his pants and pinned the victim on the bed, pulled down her pants and inserted his penis into her vagina. [AAA] cried. After doing the bestial act, [accused-appellant] left but not before threatening [AAA] that he would kill her, her mother and siblings if she reported the matter. As further testified by the victim, she had been sleeping with her father on the cement floor of their unfinished house for some time and that her father started staying with them only in 2002 since he had been staying in Laguna as a soldier in the Philippine Army.
The RTC found appellant guilty of qualified rape, imposing upon the accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape?
Ruling:
No. Art. 266-B. Penalties.- Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
In the prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim's minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the Information alleged the concurrence of the victim's minority and her relationship to accused-appellant. However, except for the bare testimony of the victim and her mother as to the former's age as well as their filiation to the accused-appellant, no birth certificate or baptismal certificate or school record and marriage contract exist on record to prove beyond reasonable doubt the victim's age or her minority at the time of the commission of the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAVIER
G.R. No. 172970, February 19, 2008
QUALIFIED RAPE
FACTS:
BBB, AAA’s father, testified that on the evening of 30 November 2002, he and appellant had a drinking spree at their house while AAA was then sleeping. While BBB went out to check on his sow, appellant offered to buy more gin. When BBB returned home, AAA and appellant were no longer there. BBB sought the help of other people including PO3 Tagala to look for AAA. They found appellant naked and sleeping inside one of the classrooms of Capacuan Primary School with AAA sleeping a few meters from appellant. AAA was wearing a dress but without any underwear. There was blood oozing out of AAA’s private organ. PO3 Tagala corroborated BBB’s testimony. Dr. Padama-Callangan, the medico-legal officer who examined AAA on the same day, testified that there were positive blood clots on AAA’s perennial area, a 3cm. laceration at 6 o’clock position of her vagina, and edema of her labia majora and that AAA’s vagina could easily admit two fingers. Appellant admitted that on the evening of 30 November 2002 he had a drinking spree with BBB. However, appellant alleged that BBB asked AAA to accompany appellant when he went out to buy more gin. Upon returning to BBB’s house and finding BBB asleep, appellant left AAA and he went to see his employer. Appellant claimed that he slept in his employer’s house. Appellant denied raping AAA. During the trial, the prosecution proved that AAA was born on 24 March 1996. Therefore, AAA was only 6 years and 8 months old when appellant committed the crime. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable of qualified rape.
On appeal, appellant alleged that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant contended that there was no direct evidence to show that he committed the crime charged and that his conviction was based on suspicion and surmises. The CA affirmed the decision with modification, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt with evidence presented?
RULING:
YES. In this case, AAA, the victim, was not able to testify. The evidence of the prosecution is undeniably circumstantial in nature. As provided in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The combination of the circumstances in the case is sufficient to convict appellant of the crime charged. Considered as a whole, they constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion — that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.
In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. This was sufficiently established in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MALATE
G.R. No. 185724, June 5, 2009
RAPE
FACTS:
BBB was on her way home when she was blocked by a man holding a knife identified as Malate. Malate grabbed her shirt from behind and poked his knife on her neck. She tried to struggle free and this caused Malate to cut his finger. She then tried to run away, but Malate ran after her and again grabbed her by her shirt. She also tried to shout for help but no help came. Malate then dragged BBB to a ricefield, all the while pointing the knife at her. There, he made her remove her clothes and his pants. Afterwards, he made her lie on the ground and kissed her all over her body. Malate then placed himself on top of her and made her hold his penis and guide it into her vagina. BBB, frightened, followed every word he said. After penetration of BBB’s sex organ, Malate succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. When it was all over, she then asked him to let her go home to her daughter, but he refused saying that he wanted her to go with him to his province in Samar because he loved her. Pretending to accede to his request, BBB asked Malate to let her look for her bag and shoes first at the place where she was blocked. While she was getting her bag and shoes and Malate was looking for his slippers, two barangay tanods then arrived. BBB told them that Malate raped her and this caused him to run away. The three of them ran after him in pursuit until they lost him in the dark. They all looked for him around Barangay CCC where they stumbled upon Milo Vanguardia, a friend of BBB’s estranged husband. BBB told Milo that they were looking for a man with curly hair and a wound on his hand, who raped her. When they still could not find Malate, BBB went to the barangay hall of DDD with her mother to report the incident. Later Milo and some barangay tanods brought Malate to the barangay hall and later proceeded to the police station where she pointed to Malate as her rapist. Malate’s defense, on the other hand, was confined to his denial of the accusation and an alibi. The trial court convicted Malate which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
1. Did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Is the alibi of the accused valid?
RULING:
1. YES. In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Moreover, in cases involving the prosecution for forcible rape, the courts have consistently held that, as a general rule, corroboration of the victim’s testimony is not a necessary condition to a conviction for rape where the victim’s testimony is credible, or clear and convincing or sufficient to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The weight and sufficiency of evidence are determined by the credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony. Furthermore, accused-appellant cannot plausibly bank on the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant to discredit her account of the incident. Even if they do exist, minor and insignificant inconsistencies tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of the witness for they show that his testimony was not contrived or rehearsed. Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming.
2. NO. This Court has been consistent in declaring that for alibi to prosper, the defense must establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The facts in this case illustrate that there was no physical impossibility for Malate to be at the scene of the crime. What is more, both denial and alibi are considered as the weakest defenses not only due to their inherent weakness and unreliability, but also because they are easy to fabricate. Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the accused by the complainant. As has been consistently ruled by this Court, an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. And both alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
In conclusion, in criminal cases such as the one on hand, the prosecution is not required to show the guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is demanded, or that degree of proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. We find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the accused with moral certainty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TALAN
GR. No. 177354, November 14, 2008
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE
FACTS:
On May 17, 2000, Talan brought AAA to his hut and then to a place with banana leaves where he raped her there twice. Then on May 30, 2000, while AAA was on her way to a friend’s house, Talan forced AAA to go with him and brought her to San Lorenzo, Santa Elena Camarines Norte in a hut in the middle of a rice field. On June 1, 2000, Talan poked a knife in AAA’s neck, threatened and raped her. On June 2, 2000, AAA’s uncles and Talan’s brothers looked for AAA and with the help of barangay tanods saw AAA and Talan. They handcuffed Talan and brought him to the police station. On 5 June 2000, Dr. Adalid examined AAA and found “incomplete healed, hymenallaceration at 9 o’clock position.”
The RTC found Talan guilty of two (2) counts of forcible abduction with rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification.
ISSUE:
1. Is the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Is the denial of the accused a valid defense?
3. Is the qualifying circumstance of relationship valid?
RULING:
1. YES. The Court finds Talan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. Based on the records, the real objective of Talan was to rape AAA when he brought her to the place with banana trees and to Santa Elena, Camarines Norte.
In rape cases, the credibility of the victim’s testimony is almost always the single most important factor. When the victim’s testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused’s conviction. In the present case, the trial court found AAA’s testimony credible. Moreover, AAA’s testimony is consistent with the medical findings. When the testimony of the victim is consistent with the medical findings, sufficient basis exists for the conclusion that the crime was committed.
2. NO. Denial as a defense is inherently weak and deserves scant consideration. It cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the accused.
3. NO. The qualifying circumstance of relationship must be specifically alleged in the information — the information must clearly state that “the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.” In the present case, the information in merely states that Talan abducted and raped his “niece” without specifying that Talan is a relative of the victim within the third degree of consanguinity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BASMAYOR
G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009
RAPE
FACTS:
Two informations were filed before the RTC of Pasig City, docketed as charging appellant with two counts of Statutory Rape.
On November 9, 2001, AAA, who was born on February 4, 1990 as stated on her Certificate of Live Birth, was with her mother (BBB) and the latter’s live-in partner, the appellant in their house. While her mother was sleeping, her stepfather, appellant embraced her and touched her “pepe.” She removed his hands from her private parts and went to sleep beside her mother. An hour after, or at around10:00 a.m., she was awakened from her sleep by appellant who was undressing her. Appellant removed his shorts and brief and lay on top of her. Appellant kissed her cheeks, mashed her breasts, licked her vagina and inserted his penis therein causing her much pain. During this time, her mother was out peddling goods. AAA clarified that when the first rape happened on 9 November 2001, her mother was with her sleeping. She tried to wake her up, but to no avail. The rape lasted only for a minute. Appellant told her not to tell anyone about the incident. She merely cried and did not tell anyone because she was afraid that appellant might kill her. On November 12, 2001, at around 10:00 a.m., while AAA was lying in bed, appellant again placed himself on top of AAA and inserted his penis inside her vagina, causing her pain. Her mother was in the market when appellant violated her a second time. Dr. Pierre Paul F. Carpio, testified that he interviewed AAA and conducted a genital examination on her. Dr. Carpio disclosed that AAA was coherent when he interviewed her. He explained that the loss of virginity may be caused by the insertion of a blunt object like a penis. He said that AAA divulged to him that she was raped only once. As to the findings of hymenal lacerations, he said that the same were fresh – maybe three days old – and could have possibly resulted from the 12 November 2001 incident.
Appellant denied the accusations that he raped AAA twice, on November 9 and 12, 2001. When he was arrested, he was at home sleeping. The barangay tanods invited him, and he voluntarily went with them. He was told that there was a complaint of rape against him. At the police station, AAA, who was accompanied by a woman, pointed to him and then cried. His live-in partner CCC was not there. He told the policemen he did not commit the crime charged.
The trial courts found the appellant guilty of simple rape in one information and dismissed the other for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the CA modified the decision by finding him guilty of qualified rape.
ISSUE:
Is the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape?
RULING:
YES. The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.
As provided for in the Revised Penal Code, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B must be alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. In the instant case, the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority (under twelve years old) and relationship have been alleged in the information. As stated above, the victim’s minority has been proved by her Certificate of Live Birth. As regards the qualifying circumstance of relationship, it is alleged in the information that the victim is the daughter of appellant’s live-in partner (common-law spouse). Appellant claims that his live-in partner is not BBB, the victim’s mother, but CCC. On such claim, the trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship and convicted appellant only of simple rape. The Court of Appeals, however, convicted him of qualified rape, because it was shown that BBB and CCC was one and the same person.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BALDO
G.R. No. 175238, February 24, 2009
RAPE
FACTS:
Three information for rape were filed against appellant Baldo. AAA, appellant, and Norman Echani were housemates in a small one-room house. As AAA recently resigned from her job and appellant worked during the night shift in a factory, the two were always left during daytime when Echani was at work. On February 10, 2000 at 1:00 p.m., appellant professed his love for AAA in their living room. She, however, admonished him against his protestation for they are relatives. He then told her that if she ignores him, he would rape her. She pleaded to him not to do anything against her will if he really liked her. Appellant then held her left hand and poked a balisong (fan knife) at her, and then removed her pants and panty while she was seated at a bench. Then he dragged her and laid her on the floor, removed his shorts and brief, and placed himself on top of her. AAA tried to resist by kicking him but he was stronger. Thereafter he placed the knife aside, then held and pressed her thighs. He then fingered her vagina with his right hand and inserted his penis into it. After two minutes, appellant stood up but threatened to kill her if she reported the incident to their relatives. According to AAA, appellant repeated his beastly act the following day, February 11 and on the next day, February 12, 2000. In the evening of February 12, 2000, AAA decided to tell Echani what appellant had done to her. Echani and his brother, Abraham, then accompanied her to the barangay hall to file complaints against appellant. The medico-legal police officer who examined AAA on February 13, 2000 found “deep healing laceration” in her hymen, “compatible with recent loss of virginity” but negative for spermatozoa. Dr. James Belgira testified that the laceration could have been caused by a penetration of a hard object like an erect penis. He also found contusions on AAA’s left arm and thighs.
Appellant, in his own defense, denied the charges against him. He claimed that he and AAA were lovers since November 1999, and that she had consented to have sex with him even prior to February 2000. He likewise denied poking a knife at her when they “made love.” To prove they are lovers, appellant presented two witnesses, Benjamin Eubra, Purok Maligaya Chairman and Simeon de los Santos, appellant’s uncle and neighbor.
The trial court found appellant guilty in one of the charges and acquitted him with the other two charges. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Is the element of force and intimidation in the crime of rape proven sufficiently?
RULING:
YES. For conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. In this case, the presence of the first element is undisputed since appellant admits his sexual congress with complainant. While making such admission however, he contends that there is no force or intimidation to speak of as it was consensual. Appellant alleges that AAA willingly participated in the sexual act because they are lovers. The “sweetheart theory” or “sweetheart defense” is an oft-abused justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests our patience. For the Court to even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required -- such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. There is none presented here by the defense. Moreover, even if it were true that they were sweethearts, a love affair does not justify rape. As wisely ruled in a previous case, a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires.
In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. In this case, the presence of a fan knife on hand or by his side speaks loudly of appellant’s use of violence, or force and intimidation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABELLA
G.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010
RAPE
FACTS:
AAA testified that she knew the appellant personally since he was a child because they lived in the same neighborhood. She narrated that sometime at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon while she was alone at home the appellant entered their house and started molesting her. Appellant pulled down her shorts with his left hand while covering her mouth with his right hand. Appellant then placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. At that time, she did not shout as the appellant was holding a knife. AAA recalled that when appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, she had felt pain. Afraid for her life, she did not tell her parents about the rape incident. BBB, AAA’s mother, on the other hand, testified that the appellant is the cousin of her husband. She claimed that she noticed her daughter becoming pale and thinner. She also noticed that AAA’s stomach was getting bigger and thus decided to bring her to a doctor, who in turn informed her that her daughter might be pregnant. An ultrasound examination confirmed that AAA was indeed pregnant. BBB then asked her daughter who was responsible for her pregnancy, AAA replied that it was the appellant.
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant. The trial court found the 38-year old AAA as a credible witness and her testimony candid and truthful despite her “moderate mental retardation” or intellectual quotient of a 7 to 8-year old child as testified by Dr. Escuadra, a specialist in the field of psychiatry who examined and evaluated AAA and Corazon Alipante, a psychologist who also examined AAA. In contrast, the trial court found that the defenses of denial and alibi of the accused-appellant were flimsy and farfetched. It further ruled that the child conceived and delivered by AAA was fathered by the accused-appellant. After its review of the evidence, the CA agreed with the findings of the RTC and affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant.
ISSUE:
Did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
YES. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Andaya, it was held that “sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a child below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape” with or without the attendance of force, threat, or intimidation. In the case before us, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented person, through force, threat or intimidation. AAA was psychiatrically evaluated as an adult woman with the mental age of a 7 to 8-year old child and that she gave birth to a child despite her mental inability to give her consent to a sexual relationship. These facts support the allegation of sexual abuse. AAA also identified without uncertainty the accused-appellant as her attacker and related distinctly that he forcibly laid her down, held her at knifepoint, and sexually abused her. Moreover, we accord great weight and respect to the conclusion of the trial court that AAA is “candid, sincere, straightforward and simple” in her testimony as well as to the ruling of the appellate court that the alleged flaws in her statements do not affect her credibility and veracity of her testimony that the accused-appellant raped her, and that the defenses of denial and alibi of the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of AAA.
The criminal information failed to allege the qualifying circumstance that the accused-appellant knew of the mental disability of the private offended party, thus, his conviction of statutory or simple rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon, instead of qualified rape, is in order.
FLORDELIZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186441, March 3, 2010
RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
FACTS:
Petitioner Salvador Flordeliz was convicted of nine (9) counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness by the RTC which was affirmed with modification by the CA.
ABC, the wife of petitioner and the mother of private complainants AAA and BBB, left for Malaysia as overseas worker. AAA and BBB were left under the care and custody of petitioner. In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who was then eleven (11) years old, petitioner woke up AAA, touched her vagina, and then played with it. AAA cried and told petitioner that it was painful. The latter stopped, but warned AAA not to tell anyone about it otherwise, she would be harmed. Petitioner allegedly committed the same acts against AAA repeatedly. Petitioner and his daughters later transferred residence and lived with the former’s siblings. Not long after, petitioner was convicted of homicide and imprisoned. While petitioner was incarcerated, AAA and BBB visited him and sent him two greeting cards. In 2001, petitioner was released on parole. He would frequently fetch AAA and BBB from their grandparents’ house during weekends and holidays and they would stay with him.Unsatisfied with the abuses committed against AAA, petitioner allegedly started molesting BBB in May 2002. On January 3, 2003, while they were sleeping, petitioner inserted his two (2) fingers into BBB’s vagina. BBB did not attempt to stop petitioner because of fear. BBB suffered the same ordeal the following night. On February 8, 2003, BBB visited petitioner. Again, petitioner held her vagina, played with it and inserted his fingers, which caused her pain. The same incident allegedly took place on August 3, 2003. On October 26, 2003, while BBB was with petitioner, the latter committed the same dastardly act. On November 1 and 2, 2003, BB spent two nights with her father and, during those nights and she experienced the same sexual abuse as well as on December 28, 2003. BBB did not reveal her ordeal to anybody because of fear for her life and that of her mother. AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal their horrifying experiences when their mother ABC arrived for a vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what petitioner did to her. When confronted by ABC, BBB likewise admitted the repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC forthwith reported the incidents to the National Bureau of Investigation. After conducting medical examinations on AAA and BBB, the attending physician remarked that there was a “disclosure of sexual abuse and she noted the presence of hymenal notch in posterior portion of hymenal rim that may be due to previous blunt force or penetrating trauma suggestive of abuse.” Petitioner assails the factual and legal bases of his conviction, allegedly because of lack of the essential details or circumstances of the commission of the crimes. Petitioner, in effect, questions the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and insists that the charges against him were designed to conceal ABC’s infidelity.
ISSUE:
Is the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
YES. The insertion of petitioner’s fingers into the victim’s vagina constituted the crime of Rape through sexual assault under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, or “The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.” Article 266-A paragraph 2 provides that rape through sexual assault is committed by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Aside from proving the fact that Rape was committed, the prosecution also established that petitioner is the biological father of BBB and that the latter was less than twelve (12) years old at the time of the commission of the crimes.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, AAA was eleven (11) years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610 or “The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” which defines sexual abuse of children. Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one -- through coercion, intimidation or influence -- engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following elements: (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness: (2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances: a. By using force or intimidation; or b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 must be proven: (1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lasciviousconduct; (2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Petitioner’s act of touching AAA’s vagina and playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the act was committed on a child less than twelve years old and through intimidation, it is beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHRISTOPHER DE JESUS
G.R. No. 181591, January 21, 2010
RAPE
FACTS:
Information for rape was filed against appellant who was armed with a kitchen knife when committing the act.
Appellant had sexual intercourse with the then 23-year old AAA, at the ground floor of her two-storey house. Later that morning, AAA disclosed to her sister that she was raped by appellant, her neighbor and classmate during her elementary schooling. AAA and her sister immediately reported the incident to the barangay captain.AAA executed a sworn statement before the local police giving details of how she was raped by the then liquor-smelling appellant including his poking of a knife at her and threatening to kill her and her children if she shouted. AAA was medically examined by Dr. Manuel C. Aves, medico-legal officer who found hymenal remnane at both lateral and superior border abrasion and laceration deep fresh at 3, 10 o’clock of the hymen. Appellant denied the charges and interposed the “sweetheart” defense. Appellant surmised that AAA filed the rape complaint against him as he did not accede to her desire to elope with him.
The RTC convicted appellant which was confirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
YES. The accused’s use of a fan knife poked at the complainant before and during the sexual abuse constitutes sufficient force as contemplated under Article 335. The accused even went beyond employing force, he likewise intimidated the complainant by threatening to kill her and her children should she shout or make any noise. It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight on appeal. The reason therefore is that the trial judge enjoys the peculiar advantage of observing first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying and is, therefore, in a better position to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof. No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, especially in the present case where AAA had minor children to protect, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.
NORMAN GAID vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
Gaid was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide when the passenger jjeepney he was driving ran over Michael Dayata. Witness testimony allege that Gaid was not driving in violation of law and that the Dayata hastily ran after the jeep when it failed to stop after he flagged it, thereby resulting to his pinning to the rear of the jeep. Gaid allege that he had not seen anyone flag the jeepney and that he only felt the jeepney’s left rear tire jolt that caused the vehicle to tilt to the right. The CA exonerated him of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but ruled that he was negligent based on his failure to stop to check what caused the sudden jolt, as such he was convicted of simple negligence resulting to homicide.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting to homicide?
Ruling: The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.
During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent, thus, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximatecause of an injury.
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
PEOPLE vs. MICHAEL HIPONA
G.R. No. 185709, February 18, 2010
Robbery with Homicide
Appellant was convicted of Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) for having carnal knowledge and the death of, at the same time taking money and a necklace from the victim who happens to be Hipona’s aunt, being the sister of his mother, although no sufficient evidence was presented by the prosecution except for the fact that he had openly apologized in front of the media and his relatives that he acted as a look-out and under pressure of his peers. He assails his conviction for the failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that he should only be liable for robbery with homicide because there was no proof that his semen was found in the victim’s genital organ. He has also failed to explain why he was in possession of the victim’s stolen necklace.
Issue: Should the accused be sentenced to rape with homicide (and robbery) or only robbery with homicide?
Ruling: He should be convicted of Robbery with Homicide, rape is only an aggravating circumstance. From the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of appellant, and the victim’s death resulted by reason of or on the occasion thereof.
The confluence of the following established facts and circumstances sustains the appellate court’s affirmance of appellant’s conviction: First, appellant was frequently visiting the victim prior to her death, hence, his familiarity with the layout of the house; second, appellant admitted to his relatives and the media that he was present during commission of the crime, albeit only as a look-out; third, appellant was in possession of victim’s necklace at the time he was arrested; and fourth, appellant extrajudicially confessed to the radio reporter that he committed the crime due to his peers and because of poverty.
Following Article 294(1) and Article 62(1)1of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead. For circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
ELISEO EDUARTE vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176566, October 2, 2009
Robbery; Plea of Reduction of Penalty based on Indeterminate Sentence Law
Respondent after being convicted with the crime of robbery is pleading for the reduction of his penalty out of compassion for him and his family, that we reduce the maximum period of his sentence from eight years to six years in order that he may apply for probation and continue to work as a messenger at Unilever Philippines, where he has been employed since 1994 or for more than 15 years. He alleges that he is a first time offender with no previous criminal record and relies on the certifications of several persons, including his parish priest, attesting his good moral character.
Accused-appellant further emphasizes that since the imposable penalty on him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law ranges from a minimum of arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months) to a maximum of prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 8 years), his prayer for the reduction of his maximum penalty to six (6) years, so that he may be eligible for probation, is not too much to ask considering that only one (1) day separates 6 years from the minimum of the maximum penalty (6 years and 1 day to 8 years) imposable by law for the offense charged.
Issue: Can the petition be granted and can the indeterminate sentence law be applied?
Ruling: The penalty prescribed under Article 294(5) is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, that is, four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its medium period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, and whose maximum term should be the proper period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, taking into account the proven modifying circumstance. First, to determine the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed on accused-appellant, the minimum term is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose a minimum term which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. In determining the minimum penalty, the law confers upon the courts in fixing the penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had.
Next, to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence, as mentioned in Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. In the instant case, the maximum term has a range of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. The maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is broken down as follows:
Minimum: 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years, 1 month and 10 days
Medium: 6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days
Maximum: 8 years and 21 days to 10 years
With the attendance of one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence must be imposed in its minimum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years, 1 month and 10 days).
PEOPLE vs. YOON CHANG WOOK
G.R. No. 178199, October 5, 2009
Rape
Yoon, a Korean national, is convicted of the crime of Rape for having carnal knowledge of the victim who was a fellow Korean. He assails the decision of the lower courts for according full credit on the testimony of the victim and disregarding his evidence. He alleges that the allegation of the victim of rape is a lie and that she is only stating such accusation to free her oh her obligation from Yoon.
However, the prosecution has proven that the victim suffered several injuries as a result of the incident, based on medical records and exhibits showing the injuries she suffered. It was also proven that Yoon had tricked the victim into coming back to Manila, then visit his restaurant, and informing her that he will be paying his debt when she comes back to the restaurant alone. When the victim returned to the restaurant, Yoon, together with several other Korean men, had tortured the victim at a room on the second floor of his restaurant, where she was stripped off her clothes, tortured and poured with gasoline.
Issue: Should the testimony of the rape victim be relied on when the accused has presented testimonial evidence that negated his guilt?
Ruling: It is basic, almost elementary, that the trial court’s factual determinations, especially its assessments of the witnesses’ testimony and their credibility, are entitled to great respect, barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance. For having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their demeanor while in the witness box, the trial court is in a better position to address questions of credibility.
By the peculiar nature of rape cases, conviction most often rests solely on the basis of the victim’s testimony, if credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. When a woman testifies to having been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed, for as long as her testimony hurdles the test of credibility.
The victim’s failure to report to the authorities and to subject herself to genital examination right after the rape incident does not diminish her credibility. The victim is a foreigner and is not familiar with the Philippines. Hence, she could hardly be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to the authorities without the aid of somebody who is very knowledgeable of the laws of the Philippines. Well-settled is the rule that the silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated.
Bare assertions of not having committed the acts complained of cannot overcome the positive, straightforward, unequivocal, and categorical testimony of the victim. An affirmative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness, is far stronger than a negative one. Mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is inherently weak, being self-serving negative evidence undeserving of weight in law; it cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a rape victim. In the case at bar, Yoon failed to present convincing proof in support of his denial.
ARMANDO VIDAR @ "Ricky", NORBERTO BUTALON,(†) SONNY MARBELLA @ "Spike" & JOHN DOES & PETER DOES vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010
Robbery with Homicide
Petitioners were convicted of Robbery with Homicide when they have entered the house of the victim, Sgt. Julio Dioneda of the Philippine Army, who at the time was still taking his bath, and took several valuables from the house of the victim, after which they had shot the victim taking advantage of their superior number and strength.
The witnesses, the wife and sister of the victim, both positively identified the petitioners to be the perpetrators and that they only delayed filing of the criminal case against the petitioners for fear of retaliation since they are aware of the petitioner’s involvement in the NPA.
Petitioners assails the conviction maintaining that the delay in filing the case casted serious doubt on the intention and motive of the complainant and that the case should have been rebellion and the crime charged was only in furtherance of such rebellion. They have also allege the insufficiency of evidence which they have said could have not proven their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Does delay in filing of a criminal case diminish the credibility of the witness? Should the crime committed be absorbed in the crime of rebellion?
Ruling: The delay did not greatly weaken the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we believe that the delay in reporting to the police authorities the attendant facts of the crime for which the petitioners have been charged is consistent with normal human behavior considering that after a tragic incident, the last thing that the bereaved would want is to provoke further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed, personal safety takes priority as dictated by our culture. Moreover, considering private complainant’s honest belief that petitioners are known to be members of the NPA, the fear of reprisal from them was ever present which caused her momentary silence. After all, delay in reporting the occurrence of a crime or other unusual event in rural areas is well known. The fact of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses cannot be taken against them. What is important is that their testimonies regarding the incident bear the earmarks of truth and dependability.
Petitioners were steadfast in their position that the crime was committed in furtherance of rebellion, obviously to escape criminal liability for the present charge. This is judicial admission that they indeed committed the crime. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with his pleading. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he is not allowed to change his theory on appeal, for to allow him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the taking of personal property was committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking was done with animo lucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
PEOPLE vs. JONJIE ESOY, ROLANDO CIANO & ROGER BOLALACAO
G.R. No. 185849, April 7, 2010
Robbery with Homicide
Respondent-appellants were charged of Robbery with Homicide for snatching the cellphone and stabbing the chest of victim Lorenzo Coro, while all of them were on board a passenger jeepney that plied Taft Avenue in the evening of June 18, 2001. Appellant’s were convicted, however, they assail the decision based on failure of the prosecution to prove that they have taken the cellular phone since only the testimony of witness Andrea Pabalan was presented. Pabalan alleged that when appellants brandished their balisongs, she found the victim was stabbed when she told him that they should alight the vehicle, he then declared that his cellphone was snatched and asked which direction the perpetrators went. Thereafter, Pabalan told him that they should just go to a hospital so that he may be treated.
Issue: Was the testimony of the witness as to the declaration of the victim sufficient to convict the accused?
Ruling: YES! Though Pabalan’s testimony as to the victim’s utterance that his cellular phone was taken is only hearsay, the testimony is considered an exception to the hearsay rule, the victim’s spontaneous utterance being part of res gestae. In the instant case, all the elements of res gestae are sufficiently established insofar as the spontaneous utterance is concerned: (1) the principal act (res gestae) – the robbery and stabbing of the victim – is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, that is, within minutes after the victim was stabbed and his cellular phone was snatched; and (3) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances – his cellular phone was stolen during the startling occurrence.
PEOPLE vs. EMELDO OBINA, AMADO RAMIREZ & CARLITO BALAGBIS
G.R. No. 186540, April 14, 2010
Robbery with Rape
Accused-appellant Obina was convicted of Robbery with Rape while Ramirez and Balagbis were charged with Robbery. Obina and Balagbis barged in the door of victims house by destroying it and demanded for money. The victim gave them Php800.00, thereafter, the husband was ordered to kneel Obina while he molested the wife. Ramirez then shouted from outside that they will only take care of the wife after they have killed the husband. When the husband had an opportunity to flee, he left the house and sought for help leaving behind his wife and Obina, while Ramirez and Balagbis ran after him. Thereafter, Obina had carnal knowledge with the wife against her will.
Issue: Appellants assail their conviction and submits errors on the imposition of penalty and award for moral damages to the rape victim.
Ruling: As to the penalty imposed, the RTC correctly sentenced appellant Obina to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA, likewise, committed no error in affirming the penalty imposed on appellant Ramirez and accused Balagbis.
As to the award of moral damages, the civil indemnity and moral damages are separately granted in rape cases without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Civil indemnity is mandatorily awarded to the rape victim on the finding that rape was committed. It is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages. Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without need of pleading or proof; it is assumed that a rape victim actually suffered moral injuries, entitling her to this award. That the victim suffered trauma, with mental, physical, and psychological suffering, is too obvious to still require recital at the trial by the victim, since we assume and acknowledge such agony as a gauge of her credibility.
PEOPLE vs. ERNESTO CRUZ & REYNALDO AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 168446, September 18, 2009
Kidnapping with Robbery
Defendants were charged with Article 267, Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, as amended by R.A. 7659 and violation of Article 294 of the RPC. Agustin argued that the prosecution failed to substantiate his participation in the conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom and that at most, he was implicated in the commission of the crime charged based solely on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances presented by the prosecution were clearly inadequate to demonstrate convincingly and persuasively that he had conspired with appellant Cruz to commit the crime charged. However the Solicitor general averred that Agustin’s participation is that of a principal by indispensable participation.
Cruz, on the other hand, have a different version of the facts. He alleges that it was the victim, Atty. Danilo Soriano, who came up with the idea of the kidnapping in order that he may settle his bank problems.
Issue: Were defendants guilty of kidnapping? Was there conspiracy?
Ruling: For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. It was obvious that there was actual confinement and that Soriano was deprived of his liberty. There must exist indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the victim of his liberty. The restraint of liberty must not arise merely as an incident to the commission of another offense that the offender primarily intended to commit. The fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused did not remove the element of deprivation of liberty, because the victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either be made forcibly or fraudulently.
BELEN REAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152065 January 29, 2008
Estafa Art. 315 (b)
FACTS Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. On several occasions, Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of time. On January 10, 1989 at around 8:30 o’clock in the morning, accused had received the seven (7) pieces of jewelry from Benjamin Uy, in trust or on commission with the obligation on her part to return the said pieces of jewelry if unsold, or to deliver the proceeds of the sale, if sold within ten (10) days from receipt. This agreement is clearly embodied in the receipt dated January 10, [1989] signed by the accused. ISSUES That one element of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC does not exist, hence, acquittal from the crime charged is proper; and That the courts below erred in imposing a penalty that contravenes the imperative mandate of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. RULING I All the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence are present in the commission of the offense and that the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. There was misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the accused. The fact that the accused had failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale of said jewelry items nor had she returned the same jewelry items when demanded to do so by the private complainant shows that accused had misappropriated or converted to her personal use the amount of P371,500.00. In fact, she even required the private complainant to return to her house for several times so that she could remit the proceeds of the sale to him. However, accused did not comply with her obligation. Accused abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Benjamin Uy when she refused and failed to comply with her obligation. Her intention to defraud Benjamin Uy of P371,500.00 is, therefore, definitely clear. II. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the RPC for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum period of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. In this case, the penalty next lower to prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision correccional medium (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Therefore, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Considering the attendant factual milieu as well as the position of the Office of the Solicitor General in the present case, the Court is convinced that the petitioner is guilty of swindling (estafa) under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code and the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon petitioner, which is in accordance with law to best serve the ends of justice, should range from four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal, as maximum. ANGELITA DELOS REYES FLORES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185614 February 5, 2010
Estafa Art. 315 (2)a
FACTS Sometime in 2000, private complainants Felix Cornejo (Felix), Jonathan Caibigan (Jonathan) and Blesilda Caibigan (Blesilda) met petitioner through Simon Onda (Simon). Petitioner told private complainants that, as a member of Club Panoly Resorts International (Club Panoly), she could sponsor them in going to Italy to work as domestic helpers or drivers. She, thus, required each of them to produce P100,000.00 as processing fee; P50,000.00 for plane ticket; and $3,000.00 as show money. After raising enough money, private complainants met with petitioner on three separate occasions, at which Felix paid P100,000.00; while Jonathan and Blesilda paid a total amount of P168,000.00 (or P84,000.00 each). Petitioner, however, failed to make good her promise. This prompted private complainants to inquire at Club Panoly about the status of their applications. They were informed by Club Panoly that it did not allow or authorize its members to use their membership to recruit workers for possible placement abroad. Upon further inquiry with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, private complainants learned that petitioner was not a licensed recruiter of workers for overseas employment. They forthwith demanded from petitioner the return of their money and documents. As their demand remained unheeded, private complainants filed criminal cases against petitioner. In separate Informations, petitioner was charged with four (4) counts of estafa for acts committed against private complainants and Simon. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of estafa, the other case filed by Simon was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. ISSUE Is petitioner guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt? RULING Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes estafa, committed as follows: 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. The elements of the crime are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. It has been sufficiently proven that petitioner represented herself to private complainants as capable of sending them to Italy for employment, even if she did not have the authority or license for the purpose. Undoubtedly, it was this misrepresentation that induced private complainants to part with their hard-earned money in exchange for what they thought was a promising future abroad. The petitioner’s act clearly constitutes estafa under the above-quoted provision. While the SC affirmed the conviction for three (3) counts of estafa, it modifies the penalty imposed by the CA, as correctly recommended by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the RPC as discussed above. On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Code, which is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 10, 2008 and Resolution dated December 9, 2008, in CA-G.R. CR No. 30105, are MODIFIED with respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed on petitioner for three (3) counts of estafa. ELISEO R. FRANCISCO, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177720 February 18, 2009
Estafa Art. 315(2)a
FACTS Petitioner Francisco was an employee of Bankard, a credit company engaged in issuing credit cards and in acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from the purchase of goods and services by credit card holders using Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by other banks and credit card companies, at the time the alleged crime occurred. He was knowledgeable in computer programming, and held the position of Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor. Sometime in August 1999, Solidbank, one of the companies which issues credit cards, relayed to Bankard that there were four questionable transactions reflected in Solidbank Mastercard Account No. 5464 9833 0005 1922 under the name of petitioner Francisco. An amount of P663,144.56 was allegedly credited to said account of petitioner Francisco, the credit apparently being a reversal of charges from four establishments. The amount of P18,430.21 was also credited to petitioner Francisco’s AIG Visa Card based on another supposed credit advance. Petitioner Francisco was the person who received the transmittals from Equicom of documents including any purported cash advice at the time the credit transactions were made in favor of his credit card accounts. As a result of the fraudulent crediting of the amount of P663,144.56 to petitioner Francisco’s Solidbank credit card account, Bankard was made to pay the same to Solidbank in the course of the settlement of transactions between the issuing banks from the time of the crediting of the amount to petitioner Francisco’s credit card account until the fraudulent credits were charged back to Solidbank on 27 August 1999. Bankard was unable to recover the amount of P18,430.21 which petitioner Francisco fraudulently credited to his AIG Visa Card No. 4009 9218 0463 3006. ISSUE Is petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code despite absence of one element? RULING Yes. The element of estafa referred to by petitioner Francisco is the third one under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code in the following list provided by this Court in several cases: the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. It does not require that the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party. Thus, in this case wherein a person pretended to possess credit in order to defraud third persons (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa), but the offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof, such person is liable for estafa under Article 315(a), even though the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended party. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him.
ROLAND V. VELOSO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 149354 January 18, 2008
Estafa Art. 315 (2)e
FACTS Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while having dinner, had a conversation with Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine’s president and general manager, Ramon Sy Hunliong (Ramon). This led to a friendly bet between petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet. On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuenco’s secretary called the restaurant’s assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for one table corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser, informed Eva that he would pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner. However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4) additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. There were four additional tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramon’s account. The Sales Invoice for the additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00. Petitioner and his guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for only one table. The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no avail. ISSUE Is petitioner-appellant guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code or simply civilly liable for an unpaid debt? RULING Petitioner employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa. HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., BSP, and PDIC
G.R. No. 159517-18 June 30, 2009
Estafa 315 (1)b and 315 (2)a
FACTS Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of P15,000,000.00 each, when in fact they did not. Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. ISSUE Is there justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners for complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents? RULING No. The information filed contains material allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions. Petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans and received the proceeds thereof when they did not in fact secure said loans or receive the amounts reflected in the promissory notes and other bank records. The information in Criminal Case No.1720, the elements of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (ii) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (iii) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (iv) that there is demand made by the offended party to the offender. The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, further alleged the following essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (ii) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means—that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. There are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was proper.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERLINDA ABORDO and VINA CABANLONG
G.R. No. 179934 May 21, 2009
Estafa and Illegal Recruitment
FACTS Sometime in January 1994, Abordo recruited Jesus Rayray (Rayray) for possible employment abroad and collected a total of P14,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured Rayray that he could soon leave for abroad. Rayray was unable to leave as promised. Sometime in September 1994, Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Esmenia Cariño (Cariño) in Lipay, Villasis, Pangasinan, to persuade her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Cariño and Cabanlong used to be neighbors. Upon being convinced by the accused, Cariño gave a total of P15,000 as placement fee. Despite this payment, Cariño was unable to leave for abroad. Sometime in December 1994, Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Segundina Fernandez (Segundina) in Caramitan, Villasis, Pangasinan. Cabanlong and Segundina are first cousins. Cabanlong introduced Abordo as a recruiter. The accused told Segundina that they could secure employment for her son, Jaime, in Hong Kong upon payment of the placement fee. Segundina and Jaime agreed to the proposition. Segundina gave the accused cash and other valuables amounting to P45,000. Abordo gave a plane ticket to Jaime, which turned out to be fake; hence, Jaime was unable to leave for abroad. Sometime in December 1994, the accused went to the house of Exequiel Mendoza (Mendoza) to convince him to work in Hong Kong as a security guard. Mendoza agreed to be recruited and to pay P45,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured him that as soon as he could pay the placement fee, he could work abroad. Mendoza gave Abordo cash and pieces of jewelry amounting to P39,000. Despite several promises from Abordo, Mendoza was unable to leave for Hong Kong. Thus, he demanded from the accused the return of his money and pieces of jewelry, but to no avail. Adonis Peralta, Dagupan District Officer of the Department of Labor and Employment, issued certifications dated 29 September 1993 and 3 August 1993 stating that the accused were not included in the Philippine Overseas and Employment Agency list of those licensed to recruit in Pangasinan. The accused denied the charges against them. Accused claimed that they could not be held liable for estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code since the element of deceit was not established. They alleged that they received the placement fees on behalf of the travel agency. They argued that it was unclear whether the false statements or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the money by the complainants. ISSUE Whether the accused are guilty of simple illegal recruitment and estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. RULING The elements of illegal recruitment are (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. In falsely pretending to possess power to deploy persons for overseas employment, the accused deceived the complainants into believing that they would provide them overseas work. Their assurances made complainants pay the placement fees required in exchange for the promised jobs. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present The accused cooperated with each other in convincing complainants to pay placement fees for employment abroad. The accused received money from the complainants. The act of the accused of recruiting complainants for employment abroad without the necessary license from the POEA constitutes the offense of illegal recruitment. The very same evidence proving the accused’s commission of the offense of illegal recruitment also established that the accused connived in defrauding complainants by misrepresenting that they had the power, influence, agency and business to obtain overseas employment for complainants upon payment of placement fees. Complainants suffered damages to the extent of the various sums of money they delivered to accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONIE DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 185843 March 3, 2010
Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C
FACTS Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City, for two counts of rape. He pled "not guilty" when arraigned. After pretrial and trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The trial court further ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed appellant’s conviction, but modified it with an additional award of P50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral damages. ISSUE Can a subsequent marriage of the offended party exculpate the perpetrator? RULING Yes. In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads – ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: x x x x 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code. Article 344 of the same Code also provides – ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. – x x x. Based on the documents, including copies of pictures taken after the ceremony and attached to the motion, the marriage between appellant and private complainant have been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each other and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy considerations of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity of the family, appellant is accorded the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC. Appellant was absolved of the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their subsequent marriage, and is ordered released from imprisonment.
G.R. No. 168437, January 8, 2009
Falsification of Public Document [Article 171 (2)]
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Laurinio and Natalio, who as barangay chairperson and secretary, respectively, allegedly falsified a barangay Resolution T-95 dated September 24, 1995, allocating the amount of PhP 18,000 as disbursement for a seminar for the two officials.
The petitioners made it appear in the Barangay resolution that all members of the Sangguniang Barangay deliberated upon and unanimously approved the questioned resolution, when in fact no such deliberation and approval occurred. The non-participation of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay in the passage of the resolution was established by the 15 October 1995 resolution issued by 7 of the 8 members of the Sangguniang Barangay denying that the challenged resolution was passed upon and approved by the council.
Issue:
1. Is a barangay resolution a public document?
2. Are petitioners liable for falsification of public document?
3. When is the crime of falsification of public document deemed consummated?
Ruling:
1. YES. Under Sec. 19(a) of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, public documents include "[t]he written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country." Verily, resolutions and ordinances of sanggunians, be they of the sanggunian panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan,or barangay,come within the pale of the above provision, such issuances being their written official acts in the exercise of their legislative authority. As a matter of common practice, an action appropriating money for some public purpose or creating liability takes the form of an ordinance or resolution.
Black defines a public document as "a document of public interest issued or published by a political body or otherwise connected with public business." The term is also described as a document in the execution of which a person in authority or notary public takes part. There can be no denying that the public money-disbursing and seemingly genuine Res. T-95, in the preparation of which petitioners, in their official capacity, had a hand, is, in context, a public document in a criminal prosecution for falsification of public document. And it bears to stress that in falsification under Art. 171(2) of the RPC, it is not necessary that there be a genuine document; it is enough that the document fabricated or simulated has the appearance of a true and genuine document or of apparent legal efficacy
2. YES. The elements of the crime of falsification of public documents are:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding.
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.
The first two elements clearly obtain, petitioners, during the period material, being local government elected officials who, by reason of their position, certified, as Natalio did, as to the holding of a barangay session and falsely attested, as Laurinio did, as to the veracity of a resolution supposedly taken up therein. The other two elements are likewise present.
Petitioners’ bid to pass off the resolution in question as a mere proposal or a draft cannot be accorded merit in the light of the manner they worded and made it appear. Indeed, the contents and appearance of Res. T- 95 argue against the very idea of its being merely a proposal or a draft barangay enactment. Res ipsa loquitur. A draft resolution would not be numbered or be carrying certificatory and attestative signatures, let alone impressed with the dry seal of the barangay. It would not also include such particulars as the attendance of all members of the sanggunian and the identity of the moving and seconding kagawads relative to the passage of the resolution, for such details are not certain; unless they have been rehearsed or planned beforehand. But the notion that a plan had been arranged by the sanggunian as a body would be negated by subsequent development which saw the approval of a resolution dated October 15, 1995 duly signed by seven kagawads virtually trashing Res. T-95 as a falsity. The sequence of events would readily show that petitioners falsified the subject resolution, but only to be exposed by private complainants.
3. Falsification of a public document is consummated upon the execution of the false document. And criminal intent is presumed upon the execution of the criminal act. Erring public officers’ failure to attain their objectives, if that really be the case, is not determinative of their guilt or innocence. The simulation of a public document, done in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity, constitutes the crime of falsification.
In fine, the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a document’s integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of public documents. What is punished in falsification of public document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. In this particular crime, therefore, the controlling consideration lies in the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.
PEOPLE VS EVANGELINE SITON & KRYSTEL SARAGANO
G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009
Vagrants and Prostitutes [Article 202 (2)]
Facts:
Petitioners were arrestedon the basis of the surveillance previously conducted on the accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Petitioners were charged with vagrancy for having willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means to support themselves nor lawful and justifiable purpose.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
Issue:
Is the Article 202 (2) unconstitutional?
Ruling:
NO. In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant" as "every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support." The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general terms – public or semi-public places.
In the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. The requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). For this reason, we are not moved by respondents’ trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their case.
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your-car" boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity.
The streets must be protected. This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.
Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional.
LT. COL. PACIFICO G. ALEJO VS PEOPLE
GR No. 173360, March 28, 2008
Malversation of Public Property
Facts:
Petitiner Alejo was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City of the crime of Malversation of Public Property under Paragraph 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The conviction was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan.
At the time of the commission of the crime, Alejo was the Task Force Commander of the Task Force Sagip Likas Yaman (TFSLY). TFSLY is composed of the military, as the armed component, and the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resource of the Department of Environment and Natural Resouces (DENR), as the civilian element, in the drive against illegal logging. At the same time, petitioner was the Commanding Officer of the Real Estate Preservation Economic Welfare Center (REPEWC), 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Palayan City. As a higher unit, REPEWC controls smaller units, one of which is Task Force Sagip Likas Yaman (TFSLY).
On June 1992, there were 46 logs, measuring about 10 to 12 meters, stockpiled at Atate Detachment, the detachment which was primarily created to confiscate illegally-transported logs. The prosecution witnesses testified that petitioner ordered them to have these logs, valued at P20,000 delivered to his house, which logs were received therein by the petitioner.
After the Sandiganbayan affirmed the decision of the RTC, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. Petitioner’s main argument is that the prosecution failed to present any documentary evidence showing that the confiscated logs actually existed and were included in the inventory of the DENR as confiscated logs, which were turned over to the custody of the TFSLY and which were subsequently lost. Petitioner insists that the audit or inventory of confiscated logs under the possession and custody of the TFSLY is crucial to the case and in the absence thereof, the charge of malversation must fail. He adds that the prosecution’s failure to establish that there were indeed confiscated logs could mean acquittal.
Issue:
Is the inventory of the confiscated logs necessary to prove the crime of malversation of public property?
Ruling:
NO. Contrary to petitioner’s postulation, it is sufficient that the prosecution established by competent evidence that there existed confiscated logs under the control and custody of petitioner and that he misappropriated the same. Inventory or audit of the confiscated logs under the custody of the TFSLY is not necessary, since the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged. There is no requirement under the law that for one to be convicted of malversation of public property, such property must first be inventoried or audited.
To justify conviction for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property, and that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. Here, the prosecution was able to muster direct evidence that petitioner had misappropriated the subject confiscated logs. Three prosecution witnesses, Rodolfo Estremos, Nelson Flores and Amrodin Sultan, all of whom were petitioner’s subordinates, corroborated each other in declaring categorically that it was petitioner who ordered them to pick up the confiscated lumber and to deliver the same to his residence.
PEOPLE VS. TEOFILO G. PANTALEON, JR. and JAIME F. VALLEJOS
G.R. Nos. 158694-96, March 13, 2009
Complex Crime of Malversation of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents
Facts:
The appellants Teofilo G. Pantaleon, Jr. (Pantaleon) and Jaime F. Vallejos (Vallejos), former Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, were found by the Sandiganbayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 217, in relation with Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The joint affidavit-complaints filed by municipal officials, led by the town’s vice-mayor, before the Office of the Special Prosecutor of Zambales alleged that the appellants, Ken Swan Tiu, and Engr. Ramos conspired to illegally disburse and misappropriate the public funds of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales in the amounts of P166,242.72 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-328), P154,634.27 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-349), and P90,464.21 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9804-415), by falsifying the supporting documents relating to three (3) fictitious or "ghost" construction projects, namely: (a) the upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc, Nagbayan, Magsaysay, and San Pablo; (b) the upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc proper-Casagatan, Nagbayan proper-Angeles, and San Pablo-Sitio San Isidro; and (c) the construction of market stalls at the public market of Castillejos.
The affidavit-complaints further alleged that the disbursement vouchers were not signed by the municipal accountant and budget officer; that the Sangguniang Bayan did not adopt a resolution authorizing Pantaleon to enter into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken Swan Tiu; and that no projects were actually undertaken by the Municipality of Castillejos.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) recommended the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against the appellants and Ken Swan Tiu, and the dismissal of the complaint against Engr. Ramos.The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon approved the Joint Resolution of the OSP, with the modification that the complaint against Ken Swan Tiu be dismissed for lack of probable cause. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the Review Action of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
During trial Vallejos argued that the signature of the accountant did not appear in the three (3) vouchers because the accountant simply refused to sign it. He also insisted that the budget officer’s signature likewise did not appear in the vouchers because she was always out of her office. He explained that he paid the vouchers despite the absence of the accountant’s signature because the projects were already completed and the sub-contractor was already demanding payment and was threatening to sue him if he would not pay.
Pantaleon testified that he signed the vouchers and allowed the treasurer to pay the amounts stated because the accountant and the budget officer were reluctant to sign. He also claimed that the signatures of the accountant and budget officer were not important. He added that he approved the release of the money because the treasurer told him that there was an appropriation in the approved annual budget. He also insisted that the owner of La Paz Construction entered into a contact with the municipality. He maintained that he physically inspected the projects, and ordered the treasurer to pay because the project in Nagbayan road had been completed
Issue:
Did the accused commit the complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents?
Ruling:
YES. All the elements of the crime charged are present in these cases.
The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are the following:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Pantaleon and Vallejos were the municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Castillejos at the time of the crimes charged. In short, they were public officers within the meaning of the term as defined above.
As a required standard procedure, the signatures of the mayor and the treasurer are needed before any disbursement of public funds can be made. The appellants, therefore, in their capacities as mayor and treasurer, had control and responsibility over the funds of the Municipality of Castillejos.
The funds for which malversation the appellants stand charged were sourced from the development fund of the municipality. They were funds belonging to the municipality, for use by the municipality, and were under the collective custody of the municipality’s officials who had to act together to disburse the funds for their intended municipal use. The funds were therefore public funds for which the appellants as mayor and municipal treasurer were accountable.
Through the appellant’s explicit admissions, the witnesses’ testimonies, and the documentary evidence submitted, the prosecution duly established the fourth element of the crime of malversation. It is settled that a public officer is liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, if he allows another to take the funds, or through abandonment or negligence, allow such taking. The felony may be committed, not only through the misappropriation or the conversion of public funds or property to one’s personal use, but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate the funds. The felony may thus be committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence.
The appellants were likewise guilty of falsification under paragraph 5 of Article 171. Engr. Ramos testified that Pantaleon and Vallejos instructed him to place the dates January 5, 1998 on the first and third programs of work, and January 14, 1998 on the second program of work, although he prepared the programs only in March 1998. Thereafter, the appellants affixed their signatures on these programs of work. The projects covered by these programs of work served as basis for the issuance of the disbursement vouchers. The falsification was a necessary means to commit the crime of malversation.
G.R. No. 184702 October 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CHRISTOPHER TALITA
Murder
FACTS: At about 2:00 p.m. on August 7, 1998, Marty Sarte parked his car before his house on 1st Street, Meliton Ave., Barangay San Antonio, Parañaque, Metro Manila. As his wife, Sunshine Sarte, was about to board the car, she saw appellant Talita walking from behind the car toward its windows. Marty was then at the driver’s seat while her aunt, Marilou Tolentino, occupied the backseat. Sunshine’s grandmother, Maxima Alejandro, stood in front of the house, bidding goodbye to those who were about to leave.
Suddenly, appellant Talita turned around, pulled out a caliber .38 revolver, fired at least six shots through the window at those in the car, and left. Once the firing ceased, Sunshine saw Marty and Marilou wounded and motionless. She moved toward the driver’s side of the car. But Talita returned, this time astride the motorcycle that someone wearing a helmet drove for him. He fired his gun at her but hit the car’s hood instead. The motorcycle riders then fled. Marilou died but Marty received first aid treatment. Enriqueta De Ocampo, a traffic enforcer directing traffic along Sucat Intersection, noticed two men riding a motorcycle. She was unable to see the face of the driver who wore a helmet but she later identified his passenger as appellant Talita. The police arrested Talita and Cinto. Marty, Sunshine and Maxima later identified Talita in a police line-up. For their part, appellant Talita and Cinto denied having committed the crimes of which they were charged.
Talita and Cinto guilty of murder, qualified by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, frustrated murder, and for attempted murder.
ISSUE: Whether appellants are guilty?
RULING: Sunshine and Maxima’s identification of appellant Talita as the assailant is corroborated by the testimonies of Marty, Sunshine’s wounded husband, and Enriqueta De Ocampo, the traffic enforcer, who also identified him. For this reason, the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court from such testimonies are usually entitled to much weight.What is more, the trial court found that soon after the police arrested Talita and his co-accused, both Sunshine and Maxima identified them at the police line-up. No doubt, their recollections of what happened were then still fresh in their minds. The possibility of their committing a mistake is somewhat remote.
The absence of proof that appellant Talita had a motive to commit the crime is of course not indispensable to conviction since the witnesses positively identified him and described with definiteness his role in the crime. Likewise, the fact that Talita did not go into hiding cannot be considered proof of innocence. While it has been held that flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight does not necessarily mean non-guilt or innocence. Evidence of flight is usually taken into account merely to strengthen a finding of guilt. Non-flight cannot be singularly considered as evidence of innocence.
Talita mainly relied on denial which, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense because it can easily be fabricated.
HOWEVER, Cinto is acquitted for failure to prove his identity beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant Christopher Talita is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,of Frustrated Murder, and of Attempted Murder.
G.R. No. 185012 March 5, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. VICTOR VILLARINO y MABUTE
Rape with Homicide
FACTS: On April 28, 1995, "BBB", together with her 10-year old daughter "AAA" and her younger son "CCC" went to the house of their relative in Barangay "D" to attend the fiesta to be held the next day. While personally serving food and drinks to appellant, SP04 Genoguin noticed that the latter was wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant. One Rodrigo also noticed appellant wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant and wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt (sando).
While at the house of "BBB’s" aunt, "BBB" also noticed that he was dressed in a white sando and that he wore jewelry consisting of a bracelet and a necklace with pendant.He was later seen wearing the same sando and jewelry while drinking at the basketball court in Barangay "D". "BBB" told "AAA" to go home to Barangay "D1" to get a t-shirt for her brother. "AAA" obeyed. However, she no longer returned. While "BBB" was anxiously waiting for "AAA" in the house of her aunt in Barangay "D",she received information that a dead child had been found in Barangay "D1". She proceeded to the area where she identified the child’s body as that of her daughter, "AAA"
"AAA’s" lifeless body lay face up with her buttocks on top of a small rock. Her body was slanted downward with her legs spread apart and dangling on the sides of the small boulder. She was no longer wearing short pants and panty, and blood oozed from her vagina. Wrapped around her right hand, which was positioned near her right ear, was a white sando." A bracelet and a pendant were also recovered from the crime scene. On the same day, the appellant was found near the seashore of Barangay "D1". He was drunk and violent. He resisted arrest and had to be bodily carried to the motorboat that would take him to the municipal building in Almagro, Samar. The arresting team made the appellant take off his clothes since they were wet. When he complied, his briefs revealed bloodstains.
The police brought appellant to Calbayog City for medical examination since he had scratches and abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat ride the appellant voluntarily admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he committed the crime charged. He also told SPO4 Genoguin that he could keep the pendant and bracelet if he would retrieve the t-shirt and throw it into the sea. He further offered to give SPO4 Genoguin P20,000.00 if he would throw the sando into the sea. However, the police officer ignored the offer and instead reported the matter to the Chief of Police. Later, the appellant’s mother, Felicidad Mabute y Legaspi, asked SPO4 Genoguin not to testify against her son.
ISSUE: Is the confession of the accused to the officer admissible?
RULING: Yes. In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman. When the victim is a minor, however, it is sufficient that the evidence proves that the appellant had sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with the victim.
When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and no force or intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously made and not elicited through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the complex crime of rape with homicide through circumstantial evidence which were credible and sufficient, and led to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to the appellant as the culprit. First. Prior to the incident, three witnesses saw the appellant wearing the white sleeveless t-shirt, a necklace with pendant and a bracelet Second. The pendant and bracelet were later recovered a few meters away from the lifeless body of "AAA". The white sando was also found clasped in the right hand of the victim. Third. The appellant could no longer produce the sando and pieces of jewelry after his arrest. Fourth. The physical examination on the appellant revealed 10 healed abrasions and two linear abrasions or scratches on his breast, knees and ears which could have been caused by the fingernails of the victim. Fifth. The victim had blood oozing from her vaginal orifice, while the appellant had human blood-stains on his briefs. Sixth. The appellant attempted to bribe SPO4 Genoguin and the policemen who were escorting him to Calbayog City, by offering them P20,000.00 in exchange for the disposal of his white sleeveless t-shirt found in the crime scene. Seventh. The appellant’s mother requested SPO4 Genoguin not to testify against her son.
G.R. No. 173510 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ERPASCUAL DIEGA y PAJARES
Rape with Homicide
FACTS: The victim, "AAA", was a 13-year old girl residing with her family in Rodriguez, Rizal. She was a 1st year high school student and would usually leave her home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning and walk for about a kilometer to a terminal where she could take a ride to school. The path towards the terminal passes a farm within a 50-hectare plantation located at Upper Ciudad Real, Araneta, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, where the appellant was employed as a stay-in security guard. "AAA" uses the same route on her way home.
On March 17, 1995, "AAA" failed to return home at the usual time. Her parents frantically searched for her, but it was only on the next day, when the dead body of "AAA" was discovered inside the plantation.
"AAA’s" corpse was covered with leaves. A wood vine was tied around her neck and her head bore several wounds. Her school uniform was crumpled and her panty was missing. The medico-legal examination indicated that she died of "asphyxia by strangulation, hemorrhages as a result of traumatic injuries, head and body". There were deep, fresh lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00 o’clock positions and a shallow fresh laceration at 7:00 o’clock position in her hymen which "are compatible with recent loss of virginity."
The police investigation revealed that Juanito Manalo III (Juanito) was tending to the grazing carabaos inside the plantation when he saw the appellant stooping down. The appellant stood up clad only in his shorts and waved his pistol to call Juanito. As Juanito approached, he saw that the appellant had a menacing look and noticed "AAA" lying unconscious on the ground. The appellant then pointed his pistol to Juanito and ordered him to touch the body of "AAA" and to tie a vine around her neck. Out of fear, Juanito obeyed and discovered that "AAA" no longer had undergarments. He was permitted to leave, but only after the appellant threatened to kill him and his family if he would reveal to anyone what he witnessed. As Juanito fled from the scene, he was seen by Martin Gailan (Martin) and Arnel Alminana (Arnel) who were also privy to the death threats made by the appellant. The police investigation also revealed that prior to the commission of the crime, "AAA" and her aunt used to pass by the plantation and every time the appellant would see them, especially when he was drunk, he would whistle at "AAA" and even touch her upper arm. At one time, the appellant uttered to "AAA’s" aunt, "Misis, ingatan mo ang iyong pamangkin." Pending trial, appellant absconded and remained at-large until his arrest in his hometown in Baybay Gamay in Northern Samar
ISSUE: Can the guilt be proven by circumstantial evidence?
RULING: Yes. In a special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.Both rape and homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering that there were no witnesses to the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even in the absence of an eyewitness, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant Erpascual Diega y Pajares is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of "AAA" civil indemnity.
G.R. No. 182460
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA
Arson and Frustrated Homicide
FACTS: Eulogio Quilates (Eulogio) is the owner of a two-storey house in Paringao, Bauang, La Union. Among the occupants of his house were his sister Felicidad Quilates (Felicidad); another sister Alicia Manlupig (Alicia); and nephew Herminio Manlupig (Herminio). Appellant, who is the adopted son of Felicidad, occupied one room in the house. At around 3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was having a drinking spree with his cousin Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey Viduya and Ricky Viduya (Ricky) in front of their house. Appellant and Herminio were arguing over the matter of caring for Felicidad while the latter was confined in the hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two. Appellant was then seen going inside the house to get a bolo. When he emerged from the house ten (10) minutes later, he ran after Herminio but the latter managed to escape unscathed. Appellant again went back to the house.
Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed drinking. A few minutes later, he saw smoke coming from the room of appellant. As Ricky was about to enter the house, he met appellant at the door. Appellant apparently tried to stab Ricky but was unsuccessful. Ricky witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia. Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the smoke. He peeped through the small window of the house and witnessed appellant burning some clothes and boxes in the sala. Herminio immediately went inside the house to save his personal belongings. Upon emerging from the house, Herminio saw his mother, Alicia, bloodied. Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she saw smoke coming out of appellant’s room. Before she could react, appellant came charging at her and stabbed her. She sustained wounds on her upper thigh, arms, below her breast and on her ear. Alicia was still able to ask for help, and her daughter-in-law brought her to the hospital.
Appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide, hence the review is limited to the crime of arson.
ISSUE: Is circumstamtial evidence enough to prove the guilt of appellant?
RULING: Yes. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.
Indeed, appellant was last seen inside the house before the fire started. Eulogio and Ricky saw smoke emanating from the room of appellant. Herminio testified that he saw appellant burning clothes in his room. Appellant then went on a stabbing rampage while the house was on fire. While nobody directly saw appellant burn the house, these circumstances would yield to a logical conclusion that the fire that gutted eight (8) houses was authored by appellant.
A close examination of the records, as well as description of the crime as stated in the information, reveals that the crime committed is in fact simple arson because the burned properties are residential houses.
G.R. No. 187049
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs LITO MACAPANAS y ECIJA
Rape
FACTS: At around 7:30 a.m. on December 7, 1999, AAA, a student of Eastern Samar State Agricultural College, was walking on the feeder road of Barangay XXX, Salcedo, Eastern Samar going to the waiting shed where she was to take a ride to school. She was 50 to 60 meters away from the waiting shed when the appellant, wearing a makeshift ski mask and armed with a bladed weapon locally known as sundang, grabbed her hair. Appellant poked the sundang on her side and pulled her towards a grassy area. She tried to free herself and pleaded for mercy, but to no avail.
When they reached a nearby stream, appellant shoved AAA towards an uninhabited house with the knife. Inside, appellant told her to undress, but AAA did not obey. She asked appellant to remove his mask so she could identify him. Appellant acceded and removed his mask. Then, he ordered her anew to remove her dress. When she refused, appellant grabbed her skirt and forcibly removed the buttons to open her skirt. Appellant then pushed her to the floor where he removed her panty. He mounted her and succeeded in having intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, appellant allowed AAA to put on her dress with a warning that he would kill her if she tells anyone about what happened.
When AAA saw plenty of people on the road, she shouted for help. Appellant then stabbed her at the back and fled. AAA was brought to the Southern Samar General Hospital where she was confined for nine (9) days.
On the third day of AAA’s confinement, they suspected that something more had happened to AAA, but she merely cried and did not answer their questions. On her sixth day of confinement, AAA, accompanied by her mother, admitted she was also raped.
ISSUE: Whether appellant’s guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: Yes. The fact that AAA did not immediately reveal that she was raped by appellant does not necessarily impair AAA’s credibility. How the victim comported herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape. Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.
In this case, the delay in reporting the sexual assault was reasonable and explained. AAA adequately explained that she did not immediately inform anyone of her ordeal because she was ashamed and afraid because appellant had threatened to kill her. Thus, her reluctance that caused the delay should not be taken against her. Neither can it be used to diminish her credibility nor undermine the charge of rape.
While appellant was not placed in a police line-up for identification by AAA, the absence of such police line-up does not make AAA’s identification of appellant as the one (1) who raped her, unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification in every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable identification as long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. What is crucial is for the witness to positively declare during trial that the person charged was the malefactor.
For one (1) to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one (1) of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, must be alleged in the Information and duly proved during the trial. In the case at bar, appellant used a sharp-pointed bolo locally known as sundang in consummating the salacious act. This circumstance was alleged in the Information and duly proved during trial. Being in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, “use of a deadly weapon” increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty. This so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. As such, the presence of generic aggravating and mitigating circumstances will determine whether the lesser or higher penalty shall be imposed. When, as in this case, neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the minimum penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should be the penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, both trial and appellate courts properly imposed on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Exemplary damages should likewise be awarded pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon attended the commission of the rape.
G.R. No. 190616
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PASTOR LLANAS, JR. y BELCHES
Rape
FACTS: Appellant is legally married to BBB, AAA’s mother, and that he is the father of AAA, his and BBB’s only child.
The first incident happened sometime in 1998 when AAA was only a 9-year old grade III schoolgirl. On the fateful day of that year, appellant tricked AAA into going with him to a “camalig” to play. Once inside, appellant laid her on the bamboo floor and removed her garments. In all her innocence, AAA asked why she is being undressed only to be told by the appellant not to report anything, else he would kill her and BBB. After taking off his clothes, appellant parted AAA’s legs, went on top of her, inserted his sex organ to hers and made the usual push-and-pull routine.
One day the following year, appellant again sexually abused AAA, now 10 years old. In the witness box, AAA could not recall whether the incident happened in the morning or in the afternoon, but she distinctly remembered that it occurred in 1999, being in Grade IV at that time and it was the year the family moved to another house in the same barrio.
Then on August 4, 2005, at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while BBB was out of the house, appellant approached AAA, now 15 years old, to ask her to play. This remark frightened AAA, as this was the same line used when she was abused in the past. AAA spurned the invitation to play, but the insistent appellant told her that: “para lang yan. It’s just that. You are not going to be pregnant because I’m withdrawing my semen.” There and then, appellant brought her to a room, stripped her of her shorts and panty and likewise removed his garments. What happened next was a virtual repeat of what appellant did in 1998 and 1999 after he asked AAA to play. Responding later to BBB’s questioning why she was crying, AAA disclosed everything to her mother. Thereafter, BBB, with AAA in tow, proceeded to the local police station to report about the incidents, after which BBB repaired to the local National Bureau of Investigation office to have AAA physically examined.
The records of the physical examination yielded: “no extragenital physical injury x x x on the body of [AAA] at the time of examination; old healed hymenal lacerations present; and hymenal orifice wide x x x as to allow complete penetration by an average sized adult male organ in full erection without producing hymenal injury.”
ISSUE: Appellant seeks acquittal, predicating his plea principally on the issue of: (1) the credibility of the prosecution’s key witness; and (2) the sufficiency of the People’s evidence.
RULING: Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy involving only two persons and not generally attempted save in secluded places far from prying eyes. By the intrinsic nature of rape cases, the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended girl herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People’s single witness of the actual occurrence.Foremost of these: an offended woman’s testimony hurdling the exacting test of credibility would suffice to convict. In fine, the credibility of the victim is always the single most important issue in prosecution for rape. Withal, in passing upon the credibility of the victim-witness, the highest degree of respect must be afforded to the evaluation and findings of the trial court.
Appellant’s obvious thesis that a minor rape victim always results in vaginal injury rests on a lot of oversimplification and, hence, must be eschewed. To start with, full penile penetration, which would ordinarily result in hymenal rupture or laceration of the vagina of a girl of tender years, is not a consummating ingredient in the crime of rape. The mere knocking at the door of the pudenda by the accused’s penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape. The medical report on AAA is only corroborative of the finding of rape. The absence of fresh external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration and like vaginal injuries not being, to repeat, an element of the crime of rape. What is more, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is, to repeat, sufficient to convict.
In rape cases, the concurrence, as here, of the victim’s minority (under 18) and her relationship with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance for which the law prescribes the penalty of death underArt. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death, for each count of qualified rape, on appellant who shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is in order in light of R.A. 9346 or the the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
G.R. No. 155850 February 19, 2008
EDGARDO POSTANES, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Slight Physical Injuries
FACTS: On April 9, 1996, at past three o'clock in the afternoon, Pasion and his co-employees, Gines Carmen, Ali Plaza and Armand Juarbal, were walking on the 3rd Floor of the Masagana City Mall when all of a sudden, petitioner appeared and tapped him on the shoulder. When he turned around, petitioner punched him on the face. Pasion fell on the floor, and petitioner kicked him and poked a gun at him. Immediately, Pasion ran toward the LRT station. As a result of the attack, Pasion suffered physical injuries which prevented him from working for ten days. He spent P2,000 for his medical expenses. Pasion's testimony was corroborated by Gines Carmen.
Petitioner was found guilty of slight physical injuries and the court sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty days. Petitioner argues that the CA should have acquitted him because the medical certificate/records presented by Mr. Pasion were not also identified by the physician who issued the same; that the findings of the trial court were overrated, and the judge who penned the decision was not the one who personally heard the testimony of petitioner and his three witnesses; that the CA should not have disregarded the testimony of petitioner's witnesses who identified Mr. Pasion as the assailant and petitioner as the victim; that Mr. Pasion and his witnesses are not credible because they were directly involved in the altercation, and their testimonies are biased and self-serving; and that the CA gravely erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Is the appeal meritorious?
RULING: No. We have constantly reiterated that conclusions and findings of the facts of the trial court as well as the assessment of the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial evidence on record.
The petition fails. Petitioner raises factual issues and credibility issues, which are not appropriate in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 wherein only questions purely of law may be raised.
Petitioner contends that there was an unequal treatment of medical certificates. The record, however, shows that the certificate of Mr. Pasion from the Philippine General Hospital was authenticated by the records custodian who testified, whereas that of petitioner was not authenticated at all.
G.R. No. 178061 January 31, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOHN MONTINOLA @ TONY MONTINOLA
Rape/Acts of Lasciviousness
FACTS: In six informations, the prosecution charged Montinola with raping his minor daughter, AAA, on 29 October 1999, 19 December 1999, February 2000, March 2000, 4 November 2000, and January 2001 and with acts of lasciviousness. AAA was born on 12 October 1987.
He claimed that AAA made up the accusations against him because he often beat her. Moreover, he claimed that, if it were true that he raped her, (1) he would have been caught by people outside the house, if there were any; and (2) she would have sustained injuries in her vagina because his penis has pellets embedded in it. AAA's mother, two brothers, and sister corroborated Montinola's claim that he did not rape AAA.
On appeal, Montinola contended that the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to AAA's testimony and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. He claimed that AAA was not credible: (1) her testimony was inconsistent, (2) her testimony was not in accord with human experience, (3) she failed to immediately report the incidents to her relatives or to the proper authorities, (4) she admitted that there were other people in the house when the alleged incidents took place yet she did not ask them for help, and (5) the medical report did not prove that Montinola was the one who raped AAA.
ISSUE: Is the appeal tenable?
RULING: No. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review. The Court can correct errors unassigned in the appeal.
The Court is not impressed with Montinola's claim that AAA's testimony is not credible because it contains an inconsistency. [M]inor lapses should be expected when a person is made to recall minor details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. After all, the credibility of a rape victim is not destroyed by some inconsistencies in her testimony. Moreover, testimonies of child victims are given full faith and credit.In the instant case, a minor inconsistency is expected especially because (1) AAA was a child witness, (2) she was made to testify on painful and humiliating incidents, (3) she was sexually abused several times, and (4) she was made to recount details and events that happened several years before she testified.
The Court believes AAA. This is a very futile attempt to discredit AAA's testimony. Allowing young children to go outside the house while the rain is pouring is not unbelievable, especially when one is overcome by lust.
AAA's failure to report the incidents immediately was justifiable: (1) Montinola threatened her that he would cut her throat, as well as the throats of her siblings, if she told anyone about the incidents; (2) her mother was at work most of the time; (3) Montinola had moral and physical control over her, kept an eye on her, and interrupted her whenever she attempted to report the incidents to her mother; (4) even if she told her mother, her mother would not have believed her; (5) she was overwhelmed by fear and confusion; (6) telling people that one has been raped by her own father is not easy to do; and (7) a 14-year-old child cannot be expected to know how to go about reporting crimes to the proper authorities.
There is no rule that rape can only be committed in seclusion. In rape cases, the credibility of the complainant's testimony is almost always the single most important issue. When the complainant's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction. AAA revealed that her own father raped her, allowed the examination of her vagina, and willingly underwent a public trial where she divulged in detail her painful experiences.
For the acts of lasciviousness, he should be punished under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Section 5(b) covers acts of lasciviousness while Section 10(a) covers other acts of abuse. Section 5(b) provides:
Under Section 5(b) has three elements: (1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years old.
All three elements are present in the instant case: (1) Montinola caressed AAA's right thigh, slipped his hand under her shorts, and touched her vagina; (2) AAA indulged in lascivious conduct under Montinola's coercion; and (3) AAA was below 18 years old.
Accordingly, the Court modifies the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 02-725. Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Since there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period - reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 187742 April 20, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CRIZALDO PACHECO y VILLANUEVA
Rape
FACTS: AAA lived with her mother, BBB, and accused-appellant, BBB’s live-in partner, in Malabon City. She recalled that accused-appellant had raped her many times, the last of which happened on January 7, 2002 at around 2 o’clock in the morning. At that time, she was awakened from her sleep when accused-appellant was removing her clothes. He then removed his clothes also and proceeded to mount her, inserting his penis into her vagina and repeating a pumping movement. AAA felt pain in her vagina but could not cry out as accused-appellant threatened to maul and box her as he had previously done. After having carnal knowledge of AAA, accused-appellant then went to sleep.
AAA eventually revealed accused-appellant’s lechery to one of her teachers, who accompanied her to Bantay Bata ABS-CBN to ask for help. AAA then gave the police a statement of what had happened to her. P/SInsp. Sabino testified in her capacity as Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Women’s Crime and Child Protection Center. Her ano-genital examination on AAA revealed that the child had deep healed laceration at 6 o’clock position.
On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for erroneously ruling against him even if (1) the rape could not have been committed inside a room where AAA’s mother and other siblings were also sleeping; (2) AAA belatedly reported the rape; (3) the prosecution failed to establish with certainty that the hymenal laceration was the direct result of his raping AAA; (4) AAA could have shouted or resisted if she was really raped; and (5) AAA was motivated by ill feelings in accusing accused-appellant of rape.
ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
RULING: No. The arguments raised by the defense are overused and insubstantial. The Revised Penal Code defines statutory rape as sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age.
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place.
In prosecuting rape cases, we reiterate from previous rulings that the eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges.
Jurisprudence holds that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape. Even the victim’s lack of resistance, especially when intimidated by the offender into submission, does not signify voluntariness or consent. While AAA may not have exerted effort to free herself from her rapist, her actions can be explained by the fear she already had of accused-appellant, who had beat her up on more than one occasion. Accused-appellant’s moral ascendancy over AAA, combined with memories of previous beatings, was more than enough to intimidate AAA and rendered her helpless while she was being victimized.
The burden of going through a rape prosecution is grossly out of proportion to whatever revenge the young girl would be able to exact. The Court has justifiably thus ruled, as the OSG noted, that a girl of tender age would not allow herself to go through the humiliation of a public trial if not to pursue justice for what has happened.
As this Court has previously ruled, accused-appellant can still be convicted of rape on the sole basis of the testimony of the victim. Hence, even if the medical findings are disregarded, in the end, the prosecution has successfully proved the case of rape against accused-appellant on the basis of AAA’s testimony.
The Revised Penal Code punishes statutory rape with reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 177138 January 26, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOEL GUILLERMO
Rape
FACTS: AAA testified that when she was 13 years of age, she and appellant, who is her first cousin, lived at her grandparents’ house. She, with her siblings, slept in the sala illuminated by a kerosene lamp. On three separate occasions, she woke up in the middle of the night to find the appellant wielding a knife and removing her clothes and blanket. He subsequently forced her to engage in sexual intercourse with him. The appellant threatened to kill her and the rest of her family if she reported the incident. Because she believed the threats of the appellant, she kept quiet about the incidents until her elementary school teacher noticed that she was pregnant. AAA revealed to her the dastardly acts of the appellant. She accompanied AAA to report the matter to her father. They then proceeded to the police station to file the complaint. Dr. Ganciñia testified that AAA disclosed that appellant forced her to engage in sexual relations with him. She found that AAA had cervical lacerations and confirmed that AAA was 5 to 6 months pregnant.
BBB testified that on September 28, 1998, when she was 12 years old, appellant sexually abused her. She lived at her grandparents house. At night, she slept in the sala (which was illuminated by a kerosene lamp) beside her siblings. One evening, she woke up as she felt someone licking her genitals. To her surprise, she discovered that her clothes had been removed and appellant was on top of her. Appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Throughout the entire ordeal, appellant was holding a knife and threatening to kill her and her family if she told anyone about the incident. Dr. Ganciñia testified that, after examining BBB she found four healed lacerations in the child’s cervix.
For its part, the defense argued that AAA was the sweetheart of appellant, and they had four sexual encounters when she accepted his love proposal. He insisted on the validity of the affidavit of desistance by AAA.
With respect to BBB’s accusation, appellant said that BBB was like a sister and he treated her accordingly. He was not aware of any reason for her to accuse him of molesting her.
ISSUE: Is the defense of the accused tenable?
RULING: No. The "sweetheart theory" is an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence. Appellant presented no evidence to substantiate his claim.
Furthermore, the Court does not look with favor on affidavits of retraction. Recanted testimony is highly questionable because it can be secured through monetary considerations. It is dangerous for courts to reject testimonies solemnly given before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who made them change their minds later on. Such a rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Here, the affidavit of retraction was precisely executed by AAA in exchange for financial assistance and land (which she never received).
Appellant’s guilt of the crime of simple rape through force or intimidation has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Inasmuch as the minority of both AAA and BBB was not proven and their relationship with appellant was outside the scope of Article 14 of the RPC and Article 266-B of RA No 8353, these circumstances cannot be considered as aggravating circumstances.
Nonetheless, the victims are entitled to exemplary damages since appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the offense. While the use of a deadly weapon is not one of the generic aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the RPC, under Article 266-B thereof, the presence of such circumstance in the commission of rape increases the penalty, provided that it has been alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Thus, even if the use of a deadly weapon is not alleged in the Information but is proven during the trial, it may be appreciated to justify the award of civil liability, particularly exemplary damages.
In this instance, while the Information did not state that appellant possessed a deadly weapon, the prosecution sufficiently established that he threatened his victims with a knife in order to facilitate the commission of his bestial acts and cow his victims into silence. Inasmuch as appellant may not be sentenced to death, the presence of such circumstance justifies the award of exemplary damages.
People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Grande
G.R. No. 170476 December 23, 2009
Facts:
Fifteen year old student [AAA] was renting a room in a boarding house at Purok 1-A, Barangay San Roque, Mercedes, Camarines Norte. In the night of August 21, 1997, [AAA] was roused from her sleep by accused-appellant who was on top of her and in the act of removing her shirt. Accused-appellant who was already naked from the waist down, pressed on [AAA] keeping the latter’s hands crossed on her chest and lowered her loose garter shorts and panty down to her knees. He then inserted his penis inside [AAA]’s private part and made pumping motions causing unbearable pain to the poor teenager. All this time, [AAA] pushed her attacker away but her efforts proved futile for accused-appellant was quite heavy for the fifteen year old. Accused-appellant’s push and pull motion lasted for about five minutes. After satisfying his lust and before leaving, accused-appellant talking slowly threatened [AAA] not to report what happened or he would kill her and the latter’s parents.
For his defense, 25-year old accused-appellant claimed that he and [AAA] were lovers. Still according to accused-appellant, they had gone out on dates and had sexual intercourse with [AAA] before the complained incident. On that fateful night, Accused-appellant claimed that they had sex.
Issue:
Was the accused guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of simple rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Accused’s reliance on the “sweetheart” theory to bolster his defense failed to inspire belief. This much-abused affirmative defense must be established with convincing evidence – by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. Considering that the sweetheart theory is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence, it must be supported by documentary, testimonial and other defense to be worthy of judicial acceptance.
The People of the Philippines vs. Quirino Cabral y Valencia
G.R. No. 179946 December 23, 2009
Facts:
The accused-appellant was charged with five (5) counts of rape committed within the period December 1995 to November 21, 1998 against the complainant who was only 10 to 13 years old at the time. The rape incidents all happened under the following circumstances: (a) the rapes were committed in the family dwelling between 12:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. when the complainant was sleeping with her siblings; (b) the size of the family dwelling was three meters by four meters; (c) the complainant’s mother was not around; (d) the accused-appellant poked a balisong at the complainant’s neck in three instances to compel her to submit to the sexual assaults; and (e) the accused-appellant also threatened to kill the complainant and the rest of the family members in case of disclosure.
The accused-appellant denied the charges against him and claimed that it was impossible for him to commit the rapes, considering that his work schedules as a tricycle driver and as a fisherman compelled him to work at nighttime. The accused-appellant imputed ill-motive on his wife and the complainant. He claimed that the complainant begrudged him for disciplining her; his wife wanted to replace him with another man.
The RTC acquitted the accused-appellant of one (1) count of rape, but convicted him of the four (4) counts charged, and imposed the penalty of death – the penalty qualified rape carries.
Issue:
Whether the court failed to appreciate the doubtful testimony of the complainant, considering her failure to shout for help and the improbability that the rapes could have been committed in a 3 x 4-meter house in the presence of other people.
Ruling:
No. The Court rejected the accused’s claim that it was impossible for him to rape his daughter in a 3 x 4 meter house, in the presence of other people. The Court noted that the close physical proximity of other relatives at the scene of the rape does not negate the commission of the crime. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the victim’s family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. Lust is no respecter of time and place, and is not deterred by age nor relationship.
People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Layco, Sr.
G.R. No. 182191 May 8, 2009
Facts:
Appellant was charged with nine (9) counts of rape committed against his own 11-year old daughter, AAA, on January 1993 and his 7-year old daughter, BBB, sometime in 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.
Both victims testified that they were raped by their father inside their house. On these occasions, each incident of rape was always preceded by physical violence on their persons. AAA saw her sister BBB washing dishes and crying while her father was doing the pumping motion behind her in a standing position. The victims were subjected to physical examination. Dra. Batino noted that AAA’s hymen had sustained several lacerations which were more than a year old counting from the time of examination. Dra. Batino likewise attended to BBB and discovered that she had incomplete lacerations in the hymen.
Appellant interposed denial and alibi. He claims that on the dates when AAA was supposedly raped, the latter was no longer living with him. As to BBB, appellant also alleges that BBB was then living with different relatives.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty as charged.
Issue:
Was the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (1) the age of the complainant; (2) the identity of the accused; and (3) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
All the required elements were proven by the prosecution. The victim’s ages are evidenced by their birth certificates that AAA only 11 years old at the time of the incidents, having been born on 22 May 1982, while BBB was only seven (7) years old and born on 18 April 1986. Their identification of their father as the rapist was positive, clear and categorical. They also gave a vivid description of the sexual acts committed by appellant. Moreover, their accusation finds support in the medical reports on the physical injuries AAA and BBB had sustained.
People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Marcos
G.R. No. 185380 June 18, 2009
Facts:
Rogelio was charged before the RTC with Rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
The victim was 11 years old, when the alleged rape incident took place. AAA was then living with her mother and her stepfather Rogelio, and three younger siblings. On July 2003, while taking care of her younger siblings, as her mother was away working in the farm, Rogelio ordered the victim to go upstairs. AAA obliged her stepfather’s order. As soon as Rogelio was upstairs, he suddenly moved toward AAA and removed her dress, her short pants and panties and put her down. Rogelio undressed himself, mounted AAA and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. Rogelio then made a push and pull motion. As Rogelio was inserting his penis, AAA cried as she felt so much pain. AAA’s wailing continued throughout the entire sexual episode.
After the first rape incident, and in the same month of July, 2003, AAA was again abused by Rogelio. This time, Rogelio did it at the back of the house. The following months, she was subjected to sexual abuse three times every month. The last rape incident was on July 2005.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the oral testimonies of Rogelio and AAA’s mother. The defense claimed that it was AAA who initiated the sexual congress.
The RTC rendered a guilty verdict against Rogelio
Issue:
Was the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Statutory rape, under Article 266-A, par. 1-d, is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman "when the offended party is under 12 years of age." The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape.
In this case, the victim’s age is undisputed. She was below 12 years old. Her Birth Certificate shows that she was born on 15 March 1992. Thus, on 13 July 2003, AAA was only eleven (11) years old.
People of the Philippines vs. Salomon Dioneda y dela Cruz
G.R. NO. 180923 April 30, 2009
Facts:
In the evening of August 2000, AAA, then six (6) years old, she having born on May 14, 1994 went to her neighbor Dajao’s three-storey house with the intention of playing with the latter’s son, Iking. On reaching the first floor, AAA met appellant, a helper of the Dajao family, who told her that Iking was already asleep at the third floor. She thus decided to go home but appellant prevented her from leaving, saying "Sandali lang," he telling her that the two of them were going to play. She refused but appellant held her arm forcing her to return to the second floor. Appellant caught up with her, however, made her lie down on the floor and placed himself on top of her. He then carried her to a double-deck bed where he laid her down, removed her panties, undressed himself, went on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She experienced pain. He then wiped her vagina and warned her not to tell the incident to anybody.
The trial court found appellant guilty of rape as charged under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.
Appellant assails AAA’s credibility, citing her inconsistent answers regarding the circumstances before the commission of the alleged rape, particularly her testimony on direct examination that she stopped at the second floor of the Dajaos’ house where he allegedly told her to wait ("sandali lang") but that on cross-examination she stated that she met appellant at the ground floor.
Issue:
Was the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
Yes. The place where AAA met appellant when she was about to leave the Dajao residence, whether on the ground or second floor is a trivial matter. AAA, a child of tender age, could not be expected to give a perfect recollection of the exact floor of the house where she met appellant.
Forthright witnesses are not immune from committing minor inaccuracies in their narration of events. Trivial inconsistencies and inconsequential discrepancies on minor details in the testimonies of witness do not impair their credibility. They could, in fact, be badges of truth for they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. As long as the inconsistencies are immaterial or irrelevant to the elements of the crime and do not touch on material facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused as in the present case, these are not valid grounds to reverse a conviction.
Appellant’s challenge to the assailed decision having failed, and no circumstance which creates reasonable doubt on his guilt being extant, his conviction must be upheld.
People of the Philippines vs. Nestor Veluz
G.R. No. 167755 November 28, 2008
Facts:
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2535, reads as follows:
That on October 23, 1999 or earlier in x x x, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, and unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge for four times of thirteen year old AAA who has a mental age only of four (4) to five (5) years old and the said accused was then aware of the mental disability and or physical handicap of the said offended party.
The prosecution evidence seeks to establish the following facts:
AAA testified that she was called by Kathleen (appellant’s daughter) to go to the latter’s house; and when inside the house, she was raped by appellant.
Corazon Rivera (Rivera) testified that on October 23, 1999, at around 10 a.m., she went to the house of appellant to ask for saluyot. Upon reaching his house, Rivera peeped through the window and saw appellant and AAA lying on the elevated bamboo platform (papag). Appellant was naked and his buttocks was moving up and down while AAA's blouse was rolled up and both were lying down facing each other side by side. Rivera watched appellant doing the pumping motion for three minutes and then left to call BBB, the aunt of AAA.
Upon reaching the house of appellant, BBB saw appellant and AAA lying naked on the bed. After seeing the scene inside the house of appellant, BBB called appellant and requested that AAA be allowed to go out. Since appellant did not immediately answer, BBB said that she would call a bantay bayan. BBB did not find a bantay bayan but instead she saw Loreto Cuaresma (Cuaresma), one of the barangay kagawads. Cuaresma told BBB to go ahead and that he would follow. When BBB went back to the house of appellant, she saw AAA at the back of the said house, sitting on the ground and perspiring. She asked AAA what happened and the latter answered, “Iniyot ng matagal.” BBB asked AAA when she was “iniyot” and the latter answered, “Nabayagon.”
Furthermore, BBB asked AAA how many times she had intercourse. AAA responded by showing her four fingers. In addition, when AAA told BBB that she had intercourse a long time ago, BBB asked if it happened again on that day and the answer was “wen” or yes.
Cuaresma followed BBB after five minutes. Upon reaching the house of appellant, he saw AAA sitting and perspiring and her hair entangled. Cuaresma observed that AAA looked as if she was out of her mind. Cuaresma asked AAA what appellant did to her and the latter answered, “Iniyot nak.” When asked how many times, AAA raised her four fingers. Cuaresma asked AAA who molested her and the latter answered that it was appellant
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of qualified rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed “when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.” The Information in this case alleges the mental disability of AAA and appellant's knowledge of the same at the time of the commission of the crime of rape. Both allegations were duly established beyond reasonable doubt during trial.
People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Abay y Trinidad
G.R. No. 177752 February 24, 2009
Facts:
Appellant Roberto Abay y Trinidad was charged with rape in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4 under the following Information:
That sometime in December 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, [appellant] by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct against [AAA], a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there kissing her breast and whole body, lying on top of her and inserting his penis into her vagina, thus succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent thereafter threatening to kill her should she report the incident, thereby gravely endangering her survival and normal growth and development, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed against her. The Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecution’s evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
People of the Philippines vs. Fidel Canete
G.R. No. 182193, November 07, 2008
Facts:
Except for the dates and times of the admission of the offense, the six Informations filed against accused-appellant contain the same accusatory portion as the first Information (Criminal Case No. 2557-M-2001), as follows:
That in or about the year 1994, in the municipality of BBB, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the uncle of the offended party, AAA, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of the said AAA, then 9 years old, against her will and without her consent.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of all six (6) counts of rape. Upon appeal,accused-appellant advances the theory of the improbability of the rape incidents having occurred based on certain details in the victim's testimony. He wonders how it was possible for the offenses to have transpired when the victim's relatives were in the same room. He likewise avers that the victim should have cried out for help while she was being raped. He argues that there was no proof that he could inflict immediate harm on AAA as he supposedly did not have a deadly weapon during the rape incidents.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape?
Ruling:
Yes. Accused-appellant's exculpatory allegations do not merit concurrence. Rape has been known to be committed not only in seclusion but in public places, inside an occupied house, or even where there are other people around. We have accordingly ruled that rape is not a respecter of people, time, or place. It is not improbable that accused-appellant was able to succumb to his lechery while AAA's grandmother and sister were sound asleep. Moreover, AAA testified that accused-appellant warned her not to tell anyone of the sexual abuse or else he would kill her. It is not unnatural then for AAA to have kept silent during the rape for fear for her personal safety. The failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate the commission of rape.
On the alleged impossibility of inflicting immediate harm on AAA since accused-appellant had no deadly weapon at the time of the rape incidents, we held in People v. Santos that it is common for a young victim of tender age to be fearful in the face of the mildest threat against her life. Although not alleged in the information’s, the moral ascendancy of accused-appellant over his victim as her uncle was more than sufficient to cow her into submission, even without use of a deadly weapon.
People of the Philippines vs. Michael Muro
G.R. No. 176263 December 24, 2008
Facts:
Michael Muro (appellant) was, by Information filed on July 4, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, charged for "rape of a girl under thirteen (13) years of age in relation to violation of Republic Act 7610.
The private complainant AAA, a deaf-mute, gave the following account with the assistance of a sign language interpreter at the witness stand:
At around 10:30 in the evening of June 29, 2000, while she, then of 13 summers and a Grade III pupil, was outside her house n Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City watching people pass by, appellant, whom she identified in open court and who was 22 years old at the time, tapped her and wrote something on his hand which she could not understand. He then gestured to her to go with him, but she refused. He thereupon grabbed her and despite her resistance, he brought her to a vacant lot along J. Rizal Street in Mandaluyong that had a lot of trees and water. She accidentally tripped and fell to the ground. He at once undressed himself and then undressed her. While she resisted, appellant got mad at her and then inserted his penis into her vagina. He thereafter put on his clothes and left.
The RTC found appellant guilty of rape. Upon appeal, appellant argued, inter alia, as follows, quoted verbatim:
x x x The private complainant, in this case, claimed that the accused-appellant forcibly took her to an area filled with trees where he allegedly sexually abused her. The said place was far from where she was taken and they merely walked the distance but surprisingly, she did not run away from the accused even when the latter was walking ahead of her. Likewise intriguing is the private complainant’s statement that she was with some friends when she was watching people pass by at Hulo and yet nobody saw the accused appellant grabbed her. Her well-chosen time to look at passer[s] by is also worth noting. It was already late at night and her mother was already asleep. Then after her alleged ordeal, she did not go home because she was allegedly afraid and decided to sleep in a stranger’s house. Her physical appearance also did not match her claim that she was ravaged in a wet place. Despite her allegation that the accused pulled her, there was no manifestation of any physical abuse. Had the accused really pulled her, her hands should have incurred hematomas.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
No. The uncorroborated testimony of the victim in a rape case may, under certain circumstances, be adequate to warrant conviction. The testimony must, however, be clear, impeccable and ring true throughout or bear the stamp of absolute candor, free from any serious contradictions. Such inexplicable discrepancies on important details vis a vis the result of her physical examination which bears no indication of the commission of sexual intercourse committed hours earlier nag the Court to entertain serious doubts on whether appellant committed the crime charged. The Court’s doubts are reinforced by prosecution witness Berme’s following observation, viz:
ATTY. JAO: Mr. witness, when you saw the victim, [AAA], how [did] she looks [sic]?
A: Very tired, sir.
Q: Was she crying?
A: No, sir.
Q: How about her clothes?
A: A bit alright, sir.
which do not indicate the commission of rape in a watery area. That appellant even fetched BBB and accompanied her to the barangay hall where AAA was, a fact attested even by the prosecution witnesses, seals the doubts on whether he had hours earlier raped AAA.
People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Antonio
G.R. No. 174372 January 20, 2009
Facts:
Appellant Elpidio Antonio was by separate Informations charged with two counts of rape of his minor daughter AAA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Ecija.
Culled from the records of the cases is the following version of the prosecution:
At around 6:00 o’clock in the morning of June 6, 1994, the then 13-year-old AAA who was sleeping with her six siblings at their house in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija awoke to find her father–herein appellant lying beside her, touching her breasts and vagina. Over her resistance, and at the point of a bladed weapon, he undressed her and inserted his penis into her vagina causing it to bleed. And he threatened to kill her if she reveals to anyone what he had done.
In the morning of August 14, 1994, again as AAA was sleeping at their house with her siblings, she awoke to find appellant mashing and sucking her breasts, licking her vagina, pointing a bladed weapon at her, following which, over her resistance, he undressed her and himself and inserted his penis into her vagina. Again blood oozed from her vagina.
Admitting that AAA is his daughter, appellant denied the charges, claiming that they were filed at BBB’s instance in retaliation for his having driven her away from home following an altercation on August 13, 1994. And to show BBB’s motive, appellant presented his mother who claimed that BBB demanded the payment by appellant of P100,000 and the transfer to her of the house and lot she (mother) owned as conditions for the dropping of the charges.
The RTC found appellant guilty of both charges. After the promulgation of the trial court’s judgment, appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for New Trial anchored in the main on, as stated earlier, the purported execution by AAA of an Affidavit of Desistance.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of of rape?
Ruling:
Yes. It bears noting that the affidavit was presented after the judgment of conviction by the trial court was promulgated which, as a rule, the Court frowns upon.
For AAA’s supposed Affidavit of Desistance to warrant a new trial, it must deny the truth of her complaint, not merely seek the withdrawal of appellant’s prosecution. Her statement that there is no sufficient basis for her father to be convicted of rape and it is unjust to convict her father and let him suffer (“walang sapat na batayan at hindi makatarungan na mahatulan at magdusa ang aking amang si Elpidio Antonio”) is just a legal conclusion.
Parenthetically, the affidavit is of doubtful authenticity, for AAA’s purported signature thereon is different from her signature on her Complaint-Affidavit which she identified in open court.
The conviction of appellant for both counts of rape must thus stand.
People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Pascual y Ildefonso
G. R. No. 172326 January 19, 2009
Facts:
Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son and that accused-appellant (who appeared to be already drunk) was also there together with his child; that accused-appellant stayed with them up to 1:00 a.m. of December 25; that during the course of his stay with the group, accused-appellant left twice to go inside the house but kept on coming back to continue drinking; that when accused-appellant left for the third time, he did not come back anymore leaving him (Jundos) alone as his son. Some 20 minutes later, accused-appellant’s wife, Divina, asked him about the whereabouts of the accused-appellant. Having failed to locate accused-appellant, Divina went back inside the house. Soon after, Jundos saw Divina chasing Alfredo running out towards the gate at the same time asked (sic) Jundos for help saying “Kuya, tulungan mo ako, si Boyet” (referring to Alfredo Pascual)). Thinking that Alfredo Pascual was making trouble, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. joined the chase but could not catch up as Alfredo was running very fast. So Divina told him to instead go upstairs as the accused might have done something wrong to Ling-ling.
Together, Jundos and Divina rushed to the second floor. As the place was dark, they switched on the light and there they saw Ling-ling (Lorelyn Pacubas) flat on her back on the floor almost naked with arms and legs open, her panty and shorts down to her ankle and t-shirt pulled up above the breast with blood on the right breast. They tried to wake up Ling-ling but the latter was already dead. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was shocked at what he saw.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide?
Ruling:
Yes. It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.
Considering that no one witnessed the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Verily, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Thus, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the culprit.
Here, the circumstances testified to by the prosecution witnesses lead to the inevitable conclusion that the accused-appellant is the author of the crime charged.
People of the Philippines vs. Joselito a. Lopit
G.R. No. 177742 December 17, 2008
Facts:
In three (3) separate Informations dated September 15, 2003, accused-appellant was charged with three (3) counts of rape committed against his 14-year old daughter AAA. [AAA], then fourteen (14) years old been born on October 2, 1988, is the daughter of the [accused-appellant] and BBB. At that time, their mother [BBB] was in San Julian Elementary School. Suddenly [AAA]'s father [accused-appellant], a farmer, arrived drunk and forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. She struggled but her efforts were in vain since [accused-appellant] was strong. [Accused-appellant] removed his pants and pinned the victim on the bed, pulled down her pants and inserted his penis into her vagina. [AAA] cried. After doing the bestial act, [accused-appellant] left but not before threatening [AAA] that he would kill her, her mother and siblings if she reported the matter. As further testified by the victim, she had been sleeping with her father on the cement floor of their unfinished house for some time and that her father started staying with them only in 2002 since he had been staying in Laguna as a soldier in the Philippine Army.
The RTC found appellant guilty of qualified rape, imposing upon the accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Was appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape?
Ruling:
No. Art. 266-B. Penalties.- Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
In the prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim's minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, the Information alleged the concurrence of the victim's minority and her relationship to accused-appellant. However, except for the bare testimony of the victim and her mother as to the former's age as well as their filiation to the accused-appellant, no birth certificate or baptismal certificate or school record and marriage contract exist on record to prove beyond reasonable doubt the victim's age or her minority at the time of the commission of the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAVIER
G.R. No. 172970, February 19, 2008
QUALIFIED RAPE
FACTS:
BBB, AAA’s father, testified that on the evening of 30 November 2002, he and appellant had a drinking spree at their house while AAA was then sleeping. While BBB went out to check on his sow, appellant offered to buy more gin. When BBB returned home, AAA and appellant were no longer there. BBB sought the help of other people including PO3 Tagala to look for AAA. They found appellant naked and sleeping inside one of the classrooms of Capacuan Primary School with AAA sleeping a few meters from appellant. AAA was wearing a dress but without any underwear. There was blood oozing out of AAA’s private organ. PO3 Tagala corroborated BBB’s testimony. Dr. Padama-Callangan, the medico-legal officer who examined AAA on the same day, testified that there were positive blood clots on AAA’s perennial area, a 3cm. laceration at 6 o’clock position of her vagina, and edema of her labia majora and that AAA’s vagina could easily admit two fingers. Appellant admitted that on the evening of 30 November 2002 he had a drinking spree with BBB. However, appellant alleged that BBB asked AAA to accompany appellant when he went out to buy more gin. Upon returning to BBB’s house and finding BBB asleep, appellant left AAA and he went to see his employer. Appellant claimed that he slept in his employer’s house. Appellant denied raping AAA. During the trial, the prosecution proved that AAA was born on 24 March 1996. Therefore, AAA was only 6 years and 8 months old when appellant committed the crime. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable of qualified rape.
On appeal, appellant alleged that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant contended that there was no direct evidence to show that he committed the crime charged and that his conviction was based on suspicion and surmises. The CA affirmed the decision with modification, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt with evidence presented?
RULING:
YES. In this case, AAA, the victim, was not able to testify. The evidence of the prosecution is undeniably circumstantial in nature. As provided in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The combination of the circumstances in the case is sufficient to convict appellant of the crime charged. Considered as a whole, they constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion — that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.
In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. This was sufficiently established in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MALATE
G.R. No. 185724, June 5, 2009
RAPE
FACTS:
BBB was on her way home when she was blocked by a man holding a knife identified as Malate. Malate grabbed her shirt from behind and poked his knife on her neck. She tried to struggle free and this caused Malate to cut his finger. She then tried to run away, but Malate ran after her and again grabbed her by her shirt. She also tried to shout for help but no help came. Malate then dragged BBB to a ricefield, all the while pointing the knife at her. There, he made her remove her clothes and his pants. Afterwards, he made her lie on the ground and kissed her all over her body. Malate then placed himself on top of her and made her hold his penis and guide it into her vagina. BBB, frightened, followed every word he said. After penetration of BBB’s sex organ, Malate succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. When it was all over, she then asked him to let her go home to her daughter, but he refused saying that he wanted her to go with him to his province in Samar because he loved her. Pretending to accede to his request, BBB asked Malate to let her look for her bag and shoes first at the place where she was blocked. While she was getting her bag and shoes and Malate was looking for his slippers, two barangay tanods then arrived. BBB told them that Malate raped her and this caused him to run away. The three of them ran after him in pursuit until they lost him in the dark. They all looked for him around Barangay CCC where they stumbled upon Milo Vanguardia, a friend of BBB’s estranged husband. BBB told Milo that they were looking for a man with curly hair and a wound on his hand, who raped her. When they still could not find Malate, BBB went to the barangay hall of DDD with her mother to report the incident. Later Milo and some barangay tanods brought Malate to the barangay hall and later proceeded to the police station where she pointed to Malate as her rapist. Malate’s defense, on the other hand, was confined to his denial of the accusation and an alibi. The trial court convicted Malate which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
1. Did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Is the alibi of the accused valid?
RULING:
1. YES. In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Moreover, in cases involving the prosecution for forcible rape, the courts have consistently held that, as a general rule, corroboration of the victim’s testimony is not a necessary condition to a conviction for rape where the victim’s testimony is credible, or clear and convincing or sufficient to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The weight and sufficiency of evidence are determined by the credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony. Furthermore, accused-appellant cannot plausibly bank on the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant to discredit her account of the incident. Even if they do exist, minor and insignificant inconsistencies tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of the witness for they show that his testimony was not contrived or rehearsed. Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming.
2. NO. This Court has been consistent in declaring that for alibi to prosper, the defense must establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The facts in this case illustrate that there was no physical impossibility for Malate to be at the scene of the crime. What is more, both denial and alibi are considered as the weakest defenses not only due to their inherent weakness and unreliability, but also because they are easy to fabricate. Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the accused by the complainant. As has been consistently ruled by this Court, an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. And both alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
In conclusion, in criminal cases such as the one on hand, the prosecution is not required to show the guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is demanded, or that degree of proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. We find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the accused with moral certainty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TALAN
GR. No. 177354, November 14, 2008
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE
FACTS:
On May 17, 2000, Talan brought AAA to his hut and then to a place with banana leaves where he raped her there twice. Then on May 30, 2000, while AAA was on her way to a friend’s house, Talan forced AAA to go with him and brought her to San Lorenzo, Santa Elena Camarines Norte in a hut in the middle of a rice field. On June 1, 2000, Talan poked a knife in AAA’s neck, threatened and raped her. On June 2, 2000, AAA’s uncles and Talan’s brothers looked for AAA and with the help of barangay tanods saw AAA and Talan. They handcuffed Talan and brought him to the police station. On 5 June 2000, Dr. Adalid examined AAA and found “incomplete healed, hymenallaceration at 9 o’clock position.”
The RTC found Talan guilty of two (2) counts of forcible abduction with rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification.
ISSUE:
1. Is the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Is the denial of the accused a valid defense?
3. Is the qualifying circumstance of relationship valid?
RULING:
1. YES. The Court finds Talan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. Based on the records, the real objective of Talan was to rape AAA when he brought her to the place with banana trees and to Santa Elena, Camarines Norte.
In rape cases, the credibility of the victim’s testimony is almost always the single most important factor. When the victim’s testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused’s conviction. In the present case, the trial court found AAA’s testimony credible. Moreover, AAA’s testimony is consistent with the medical findings. When the testimony of the victim is consistent with the medical findings, sufficient basis exists for the conclusion that the crime was committed.
2. NO. Denial as a defense is inherently weak and deserves scant consideration. It cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the accused.
3. NO. The qualifying circumstance of relationship must be specifically alleged in the information — the information must clearly state that “the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.” In the present case, the information in merely states that Talan abducted and raped his “niece” without specifying that Talan is a relative of the victim within the third degree of consanguinity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BASMAYOR
G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009
RAPE
FACTS:
Two informations were filed before the RTC of Pasig City, docketed as charging appellant with two counts of Statutory Rape.
On November 9, 2001, AAA, who was born on February 4, 1990 as stated on her Certificate of Live Birth, was with her mother (BBB) and the latter’s live-in partner, the appellant in their house. While her mother was sleeping, her stepfather, appellant embraced her and touched her “pepe.” She removed his hands from her private parts and went to sleep beside her mother. An hour after, or at around10:00 a.m., she was awakened from her sleep by appellant who was undressing her. Appellant removed his shorts and brief and lay on top of her. Appellant kissed her cheeks, mashed her breasts, licked her vagina and inserted his penis therein causing her much pain. During this time, her mother was out peddling goods. AAA clarified that when the first rape happened on 9 November 2001, her mother was with her sleeping. She tried to wake her up, but to no avail. The rape lasted only for a minute. Appellant told her not to tell anyone about the incident. She merely cried and did not tell anyone because she was afraid that appellant might kill her. On November 12, 2001, at around 10:00 a.m., while AAA was lying in bed, appellant again placed himself on top of AAA and inserted his penis inside her vagina, causing her pain. Her mother was in the market when appellant violated her a second time. Dr. Pierre Paul F. Carpio, testified that he interviewed AAA and conducted a genital examination on her. Dr. Carpio disclosed that AAA was coherent when he interviewed her. He explained that the loss of virginity may be caused by the insertion of a blunt object like a penis. He said that AAA divulged to him that she was raped only once. As to the findings of hymenal lacerations, he said that the same were fresh – maybe three days old – and could have possibly resulted from the 12 November 2001 incident.
Appellant denied the accusations that he raped AAA twice, on November 9 and 12, 2001. When he was arrested, he was at home sleeping. The barangay tanods invited him, and he voluntarily went with them. He was told that there was a complaint of rape against him. At the police station, AAA, who was accompanied by a woman, pointed to him and then cried. His live-in partner CCC was not there. He told the policemen he did not commit the crime charged.
The trial courts found the appellant guilty of simple rape in one information and dismissed the other for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the CA modified the decision by finding him guilty of qualified rape.
ISSUE:
Is the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape?
RULING:
YES. The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.
As provided for in the Revised Penal Code, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B must be alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. In the instant case, the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority (under twelve years old) and relationship have been alleged in the information. As stated above, the victim’s minority has been proved by her Certificate of Live Birth. As regards the qualifying circumstance of relationship, it is alleged in the information that the victim is the daughter of appellant’s live-in partner (common-law spouse). Appellant claims that his live-in partner is not BBB, the victim’s mother, but CCC. On such claim, the trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship and convicted appellant only of simple rape. The Court of Appeals, however, convicted him of qualified rape, because it was shown that BBB and CCC was one and the same person.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BALDO
G.R. No. 175238, February 24, 2009
RAPE
FACTS:
Three information for rape were filed against appellant Baldo. AAA, appellant, and Norman Echani were housemates in a small one-room house. As AAA recently resigned from her job and appellant worked during the night shift in a factory, the two were always left during daytime when Echani was at work. On February 10, 2000 at 1:00 p.m., appellant professed his love for AAA in their living room. She, however, admonished him against his protestation for they are relatives. He then told her that if she ignores him, he would rape her. She pleaded to him not to do anything against her will if he really liked her. Appellant then held her left hand and poked a balisong (fan knife) at her, and then removed her pants and panty while she was seated at a bench. Then he dragged her and laid her on the floor, removed his shorts and brief, and placed himself on top of her. AAA tried to resist by kicking him but he was stronger. Thereafter he placed the knife aside, then held and pressed her thighs. He then fingered her vagina with his right hand and inserted his penis into it. After two minutes, appellant stood up but threatened to kill her if she reported the incident to their relatives. According to AAA, appellant repeated his beastly act the following day, February 11 and on the next day, February 12, 2000. In the evening of February 12, 2000, AAA decided to tell Echani what appellant had done to her. Echani and his brother, Abraham, then accompanied her to the barangay hall to file complaints against appellant. The medico-legal police officer who examined AAA on February 13, 2000 found “deep healing laceration” in her hymen, “compatible with recent loss of virginity” but negative for spermatozoa. Dr. James Belgira testified that the laceration could have been caused by a penetration of a hard object like an erect penis. He also found contusions on AAA’s left arm and thighs.
Appellant, in his own defense, denied the charges against him. He claimed that he and AAA were lovers since November 1999, and that she had consented to have sex with him even prior to February 2000. He likewise denied poking a knife at her when they “made love.” To prove they are lovers, appellant presented two witnesses, Benjamin Eubra, Purok Maligaya Chairman and Simeon de los Santos, appellant’s uncle and neighbor.
The trial court found appellant guilty in one of the charges and acquitted him with the other two charges. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Is the element of force and intimidation in the crime of rape proven sufficiently?
RULING:
YES. For conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. In this case, the presence of the first element is undisputed since appellant admits his sexual congress with complainant. While making such admission however, he contends that there is no force or intimidation to speak of as it was consensual. Appellant alleges that AAA willingly participated in the sexual act because they are lovers. The “sweetheart theory” or “sweetheart defense” is an oft-abused justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests our patience. For the Court to even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required -- such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. There is none presented here by the defense. Moreover, even if it were true that they were sweethearts, a love affair does not justify rape. As wisely ruled in a previous case, a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires.
In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. In this case, the presence of a fan knife on hand or by his side speaks loudly of appellant’s use of violence, or force and intimidation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABELLA
G.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010
RAPE
FACTS:
AAA testified that she knew the appellant personally since he was a child because they lived in the same neighborhood. She narrated that sometime at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon while she was alone at home the appellant entered their house and started molesting her. Appellant pulled down her shorts with his left hand while covering her mouth with his right hand. Appellant then placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. At that time, she did not shout as the appellant was holding a knife. AAA recalled that when appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, she had felt pain. Afraid for her life, she did not tell her parents about the rape incident. BBB, AAA’s mother, on the other hand, testified that the appellant is the cousin of her husband. She claimed that she noticed her daughter becoming pale and thinner. She also noticed that AAA’s stomach was getting bigger and thus decided to bring her to a doctor, who in turn informed her that her daughter might be pregnant. An ultrasound examination confirmed that AAA was indeed pregnant. BBB then asked her daughter who was responsible for her pregnancy, AAA replied that it was the appellant.
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant. The trial court found the 38-year old AAA as a credible witness and her testimony candid and truthful despite her “moderate mental retardation” or intellectual quotient of a 7 to 8-year old child as testified by Dr. Escuadra, a specialist in the field of psychiatry who examined and evaluated AAA and Corazon Alipante, a psychologist who also examined AAA. In contrast, the trial court found that the defenses of denial and alibi of the accused-appellant were flimsy and farfetched. It further ruled that the child conceived and delivered by AAA was fathered by the accused-appellant. After its review of the evidence, the CA agreed with the findings of the RTC and affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant.
ISSUE:
Did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
YES. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Andaya, it was held that “sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a child below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape” with or without the attendance of force, threat, or intimidation. In the case before us, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented person, through force, threat or intimidation. AAA was psychiatrically evaluated as an adult woman with the mental age of a 7 to 8-year old child and that she gave birth to a child despite her mental inability to give her consent to a sexual relationship. These facts support the allegation of sexual abuse. AAA also identified without uncertainty the accused-appellant as her attacker and related distinctly that he forcibly laid her down, held her at knifepoint, and sexually abused her. Moreover, we accord great weight and respect to the conclusion of the trial court that AAA is “candid, sincere, straightforward and simple” in her testimony as well as to the ruling of the appellate court that the alleged flaws in her statements do not affect her credibility and veracity of her testimony that the accused-appellant raped her, and that the defenses of denial and alibi of the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of AAA.
The criminal information failed to allege the qualifying circumstance that the accused-appellant knew of the mental disability of the private offended party, thus, his conviction of statutory or simple rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon, instead of qualified rape, is in order.
FLORDELIZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186441, March 3, 2010
RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
FACTS:
Petitioner Salvador Flordeliz was convicted of nine (9) counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness by the RTC which was affirmed with modification by the CA.
ABC, the wife of petitioner and the mother of private complainants AAA and BBB, left for Malaysia as overseas worker. AAA and BBB were left under the care and custody of petitioner. In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who was then eleven (11) years old, petitioner woke up AAA, touched her vagina, and then played with it. AAA cried and told petitioner that it was painful. The latter stopped, but warned AAA not to tell anyone about it otherwise, she would be harmed. Petitioner allegedly committed the same acts against AAA repeatedly. Petitioner and his daughters later transferred residence and lived with the former’s siblings. Not long after, petitioner was convicted of homicide and imprisoned. While petitioner was incarcerated, AAA and BBB visited him and sent him two greeting cards. In 2001, petitioner was released on parole. He would frequently fetch AAA and BBB from their grandparents’ house during weekends and holidays and they would stay with him.Unsatisfied with the abuses committed against AAA, petitioner allegedly started molesting BBB in May 2002. On January 3, 2003, while they were sleeping, petitioner inserted his two (2) fingers into BBB’s vagina. BBB did not attempt to stop petitioner because of fear. BBB suffered the same ordeal the following night. On February 8, 2003, BBB visited petitioner. Again, petitioner held her vagina, played with it and inserted his fingers, which caused her pain. The same incident allegedly took place on August 3, 2003. On October 26, 2003, while BBB was with petitioner, the latter committed the same dastardly act. On November 1 and 2, 2003, BB spent two nights with her father and, during those nights and she experienced the same sexual abuse as well as on December 28, 2003. BBB did not reveal her ordeal to anybody because of fear for her life and that of her mother. AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal their horrifying experiences when their mother ABC arrived for a vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what petitioner did to her. When confronted by ABC, BBB likewise admitted the repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC forthwith reported the incidents to the National Bureau of Investigation. After conducting medical examinations on AAA and BBB, the attending physician remarked that there was a “disclosure of sexual abuse and she noted the presence of hymenal notch in posterior portion of hymenal rim that may be due to previous blunt force or penetrating trauma suggestive of abuse.” Petitioner assails the factual and legal bases of his conviction, allegedly because of lack of the essential details or circumstances of the commission of the crimes. Petitioner, in effect, questions the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and insists that the charges against him were designed to conceal ABC’s infidelity.
ISSUE:
Is the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
YES. The insertion of petitioner’s fingers into the victim’s vagina constituted the crime of Rape through sexual assault under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, or “The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.” Article 266-A paragraph 2 provides that rape through sexual assault is committed by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Aside from proving the fact that Rape was committed, the prosecution also established that petitioner is the biological father of BBB and that the latter was less than twelve (12) years old at the time of the commission of the crimes.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, AAA was eleven (11) years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610 or “The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” which defines sexual abuse of children. Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one -- through coercion, intimidation or influence -- engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following elements: (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness: (2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances: a. By using force or intimidation; or b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 must be proven: (1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lasciviousconduct; (2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Petitioner’s act of touching AAA’s vagina and playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the act was committed on a child less than twelve years old and through intimidation, it is beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHRISTOPHER DE JESUS
G.R. No. 181591, January 21, 2010
RAPE
FACTS:
Information for rape was filed against appellant who was armed with a kitchen knife when committing the act.
Appellant had sexual intercourse with the then 23-year old AAA, at the ground floor of her two-storey house. Later that morning, AAA disclosed to her sister that she was raped by appellant, her neighbor and classmate during her elementary schooling. AAA and her sister immediately reported the incident to the barangay captain.AAA executed a sworn statement before the local police giving details of how she was raped by the then liquor-smelling appellant including his poking of a knife at her and threatening to kill her and her children if she shouted. AAA was medically examined by Dr. Manuel C. Aves, medico-legal officer who found hymenal remnane at both lateral and superior border abrasion and laceration deep fresh at 3, 10 o’clock of the hymen. Appellant denied the charges and interposed the “sweetheart” defense. Appellant surmised that AAA filed the rape complaint against him as he did not accede to her desire to elope with him.
The RTC convicted appellant which was confirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
YES. The accused’s use of a fan knife poked at the complainant before and during the sexual abuse constitutes sufficient force as contemplated under Article 335. The accused even went beyond employing force, he likewise intimidated the complainant by threatening to kill her and her children should she shout or make any noise. It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight on appeal. The reason therefore is that the trial judge enjoys the peculiar advantage of observing first-hand the deportment of the witnesses while testifying and is, therefore, in a better position to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof. No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, especially in the present case where AAA had minor children to protect, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.
NORMAN GAID vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
Gaid was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide when the passenger jjeepney he was driving ran over Michael Dayata. Witness testimony allege that Gaid was not driving in violation of law and that the Dayata hastily ran after the jeep when it failed to stop after he flagged it, thereby resulting to his pinning to the rear of the jeep. Gaid allege that he had not seen anyone flag the jeepney and that he only felt the jeepney’s left rear tire jolt that caused the vehicle to tilt to the right. The CA exonerated him of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but ruled that he was negligent based on his failure to stop to check what caused the sudden jolt, as such he was convicted of simple negligence resulting to homicide.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting to homicide?
Ruling: The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.
During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent, thus, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximatecause of an injury.
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.
PEOPLE vs. MICHAEL HIPONA
G.R. No. 185709, February 18, 2010
Robbery with Homicide
Appellant was convicted of Rape with Homicide (and Robbery) for having carnal knowledge and the death of, at the same time taking money and a necklace from the victim who happens to be Hipona’s aunt, being the sister of his mother, although no sufficient evidence was presented by the prosecution except for the fact that he had openly apologized in front of the media and his relatives that he acted as a look-out and under pressure of his peers. He assails his conviction for the failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that he should only be liable for robbery with homicide because there was no proof that his semen was found in the victim’s genital organ. He has also failed to explain why he was in possession of the victim’s stolen necklace.
Issue: Should the accused be sentenced to rape with homicide (and robbery) or only robbery with homicide?
Ruling: He should be convicted of Robbery with Homicide, rape is only an aggravating circumstance. From the evidence for the prosecution, robbery was the main intent of appellant, and the victim’s death resulted by reason of or on the occasion thereof.
The confluence of the following established facts and circumstances sustains the appellate court’s affirmance of appellant’s conviction: First, appellant was frequently visiting the victim prior to her death, hence, his familiarity with the layout of the house; second, appellant admitted to his relatives and the media that he was present during commission of the crime, albeit only as a look-out; third, appellant was in possession of victim’s necklace at the time he was arrested; and fourth, appellant extrajudicially confessed to the radio reporter that he committed the crime due to his peers and because of poverty.
Following Article 294(1) and Article 62(1)1of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance instead. For circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
ELISEO EDUARTE vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176566, October 2, 2009
Robbery; Plea of Reduction of Penalty based on Indeterminate Sentence Law
Respondent after being convicted with the crime of robbery is pleading for the reduction of his penalty out of compassion for him and his family, that we reduce the maximum period of his sentence from eight years to six years in order that he may apply for probation and continue to work as a messenger at Unilever Philippines, where he has been employed since 1994 or for more than 15 years. He alleges that he is a first time offender with no previous criminal record and relies on the certifications of several persons, including his parish priest, attesting his good moral character.
Accused-appellant further emphasizes that since the imposable penalty on him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law ranges from a minimum of arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months) to a maximum of prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 8 years), his prayer for the reduction of his maximum penalty to six (6) years, so that he may be eligible for probation, is not too much to ask considering that only one (1) day separates 6 years from the minimum of the maximum penalty (6 years and 1 day to 8 years) imposable by law for the offense charged.
Issue: Can the petition be granted and can the indeterminate sentence law be applied?
Ruling: The penalty prescribed under Article 294(5) is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, that is, four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its medium period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, and whose maximum term should be the proper period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, taking into account the proven modifying circumstance. First, to determine the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed on accused-appellant, the minimum term is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose a minimum term which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. In determining the minimum penalty, the law confers upon the courts in fixing the penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had.
Next, to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence, as mentioned in Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. In the instant case, the maximum term has a range of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, or four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. The maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is broken down as follows:
Minimum: 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years, 1 month and 10 days
Medium: 6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days
Maximum: 8 years and 21 days to 10 years
With the attendance of one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence must be imposed in its minimum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years, 1 month and 10 days).
PEOPLE vs. YOON CHANG WOOK
G.R. No. 178199, October 5, 2009
Rape
Yoon, a Korean national, is convicted of the crime of Rape for having carnal knowledge of the victim who was a fellow Korean. He assails the decision of the lower courts for according full credit on the testimony of the victim and disregarding his evidence. He alleges that the allegation of the victim of rape is a lie and that she is only stating such accusation to free her oh her obligation from Yoon.
However, the prosecution has proven that the victim suffered several injuries as a result of the incident, based on medical records and exhibits showing the injuries she suffered. It was also proven that Yoon had tricked the victim into coming back to Manila, then visit his restaurant, and informing her that he will be paying his debt when she comes back to the restaurant alone. When the victim returned to the restaurant, Yoon, together with several other Korean men, had tortured the victim at a room on the second floor of his restaurant, where she was stripped off her clothes, tortured and poured with gasoline.
Issue: Should the testimony of the rape victim be relied on when the accused has presented testimonial evidence that negated his guilt?
Ruling: It is basic, almost elementary, that the trial court’s factual determinations, especially its assessments of the witnesses’ testimony and their credibility, are entitled to great respect, barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance. For having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their demeanor while in the witness box, the trial court is in a better position to address questions of credibility.
By the peculiar nature of rape cases, conviction most often rests solely on the basis of the victim’s testimony, if credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. When a woman testifies to having been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed, for as long as her testimony hurdles the test of credibility.
The victim’s failure to report to the authorities and to subject herself to genital examination right after the rape incident does not diminish her credibility. The victim is a foreigner and is not familiar with the Philippines. Hence, she could hardly be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to the authorities without the aid of somebody who is very knowledgeable of the laws of the Philippines. Well-settled is the rule that the silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated.
Bare assertions of not having committed the acts complained of cannot overcome the positive, straightforward, unequivocal, and categorical testimony of the victim. An affirmative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness, is far stronger than a negative one. Mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is inherently weak, being self-serving negative evidence undeserving of weight in law; it cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a rape victim. In the case at bar, Yoon failed to present convincing proof in support of his denial.
ARMANDO VIDAR @ "Ricky", NORBERTO BUTALON,(†) SONNY MARBELLA @ "Spike" & JOHN DOES & PETER DOES vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010
Robbery with Homicide
Petitioners were convicted of Robbery with Homicide when they have entered the house of the victim, Sgt. Julio Dioneda of the Philippine Army, who at the time was still taking his bath, and took several valuables from the house of the victim, after which they had shot the victim taking advantage of their superior number and strength.
The witnesses, the wife and sister of the victim, both positively identified the petitioners to be the perpetrators and that they only delayed filing of the criminal case against the petitioners for fear of retaliation since they are aware of the petitioner’s involvement in the NPA.
Petitioners assails the conviction maintaining that the delay in filing the case casted serious doubt on the intention and motive of the complainant and that the case should have been rebellion and the crime charged was only in furtherance of such rebellion. They have also allege the insufficiency of evidence which they have said could have not proven their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Does delay in filing of a criminal case diminish the credibility of the witness? Should the crime committed be absorbed in the crime of rebellion?
Ruling: The delay did not greatly weaken the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we believe that the delay in reporting to the police authorities the attendant facts of the crime for which the petitioners have been charged is consistent with normal human behavior considering that after a tragic incident, the last thing that the bereaved would want is to provoke further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed, personal safety takes priority as dictated by our culture. Moreover, considering private complainant’s honest belief that petitioners are known to be members of the NPA, the fear of reprisal from them was ever present which caused her momentary silence. After all, delay in reporting the occurrence of a crime or other unusual event in rural areas is well known. The fact of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses cannot be taken against them. What is important is that their testimonies regarding the incident bear the earmarks of truth and dependability.
Petitioners were steadfast in their position that the crime was committed in furtherance of rebellion, obviously to escape criminal liability for the present charge. This is judicial admission that they indeed committed the crime. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with his pleading. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he is not allowed to change his theory on appeal, for to allow him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the taking of personal property was committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking was done with animo lucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
PEOPLE vs. JONJIE ESOY, ROLANDO CIANO & ROGER BOLALACAO
G.R. No. 185849, April 7, 2010
Robbery with Homicide
Respondent-appellants were charged of Robbery with Homicide for snatching the cellphone and stabbing the chest of victim Lorenzo Coro, while all of them were on board a passenger jeepney that plied Taft Avenue in the evening of June 18, 2001. Appellant’s were convicted, however, they assail the decision based on failure of the prosecution to prove that they have taken the cellular phone since only the testimony of witness Andrea Pabalan was presented. Pabalan alleged that when appellants brandished their balisongs, she found the victim was stabbed when she told him that they should alight the vehicle, he then declared that his cellphone was snatched and asked which direction the perpetrators went. Thereafter, Pabalan told him that they should just go to a hospital so that he may be treated.
Issue: Was the testimony of the witness as to the declaration of the victim sufficient to convict the accused?
Ruling: YES! Though Pabalan’s testimony as to the victim’s utterance that his cellular phone was taken is only hearsay, the testimony is considered an exception to the hearsay rule, the victim’s spontaneous utterance being part of res gestae. In the instant case, all the elements of res gestae are sufficiently established insofar as the spontaneous utterance is concerned: (1) the principal act (res gestae) – the robbery and stabbing of the victim – is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, that is, within minutes after the victim was stabbed and his cellular phone was snatched; and (3) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances – his cellular phone was stolen during the startling occurrence.
PEOPLE vs. EMELDO OBINA, AMADO RAMIREZ & CARLITO BALAGBIS
G.R. No. 186540, April 14, 2010
Robbery with Rape
Accused-appellant Obina was convicted of Robbery with Rape while Ramirez and Balagbis were charged with Robbery. Obina and Balagbis barged in the door of victims house by destroying it and demanded for money. The victim gave them Php800.00, thereafter, the husband was ordered to kneel Obina while he molested the wife. Ramirez then shouted from outside that they will only take care of the wife after they have killed the husband. When the husband had an opportunity to flee, he left the house and sought for help leaving behind his wife and Obina, while Ramirez and Balagbis ran after him. Thereafter, Obina had carnal knowledge with the wife against her will.
Issue: Appellants assail their conviction and submits errors on the imposition of penalty and award for moral damages to the rape victim.
Ruling: As to the penalty imposed, the RTC correctly sentenced appellant Obina to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA, likewise, committed no error in affirming the penalty imposed on appellant Ramirez and accused Balagbis.
As to the award of moral damages, the civil indemnity and moral damages are separately granted in rape cases without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Civil indemnity is mandatorily awarded to the rape victim on the finding that rape was committed. It is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages. Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without need of pleading or proof; it is assumed that a rape victim actually suffered moral injuries, entitling her to this award. That the victim suffered trauma, with mental, physical, and psychological suffering, is too obvious to still require recital at the trial by the victim, since we assume and acknowledge such agony as a gauge of her credibility.
PEOPLE vs. ERNESTO CRUZ & REYNALDO AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 168446, September 18, 2009
Kidnapping with Robbery
Defendants were charged with Article 267, Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, as amended by R.A. 7659 and violation of Article 294 of the RPC. Agustin argued that the prosecution failed to substantiate his participation in the conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom and that at most, he was implicated in the commission of the crime charged based solely on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances presented by the prosecution were clearly inadequate to demonstrate convincingly and persuasively that he had conspired with appellant Cruz to commit the crime charged. However the Solicitor general averred that Agustin’s participation is that of a principal by indispensable participation.
Cruz, on the other hand, have a different version of the facts. He alleges that it was the victim, Atty. Danilo Soriano, who came up with the idea of the kidnapping in order that he may settle his bank problems.
Issue: Were defendants guilty of kidnapping? Was there conspiracy?
Ruling: For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. It was obvious that there was actual confinement and that Soriano was deprived of his liberty. There must exist indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the victim of his liberty. The restraint of liberty must not arise merely as an incident to the commission of another offense that the offender primarily intended to commit. The fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused did not remove the element of deprivation of liberty, because the victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either be made forcibly or fraudulently.
BELEN REAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152065 January 29, 2008
Estafa Art. 315 (b)
FACTS Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. On several occasions, Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of time. On January 10, 1989 at around 8:30 o’clock in the morning, accused had received the seven (7) pieces of jewelry from Benjamin Uy, in trust or on commission with the obligation on her part to return the said pieces of jewelry if unsold, or to deliver the proceeds of the sale, if sold within ten (10) days from receipt. This agreement is clearly embodied in the receipt dated January 10, [1989] signed by the accused. ISSUES That one element of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC does not exist, hence, acquittal from the crime charged is proper; and That the courts below erred in imposing a penalty that contravenes the imperative mandate of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. RULING I All the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence are present in the commission of the offense and that the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. There was misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the accused. The fact that the accused had failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale of said jewelry items nor had she returned the same jewelry items when demanded to do so by the private complainant shows that accused had misappropriated or converted to her personal use the amount of P371,500.00. In fact, she even required the private complainant to return to her house for several times so that she could remit the proceeds of the sale to him. However, accused did not comply with her obligation. Accused abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Benjamin Uy when she refused and failed to comply with her obligation. Her intention to defraud Benjamin Uy of P371,500.00 is, therefore, definitely clear. II. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the RPC for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum period of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. In this case, the penalty next lower to prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision correccional medium (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Therefore, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Considering the attendant factual milieu as well as the position of the Office of the Solicitor General in the present case, the Court is convinced that the petitioner is guilty of swindling (estafa) under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code and the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon petitioner, which is in accordance with law to best serve the ends of justice, should range from four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal, as maximum. ANGELITA DELOS REYES FLORES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185614 February 5, 2010
Estafa Art. 315 (2)a
FACTS Sometime in 2000, private complainants Felix Cornejo (Felix), Jonathan Caibigan (Jonathan) and Blesilda Caibigan (Blesilda) met petitioner through Simon Onda (Simon). Petitioner told private complainants that, as a member of Club Panoly Resorts International (Club Panoly), she could sponsor them in going to Italy to work as domestic helpers or drivers. She, thus, required each of them to produce P100,000.00 as processing fee; P50,000.00 for plane ticket; and $3,000.00 as show money. After raising enough money, private complainants met with petitioner on three separate occasions, at which Felix paid P100,000.00; while Jonathan and Blesilda paid a total amount of P168,000.00 (or P84,000.00 each). Petitioner, however, failed to make good her promise. This prompted private complainants to inquire at Club Panoly about the status of their applications. They were informed by Club Panoly that it did not allow or authorize its members to use their membership to recruit workers for possible placement abroad. Upon further inquiry with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, private complainants learned that petitioner was not a licensed recruiter of workers for overseas employment. They forthwith demanded from petitioner the return of their money and documents. As their demand remained unheeded, private complainants filed criminal cases against petitioner. In separate Informations, petitioner was charged with four (4) counts of estafa for acts committed against private complainants and Simon. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of estafa, the other case filed by Simon was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. ISSUE Is petitioner guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt? RULING Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes estafa, committed as follows: 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. The elements of the crime are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. It has been sufficiently proven that petitioner represented herself to private complainants as capable of sending them to Italy for employment, even if she did not have the authority or license for the purpose. Undoubtedly, it was this misrepresentation that induced private complainants to part with their hard-earned money in exchange for what they thought was a promising future abroad. The petitioner’s act clearly constitutes estafa under the above-quoted provision. While the SC affirmed the conviction for three (3) counts of estafa, it modifies the penalty imposed by the CA, as correctly recommended by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the RPC as discussed above. On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Code, which is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 10, 2008 and Resolution dated December 9, 2008, in CA-G.R. CR No. 30105, are MODIFIED with respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed on petitioner for three (3) counts of estafa. ELISEO R. FRANCISCO, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177720 February 18, 2009
Estafa Art. 315(2)a
FACTS Petitioner Francisco was an employee of Bankard, a credit company engaged in issuing credit cards and in acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments arising from the purchase of goods and services by credit card holders using Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by other banks and credit card companies, at the time the alleged crime occurred. He was knowledgeable in computer programming, and held the position of Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor. Sometime in August 1999, Solidbank, one of the companies which issues credit cards, relayed to Bankard that there were four questionable transactions reflected in Solidbank Mastercard Account No. 5464 9833 0005 1922 under the name of petitioner Francisco. An amount of P663,144.56 was allegedly credited to said account of petitioner Francisco, the credit apparently being a reversal of charges from four establishments. The amount of P18,430.21 was also credited to petitioner Francisco’s AIG Visa Card based on another supposed credit advance. Petitioner Francisco was the person who received the transmittals from Equicom of documents including any purported cash advice at the time the credit transactions were made in favor of his credit card accounts. As a result of the fraudulent crediting of the amount of P663,144.56 to petitioner Francisco’s Solidbank credit card account, Bankard was made to pay the same to Solidbank in the course of the settlement of transactions between the issuing banks from the time of the crediting of the amount to petitioner Francisco’s credit card account until the fraudulent credits were charged back to Solidbank on 27 August 1999. Bankard was unable to recover the amount of P18,430.21 which petitioner Francisco fraudulently credited to his AIG Visa Card No. 4009 9218 0463 3006. ISSUE Is petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code despite absence of one element? RULING Yes. The element of estafa referred to by petitioner Francisco is the third one under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code in the following list provided by this Court in several cases: the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. It does not require that the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party. Thus, in this case wherein a person pretended to possess credit in order to defraud third persons (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa), but the offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof, such person is liable for estafa under Article 315(a), even though the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended party. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him.
ROLAND V. VELOSO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 149354 January 18, 2008
Estafa Art. 315 (2)e
FACTS Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while having dinner, had a conversation with Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine’s president and general manager, Ramon Sy Hunliong (Ramon). This led to a friendly bet between petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet. On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuenco’s secretary called the restaurant’s assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for one table corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser, informed Eva that he would pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner. However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4) additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. There were four additional tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramon’s account. The Sales Invoice for the additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00. Petitioner and his guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for only one table. The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no avail. ISSUE Is petitioner-appellant guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code or simply civilly liable for an unpaid debt? RULING Petitioner employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa. HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., BSP, and PDIC
G.R. No. 159517-18 June 30, 2009
Estafa 315 (1)b and 315 (2)a
FACTS Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of P15,000,000.00 each, when in fact they did not. Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. ISSUE Is there justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners for complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents? RULING No. The information filed contains material allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions. Petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans and received the proceeds thereof when they did not in fact secure said loans or receive the amounts reflected in the promissory notes and other bank records. The information in Criminal Case No.1720, the elements of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (ii) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (iii) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (iv) that there is demand made by the offended party to the offender. The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, further alleged the following essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (ii) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means—that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. There are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was proper.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERLINDA ABORDO and VINA CABANLONG
G.R. No. 179934 May 21, 2009
Estafa and Illegal Recruitment
FACTS Sometime in January 1994, Abordo recruited Jesus Rayray (Rayray) for possible employment abroad and collected a total of P14,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured Rayray that he could soon leave for abroad. Rayray was unable to leave as promised. Sometime in September 1994, Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Esmenia Cariño (Cariño) in Lipay, Villasis, Pangasinan, to persuade her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Cariño and Cabanlong used to be neighbors. Upon being convinced by the accused, Cariño gave a total of P15,000 as placement fee. Despite this payment, Cariño was unable to leave for abroad. Sometime in December 1994, Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Segundina Fernandez (Segundina) in Caramitan, Villasis, Pangasinan. Cabanlong and Segundina are first cousins. Cabanlong introduced Abordo as a recruiter. The accused told Segundina that they could secure employment for her son, Jaime, in Hong Kong upon payment of the placement fee. Segundina and Jaime agreed to the proposition. Segundina gave the accused cash and other valuables amounting to P45,000. Abordo gave a plane ticket to Jaime, which turned out to be fake; hence, Jaime was unable to leave for abroad. Sometime in December 1994, the accused went to the house of Exequiel Mendoza (Mendoza) to convince him to work in Hong Kong as a security guard. Mendoza agreed to be recruited and to pay P45,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured him that as soon as he could pay the placement fee, he could work abroad. Mendoza gave Abordo cash and pieces of jewelry amounting to P39,000. Despite several promises from Abordo, Mendoza was unable to leave for Hong Kong. Thus, he demanded from the accused the return of his money and pieces of jewelry, but to no avail. Adonis Peralta, Dagupan District Officer of the Department of Labor and Employment, issued certifications dated 29 September 1993 and 3 August 1993 stating that the accused were not included in the Philippine Overseas and Employment Agency list of those licensed to recruit in Pangasinan. The accused denied the charges against them. Accused claimed that they could not be held liable for estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code since the element of deceit was not established. They alleged that they received the placement fees on behalf of the travel agency. They argued that it was unclear whether the false statements or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the money by the complainants. ISSUE Whether the accused are guilty of simple illegal recruitment and estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. RULING The elements of illegal recruitment are (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. In falsely pretending to possess power to deploy persons for overseas employment, the accused deceived the complainants into believing that they would provide them overseas work. Their assurances made complainants pay the placement fees required in exchange for the promised jobs. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present The accused cooperated with each other in convincing complainants to pay placement fees for employment abroad. The accused received money from the complainants. The act of the accused of recruiting complainants for employment abroad without the necessary license from the POEA constitutes the offense of illegal recruitment. The very same evidence proving the accused’s commission of the offense of illegal recruitment also established that the accused connived in defrauding complainants by misrepresenting that they had the power, influence, agency and business to obtain overseas employment for complainants upon payment of placement fees. Complainants suffered damages to the extent of the various sums of money they delivered to accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONIE DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 185843 March 3, 2010
Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C
FACTS Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City, for two counts of rape. He pled "not guilty" when arraigned. After pretrial and trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The trial court further ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed appellant’s conviction, but modified it with an additional award of P50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral damages. ISSUE Can a subsequent marriage of the offended party exculpate the perpetrator? RULING Yes. In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads – ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: x x x x 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code. Article 344 of the same Code also provides – ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. – x x x. Based on the documents, including copies of pictures taken after the ceremony and attached to the motion, the marriage between appellant and private complainant have been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each other and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy considerations of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity of the family, appellant is accorded the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC. Appellant was absolved of the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their subsequent marriage, and is ordered released from imprisonment.